Chavira v. Rankin

Filing 10

ORDER OF DISMISSAL. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 11/26/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/26/2012)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RUBEN MIJEL CHAVIRA,
Plaintiff,

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Case No.: C 11-5730 CW (PR)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

v.
B. RANKIN, CORRECTIONAL
ADMINISTRATOR, et al.,
Defendants.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Kern
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Valley State Prison, filed the instant pro se civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining of the violation of his
constitutional rights by correctional officials at Salinas Valley

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State Prison (SVSP), where he was incarcerated previously.

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has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

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He

Upon initial review, the Court dismissed the complaint with

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leave to amend because Plaintiff had not clearly and concisely

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set forth his claims against Defendants or directly linked

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Defendants to his allegations.

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Plaintiff filed an amended complaint.

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Court determined:

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In response to the Court’s order,
Upon review thereof, the

Plaintiff appears to allege the following: on
January 17, 2007, he was involved in an
altercation with another inmate; he was
injured and the other inmate died; Plaintiff
was accused of having killed the other inmate
and was not provided with medical care for
his injuries; subsequently, prison officials
found Plaintiff not guilty of killing the

other inmate and no criminal charges were
brought against him. Plaintiff names only
one Defendant, Correctional Officer B.
Rankin.

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Docket no. 8 at 1:23-2:3.
The Court further found that the amended complaint remained

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deficient because Plaintiff had not explained how Defendant
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Rankin was involved in the above events and what actions he took
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that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Consequently,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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the Court dismissed the amended complaint with further leave to
amend for Plaintiff to cure the noted pleading deficiencies.
Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint in which he

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restates his allegations as follows: on January 17, 2008, inmate

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Browne was injured and subsequently died; on November 19, 2008,

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the District Attorney chose not to press charges against

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Plaintiff for the incident; on February 3, 2009, Defendant Rankin

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reissued disciplinary charges against him; he was held in

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administrative segregation for twenty-one days pending

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disposition of the charges; on May 8, 2009, the charges were

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dismissed.

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his civil rights based on the above course of events.

Plaintiff seeks damages and claims the violation of

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The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s allegations as an

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attempt to claim that his right to due process was violated when

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he was charged with a disciplinary violation of which he later

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was found innocent and was held in administrative segregation

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pending investigation of the charges.

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not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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These claims, however, are

A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from
being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in
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the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.

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Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout,

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808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986).

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prisoner may have been innocent of disciplinary charges brought

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against him and incorrectly held in administrative segregation

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does not raise a due process issue.

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process, not error-free decision-making.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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See Sprouse v.

Specifically, the fact that a

The Constitution demands due
See Ricker v. Leapley,

25 F.3d 1406, 1410 (8th Cir. 1994); McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d
863, 868 (5th Cir. 1983).
Further, a prisoner’s right to due process in connection
with his placement in administrative segregation arises only when
such segregation implicates a protected liberty interest in some
unexpected manner, or imposes an “‘atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.’”

Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).
Serrano, the Ninth Circuit recognized that,

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[t]ypically, administrative segregation in and of
itself does not implicate a protected liberty
interest. See, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486
(“[D]isciplinary segregation, with insignificant
exceptions, mirror[s] those conditions imposed
upon inmates in administrative segregation and
protective custody.”); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d
443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the presentencing prisoner had no liberty interest in
being free from administrative segregation);
accord Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1174 (7th
Cir.1997) (“But it would be difficult (we do not
say impossible) to make disciplinary segregation
sufficiently more restrictive than the conditions
of the general population . . . to count as an
atypical and significant deprivation of
liberty[.]”); Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1337
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In

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(8th Cir.1997) (“We believe that as a matter of
law these conditions of [standard administrative
segregation] do not constitute an ‘atypical and
significant’ hardship, . . . when compared to the
burdens of ordinary prison life.”) (internal
citation omitted).
Id. (alterations in original).
Here, Plaintiff objects solely to the fact of his placement

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in administrative segregation for twenty-one days after being

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charged with a disciplinary violation of which he subsequently

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was found innocent.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Such allegation fails to state a claim for

the denial of due process.

See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86

(finding prisoner’s thirty-day placement in disciplinary
segregation did not result in type of atypical, significant

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deprivation for which state might create liberty interest);
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Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 448-49 (9th Cir. 2000)(finding
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prisoner’s seventy-day placement in secured housing unit pending
disciplinary hearing did not give rise to liberty interest); May
v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding allegation

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of placement in administrative segregation does not state due

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process claim); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468

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(1983) (“[T]he transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more

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restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the

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terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison

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sentence.”).

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Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

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allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted for the violation of his right to due process, and that

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granting him further leave to amend the complaint would be
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futile.

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Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the
file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 11/26/2012

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____________________________
CLAUDIA WILKEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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