Thomas v. Hedgpath et al

Filing 41

ORDER OF DISMISSAL. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 1/31/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/31/2014)

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1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Plaintiff, 11 12 13 14 Case No.: C 12-3071 CW (PR) EDWARD THOMAS, ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. Docket no. 27 ANTHONY HEDGPETH, et al., Defendants. 15 INTRODUCTION 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner incarcerated at California State Prison-Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (CSP), has filed a pro 18 19 se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the violation of his constitutional rights by prison officials and 20 medical staff at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP), where he was 21 formerly incarcerated. 22 Plaintiff alleges that he is mentally ill and because of his 23 mental health needs and inability to live compatibly with other 24 prisoners he was placed on single-cell status in 2005. 25 in 2010, prison officials determined that he no longer was 26 entitled to single-cell housing and required that he be housed 27 28 with a cell-mate. In his first amended complaint (1AC), However, On April 5, 2013, the Court issued an Order of Service finding that, construed liberally, these allegations were 1 sufficient to state cognizable Eighth Amendment claims for 2 deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and 3 safety and a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim. 4 no. 10. 5 6 Doc. The Court found that an Equal Protection claim was not cognizable and dismissed it without prejudice. Id. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss based on res judicata, collateral estoppel, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, failure to state a claim 7 and qualified immunity. 8 9 Plaintiff filed an opposition, Defendants filed a reply and Plaintiff filed a “secondary objection” to Defendants’ reply which includes requests for sanctions and United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 appointment of counsel. 11 Plaintiff’s last filing and the Court considers it in deciding 12 this motion.1 13 Defendants have not objected to For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the motion 14 to dismiss based on res judicata and, thus, need not address 15 Defendants’ other grounds for dismissal. BACKGROUND 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 On September 20, 2011, before Plaintiff filed this federal civil rights action, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Monterey County Superior Court, In re Edward Thomas On Habeas Corpus, case number HC 7507. Notice (RJN), Ex. A. Request for Judicial On March 7, 2012, in a written order, the superior court denied the petition. RJN, Ex. E. Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied on May 18, 2012. RJN, 25 26 1 27 28 Defendants’ two requests for judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2) are granted. Doc. nos. 28 and 39. 2 1 Ex. G. 2 rights action. 3 I. State Court Habeas Petition 4 On June 15, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant civil In his state court petition, Plaintiff challenged the June 22, 2011 decision made by the SVSP Unit Classification Committee 6 (UCC) which changed his single-cell housing assignment to double- 7 cell status. 8 challenging the UCC’s decision that he was eligible to be double- 9 celled: (1) his mental illness placed himself and any potential 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 5 cell-mate in imminent danger; (2) he wanted to prevent himself 11 from being subject to disciplinary action in the event his cell- 12 mate brought contraband into the cell, which might lead to a 13 physical confrontation and potential serious physical harm or 14 fatality; and (3) SVSP failed to follow the procedures set forth 15 in the Department Operations Manual (DOM) which requires potential 16 cell-mates to be given the opportunity to speak with each other to 17 determine if they would be compatible cell-mates prior to being 18 housed together. 19 grievance submitted against Defendants, Log No. SVSP 11-00136, in 20 which he challenged the UCC’s June 22, 2010 decision to remove him 21 from single-cell status. 22 order preventing him from a double-cell assignment. 23 Ex. B at 1.2 Plaintiff asserted three grounds for RJN, Ex. E. Petitioner identified his inmate Ex. A at 6. Plaintiff sought a court Id. at 9. On December 6, 2011, the Monterey County Superior Court ruled 24 that Plaintiff’s third ground for relief failed because he failed 25 to set forth a factual basis for the claim that the CDCR had 26 27 28 2 Page numbers refer to the numbers on the Court’s electronic docketing system. 3 1 violated procedures set up in the DOM. 2 it ruled on Plaintiff’s first and second claims, the court 3 requested that the respondent file an informal response addressing 4 the questions: (1) at any time or at any CDCR institution, has 5 there been documentation in Plaintiff’s central file showing that 6 he had been victimized by a prior cell-mate; and (2) was this 7 factor considered by the UCC at the June 22, 2010 hearing? 