Martinez v. Chappell

Filing 9

ORDER OF DISMISSAL, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton on 4/8/13. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(nah, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/8/2013)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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SANTIAGO MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,

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vs.

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ORDER OF DISMISSAL

KEVIN R. CHAPPELL,
Defendant.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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No. C 12-6164 PJH (PR)

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint. The first amended

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complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff has filed a second amended

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complaint.

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DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

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seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

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dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

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be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at

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1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

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Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of

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the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;

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the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the

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grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations

allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'

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requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

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cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

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above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

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(citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained

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the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the

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framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are

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well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

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For the Northern District of California

omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual

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United States District Court

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whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

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1937, 1950 (2009).

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

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elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

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violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

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color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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B.

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Legal Claims
In the prior complaint plaintiff stated that doctors had stopped prescribing him

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Tramadol for pain and instead prescribed Acetaminophen, which was not sufficient to

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control his back pain. Plaintiff had been prescribed Tramadol but a blood test indicated that

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there was no Tramadol in plaintiff’s system which was indicative of not taking the

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medication and in violation of the medication agreement between the prison and inmates.

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Plaintiff has been provided leave to amend on two separate occasions to demonstrate

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deliberate indifference on behalf of defendants, not just that he disagreed with their

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treatment plan.

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Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's

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proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

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(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other
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grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

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A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

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seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to

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that need. Id. at 1059.

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A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could

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result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. The

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existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

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comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an

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individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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indications that a prisoner has a "serious" need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60.
A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a

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substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps

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to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only

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“be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

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harm exists,” but he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have

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been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

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Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175,

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1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison

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medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v.

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Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

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In this case, plaintiff focuses on the difference of opinion with his medical providers,

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but this alone fails to state a claim. See Franklin. While plaintiff has now presented some

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allegations regarding the ill effects of just taking Acetaminophen, back locks, pain and

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depression, at most he has described negligence, but not deliberate indifference, especially

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as there was a dispute if he was even taking the medication when it was prescribed. "[A]

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complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

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that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

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"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
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to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

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Id. Plaintiff’s brief allegations in the second amended complaint fail to meet this standard to

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demonstrate an Eighth Amendment claim.

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Moreover, in this complaint plaintiff identifies as defendants, Dr. Grant and Dr.

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Jones. Plaintiff does not allege that these doctors discontinued his medication or even

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treated him. He simply states that these doctors were aware of his medical problems

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based on his records and are therefore liable as his medication was discontinued. This

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conclusory statement is insufficient and plaintiff has failed to connect these defendants to

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the alleged constitutional deprivation. As plaintiff has already been provided several
opportunities to amend, and has still failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the court,

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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this case is dismissed with prejudice.

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: April 8, 2013.
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge

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