Jackson v. Sullivan et al

Filing 32

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING DEFENDANTS 23 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS 26 MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY; DENYING PLAINTIFFS ( 20 , 21 ) MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND TO ISSUE SUMMONS. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/24/2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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No. C 09-1785 CW (PR)

JONATHAN JACKSON,

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS; DENYING AS MOOT
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY
DISCOVERY; DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND TO
ISSUE SUMMONS

Plaintiff,

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v.
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B. SULLIVAN, et al.,
Defendants.

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________________________________/
(Docket nos. 20, 21, 23, 26)

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff, a death row prisoner incarcerated at San Quentin
State Prison (SQSP), has filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
seeking injunctive relief and damages.

Robert L. Ayers and Appeals Examiner B. Sullivan have filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff has opposed the
motion and Defendants have filed a reply.1

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For the reasons

discussed below, the motion is GRANTED and the action is DISMISSED
without leave to amend.

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Defendants SQSP Warden

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “after

the pleadings are closed –- but early enough not to delay trial –a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”

Judgment on

the pleadings is proper when, “taking all allegations in the
pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

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1SQSP

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Appeals Coordinator V. Kelly has not been served.
Because this order dismisses the action, Plaintiff’s motion to
issue summons to serve Kelly is DENIED.
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matter of law.”

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F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2006).

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the moving party must clearly establish “that no material issue of

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fact remains to be resolved.”

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Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1551 (9th Cir. 1989).

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Stanley v. Trustees of the Cal. State Univ., 433
On the face of the pleadings,

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

A Rule 12(c) motion is “functionally identical” to a Rule

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12(b) motion.

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1192 (9th Cir. 1989).

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to both.

Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188,
Thus, the same standard of review applies

Under both rules, “the allegations of the non-moving

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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party must be accepted as true, while the allegations of the

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moving party which have been denied are assumed to be false.”

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Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1550.

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true, however, unreasonable inferences, unwarranted deductions of

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fact, or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual

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allegations.

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624 (9th Cir. 1981).

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Hal

A court need not accept as

See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,

In deciding such a motion, a court may properly consider

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material submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are

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not part of the complaint but are referred to extensively in the

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complaint and considered authentic by all parties, and materials

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that are part of the public record and thus subject to judicial

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notice.

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Cir. 2003).

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B.

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See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908-09 (9th

Plaintiff’s Claims
The Court conducted a preliminary screening of Plaintiff’s

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original complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and liberally

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construed the allegations therein as an attempt by Plaintiff to

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state three claims for relief, all pertaining to his designation
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as a death row prisoner reassigned from Grade A status to the more

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restrictive Grade B/Privilege Group D (Grade B) status.

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Specifically, the Court construed the complaint as raising the

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following claims: (1) the Grade B designation violates due process

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because Plaintiff was not afforded the procedural protections

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provided to non-death-row prisoners who are reassigned to more

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restrictive conditions of confinement, (2) the designation

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violates his right to equal protection, and (3) the designation

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violates his rights under the Eighth Amendment.

The Court

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, finding that

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Plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim

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for relief under any of the above three theories and that he had

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failed to link Defendants Sullivan and Kelly to his allegations.

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Docket no. 9.

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Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint; the Court

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found Plaintiff’s allegations, when liberally construed, cured the

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pleading deficiencies with respect to the due process and equal

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protection claims, and ordered those claims served on Defendants.

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Because Plaintiff had not alleged facts in the amended complaint

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pertaining to his Eighth Amendment claim, the Court dismissed that

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claim without prejudice.

Docket no. 12.

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When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the amended

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complaint, the Court relied solely on the allegations therein.

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Specifically, the Court relied on Plaintiff’s allegations

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concerning the language of various prison regulations, a decision

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made by the classification committee to retain him on Grade B

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status, and the content of the administrative appeals he filed

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challenging his designation as a Grade B prisoner and Defendants’
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responses thereto.

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classification decision, administrative appeals or any other

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documents to either his original or amended complaint.

Plaintiff did not attach the regulations,

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In support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings,

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Defendants have attached copies of the classification decision and

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administrative appeals to which the complaint refers.

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on the motion, the Court considers these documents and also takes

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judicial notice of the language of the prison regulations relied

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upon by Plaintiff in the amended complaint.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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C.

In ruling

Analysis

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1.

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Plaintiff claims that his right to due process was violated

Due Process Claim

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when, after he was found guilty of a disciplinary violation,

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Defendants chose not to sentence him to a determinate term of

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punishment on Grade B status but, instead, relied upon the

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disciplinary violation as justification to reassign him

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permanently to Grade B status.

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assigned to an indeterminate term in administrative segregation or

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the secured housing unit (SHU) for non-death-row prisoners.

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maintains that if he had received a determinate term of punishment

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on Grade B status he would have been able to return to Grade A

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status when the term ended, but because he has been reassigned to

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Grade B status he cannot return to Grade A status until the Unit

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Classification Committee (UCC) and Institutional Classification

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Committee (ICC) allow him to do so, and that the criteria used to

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guide their decisions are wholly discretionary.