8 at 3. 9 court with a complete copy of the Classification Chrono dated June United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 RJN, Ex. B at 3. Before Ex. B The court also requested that the respondent provide the 15, 2010.3 11 Both the respondent and Plaintiff filed informal reply 12 briefs. 13 declarations from two inmates, who each said he had been celled 14 with Plaintiff for a while, but Plaintiff’s psychological 15 symptoms, such as talking to himself, hallucinating and pacing the 16 floor at night, made it impossible to continue to be his cell- 17 mate. 18 Exs. C & D. With his reply, Plaintiff submitted Ex. D at 12-16. After review and consideration of the pleadings and 19 documentation presented by the parties, the Monterey County 20 Superior Court found that Plaintiff “failed to state a prima facie 21 case for relief.” 22 and federal authority holding that: 23 24 25 26 27 28 Ex. E at 4. The court applied both California A classification decision must be supported by “some evidence,” and the court may intervene only if a prison official’s classification decision is arbitrary, capricious, irrational or an abuse of discretion. Under the “some 3 A “chrono” is an institutional documentation of information about inmates and their behavior. In re Stoneroad, 215 Cal. App. 4th 596, 606 n.4 (2013) (citing 15 Cal. Code. Regs. § 2000 et seq.). 4 evidence” standard, the requirements of due process are satisfied as long as there is “some basis in fact” for the decision. 1 2 3 4 Ex. E at 4-5 (citing In re Wilson, 202 Cal. App. 3d 661, 666-67 (2002); Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985)). The court reviewed the record and found that, in making its 5 decision to approve Plaintiff for double-cell status, the UCC 6 7 8 9 relied on the evidence that Plaintiff had no history of in-cell violence, sexual predatory behavior or victimization. These were factors that must be considered in determining whether an inmate could be double-celled. 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Id. at 5. Id. The court also addressed Plaintiff’s argument that the UCC 11 had not considered his mental health illness prior to changing him 12 to double-cell status. 13 regulations only required a review of mental health issues if a 14 recommendation for single-cell status was made by a clinician, 15 that Plaintiff had not alleged that such a request had been made 16 nor had he raised the issue and that, in fact, the Psychiatric 17 Services Unit Institutional Classification Committee had 18 determined that Plaintiff was eligible for double-cell status. 19 Id. 20 mental health issues because his record showed that he had been 21 appointed a staff assistant and was taking psychotropic 22 23 24 25 Id. The court noted that the state The court also noted that the UCC was aware of Plaintiff’s medication. Id. Based on its review of the record, the court determined that Plaintiff had “failed to show that the committee’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Id. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. Id. at 6. II. Allegations in Federal Civil Rights Complaint 26 Plaintiff’s 1AC names ten Defendants and contains the 27 following allegations against them. 28 5 1 When Plaintiff was transferred to SVSP on March 30, 2010, 2 Acting Facility Captain-Correctional Counselor R. Burgh4 and 3 Acting Correctional Counselor D. Garcia kept Plaintiff on single- 4 cell status due to Plaintiff’s mental health issues and his 5 classification chrono placing him on single-cell status, which he 6 had since May 19, 2005. 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 However, at a June 22, 2010 UCC hearing, Defendant Burgh and Correctional Counselor J. Martin removed Plaintiff from his single-cell status. 1AC at 11. On January 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal, Log No. SVSP 11-00136, challenging the UCC’s decision to place him on single-cell status. Id. at 12. 11 On February 9, 2011, this appeal was denied at the first level of 12 review by Defendant Burgh and Captain D. Muniz. Id. 13 On February 17, 2011, Plaintiff resubmitted his appeal to the 14 15 16 second level of review. Id. On April 12, 2011, Chief Deputy Warden A. Solis denied it at the second level. Id. at 13. On April 14, 2011, Plaintiff resubmitted this appeal to the third 17 level of review. 18 Warden L. Trexler, Captain N. Walker and Defendant Burgh were 19 “made aware” of Plaintiff’s concern that double-celling would put 20 his life and well-being in jeopardy because of his mental health 21 problems. 22 23 24 25 By this appeal, Warden Hedgpeth, Chief Deputy Id. at 13. On July 14, 2011, Plaintiff’s appeal at the director’s level was denied. Id. at 14. On October 19, 2011, Plaintiff was forced to be celled with inmate William Swanigan. Nine days later Plaintiff had been 26 27 28 4 R. Burgh was both Acting Facility Captain and Acting Correctional Counselor. 