Flowers v. Alameda County Sheriffs et al
Filing
97
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 84 , 85 MOTIONS TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; DISMISSING EXCESSIVE FORCE AND UNREASONABLE SEARCH CLAIMS; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 67 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 3/27/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/27/2012)
1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3
4
5
6
7
8
JOSEPH J. FLOWERS,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFF'S )
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________ )
No. C 08-04179 CW (PR)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO
FILE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
DISMISSING EXCESSIVE FORCE AND
UNREASONABLE SEARCH CLAIMS; GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
(Docket nos. 67, 84, 85)
9
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas
12
Valley State Prison (SVSP), filed this civil rights action pursuant
13
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concerning events that took place when he was
14
in the custody of the Alameda County Sheriff's Department in 2007
15
and 2008.
16
The operative pleading is Plaintiff's third amended complaint
17
(3AC), which was filed on July 2, 2010.
18
Alameda County Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
19
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, together
20
with a motion to file a fourth amended complaint (4AC) and a motion
21
to compel discovery (MTC).
22
Defendants have filed a reply to
Plaintiff's opposition and have opposed Plaintiff's motions.
BACKGROUND
23
24
On May 13, 2011, the
On March 21, 2007, Plaintiff was taken into the custody of the
Alameda County Sheriff's Department and booked into the Santa Rita
25
County Jail (SRCJ).
Through August 3, 2007, he was incarcerated at
26
either SRCJ or the Glenn Dyer Detention Facility (GDDF).
On that
27
date, he was transferred from the custody of the Alameda County
28
Sheriff's Office to the California Department of Corrections and
1
Rehabilitation (CDCR).
2
Following his release from CDCR, Plaintiff was arrested again.
3
He was booked by the Hayward Police Department on May 13, 2008, and
4
transported to SRCJ on May 14, 2008.
5
Plaintiff alleges that during these two periods of
6
incarceration at SRCJ and GDDF, Defendants violated his
7
constitutional rights.
8
reviewed the allegations in the 3AC and ordered that pleading
9
served on Defendants.
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
By Order filed November 24, 2010, the Court
Specifically, the Court directed Defendants
to respond to the following cognizable claims for relief:
(1) unlawful placement in administrative segregation; (2) mail
tampering; (3) deliberate indifference to safety and denial of
access to the courts; (4) deliberate indifference to serious
13
medical needs; and (5) food tampering.
Plaintiff's excessive force
14
and unreasonable search claims were dismissed because Plaintiff had
15
16
17
not named or linked any Defendants to his allegations; the claims
were dismissed with leave for Plaintiff to move to amend should he
learn the identities of the responsible individuals.
18
19
DISCUSSION
I.
20
Voluntary Dismissal of Claims
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff
21
states he is dismissing voluntarily his claims of unlawful
22
placement in administrative segregation and food tampering.
23
no. 86 at 3.
24
prejudice.
25
II.
26
Docket
Accordingly, these claims are DISMISSED with
Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint
"[A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
27
party's written consent or the court's leave."
28
15(a)(2).
See Fed. R. Civ. P.
The district court may exercise its discretion to deny a
2
1
motion for leave to amend where the amendment of the complaint
2
would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is sought in bad
3
faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or creates undue delay.
4
See Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir.
5
1994). "[A] district court has broad discretion to grant or deny
6
leave to amend, particularly where the court has already given a
7
plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint to
8
allege federal claims."
9
Cir. 1996).
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
A.
Mir v. Fosburg, 646 F.2d 342, 347 (9th
Mail Tampering, Safety and Court Access
The allegations in the 3AC and 4AC with respect to Plaintiff's
claims of mail tampering, deliberate indifference to his safety and
denial of access to the courts are substantially the same.
13
Plaintiff has not shown why amendment of these claims should be
14
granted.
15
16
17
B.
Accordingly, leave to amend these claims is DENIED.
Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
In Plaintiff's original complaint, first amended complaint,
second amended complaint and the operative 3AC, his claim of
18
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs is based on
19
allegations of inadequate access to medical care in 2008 for an
20
injury that occurred in 2007, and the failure to comply with
21
medical orders, resulting in him re-injuring himself on August 13,
22
2008 while climbing stairs.
23
Plaintiff's proposed amendment to this claim seeks to add a
24
new allegation of injury from climbing stairs that occurred on
25
September 9, 2008.
