Thomas v. Hedgpath et al

Filing 41

ORDER OF DISMISSAL. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 1/31/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/31/2014)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff,

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Case No.: C 12-3071 CW (PR)

EDWARD THOMAS,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

v.

Docket no. 27

ANTHONY HEDGPETH, et al.,
Defendants.

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INTRODUCTION

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner incarcerated at California State
Prison-Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (CSP), has filed a pro

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se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the
violation of his constitutional rights by prison officials and

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medical staff at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP), where he was

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formerly incarcerated.

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Plaintiff alleges that he is mentally ill and because of his

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mental health needs and inability to live compatibly with other

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prisoners he was placed on single-cell status in 2005.

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in 2010, prison officials determined that he no longer was

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entitled to single-cell housing and required that he be housed

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with a cell-mate.

In his first amended complaint (1AC),

However,

On April 5, 2013, the Court issued an Order of

Service finding that, construed liberally, these allegations were

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sufficient to state cognizable Eighth Amendment claims for

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deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and

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safety and a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim.

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no. 10.

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Doc.

The Court found that an Equal Protection claim was not

cognizable and dismissed it without prejudice.

Id.

Defendants

have filed a motion to dismiss based on res judicata, collateral
estoppel, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, failure to state a claim

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and qualified immunity.
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Plaintiff filed an opposition, Defendants

filed a reply and Plaintiff filed a “secondary objection” to
Defendants’ reply which includes requests for sanctions and

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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appointment of counsel.

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Plaintiff’s last filing and the Court considers it in deciding

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this motion.1

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Defendants have not objected to

For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the motion

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to dismiss based on res judicata and, thus, need not address

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Defendants’ other grounds for dismissal.
BACKGROUND

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On September 20, 2011, before Plaintiff filed this federal
civil rights action, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Monterey County Superior Court, In re Edward Thomas
On Habeas Corpus, case number HC 7507.
Notice (RJN), Ex. A.

Request for Judicial

On March 7, 2012, in a written order, the

superior court denied the petition.

RJN, Ex. E.

Plaintiff then

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California
Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied on May 18, 2012.

RJN,

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Defendants’ two requests for judicial notice pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2) are granted. Doc. nos. 28 and
39.

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Ex. G.

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rights action.

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I. State Court Habeas Petition

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On June 15, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant civil

In his state court petition, Plaintiff challenged the June
22, 2011 decision made by the SVSP Unit Classification Committee

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(UCC) which changed his single-cell housing assignment to double-

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cell status.

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challenging the UCC’s decision that he was eligible to be double-

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celled: (1) his mental illness placed himself and any potential

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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cell-mate in imminent danger; (2) he wanted to prevent himself

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from being subject to disciplinary action in the event his cell-

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mate brought contraband into the cell, which might lead to a

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physical confrontation and potential serious physical harm or

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fatality; and (3) SVSP failed to follow the procedures set forth

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in the Department Operations Manual (DOM) which requires potential

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cell-mates to be given the opportunity to speak with each other to

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determine if they would be compatible cell-mates prior to being

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housed together.

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grievance submitted against Defendants, Log No. SVSP 11-00136, in

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which he challenged the UCC’s June 22, 2010 decision to remove him

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from single-cell status.

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order preventing him from a double-cell assignment.

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Ex. B at 1.2

Plaintiff asserted three grounds for

RJN, Ex. E.

Petitioner identified his inmate

Ex. A at 6.

Plaintiff sought a court
Id. at 9.

On December 6, 2011, the Monterey County Superior Court ruled

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that Plaintiff’s third ground for relief failed because he failed

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to set forth a factual basis for the claim that the CDCR had

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Page numbers refer to the numbers on the Court’s electronic
docketing system.

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violated procedures set up in the DOM.

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it ruled on Plaintiff’s first and second claims, the court

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requested that the respondent file an informal response addressing

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the questions: (1) at any time or at any CDCR institution, has

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there been documentation in Plaintiff’s central file showing that

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he had been victimized by a prior cell-mate; and (2) was this

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factor considered by the UCC at the June 22, 2010 hearing?