6 1 involved in a physical altercation and was re-housed. 2 30, 2011, Plaintiff was forced to be celled with inmate Darrel 3 Hospedale without first being able to speak with him to determine 4 if they would be compatible as cell-mates. On December Id. at 14-15. 5 At some point in time, Plaintiff notified Mental Health 6 Psychiatric Technician Bonilla about his mental health issues and 7 double-celling producing a potentially violent situation. 8 15. 9 health department “no longer makes recommendations for triple CMS Id. at Defendant Bonilla advised Plaintiff that the SVSP mental United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 (CCCMS) inmates to be housed ‘single celled’ . . . and has not 11 done so since 2005.” 12 Id. Plaintiff also makes allegations regarding his gang member 13 status. 14 challenging his classification as a gang member which was granted 15 by Defendants Hedgpeth and Burgh. 16 gang membership and gang status labels were to be removed from 17 Plaintiff’s Central File. 18 was granted, each Defendant has accused Plaintiff of being a gang 19 member and they have continued to house him with a cell-mate who 20 is a gang member or associate, which could place Plaintiff in a 21 volatile situation. 22 On April 22, 2009, Plaintiff filed a 602 appeal Id. Id. at 23. As a result, all However, even though the appeal Id. Plaintiff also alleges, “Because of prior litigation and 23 current litigation against prison staff, the decision to remove 24 [Plaintiff] from his single cell status was done as a retaliatory 25 measure to cause Plaintiff injury . . .” 26 27 Id. at 24. Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities and seeks injunctive relief and damages. 28 7 Id. at 30-31. 1 DISCUSSION 2 Defendants argue that litigation of Plaintiff’s claims is 3 barred by res judicata (claim preclusion) and litigation of 4 Plaintiff’s issues is barred by collateral estoppel (issue 5 preclusion) based on the fact that Plaintiff litigated these same 6 claims and issues in his state habeas proceeding. 7 Under the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1738, federal courts must give a state court judgment the same 9 preclusive effect as the state court judgment would receive by United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 another court of that state. 11 Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004). 12 federal courts to apply the rules chosen by the state which issued 13 the judgment to determine whether claim or issue preclusion 14 applies to a second-filed federal case. 15 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2003). 16 issue and claim preclusion for federal civil rights actions under 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 18 F.2d 781, 788 n.9 (9th Cir. 1986). 19 federal court is subject to principles of issue and claim 20 preclusion by a prior state court judgment. 21 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1980) (issue preclusive effect in federal court of 22 state proceedings is same as that accorded in state’s own courts); 23 Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 24 1981) (“because of the nature of a state habeas proceeding, a 25 decision actually rendered should preclude an identical issue from 26 being relitigated in a subsequent § 1983 action if the state 27 habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to 28 be heard and determined under federal standards”); Clark, 785 F.2d 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Maldonado v. Section 1738 requires Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d There is no exception to the rules of Clark v. Yosemite Community College Dist., 785 8 A § 1983 claim brought in Allen v. McCurry, 449 1 at 786-87 (under res judicata, state judgment bars relitigation of 2 same causes of action in federal § 1983 action). 3 Under California law, claim preclusion applies when: (I) the 4 party to be precluded was a party or in privity with a party to 5 the previous adjudication; (II) the second lawsuit involves the 6 same “cause of action” as the first; and (III) there was a final 7 judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit. 8 Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Employees’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 9 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009). San Diego Police As a result, a “plaintiff cannot avoid United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 the bar of claim preclusion merely by alleging conduct by the 11 defendant not alleged in the prior action, or by pleading a new 12 legal theory.” 13 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 14 I. Identity or Privity of Parties 15 Gonzales v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 782 For res judicata purposes, if the parties in the second 16 lawsuit are not the same as in the original lawsuit, privity is 17 determined based on “whether the non-party is sufficiently close 18 to the original case to afford application of the principle of 19 preclusion.” 