26
not allege facts about the September 8, 2008 incident in any of his
27
prior pleadings.
28
Plaintiff, however, does not explain why he did
The Court finds that amendment to add these new allegations to
3
1
Plaintiff's medical claim at this late stage in the proceedings
2
would cause undue prejudice to Defendants and create undue delay of
3
the resolution of this case.
4
claim is DENIED.
Accordingly, leave to amend this
5
C.
Excessive Force and Illegal Search
6
The Court previously found that Plaintiff stated cognizable
7
claims (1) for excessive force, based on his allegations that, on
8
May 14, 2008, he was beaten without cause by unidentified sheriff's
9
deputies, and (2) an unreasonable search, based on his allegations
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
that, on July 28, 2008, he was strip-searched repeatedly without
cause by an unidentified sheriff's deputy.
As noted above,
however, because Plaintiff had not identified any of the deputies
responsible for the above alleged violations, the Court dismissed
13
both claims with leave to move to amend to name the responsible
14
individuals should he discover their identities.
15
16
17
Docket no. 38 at
12:8-14, 14:4-16.
Plaintiff now seeks to amend the 3AC to add Deputies R. Bixby
and M. Menard as Defendants responsible for the use of excessive
18
force and Deputy R. Bartholomew as the Defendant responsible for
19
the unreasonable search.
20
amendments.
21
with respect to these claims, however, the Court finds that
22
granting leave to amend the 3AC to add the new Defendants would be
23
futile because the claims are subject to dismissal as improperly
24
joined.
25
Defendants do not oppose these
In view of the new information Plaintiff has provided
A plaintiff may properly join as many claims as he has against
26
an opposing party.
27
against a single party may be alleged in a single complaint,
28
unrelated claims against different defendants must be alleged in
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
While multiple claims
1
separate complaints.
2
Cir. 2007).
3
"any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally,
4
or in the alternative, with respect to or arising out of the same
5
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and
6
occurrences," Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A), and, "any question of
7
law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action,"
8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B).
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
11
12
Further, parties may be joined as defendants only if
Here, Plaintiff's excessive force and illegal search claims
9
10
See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th
involve Defendants who are identified for the first time in the 4AC
and are not linked to any of Plaintiff's other claims.
Additionally, the claims concern discrete instances of alleged
misconduct that do not arise out of the same transactions or
13
occurrences as the claims at issue in the 3AC.
Consequently, the
14
Court concludes that the excessive force and illegal search claims
15
16
17
are not properly joined in the 3AC.
Therefore, leave to amend
these claims is DENIED, and the claims are DISMISSED without
prejudice to Plaintiff's pursuing them in new and separate
18
complaints.
19
III. Discovery
20
Together with his opposition to the motion for summary
21
judgment Plaintiff has filed a "Motion for Additional Discovery"
22
and, in his supplemental opposition to the motion for summary
23
judgment, he claims he requires additional relevant documentation
24
from Defendants to support his opposition.
25
As Defendants have done, the Court construes the discovery-related
26
requests as a motion to compel discovery and a request for
27
additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).
28
//
5
Docket nos. 84 & 94.
1
A.
2
Plaintiff seeks to compel discovery of the following documents
Motion to Compel
3
previously requested from Defendants: (1) his booking photos from
4
May 13 and 14, 2008, from both SRCJ and the Hayward Police
5
Department; (2) photos related to discovery documents numbers
6
ACSO000706 and ACSO000703, which pertain to injuries suffered by
7
Plaintiff at SRCJ on August 12 and September 9, 2008; (3) the
8
legible or typed names of medical staff at Prison Health Services
9
who produced medical progress reports on June 17 and 19, 2008; and
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
(4) the name of an Asian deputy sheriff working when Plaintiff was
booked at the Hayward Police Department.
Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion on the ground they have
12
complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by producing
13
those documents responsive to Plaintiff's requests that are in
14
their "possession, custody or control," see Fed. R. Civ. P.
15
16
17
34(a)(1), and also by fulfilling their obligation to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the location of the documents requested.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
In support of their opposition,
18
Defendants submit the declaration of their counsel of record,
19
Associate County Counsel Manuel Martinez, and attached exhibits
20
comprised of Defendants' responses to Plaintiff's discovery
21
requests.