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at 3.

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court with a complete copy of the Classification Chrono dated June

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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RJN, Ex. B at 3.

Before

Ex. B

The court also requested that the respondent provide the

15, 2010.3

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Both the respondent and Plaintiff filed informal reply

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briefs.

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declarations from two inmates, who each said he had been celled

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with Plaintiff for a while, but Plaintiff’s psychological

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symptoms, such as talking to himself, hallucinating and pacing the

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floor at night, made it impossible to continue to be his cell-

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mate.

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Exs. C & D.

With his reply, Plaintiff submitted

Ex. D at 12-16.
After review and consideration of the pleadings and

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documentation presented by the parties, the Monterey County

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Superior Court found that Plaintiff “failed to state a prima facie

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case for relief.”

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and federal authority holding that:

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Ex. E at 4.

The court applied both California

A classification decision must be supported by “some
evidence,” and the court may intervene only if a prison
official’s classification decision is arbitrary, capricious,
irrational or an abuse of discretion. Under the “some
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A “chrono” is an institutional documentation of information
about inmates and their behavior. In re Stoneroad, 215 Cal. App.
4th 596, 606 n.4 (2013) (citing 15 Cal. Code. Regs. § 2000 et
seq.).

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evidence” standard, the requirements of due process are
satisfied as long as there is “some basis in fact” for the
decision.

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Ex. E at 4-5 (citing In re Wilson, 202 Cal. App. 3d 661, 666-67
(2002); Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985)).
The court reviewed the record and found that, in making its

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decision to approve Plaintiff for double-cell status, the UCC
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relied on the evidence that Plaintiff had no history of in-cell
violence, sexual predatory behavior or victimization.

These were factors that must be considered in determining whether
an inmate could be double-celled.

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

Id. at 5.

Id.

The court also addressed Plaintiff’s argument that the UCC

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had not considered his mental health illness prior to changing him

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to double-cell status.

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regulations only required a review of mental health issues if a

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recommendation for single-cell status was made by a clinician,

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that Plaintiff had not alleged that such a request had been made

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nor had he raised the issue and that, in fact, the Psychiatric

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Services Unit Institutional Classification Committee had

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determined that Plaintiff was eligible for double-cell status.

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Id.

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mental health issues because his record showed that he had been

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appointed a staff assistant and was taking psychotropic

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Id.

The court noted that the state

The court also noted that the UCC was aware of Plaintiff’s

medication.

Id.

Based on its review of the record, the court

determined that Plaintiff had “failed to show that the committee’s
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”
Id.

Accordingly, the court denied the petition.

Id. at 6.

II. Allegations in Federal Civil Rights Complaint
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Plaintiff’s 1AC names ten Defendants and contains the
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following allegations against them.
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When Plaintiff was transferred to SVSP on March 30, 2010,

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Acting Facility Captain-Correctional Counselor R. Burgh4 and

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Acting Correctional Counselor D. Garcia kept Plaintiff on single-

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cell status due to Plaintiff’s mental health issues and his

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classification chrono placing him on single-cell status, which he

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had since May 19, 2005.

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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However, at a June 22, 2010 UCC hearing, Defendant Burgh and
Correctional Counselor J. Martin removed Plaintiff from his
single-cell status.

1AC at 11.

On January 8, 2011, Plaintiff

filed an administrative appeal, Log No. SVSP 11-00136, challenging
the UCC’s decision to place him on single-cell status. Id. at 12.

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On February 9, 2011, this appeal was denied at the first level of
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review by Defendant Burgh and Captain D. Muniz.

Id.

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On February 17, 2011, Plaintiff resubmitted his appeal to the
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second level of review.

Id.

On April 12, 2011, Chief Deputy

Warden A. Solis denied it at the second level.

Id. at 13.

On

April 14, 2011, Plaintiff resubmitted this appeal to the third

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level of review.