20 (1970). 21 relationship to the same rights of property, or to such an 22 identification in interest of one person with another as to 23 24 25 26 People v. Drinkhouse, 4 Cal. App. 3d 931, 937 It is also defined as “a mutual or successive represent the same legal rights.” Citizens for Open Access to Sand and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1069 (1998). In both the state habeas proceeding and this federal civil rights action, Plaintiff alleges that he has wrongfully been 27 classified as eligible for double-cell status when he should be on 28 9 1 single-cell status because of his mental disability. 2 proceedings, Petitioner identified inmate grievance, SVSP log No. 3 11-00136, as support for his claim. 4 reinstatement of his single-cell assignment that was discontinued 5 at the June 22, 2010 UCC hearing, attended by Defendants Burgh and 6 Martin, and an order preventing staff from assigning him a cell- 7 mate due to his mental disability. 8 some of the named Defendants in this action. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 In both This grievance seeks The grievance also mentions For instance Defendants Burgh and Muniz responded to Plaintiff’s inmate appeal of the June 22, 2010 UCC decision at the first level of review and Defendant Solis responded to the appeal at the second level of review. Furthermore, even though the respondent in a habeas 13 proceeding is usually the warden of the petitioner’s penal 14 institution, where a state habeas petition and a federal civil 15 rights claim challenge the same wrong to the same plaintiff by the 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 same prison officials, there is privity between the parties. Gonzales, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 839. See This applies here, where Plaintiff named Warden A. Hedgpeth as the respondent in his habeas petition. See RJN, Ex. A. Plaintiff does not argue that privity does not exist between the defendants in both actions. Thus, the parties involved in both proceedings are either 23 identical or substantially identical under California law so as to 24 be in privity with each other for purposes of res judicata. 25 II. Same Cause of Action 26 For res judicata purposes, California law defines a “cause of 27 action” by analyzing the primary right at stake. 28 Officers’ Ass’n, 568 F.3d at 735. 10 San Diego Police This means that: 1 2 3 if two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief, and/or adds new facts supporting recovery. 4 Id. (quoting Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170 5 (1983). 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The California Supreme Court has defined “cause of action” and “primary right” as follows: A “cause of action” is comprised of a “primary right” of the plaintiff, a corresponding “primary duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty. The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action. A pleading that states the violation of one primary right in two causes of action contravenes the rule against “splitting” a cause of action. . . . The primary right is simply the plaintiff’s right to be free from the particular injury suffered. It must therefore be distinguished from the legal theory on which liability for that injury is premised. Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 681 (1994) (emphasis in original). The primary right claimed in Plaintiff’s state petition and this complaint is the same--it is the constitutional right to be correctly classified as not being capable of sharing a cell with another prisoner while housed at SVSP. Plaintiff alleged in both proceedings that he was improperly given a double-cell assignment by the UCC committee and that decision places him and any potential cell-mate in danger of injury or discipline for any violence that may occur between Plaintiff and the cell-mate. The corresponding duty on Defendants’ part is to classify Plaintiff correctly so that he and a potential cell-mate will not physically harm each other. The alleged harm is the potential physical injury that will result when Plaintiff is housed with an 11 1 “incompatible” cell-mate and the discipline that will result when 2 Plaintiff refuses to be housed with an “incompatible” cell-mate. 3 The fact that Plaintiff submitted the same prisoner grievance and 4 inmate declarations in support of his claims in both proceedings 5 supports the finding that he is claiming a violation of the same 6 right and same injury in both proceedings. 7 Plaintiff argues that the causes of action are different in 8 the two proceedings because in the state petition he did not 9 allege that Defendants violated any of his constitutional rights, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 including the violation of his First Amendment rights based on 11 Defendants’ retaliation against him. 12 The state habeas court construed Plaintiff’s claim as 13 alleging a due process violation because due process jurisprudence 14 afforded the best theory for overturning a ruling of the 15 classification committee. 