Rios v. Nady et al

Filing 11

ORDER OF DISMISSAL, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton on 11/28/11. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(nah, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/28/2011)

1
2
3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

5

OAKLAND DIVISION

6
7

KEITH R. RIOS,
Plaintiff,

8
v.

9

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

XAVIER NADY and HON. JUDGE
SUSAN M. DAUPHINE,

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

No. C 11-4860 PJH (PR)

Defendants.
12

/

13
Plaintiff, an inmate at North Kern State Prison, has filed a pro se civil rights
14
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma
15
pauperis.
16
DISCUSSION
17
A.

Standard of Review

18
Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners
19
seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
20
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and
21
dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may
22
be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at
23
1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
24
Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
25
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of
26
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;
27
the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the
28
grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations

allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'

3

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

4

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

5

above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

6

(citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

7

plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained

8

the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the

9

framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are

10

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

11
For the Northern District of California

omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual

2

United States District Court

1

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

12

1937, 1950 (2009).

13

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

14

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

15

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

16

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

17

B.

18
19

Legal Claims
Defendants are a state family court judge and an attorney appointed to represent

plaintiff in a proceeding for termination of parental rights.

20

1.

21

Public defenders, and those private lawyers appointed to serve as defense counsel,

Attorney Nady

22

do not act under color of state law for purposes of a section 1983 action because their

23

loyalty is not to the appointing authority but to their clients. Polk County v. Dodson, 454

24

U.S. 312, 325 (1981). For the same reason, private lawyers performing a lawyer's

25

traditional functions as counsel in family court proceedings do not act under color of state

26

law for purposes of a section 1983 action. Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093-96 (9th

27

Cir. 2003) (role of attorney appointed guardian ad litem to child in state court custody

28

proceeding is analogous to that of public defender; attorney does not act under color of
2

1

state law); Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193 (6th Cir.1991) (court-appointed

2

attorney's representation of a child's adoptive parents did not constitute state action);

3

Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 710 (1st Cir.1986) (court-appointed attorney

4

for child in delinquency proceeding does not act under color of state law, by analogy to Polk

5

County); Ramirez v. Tsuchiya, No. C 08-4456 WHA (PR), 2008 WL 4402911 at *1 (N.D.

6

Cal. Sept. 26, 2008) (court appointed attorney who represented inmate in proceeding for

7

termination of parental rights not a state actor). Defendant Nady therefore was not acting

8

under color of state law, and plaintiff has failed to state a claim against him. Because

9

nothing plaintiff could allege would change this fact, the dismissal will be without leave to
amend.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

2.

12

The other defendant is the family court judge who presided, Judge Susan M.

Judge Dauphine

13

Dauphine. Plaintiff alleges that she did not ensure that he was properly represented and

14

held proceedings without his being present.

15

State court judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts

16

performed in their judicial capacity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (applying

17

judicial immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The actions that plaintiff contends

18

give rise to his claims clearly were taken in a judicial capacity, so to whatever extent

19

plaintiff seeks damages, he has failed to state a claim.

20

The main relief plaintiff seeks, however, is that he be given “proper representation,”

21

allowed to present evidence, and allowed to be present at “hearings to adequately defend

22

and present my case.” The doctrine of judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive

23

relief in section 1983 actions. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984);

24

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). However, section 1983

25

itself provides that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission

26

taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

27

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

28

Plaintiff has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated, and no reason why one
3

1

would not be available from state court is apparent. Plaintiff thus has failed to state a claim

2

for injunctive relief against Judge Dauphine.

3

It is unclear whether family court proceedings are ongoing. If the proceedings are

4

completed, plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “Under

5

Rooker–Feldman, a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a

6

direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154

7

(9th Cir. 2003). “[W]hen a losing plaintiff in state court brings a suit in federal district court

8

asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal rulings of the state court and seeks

9

to vacate or set aside the judgment of that court, the federal suit is a forbidden de facto
appeal.” Id. at 1156. Assuming state court proceedings have been completed, it appears

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

that plaintiff is trying to appeal to this court from the judgment of the state court, which is

12

forbidden by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

13

Alternatively, if proceedings are not completed, abstention under Younger v. Harris,

14

401 U.S. 37 (1971), is appropriate. A federal court “must abstain under Younger if four

15

requirements are met: (1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding

16

implicates important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating

17

federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would

18

enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the

19

state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of

20

Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008).

21

Younger abstention applies not only where a federal action would interfere with a state

22

criminal proceeding, but also “to federal cases that would interfere with state civil cases and

23

state administrative proceedings.” Id. Assuming state proceedings are ongoing, all the

24

conditions for abstention are met here.

25

For the above reasons, the claims against Judge Dauphine also will be dismissed.

26

Because the defects in the claims against her could not be cured by amendment, the

27

dismissal will be without leave to amend. Because circumstances could change in the

28

future, however – plaintiff might obtain a declaratory judgment in state court, and at some
4

1

point the proceedings in state court will be completed, if they have not been already, so

2

abstention would no longer apply – the dismissal as to Judge Dauphine will be without

3

prejudice.

4
5
6

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's claims against defendant Nady are DISMISSED
with prejudice. His claims against Judge Dauphine are DISMISSED without prejudice.

7

The clerk shall close the file.

8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

9

Dated: November 28, 2011.
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
P:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.11\RIOS4860.DSM.wpd

28
5