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Warden L. Trexler, Captain N. Walker and Defendant Burgh were

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“made aware” of Plaintiff’s concern that double-celling would put

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his life and well-being in jeopardy because of his mental health

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problems.

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By this appeal, Warden Hedgpeth, Chief Deputy

Id. at 13.

On July 14, 2011, Plaintiff’s appeal at the director’s level
was denied.

Id. at 14.

On October 19, 2011, Plaintiff was forced to be celled with
inmate William Swanigan.

Nine days later Plaintiff had been

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R. Burgh was both Acting Facility Captain and Acting
Correctional Counselor.

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involved in a physical altercation and was re-housed.

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30, 2011, Plaintiff was forced to be celled with inmate Darrel

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Hospedale without first being able to speak with him to determine

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if they would be compatible as cell-mates.

On December

Id. at 14-15.

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At some point in time, Plaintiff notified Mental Health

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Psychiatric Technician Bonilla about his mental health issues and

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double-celling producing a potentially violent situation.

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15.

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health department “no longer makes recommendations for triple CMS

Id. at

Defendant Bonilla advised Plaintiff that the SVSP mental

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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(CCCMS) inmates to be housed ‘single celled’ . . . and has not

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done so since 2005.”

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Id.

Plaintiff also makes allegations regarding his gang member

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status.

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challenging his classification as a gang member which was granted

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by Defendants Hedgpeth and Burgh.

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gang membership and gang status labels were to be removed from

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Plaintiff’s Central File.

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was granted, each Defendant has accused Plaintiff of being a gang

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member and they have continued to house him with a cell-mate who

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is a gang member or associate, which could place Plaintiff in a

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volatile situation.

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On April 22, 2009, Plaintiff filed a 602 appeal

Id.

Id. at 23.

As a result, all

However, even though the appeal

Id.

Plaintiff also alleges, “Because of prior litigation and

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current litigation against prison staff, the decision to remove

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[Plaintiff] from his single cell status was done as a retaliatory

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measure to cause Plaintiff injury . . .”

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Id. at 24.

Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official
capacities and seeks injunctive relief and damages.

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Id. at 30-31.

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DISCUSSION

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Defendants argue that litigation of Plaintiff’s claims is

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barred by res judicata (claim preclusion) and litigation of

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Plaintiff’s issues is barred by collateral estoppel (issue

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preclusion) based on the fact that Plaintiff litigated these same

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claims and issues in his state habeas proceeding.

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Under the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1738, federal courts must give a state court judgment the same

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preclusive effect as the state court judgment would receive by

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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another court of that state.

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Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004).

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federal courts to apply the rules chosen by the state which issued

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the judgment to determine whether claim or issue preclusion

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applies to a second-filed federal case.

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1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2003).

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issue and claim preclusion for federal civil rights actions under

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42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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F.2d 781, 788 n.9 (9th Cir. 1986).

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federal court is subject to principles of issue and claim

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preclusion by a prior state court judgment.

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U.S. 90, 97-98 (1980) (issue preclusive effect in federal court of

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state proceedings is same as that accorded in state’s own courts);

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Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir.

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1981) (“because of the nature of a state habeas proceeding, a

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decision actually rendered should preclude an identical issue from

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being relitigated in a subsequent § 1983 action if the state

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habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to

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be heard and determined under federal standards”); Clark, 785 F.2d

28 U.S.C. § 1738; Maldonado v.
Section 1738 requires

Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d

There is no exception to the rules of

Clark v. Yosemite Community College Dist., 785

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A § 1983 claim brought in

Allen v. McCurry, 449

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at 786-87 (under res judicata, state judgment bars relitigation of

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same causes of action in federal § 1983 action).

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Under California law, claim preclusion applies when: (I) the

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party to be precluded was a party or in privity with a party to

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the previous adjudication; (II) the second lawsuit involves the

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same “cause of action” as the first; and (III) there was a final

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judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit.

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Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Employees’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d

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725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009).