16 666-67 (1988) (court may intervene in prison classification 17 decision only if the decision is arbitrary, capricious, irrational 18 or an abuse of discretion). 19 case, Superintendent v. Hill, for the proposition that a decision 20 of the UCC must be supported by some evidence to satisfy due 21 process, the court found that there was some evidence to support 22 the UCC’s decision that Plaintiff was qualified for double-cell 23 status and, thus, no due process violation had been committed. 24 See In re Wilson, 202 Cal. App. 3d 661, Citing the United State Supreme Court Because res judicata bars not only the due process claim that 25 was litigated, but all the claims that could have been litigated 26 based on the primary right alleged in the first proceeding, 27 Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and First Amendment claims are also 28 barred. They are based on the violation of the same primary right 12 1 litigated in the state habeas proceeding--to be classified 2 correctly as not capable of sharing a cell with another inmate. 3 See Gonzales, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (res judicata barred not only 4 due process claim based on improper gang validation litigated in 5 state habeas proceeding, but all new legal theories and claims 6 stemming from the same cause of action, such as First Amendment 7 and Equal Protection claims based on same right to be free from 8 improper gang validation). 9 In his civil rights case, Plaintiff also alleges that United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Defendants are placing him in imminent danger by housing him with 11 cell-mates who are gang members or disruptive group members. 12 However, if the cause of action test is satisfied, the same 13 primary right is at stake, even if in the later suit the plaintiff 14 pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of 15 relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery. 16 Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting City of Martinez 17 v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 18 2003)). 19 that Defendants are placing him in imminent danger by double- 20 celling him with dangerous gang members--does not change the 21 primary right alleged, that the UCC’s decision to double-cell him 22 is placing him in imminent danger of harm by allowing him to be 23 double-celled with “incompatible” inmates. 24 III. Final Judgment on the Merits 25 See Brodheim v. The fact that Plaintiff adds new facts in his complaint-- As mentioned above, a decision actually rendered in a state 26 habeas proceeding, after a full and fair hearing, precludes the 27 litigation of the same claims and issues in a federal civil rights 28 case. See Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1993); 13 1 Silverton, 644 F.2d at 1347. 2 “when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did 3 not have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the claim or 4 issue . . . Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is 5 reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of 6 procedures followed in prior litigation.” 7 Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81 & n.22 (1982). 8 federal court is considering the preclusive effect of a state 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 However, res judicata does not apply Kremer v. Chemical Where a court judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the “state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law.” Id. at 481. Plaintiff argues that the state decision on his habeas 13 petition was not a final judgment on the merits. First, Plaintiff 14 argues that it was not a final judgment because he did not 15 “exhaust the habeas corpus action due to the matter(s) could be 16 17 18 processed all the way up the judicial process to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals [sic].” Opp’n at 2, 9. Plaintiff filed a habeas petition in the California Court of 19 Appeal, which denied it on May 18, 2012. 20 could have filed his petition in the California Supreme Court but 21 did not do so. 22 that are filed after “substantial delay.” 23 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2006). 24 standards for determining what period of time constitutes 25 substantial delay, see id., it is likely that any petition 26 Plaintiff files now would be considered substantially delayed. 27 Therefore, it is unlikely that the California Supreme Court would 28 rule on the merits of Plaintiff’s petition. RJN, Ex. G. Plaintiff California’s timeliness rule bars habeas petitions King v. LaMarque, 464 Although there are no fixed 14 And, although 1 Plaintiff argues that he can appeal his petition to the Ninth 2 Circuit, Plaintiff may only appeal to the Ninth Circuit a judgment 3 from a federal district court, not a judgment from the state 4 courts. 5 ruling is not final because he still may appeal lacks merit. 