22
County Counsel Audrey Beaman and Kelly Martinez, the Civil
23
Litigation Manager for the Alameda County Sheriff's Department, all
24
of whom have sworn, under penalty of perjury, that they have
25
searched for, and provided Plaintiff with, all documents, photos
26
and other information in their possession, custody or control that
27
might be responsive to his requests.
28
1-7.
The responses have been verified by Martinez, Deputy
6
See Martinez Decl. & Exs.
1
By contrast, Plaintiff's contention that, despite the
2
representations noted above, Defendants have not searched
3
diligently enough to find the discovery he seeks, are speculative
4
and unsupported by the record.
5
compel is DENIED.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to
6
B.
Additional Discovery
7
Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a
8
party to avoid summary judgment when such party has not had
9
sufficient opportunity to discover affirmative evidence necessary
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
to oppose the motion.
See Garrett v. San Francisco, 818 F. 2d
1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987).1
In particular, Rule 56(d) provides
that a court may deny a summary judgment motion and permit the
opposing party to conduct discovery where it appears that the
13
opposing party, in the absence of such discovery, is unable to
14
present facts essential to opposing the motion.
15
16
17
Here, Plaintiff has had adequate opportunity to conduct
discovery to seek facts to oppose the claims at issue in the motion
for summary judgment, and he acknowledges in his opposition to the
18
motion for summary judgment that he has received more than 1,500
19
discovery responses from Defendants.
20
additional discovery under Rule 56(d) is DENIED.
21
IV.
Accordingly, the request for
Motion for Summary Judgment
22
A.
23
Summary judgment is only proper where the pleadings, discovery
Legal Standard
24
and affidavits show there is "no genuine issue as to any material
25
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
26
27
28
1
Garrett cites Rule 56(f), the subsection in which this
provision formerly was set forth; as of December 1, 2010, the
applicable provision is Rule 56(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
7
1
of law."
2
affect the outcome of the case.
3
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
4
genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
5
a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Material facts are those that may
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A dispute as to a material fact is
Id.
6
The court will grant summary judgment "against a party who
7
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
8
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
9
will bear the burden of proof at trial."
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248
(holding fact to be material if it might affect outcome of suit
under governing law).
The moving party bears the initial burden of
identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the
13
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
The burden then
14
shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings, and by
15
16
17
18
his own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"
Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
19
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must
20
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
21
party; if, as to any given fact, evidence produced by the moving
22
party conflicts with evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the
23
court must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the
24
nonmoving party with respect to that fact.
25
ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999).
26
a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations
27
or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material
28
fact.
See Leslie v. Grupo
The court's function on
See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809
8
1
F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
2
B.
Mail Tampering
3
Plaintiff alleges a single incident of purported mail
4
tampering that occurred on August 2, 2007, the day he was
5
transferred from GDDF to SRCJ.
6
that prior to the transfer he handed to mailroom personnel two
7
legal mail packages, each of which contained documents concerning
8
his "writ."
9
County Superior Court and the District Attorney's Office.
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
12
The packages were addressed to the Alameda
Id.
The following day, Plaintiff was transferred to state prison.
10
11
3AC at 2.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
Martinez Decl. ¶ 23.
When, after sixty days, he had not heard back
from the Superior Court, he sent a notice regarding lost mail to
GDDF.
On or about October 22, 2007, Plaintiff received the
13
documents in question, which had been forwarded from GDDF as "Lost
14
Mail."
15
16
17
3AC at 2.
He noticed that the documents were misplaced and
not in their original envelopes.
Id.
He claims that as a result
of the mishandling of his mail the "[j]udges rulings were effected"
in his case.
Id.
He brings this claim against Sheriff Ahern, who
18
he claims is responsible for implementing the mail policy and
19
procedures that resulted in the mishandling of his mail.
20
Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive
21
mail.
22
Nonetheless, prison officials may institute procedures for
23
inspecting legal mail, which includes mail sent between attorneys
24
and prisoners, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974),
25
and mail sent from prisoners to the courts, see Royse v. Superior
26
Court, 779 F.2d 573, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1986).
27
delay of legal mail which adversely affects legal proceedings
28
presents a cognizable claim for denial of access to the courts, see
9
Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995).
While the deliberate
1
Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986), isolated
2
incidents of mail interference without any evidence of improper
3
motive or resulting interference with the right to counsel or
4
access to the courts do not give rise to a constitutional
5
violation.