San Diego Police

As a result, a “plaintiff cannot avoid

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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the bar of claim preclusion merely by alleging conduct by the

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defendant not alleged in the prior action, or by pleading a new

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legal theory.”

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F. Supp. 2d 834, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

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I. Identity or Privity of Parties

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Gonzales v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 782

For res judicata purposes, if the parties in the second

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lawsuit are not the same as in the original lawsuit, privity is

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determined based on “whether the non-party is sufficiently close

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to the original case to afford application of the principle of

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preclusion.”

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(1970).

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relationship to the same rights of property, or to such an

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identification in interest of one person with another as to

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People v. Drinkhouse, 4 Cal. App. 3d 931, 937

It is also defined as “a mutual or successive

represent the same legal rights.”

Citizens for Open Access to

Sand and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1069
(1998).
In both the state habeas proceeding and this federal civil
rights action, Plaintiff alleges that he has wrongfully been

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classified as eligible for double-cell status when he should be on
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single-cell status because of his mental disability.

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proceedings, Petitioner identified inmate grievance, SVSP log No.

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11-00136, as support for his claim.

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reinstatement of his single-cell assignment that was discontinued

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at the June 22, 2010 UCC hearing, attended by Defendants Burgh and

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Martin, and an order preventing staff from assigning him a cell-

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mate due to his mental disability.

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some of the named Defendants in this action.

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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In both

This grievance seeks

The grievance also mentions
For instance

Defendants Burgh and Muniz responded to Plaintiff’s inmate appeal
of the June 22, 2010 UCC decision at the first level of review and
Defendant Solis responded to the appeal at the second level of
review.
Furthermore, even though the respondent in a habeas

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proceeding is usually the warden of the petitioner’s penal
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institution, where a state habeas petition and a federal civil
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rights claim challenge the same wrong to the same plaintiff by the
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same prison officials, there is privity between the parties.
Gonzales, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 839.

See

This applies here, where

Plaintiff named Warden A. Hedgpeth as the respondent in his habeas
petition.

See RJN, Ex. A.

Plaintiff does not argue that privity does not exist between
the defendants in both actions.
Thus, the parties involved in both proceedings are either

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identical or substantially identical under California law so as to

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be in privity with each other for purposes of res judicata.

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II. Same Cause of Action

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For res judicata purposes, California law defines a “cause of

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action” by analyzing the primary right at stake.

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Officers’ Ass’n, 568 F.3d at 735.
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San Diego Police

This means that:

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if two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and
the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right
is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads
different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of
relief, and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.

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Id. (quoting Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170

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(1983).

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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The California Supreme Court has defined “cause of action”
and “primary right” as follows:
A “cause of action” is comprised of a “primary right” of the
plaintiff, a corresponding “primary duty” of the defendant,
and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of
that duty. The most salient characteristic of a primary
right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a single
primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action. A
pleading that states the violation of one primary right in
two causes of action contravenes the rule against “splitting”
a cause of action. . . . The primary right is simply the
plaintiff’s right to be free from the particular injury
suffered. It must therefore be distinguished from the legal
theory on which liability for that injury is premised.
Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 681 (1994) (emphasis in
original).
The primary right claimed in Plaintiff’s state petition and
this complaint is the same--it is the constitutional right to be
correctly classified as not being capable of sharing a cell with
another prisoner while housed at SVSP.

Plaintiff alleged in both

proceedings that he was improperly given a double-cell assignment
by the UCC committee and that decision places him and any
potential cell-mate in danger of injury or discipline for any
violence that may occur between Plaintiff and the cell-mate.

The

corresponding duty on Defendants’ part is to classify Plaintiff
correctly so that he and a potential cell-mate will not physically
harm each other.

The alleged harm is the potential physical

injury that will result when Plaintiff is housed with an

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“incompatible” cell-mate and the discipline that will result when

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Plaintiff refuses to be housed with an “incompatible” cell-mate.

