Martinez v. Chappell

Filing 11

ORDER OF DISMISSAL, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton on 2/11/13. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(nah, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/11/2013)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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SANTIAGO MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,

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vs.

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ORDER OF DISMISSAL

KEVIN R. CHAPPELL,
Defendants.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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No. C 12-4356 PJH (PR)

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Plaintiff, a prisoner at San Quentin State Prison, filed a pro se civil rights complaint
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend
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and plaintiff has submitted a new filing that the court construes as an amended complaint.
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DISCUSSION
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A.

Standard of Review

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Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners
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seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and
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dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may
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be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at
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1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
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Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of
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the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;
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the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the
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grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations
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omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual

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allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'

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requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

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cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

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above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

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(citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained

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the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the

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framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are

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well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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1937, 1950 (2009).

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

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elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

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violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

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color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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B.

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Legal Claims
While plaintiff has not specifically described his claims in the amended complaint, for

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purposes of this Order, the court will incorporate his arguments from the original complaint

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that it appears he intends to assert. Plaintiff alleges a violation of due process resulting

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from the mandatory restitution fines arising from his conviction. Plaintiff seeks a return of

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his money and to stop the restitution.

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In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held

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that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

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imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

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conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

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been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

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tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's

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issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 486-487. A claim for damages arising from a
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conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under section

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1983. Id.

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When a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the district court must

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consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of

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her continued confinement; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff

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can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Id. at 487.

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Plaintiff is challenging the validity of the restitution aspect of his conviction, but the

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conviction has not been invalidated, so this claim must be dismissed. See Trimble v. City

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of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995).
Even looking to the merits of plaintiff’s claim, it does not warrant relief as state law

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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provides for restitution and plaintiff’s restitution is appropriate. California Penal Code §§

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2085.5(a) and (b) permit CDCR to deduct up to 50% of a prisoner's wage and trust account

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deposits and use those funds to pay off that prisoner's restitution. The entirety of this 50%

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deduction must be applied to that prisoner's restitution. California Penal Code § 2085.5(c)

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permits CDCR to deduct an additional amount, up to 10% of the amount deducted under

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subdivision (a) or (b), as an administrative fee. Thus, one subdivision authorizes a 50%

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deduction that is applied toward restitution and an entirely separate subdivision authorizes

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an additional deduction that is paid as an administrative fee. The amount of the second

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deduction is equal to 10% of the amount of the first deduction. Thus, if the prison deducts

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50% under subdivision (a) or (b) for restitution, subdivision (c) authorizes prison officials to

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deduct an additional 10% of that amount. The two amounts taken together would add up to

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55% of the wage and trust account deposit as in plaintiff’s case

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To the extent the complaint could raise an Eighth Amendment violation, any claim

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would fail. The Excessive Fines clause limits the government's power to extract payments

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(in kind or in cash) as punishment for some offense. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.

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321, 324 (1998). The Eighth Amendment is implicated if a sanction has a retributive or

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deterrent purpose in addition to a remedial purpose. United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d

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1141, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the similar federal Mandatory Victims Restitution
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Act serves both a remedial and a deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributive purpose, so that

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restitution under the Act is punishment implicating the Eighth Amendment). “[J]udgments

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about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the

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legislature.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336 (citation omitted). Only a grossly disproportionate

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amount will raise an Eighth Amendment excessive fines concern. Id. at 334 (“A punitive

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forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of

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a defendant's offense”). Plaintiff has not set forth any arguments that the restitution is

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grossly disproportionate.

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The complaint will be dismissed and as plaintiff has already been provided an
opportunity to amend and as it is clear no amount of amendment would cure the

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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deficiencies of this action, the case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 11, 2013.
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge

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