6
1990); Morgan v. Montanye, 516 F.2d 1367, 1370-71 (2d Cir. 1975);
7
Bach v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1974).
8
9
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
12
See Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir.
Here, on the undisputed evidence presented by the parties, a
First Amendment violation is not shown.
This was an isolated
incident of mail mishandling; there is no evidence that the
mishandling was based on the content of the mail or was purposeful.
Moreover, Plaintiff's conclusory assertion that the ruling in his
Superior Court case was affected by the mishandling is unsupported
13
and is not probative evidence that the mishandling had a negative
14
impact on any legal proceeding.
15
16
17
18
19
Additionally, Plaintiff's
supervisory liability claim fails because his assertion is that the
mail was not handled in accordance with Sheriff Ahern's written
policy and procedures, and he has offered no evidence that shows
there was a mailroom practice of subverting the policy.
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED to Sheriff Ahern on
20
this claim.
21
C.
22
Plaintiff alleges that upon arriving at SRCJ after his
Deliberate Indifference to Safety/Denial of Court Access
23
transfer from GDDF on August 2, 2007, he was placed in a cell with
24
two inmates who were dressed in yellow clothing.
25
was in full hand and leg restraints, was wearing red clothing.
26
According to Plaintiff, red clothing indicates an inmate's
27
segregation status, while yellow clothing indicates an inmate is
28
housed on the mainline.
Plaintiff, who
Inmates wearing different colored clothing
10
1
are not to be placed in cells together.
3AC at 3(a).
2
Plaintiff alleges the two inmates took his legal materials,
3
which were hard copies of his criminal appeal and several of his
4
musical compositions, ripped them up and flushed them down the
5
toilet and "physically abused" Plaintiff, who was unable to protect
6
himself.
7
seen [sic] was Deputy Fis[c]her, a female officer; who ignored
8
plaintiff during the attacks; and refused to assist plaintiff while
9
housed in the intack [sic] unit of receiving the 'afternoon time',
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that "[p]resent at the
Aug. 2, 2007."
Ahern.
He brings this claim against Fischer and Sheriff
3AC at 3(a)-(b).
In support of the motion for summary judgment, Fischer
12
affirmatively denies, under penalty of perjury, that she either
13
witnessed or was aware of Plaintiff being physically attacked or of
14
anyone destroying or taking his property on August 2, 2007.
15
16
17
Shavies ¶¶ 5-6.2
Decl.
She further denies that she stood idly by while
the alleged attack occurred.
Id. ¶ 7.
Additionally, Defendants
have submitted evidence that the Sheriff's Department possesses no
18
"grievance, information, record or document" that supports
19
Plaintiff's allegations, nor is there any report documenting
20
physical injury to Plaintiff on that date.
21
27.
22
Decl. Martinez ¶¶ 26-
In his declaration in support of his opposition to the motion
23
for summary judgment, Plaintiff states that "Plaintiff recalls
24
Deputy Fischer there and ignored Plaintiff during the morning/noon
25
shift the incidents of Aug 2, 2007.
She walked pass the
26
27
28
2
Deputy Fischer's last name is now Shavies. For convenience
and consistency, she will be referred to as Deputy Fischer herein.
11
1
location/cell several times without assisting Plaintiff, as
2
Plaintiff called."
3
Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 17.
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must take
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
6
officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the
7
hands of other prisoners.
8
1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005).
9
protect inmates from attacks by other inmates violates the Eighth
10
Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation
11
For the Northern District of California
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners.
5
United States District Court
4
alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison
12
official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate
13
safety.
14
Farmer
In particular, prison
Id. at 833; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d
The failure of prison officials to
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040-41.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that creates a
15
genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Fischer
16
acted with deliberate indifference to his safety.
17
Fischer affirmatively denies that she was aware of the alleged
18
incident or failed to come to Plaintiff's aid, and also has shown
19
that the Sheriff's Department possesses no record of the incident.
20
In response, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that refutes
21
Fischer's.
22
inmates, without providing any further detail about the assault or
23
resulting injury, Opp'n at 27-28, and that Fischer walked by the
24
cell several times during the morning/noon shift without responding
25
when "plaintiff called."
26
about what he said when he called or how many times he did so.
27
Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 17.