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The fact that Plaintiff submitted the same prisoner grievance and

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inmate declarations in support of his claims in both proceedings

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supports the finding that he is claiming a violation of the same

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right and same injury in both proceedings.

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Plaintiff argues that the causes of action are different in

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the two proceedings because in the state petition he did not

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allege that Defendants violated any of his constitutional rights,

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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including the violation of his First Amendment rights based on

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Defendants’ retaliation against him.

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The state habeas court construed Plaintiff’s claim as

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alleging a due process violation because due process jurisprudence

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afforded the best theory for overturning a ruling of the

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classification committee.

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666-67 (1988) (court may intervene in prison classification

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decision only if the decision is arbitrary, capricious, irrational

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or an abuse of discretion).

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case, Superintendent v. Hill, for the proposition that a decision

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of the UCC must be supported by some evidence to satisfy due

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process, the court found that there was some evidence to support

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the UCC’s decision that Plaintiff was qualified for double-cell

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status and, thus, no due process violation had been committed.

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See In re Wilson, 202 Cal. App. 3d 661,

Citing the United State Supreme Court

Because res judicata bars not only the due process claim that

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was litigated, but all the claims that could have been litigated

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based on the primary right alleged in the first proceeding,

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Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and First Amendment claims are also

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barred.

They are based on the violation of the same primary right
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litigated in the state habeas proceeding--to be classified

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correctly as not capable of sharing a cell with another inmate.

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See Gonzales, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (res judicata barred not only

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due process claim based on improper gang validation litigated in

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state habeas proceeding, but all new legal theories and claims

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stemming from the same cause of action, such as First Amendment

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and Equal Protection claims based on same right to be free from

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improper gang validation).

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In his civil rights case, Plaintiff also alleges that

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Defendants are placing him in imminent danger by housing him with

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cell-mates who are gang members or disruptive group members.

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However, if the cause of action test is satisfied, the same

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primary right is at stake, even if in the later suit the plaintiff

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pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of

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relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.

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Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting City of Martinez

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v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir.

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2003)).

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that Defendants are placing him in imminent danger by double-

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celling him with dangerous gang members--does not change the

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primary right alleged, that the UCC’s decision to double-cell him

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is placing him in imminent danger of harm by allowing him to be

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double-celled with “incompatible” inmates.

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III. Final Judgment on the Merits

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See Brodheim v.

The fact that Plaintiff adds new facts in his complaint--

As mentioned above, a decision actually rendered in a state

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habeas proceeding, after a full and fair hearing, precludes the

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litigation of the same claims and issues in a federal civil rights

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case.

See Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1993);
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Silverton, 644 F.2d at 1347.

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“when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did

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not have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the claim or

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issue . . . Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is

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reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of

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procedures followed in prior litigation.”

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Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81 & n.22 (1982).

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federal court is considering the preclusive effect of a state

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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However, res judicata does not apply

Kremer v. Chemical
Where a

court judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the “state proceedings need
do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in order to qualify for
the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law.”

Id. at 481.

Plaintiff argues that the state decision on his habeas
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petition was not a final judgment on the merits.

First, Plaintiff

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argues that it was not a final judgment because he did not
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“exhaust the habeas corpus action due to the matter(s) could be
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processed all the way up the judicial process to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals [sic].”

Opp’n at 2, 9.

Plaintiff filed a habeas petition in the California Court of

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Appeal, which denied it on May 18, 2012.

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could have filed his petition in the California Supreme Court but

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did not do so.

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that are filed after “substantial delay.”

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F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2006).

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standards for determining what period of time constitutes

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substantial delay, see id., it is likely that any petition

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Plaintiff files now would be considered substantially delayed.

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Therefore, it is unlikely that the California Supreme Court would

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rule on the merits of Plaintiff’s petition.

RJN, Ex. G.

Plaintiff

California’s timeliness rule bars habeas petitions
King v. LaMarque, 464

Although there are no fixed

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And, although

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Plaintiff argues that he can appeal his petition to the Ninth

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Circuit, Plaintiff may only appeal to the Ninth Circuit a judgment

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from a federal district court, not a judgment from the state

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courts.