6 Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that the superior court’s Plaintiff argues that he did not have a full and fair 7 opportunity to litigate his claim in the state court. 8 finds that he did. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 The Court After Plaintiff filed his petition in the state superior court, the court requested an informal response from the respondent and ordered the respondent to provide the court with a complete copy of the June 15, 2010 UCC chrono of Plaintiff’s case. The respondent complied and Plaintiff filed an informal response to the respondent’s response. Therefore, when 13 the superior court rendered its decision, it had before it two 14 briefs filed by Plaintiff, the respondent’s informal response, the 15 UCC chrono and decision and Plaintiff’s administrative grievance. 16 17 18 The state superior court considered the arguments raised in Plaintiff’s habeas petition and informal response and, after review, found that some evidence existed to support the UCC’s 19 decision to approve Plaintiff for double-cell status. 20 Ex. E. at 3-5. 21 litigate the issues as required by Kremer, 456 U.S. at 480-81. 22 See RJN, This qualifies as a full and fair opportunity to Plaintiff next argues the state court decision was not a 23 final judgment because he was not allowed to argue the case 24 personally in court and could only submit his arguments on paper. 25 However, a hearing before the court is not necessary to satisfy 26 the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 27 Due Process Clause. 28 “no single model of procedural fairness, let alone a particular As stated by the United States Supreme Court, 15 1 form of procedure is dictated by the Due Process Clause. . . . The 2 very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible 3 procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” 4 Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483. 5 file two briefs in support of his petition, to submit evidence 6 with both briefs and to refute the arguments and evidence 7 proffered by the respondent. 8 petition, where the petitioner is incarcerated, a hearing before 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 Here, Plaintiff had the opportunity to Under the circumstances of a habeas the court is not required in order to provide the petitioner with a full and fair opportunity to present his arguments. Plaintiff had that opportunity before the state superior court. Next, Plaintiff argues that he did not seek monetary compensation in his state habeas proceeding, while he does in this 13 federal civil rights case. Although damages are unavailable in 14 habeas proceedings, this does not exempt Petitioner’s state habeas 15 case from the reach of res judicata. 16 17 18 See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 143, 151 (1978) (litigant “cannot avoid impact of rule against splitting causes of action by choosing for his first foray a tribunal of limited 19 jurisdiction.”). 20 splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same 21 cause of action on a different legal theory or for different 22 relief. . . . A predictable doctrine of res judicata benefits both 23 the parties and the courts because it seeks to curtail multiple 24 litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted 25 effort and expense in judicial administration." 26 Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 897 (2002) (citations and internal 27 quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original). 28 claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a "Res judicata precludes piecemeal litigation by 16 Mycogen Corp. v. Therefore, all 1 single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a 2 later date. 3 barred a plaintiff who prevailed in an action for declaratory 4 relief and specific performance of a contract from pursuing 5 damages in a subsequent action for breach of that same contract. 6 Id. at 904. In Mycogen, the court held that res judicata Based on the foregoing, the denial of Plaintiff’s state 7 8 Id. habeas decision was a final judgment on the merits. For all the above reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 complaint because it is barred by res judicata is GRANTED. 11 the Court need not address Defendants’ other arguments for 12 dismissal based on collateral estoppel, the Rooker-Feldman 13 doctrine, failure to state a claim and qualified immunity. Given this ruling, Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions and 14 15 Thus, appointment of counsel are denied as moot. CONCLUSION 16 17 Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: 18 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on res judicata is 19 GRANTED. 2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the 20 21 Doc. no. 27. file. 22 3. This Order terminates docket number 27. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 Dated: 1/31/2014 ________________________ CLAUDIA WILKEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28 17

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