Ramirez v. Cate

Filing 20

ORDER by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granting 8 Respondent's Motion to Dismiss; and Denying a Certificate of Appealability. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/28/2013)

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3

EDY RAMIREZ,

4

No. C 12-00872 YGR (PR)
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS; AND DENYING
A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner,

5
6
7

vs.

Respondent.

8
9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2009 prison disciplinary finding imposed by prison staff at Salinas
Valley State Prison ("SVSP").
In an Order dated March 14, 2012, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the writ
should not be granted. Petitioner was also granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

14
15
16
17
18
19

Before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss ("MTD") the instant petition on the
grounds that the challenged disciplinary action does not implicated the fact or duration of
Petitioner's confinement. Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. Respondent filed a
reply.
Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Respondent's
motion to dismiss.

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

/

Petitioner, a state prisoner, has filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

12
13

(Docket No. 8)

ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Warden,

BACKGROUND
On October 5, 2009, prison staff at SVSP observed Petitioner and another inmate engaged in
a fight. (Resp't Ex. 1.) According to the Rules Violation Report ("RVR"), Petitioner "was observed
by staff actively involved in a Riot involving (6) six inmates." (Id.) It further states: "Numerous
force options were required to quell the incident and one involved inmate received life threatening
injuries." (Id.)
At his November 9, 2009 disciplinary hearing, Petitioner was found guilty of participation in
a riot. (Id.) He was initially assessed a ninety-day forfeiture of credit. (Id.) However, because

1

Petitioner is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole ("LWOP"), he forfeited no

2

time credits as a result of this guilty finding. (Resp't Ex. 2.)

3

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on February 13, 2012.

4

DISCUSSION

5

Respondent now moves to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim for relief because

6

Petitioner's claims do not implicate the fact or duration of his confinement. Respondent argues that

7

Petitioner challenges a prison disciplinary finding which did not result in forfeiture of any time

8

credit and thus his dispute cannot impact the duration of his confinement. (MTD at 2-3 (citing

9

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003) (no federal habeas jurisdiction where

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

successful challenge to disciplinary proceeding would not necessarily shorten inmate's sentence).)

11

Petitioner alleges that his claims are properly brought in habeas. While he concedes that he

12

was not assessed any credit loss as a result of the guilty finding, Petitioner claims that he was housed

13

at the Security Housing Unit ("SHU") at SVSP for an unspecified term. (Opp'n at 3.) He also

14

argues that "prison officials will use his prior RVR conviction to give him an 'indeterminate SHU

15

sentence['] should [he] receive another SHU term for her will be classified as a disruptive inmate."

16

(Id.)

17

Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two

18

sources -- the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

19

223-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests are generally ones pertaining to liberty.

20

Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner

21

implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin

22

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (transfer to

23

mental hospital), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (involuntary

24

administration of psychotropic drugs)). Here, Respondent argues that Petitioner's 2009 disciplinary

25

violation did not involve a change so severe as to implicate the Due Process Clause itself.

26

Deprivations that are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of

27

confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided

28

that state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the
2

1

deprivation and that the liberty in question is one of "real substance." See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-

2

87. An interest of "real substance" will generally be limited to freedom from restraint that imposes

3

"atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" or

4

"will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 487.
In Sandin, the United States Supreme Court explained what does not qualify as an interest of

5

"real substance." Sandin determined that the possible effect of a disciplinary decision on parole

7

consideration did not show that the disciplinary decision would inevitably affect the duration of the

8

inmate's sentence. See id. at 487. State law did not require "the parole board to deny parole in the

9

face of a misconduct record or to grant parole in its absence, . . . even though misconduct is by

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

6

regulation a relevant consideration . . . . The decision to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of

11

considerations . . . . The chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too

12

attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause." Id. In sum, habeas

13

relief is available only if the challenged state action exceeds the sentence in such an unexpected

14

manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, imposes an atypical

15

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, or will

16

inevitably affect the duration of the inmate's sentence. Id. at 484, 487.
As mentioned above, upon being found guilty of the disciplinary violation, Petitioner claims

17
18

he was placed in the SHU for an unspecified term.1 As will be discussed below, under Sandin

19

habeas relief is unavailable to Petitioner unless the aforementioned punishment: (1) exceeds the

20

sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its

21

own force; (2) imposes an atypical and significant hardship on Petitioner in relation to the ordinary

22

incidents of prison life; or (3) will inevitably affect the duration of Petitioner's sentence. See id.

23

I.