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ruling is not final because he still may appeal lacks merit.

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Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that the superior court’s

Plaintiff argues that he did not have a full and fair

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opportunity to litigate his claim in the state court.

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finds that he did.

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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The Court

After Plaintiff filed his petition in the

state superior court, the court requested an informal response
from the respondent and ordered the respondent to provide the
court with a complete copy of the June 15, 2010 UCC chrono of
Plaintiff’s case.

The respondent complied and Plaintiff filed an

informal response to the respondent’s response.

Therefore, when

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the superior court rendered its decision, it had before it two
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briefs filed by Plaintiff, the respondent’s informal response, the
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UCC chrono and decision and Plaintiff’s administrative grievance.
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The state superior court considered the arguments raised in
Plaintiff’s habeas petition and informal response and, after
review, found that some evidence existed to support the UCC’s

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decision to approve Plaintiff for double-cell status.

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Ex. E. at 3-5.

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litigate the issues as required by Kremer, 456 U.S. at 480-81.

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See RJN,

This qualifies as a full and fair opportunity to

Plaintiff next argues the state court decision was not a

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final judgment because he was not allowed to argue the case

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personally in court and could only submit his arguments on paper.

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However, a hearing before the court is not necessary to satisfy

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the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s

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Due Process Clause.

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“no single model of procedural fairness, let alone a particular

As stated by the United States Supreme Court,

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form of procedure is dictated by the Due Process Clause. . . . The

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very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible

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procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.”

4

Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483.

5

file two briefs in support of his petition, to submit evidence

6

with both briefs and to refute the arguments and evidence

7

proffered by the respondent.

8

petition, where the petitioner is incarcerated, a hearing before

9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11
12

Here, Plaintiff had the opportunity to

Under the circumstances of a habeas

the court is not required in order to provide the petitioner with
a full and fair opportunity to present his arguments.

Plaintiff

had that opportunity before the state superior court.
Next, Plaintiff argues that he did not seek monetary
compensation in his state habeas proceeding, while he does in this

13
federal civil rights case.

Although damages are unavailable in

14
habeas proceedings, this does not exempt Petitioner’s state habeas
15
case from the reach of res judicata.
16
17
18

See City of Los Angeles v.

Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 143, 151 (1978) (litigant “cannot
avoid impact of rule against splitting causes of action by
choosing for his first foray a tribunal of limited

19

jurisdiction.”).

20

splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same

21

cause of action on a different legal theory or for different

22

relief. . . . A predictable doctrine of res judicata benefits both

23

the parties and the courts because it seeks to curtail multiple

24

litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted

25

effort and expense in judicial administration."

26

Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 897 (2002) (citations and internal

27

quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).

28

claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a

"Res judicata precludes piecemeal litigation by

16

Mycogen Corp. v.

Therefore, all

1

single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a

2

later date.

3

barred a plaintiff who prevailed in an action for declaratory

4

relief and specific performance of a contract from pursuing

5

damages in a subsequent action for breach of that same contract.

6

Id. at 904.

In Mycogen, the court held that res judicata

Based on the foregoing, the denial of Plaintiff’s state

7
8

Id.

habeas decision was a final judgment on the merits.
For all the above reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

complaint because it is barred by res judicata is GRANTED.

11

the Court need not address Defendants’ other arguments for

12

dismissal based on collateral estoppel, the Rooker-Feldman

13

doctrine, failure to state a claim and qualified immunity.
Given this ruling, Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions and

14
15

Thus,

appointment of counsel are denied as moot.
CONCLUSION

16
17

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

18

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on res judicata is

19

GRANTED.

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the

20
21

Doc. no. 27.

file.

22

3. This Order terminates docket number 27.

23

IT IS SO ORDERED.

24
25

Dated:

1/31/2014

________________________
CLAUDIA WILKEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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27
28
17