28
Fischer might have heard Plaintiff calling to her when she walked
Specifically,
Rather, he states only that he was "jumped" by the
He does not provide any further detail
At most, Plaintiff's assertions show that
12
1
by his cell, but did not respond.
Such assertions, however, do not
2
raise a reasonable inference that Fischer knew Plaintiff was being
3
beaten and intentionally failed to act to protect him.
4
Plaintiff has presented no evidence to refute to refute Fischer and
5
Sheriff Ahern's evidence that no record of the incident exists.
6
Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown that, as a result of
Further,
7
either Fischer's or Sheriff Ahern's actions, he was denied access
8
to the courts.
9
the courts.
Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996).
To
establish a claim for a violation of this right, the prisoner must
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
prove that he suffered "actual injury" because he was denied such
12
access.
13
that the actions of prison officials hindered his efforts to pursue
14
a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of
15
confinement.
16
evidence to support his assertion that either Fischer or Sheriff
17
Ahern's conduct was the cause of the destruction of his legal
18
documents or that he suffered an actual injury to court access as a
19
result of the destruction.
Id. at 350-55.
To prove an actual injury, he must show
See id. at 354-55.
Here, Plaintiff has presented no
20
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED to Fischer and
21
Sheriff Ahern on Plaintiff's deliberate indifference to safety and
22
denial of court access claims.
23
D.
Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
24
Plaintiff alleges that when he was incarcerated at SRCJ,
25
Deputies Jones, Smith, DeLeon, Nelson, Delima, Kull and Valverde
26
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs between
27
May 13, 2008 and August 24, 2008.
28
Sheriff Ahern was responsible for policies that permitted
13
Plaintiff further alleges that
1
indifference to his medical needs through September 2008.
Department on May 13, 2008 and transported to SRCJ the next day.
4
Plaintiff maintains that, from his arrival at SRCJ on May 14, 2008
5
through August 24, 2008, Defendants acted to prevent him from
6
seeking medical treatment for injuries he suffered from the alleged
7
beating by other inmates at SRCJ on August 2, 2007 (discussed
8
above), and from an old gunshot wound to his neck.
9
that the lack of adequate attention to those needs resulted in his
10
re-injuring himself on August 13, 2008, when he was moved through
11
For the Northern District of California
Plaintiff was arrested and booked by the Hayward Police
3
United States District Court
2
the jail while in restraints.
He also claims
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs
12
13
violates the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and
14
unusual punishment.
15
(1976).
16
examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's
17
medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that
18
need.
19
overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104
20
F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
21
deliberately indifferent if he knows a prisoner faces a substantial
22
risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
23
reasonable steps to abate it.
24
(1994).
25
established, there must exist both a purposeful act or failure to
26
act on the part of the defendant and harm resulting therefrom.
27
McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
28
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an
McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992),
A prison official is
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
Consequently, in order for deliberate indifference to be
The Court finds Plaintiff has not presented evidence that
14
See
1
raises a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendants acted with
2
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
3
initial matter, it is undisputed that Defendants are not medical
4
providers.
5
claims knew of his injuries and prevented him from receiving
6
necessary medical care.
7
evidence that supports his assertion.
8
undisputed facts show the following: (1) Plaintiff was medically
9
assessed when he arrived at SRCJ on May 14, 2008, and the only
As an
Rather, they are sheriff's deputies who Plaintiff
Plaintiff, however, has not presented
In particular, the
injuries noted were a wrist abrasion three to four days old and an
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
old gunshot wound to the neck, which he states he suffered in 1987;
12
(2) deputy sheriffs escorted him to sick call on May 20, 27 and 30,
13
2008, July 10, 2008, and September 9 and 15, 2008; (3) he had two
14
sets of x-rays taken while at SRCJ -- an x-ray of his right wrist,
15
on May 28, 2008, and of his right wrist and lumbar spine, on
16
September 10, 2008, both of which showed no acute findings; (4) he
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refused an annual health assessment on May 29, 2008 and
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acknowledged that he would assume all responsibility for his
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welfare; (5) he refused to cooperate during physical therapy
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appointments on June 17, 2008, June 19, 2008 and July 3, 2008;
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(6) medical staff provided him with pain medication from May 27,
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2008 to June 3, 2008, and from July 30, 2008 to August 13, 2008.