24

Implicates Due Process Clause of its Own Force
Petitioner's punishment of being placed in SHU for an unspecified period is not so severe a

25

consequence to implicate the Due Process Clause of its own force. Only those changes in condition

26

so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an "unexpected manner" implicate the Due Process

27
28

1

Because it is undisputed that Petitioner did not forfeit any good time credit, the Court will focus
on his allegation that he was placed in the SHU for an unspecified term.
3

1

Clause itself. Id. at 484. Here, Petitioner's temporary placement in the SHU is a consequence far

2

removed from more severe disciplinary actions, such as the administration of psychotropic drugs or

3

being transferred to a mental hospital. Id. (citing Washington, 494 U.S. at 221-22 and Vitek, 445

4

U.S. at 493). The mere curtailment of an inmate's privileges while in the SHU does not rise to the

5

level of becoming a change in condition so severe -- like those in Washington and Vitek -- that it

6

affects Petitioner's sentence in an unexpected manner. Because Petitioner cannot demonstrate that

7

the finding of guilt at his disciplinary hearing affected his sentence in an "unexpected manner," the

8

2009 disciplinary violation and the consequence of being placed in the SHU do not give rise to a due

9

process claim.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

II.

Atypical and Significant Hardship
Petitioner's SHU term stemming from the 2009 disciplinary violation also fails to give rise to

12

a due process claim because it did not result in an "atypical and significant hardship." While States

13

"may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process

14

Clause . . . these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not

15

exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due

16

Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate

17

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (internal citations

18

omitted). In Sandin, the Supreme Court concluded that a prison disciplinary decision which resulted

19

in one month of solitary confinement did not give rise to a due process claim because "discipline in

20

segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state

21

might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. at 476, 486. The prisoner in Sandin was confined to

22

solitary confinement for twenty-three hours per day, without any opportunity to interact with other

23

inmates. See id. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court found that this period of

24

solitary confinement "did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either

25

duration or degree of restriction," and "did not work a major disruption in [the prisoner's]

26

environment." Id. at 486.

27
28

In the present case, the guilty finding at issue against Petitioner did not lead to solitary
confinement as in Sandin, instead, it resulted in a less-extreme SHU term, during which the Court
4

1

assumes that Petitioner's privileges were limited for an unspecified amount of time. These

2

consequences, while inconvenient, do not significantly changed his confinement. Nor do they create

3

an atypical and significant hardship in Petitioner's daily prison life. Because significantly more

4

restrictive disciplinary actions -- like those in Sandin -- failed to qualify as an atypical and

5

significant deprivation of a conceivable liberty interest, Petitioner fails to establish that he suffered

6

such a deprivation.

7

III.

8

Inevitably Affects Duration of Sentence
As mentioned above, it is undisputed that Petitioner challenges a prison disciplinary finding

which did not result in forfeiture of any time credit and, thus, such a claim cannot impact the

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

9

duration of his sentence. Instead, Petitioner argues that prison officials will rely on his 2009

11

disciplinary violation to give him an "indeterminate SHU sentence" and classify him as a "disruptive

12

inmate." (Opp'n at 3, 7.) However, the presumption of collateral consequences does not apply to

13

prison disciplinary proceedings. See Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 482-83 (9th Cir. 2003). Nor

14

is this a case where the petitioner claims that the administrative detentions may potentially affect the

15

length of his or her confinement due to the increased likelihood of a denial at the next parole

16

suitability hearing. Contra Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding habeas

17

jurisdiction is available "when prison inmates seek only equitable relief in challenging aspects of

18

their parole review that, so long as they prevail, could potentially affect the duration of their

19

confinement").

20

Petitioner's claim that he will be subject to an indeterminate SHU term upon at being

21

classified as a "disruptive inmate" in the future -- possibly as a result of disciplinary violation, which

22

he has not yet received -- is speculative. Moreover, such a claim is not yet ripe for adjudication.

23

Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1998). Finally, as explained above,

24

the temporary SHU term at issue -- that, incidentally, Petitioner has already completed -- is not the

25

type of atypical or significant deprivation that triggers due process protections. See Sandin, 515

26

U.S. at 476, 486.

27
28
5

1

In sum, under the reasoning of Sandin, Petitioner has no protected liberty interest and no

2

federal right to due process based on his challenge to the 2009 disciplinary violation. Without a

3

federal right to due process, Petitioner cannot state a claim for a due process violation. Accordingly,

4

Respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

5
6
7
8

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondent's motion to dismiss (Docket No.
8). This action is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Further, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. Petitioner has not shown "that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

9

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the

11

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

12

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate all pending motions and close the file.

13

This Order terminates Docket No. 8.

14

IT IS SO ORDERED.

15

DATED: March 28, 2013
YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
G:\PRO-SE\YGR\HC.12\Ramirez0872.grantMTD&denyCOA.wpd

6