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He analogizes this to being

He

The requirements of due process apply only to the deprivation
of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection
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of liberty and property.

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569 (1972).

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the Due Process Clause of its own force or by states through

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statutes or regulations.

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(1995).

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such as loss of recreational and rehabilitative programs or

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confinement to one’s cell for a lengthy period of time, is not so

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severe as to violate the Due Process Clause itself.

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v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,

A protected liberty interest may be created either by

Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84

The hardship associated with administrative segregation,

See Toussaint

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)).
A deprivation authorized by state law may amount to

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deprivation of a protected liberty interest if the deprivation is

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one of “real substance,” that “imposes atypical and significant

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hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

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prison life,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, or “will inevitably affect

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the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487.

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holds that when prison officials initially determine whether a

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prisoner is to be segregated for administrative reasons due

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process requires that they comply with the following procedures:

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(1) they must hold an informal non-adversarial hearing within a

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reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated, (2) the prisoner

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must be informed of the charges against him or the reasons

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segregation is being considered, and (3) he must be allowed to

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present his views.

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Additionally, “some evidence” must support the decision to place

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an inmate in segregation for administrative reasons.

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The Ninth Circuit

See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100.

Id. at 1104.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a due process
claim because he has not alleged facts that show either that
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reassignment to Grade B status is a deprivation of “real

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substance,” or that he has not been provided with constitutionally

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adequate process.2

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The Court need not decide whether Plaintiff has alleged facts

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that show that reassignment to Grade B status amounts to a

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deprivation of real substance.

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allege facts that show he has been denied due process.

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Specifically, he does not allege that he was not provided with

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notice and a hearing at which he was allowed to present his views,

Even if he has, he has failed to

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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or that there was not some evidence to support the decision to

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place him on Grade B status.

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initially was placed on Grade B status on April 29, 2006, when he

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was charged with a rules violation; on January 1, 2007, he was

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found guilty of a lesser offense, specifically, the serious rules

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violation of conspiracy to murder a peace officer; on February 1,

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2007, he appeared before the ICC and was informed that he would

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not be assessed a determinate term of punishment on Grade B status

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but, instead, would be reassigned to Grade B status and reviewed

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every ninety days to determine whether he could be returned to

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Grade A status.

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Grade B status because of the “rule violation [he] was found

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guilty of.”

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Rather, he alleges the following: he

Notably, Plaintiff alleges that he was assigned

(Am. Compl. at 7.)

Nor does Plaintiff allege that Defendants have failed to
review his continued Grade B status.

When an inmate has been

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Whether Plaintiff’s reassignment to Grade B status will
inevitably affect the duration of his sentence, see Sandin, 515
U.S. at 487, is not at issue because Plaintiff has been sentenced
to death.
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placed in administrative segregation, prison officials must engage

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in some sort of periodic review of his confinement.

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459 U.S. at 477 n.9; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1101.

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acknowledges that he has been provided with periodic reviews,

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every ninety days, by the UCC, and has received regular reviews by

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the ICC.

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has been provided with the opportunity to ask questions, has been

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informed of the reasons for the reviewing committee’s decision to

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retain him on Grade B status, and has been able to present his

See Hewitt,

Here, Plaintiff

Additionally, he acknowledges that, at these reviews, he

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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views.

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procedural protections to which he is entitled.

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Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 217, 224 (2005) (finding due process

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satisfied by indeterminate administrative segregation policy that

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requires periodic review of inmate’s files every thirty days and

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annual review at which inmate is allowed to appear and present his

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views).

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Consequently, he has been provided with at least the
See Wilkinson v.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff’s

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allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

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for the violation of due process.

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for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED on this claim.

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the Court finds amendment would be futile, the claim is dismissed

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without leave to amend.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion
Because

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2.

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are violating his right to

Equal Protection Claim

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equal protection by using highly discretionary procedures to place

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and retain death row prisoners on Grade B status that are

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different than those used to place and retain non-death-row

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prisoners on restrictive status in administrative segregation and
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the SHU.

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the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

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require that non-death-row prisoners who are found guilty of a

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serious rules violation be sentenced to a determinate term in the

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SHU and then returned to their prior housing status after the term

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is served, while death row prisoners do not receive a determinate

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term of punishment but instead are placed on Grade B status for an

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indeterminate term and without specific criteria for release.

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“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Specifically, he alleges that regulations promulgated by

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its

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jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is

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essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should

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be treated alike.”

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473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216

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(1982)).

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support an equal protection claim.

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Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005).

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prisoner to state an equal protection claim when challenging his

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treatment in contrast to that of other prisoners, he must allege

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that his treatment is invidiously dissimilar to that received by

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other prisoners.

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Cir. 1993).

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,

The different treatment of unlike groups does not
Thornton v. City of St.
In order for a

See More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271-72 (8th

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Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a

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claim upon which relief may be granted because death row prisoners

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are not situated similarly to non-death-row prisoners.

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maintains that the two groups are similarly situated because

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placing a death row prisoner on Grade B status is equivalent to

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Plaintiff

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placing a non-death-row prisoner in administrative segregation or

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the SHU.