23
See Decl. Gilbert & Exs. 1-6; Decl. Gober & Ex. 1; Decl. Molloy.
24
Further, Plaintiff claims Defendants did not comply with a
25
medical order for special housing and bunk assignments.
26
Defendants, however, have presented undisputed evidence that
27
Plaintiff never informed the housing unit deputies of that order
28
and, pursuant to Alameda County Jail regulations, it is the
15
1
prisoner's responsibility to inform the housing unit deputy of an
2
order to be placed on the lower tier and lower bunk.
3
Jones ¶ 6-7.
4
Defendants could not have been deliberately indifferent to them.
Decl. P.M.
Without knowledge of Plaintiff's medical needs,
5
Additionally, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that Deputy
6
Jones acted with deliberate indifference when he moved Plaintiff in
7
restraints on August 12, 2008, which, Plaintiff alleges, caused him
8
to fall and re-injure himself.
9
was restrained and not, as Jones wrote in the incident report,
Even if Plaintiff fell because he
because his foot slipped out of his sandal, there is no evidence
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
that Jones knew of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff and
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failed to act to prevent such harm.
13
Plaintiff was housed in administrative segregation and all such
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inmates must be moved in restraints; Plaintiff does not allege that
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a medical order required that he be excepted from this procedure or
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that Jones failed to honor such an order.
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other facts which support the proposition that Jones acted with
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deliberate indifference.
19
Rather, it is undisputed that
Nor does he allege any
Finally, Plaintiff has not shown supervisory liability for
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deliberate indifference to his medical needs by Sheriff Ahern.
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Respondeat superior liability does not exist under 42 U.S.C.
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§ 1983.
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supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his
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subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the
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violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent
26
them."
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acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs or
28
that any Sheriff's Department policy resulted in the violation of
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id.
"A
Here, Plaintiff has not shown that any deputy sheriff
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1
2
3
his constitutional rights.
Based on the above, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of
Defendants on this claim.
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E.
Qualified Immunity
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Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
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The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials
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. . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
8
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
9
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
The threshold question in
qualified immunity analysis is: "Taken in the light most favorable
12
to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the
13
officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?"
14
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
15
in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it
16
would be clear to a reasonable defendant that his conduct was
17
unlawful in the situation he confronted.
Saucier v.
The relevant, dispositive inquiry
Id. at 202.
18
On the facts presented herein, viewed in the light most
19
favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants prevail as a matter of law on
20
their qualified immunity defense because the record establishes no
21
constitutional violation.
22
occur, however, Defendants could have reasonably believed their
23
conduct was lawful.
24
tampering claim, it would not have been clear to Sheriff Ahern that
25
his policy for the inspection of legal mail violated the First
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Amendment because of a single incident of Plaintiff's mail being
27
mishandled.
28
Fischer or Sheriff Ahern that Plaintiff's right to be protected
Even if a constitutional violation did
Specifically, with respect to Plaintiff's mail
Additionally, it would not have been clear to Deputy
17
1
from attack by other inmates was violated based on Plaintiff's bare
2
statement that he called out to Fischer when she passed by his cell
3
but she did not respond.
4
Fischer or Sheriff Ahern that Fischer violated Plaintiff's
5
constitutional right of access to the courts by failing to prevent
6
other inmates from flushing his legal materials down the toilet.
7
Finally, it would not have been clear to those Defendants who are
8
alleged to have prevented Plaintiff from receiving adequate medical
9
care that they were acting with deliberate indifference to his
Further, it would not have been clear to
serious medical needs.
11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
10
They escorted him to see medical staff on
numerous occasions, were unaware of a medical order to provide him
12
with certain housing and bunk assignments, and escorted him in
13
restraints when there was no medical order requiring a different
14
procedure.
15
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
16
with respect to all of Plaintiff's claims, and their motion for
17
summary judgment is GRANTED for this reason as well.
CONCLUSION
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19
For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:
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1.
21
Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a fourth amended
complaint is DENIED.
22
2.
Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is DENIED.
23
3.
The administrative segregation and food tampering claims
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25
26
are DISMISSED with prejudice.
4.
The excessive force and illegal search claims are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
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5.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
28
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the
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1
file.
All parties shall bear their own costs.
2
This Order terminates Docket nos. 67, 84 and 85.
3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
4
Dated: 3/27/2012
CLAUDIA WILKEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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11
For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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