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non-death-row prisoners are similarly situated in this regard;

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even if they are, the inferences drawn by Plaintiff from the

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regulatory language are unreasonable and his factual allegations

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are therefore unsubstantiated.

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The Court need not decide whether death row and

As an initial matter, and contrary to Plaintiff’s

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allegations, the regulations do not require that a non-death-row

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prisoner found guilty of a serious rule violation be sentenced to

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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a determinate term in the SHU.

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prisoner be assessed a credit forfeiture.

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(C.C.R.) § 3315(f)(3).

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conspiracy to murder a peace officer -- the serious rules

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violation of which Plaintiff was found guilty -- is to be assessed

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a credit forfeiture of 151-180 days.

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However, credit forfeitures can be assessed only against prisoners

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serving determinate terms.

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after a rules violation has been adjudicated against a

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non-death-row prisoner, a serious disciplinary action can be

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referred to a classification committee to determine whether the

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prisoner should be assigned to a different work or housing group.

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15 C.C.R. § 3315(g).

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a “determinate period of confinement in SHU may be established for

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an inmate found guilty of a serious offense,” or that an inmate

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can be assigned to an indeterminate SHU term if he is “deemed to

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be a threat to the safety of others or the security of the

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institution.”

Rather, they provide that the
15 Cal. Code Regs.

In particular, a prisoner found guilty of

15 C.C.R. § 3323(c)(8).

15 C.C.R. § 3323(a).

Additionally,

The classification regulations provide that

15 C.C.R. § 3341.5(c)(1) & (c)(B)(1).

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Like non-death-row prisoners found guilty of a serious rules

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violation who are not serving determinate terms of imprisonment,

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Plaintiff is ineligible for credit forfeiture as a disciplinary

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measure.

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rules violation adjudicated, he is subject to reclassification,

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including either a determinate or indeterminate SHU term.

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Consequently, Plaintiff’s contention that he has been treated

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differently from non-death-row prisoners because he did not

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receive a determinate term on Grade B status is unsupported.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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And, like non-death-row prisoners who have had a serious

Nor do the regulations provide, as Plaintiff alleges, that a

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non-death-row prisoner will be returned to his former housing

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status after serving a determinate SHU term.

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that, when a determinate SHU term ends, a non-death-row prisoner

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may continue to be retained in the SHU if, among other things, a

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classification committee determines that “[r]elease of the inmate

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would severely endanger the lives of inmates or staff, the

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security of the institution, or the integrity of an investigation

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into suspected criminal activity or serious misconduct.”

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C.C.R. § 3341.5(c)(3).

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explained its denial of his request to be referred to the ICC for

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Grade A consideration as follows: “This is based on the

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seriousness of his RVR’s, DTD, 12/11/07 for Possession of Alcohol

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and couple[d] with RVR DTD on 11/30/05 for Conspiracy to commit[]

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the Murder of A Peace Officer.

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observation on [Grade] B is needed to evaluate inmate Jackson’s

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behavior.”

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Plaintiff’s contention that he has been treated differently than

Rather, they provide

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Here, Plaintiff acknowledges that the UCC

Defs.’ Ex. E.

Committee feels a longer period of

Thus, the Court finds no merit to

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non-death-row prisoners because Defendants have exercised

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discretion to retain him on Grade B status.

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Similarly, the language of the regulations does not support

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Plaintiff’s allegation that prison officials may retain on

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indeterminate SHU status only those non-death-row prisoners who

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are validated gang members or associates.

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provide, “Release from segregation status shall occur at the

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earliest possible time in keeping with the circumstances and

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reasons for the inmate’s initial placement in administrative

Rather, the regulations

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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segregation.”

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discretion to determine when non-death-row prisoners are eligible

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for release from an indeterminate SHU term based on the

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circumstances surrounding their SHU placement, Plaintiff’s

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contention, that he has been treated differently than

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non-death-row prisoners because Defendants have exercised their

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discretion to retain him on Grade B status, is unsubstantiated.

15 C.C.R. § 3339(a).

Because prison officials have

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Based on the above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s factual

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deduction of differential treatment based on the language of the

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noted regulations is unwarranted.

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regulations do treat death row and non-death-row prisoners

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differently, Plaintiff has not alleged facts from which an

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inference of invidious discrimination can be drawn.

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F.2d at 271-72.3

Further, to the extent the

See More, 984

Because Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a

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Defendants further argue that, even if Plaintiff has been
treated differently than other prisoners to whom he is similarly
situated, he has alleged no facts to suggest that such differences
are not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). The Court
declines to rule on this argument as it requires the development
of an evidentiary record.
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claim upon which relief may be granted for an equal protection

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violation, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is

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GRANTED on this claim.

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amendment would be futile, the claim is dismissed without leave to

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amend.4

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Additionally, because the Court finds

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

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1.

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Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is

GRANTED.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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2.

Defendants’ motion to stay discovery is DENIED as moot.

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3.

Plaintiff’s motions to issue summons and for the

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appointment of counsel are DENIED as moot.

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This Order terminates Docket nos. 20, 21, 23 and 26.

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The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the

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file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

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1/24/2013

CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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Because the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted
based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a due process or equal
protection claim, the Court does not reach Defendants’ other
arguments.
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