Reyes v. Sayre et al
Filing
38
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' ( 27 , 30 , 31 , 32 ) MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ***Civil Case Terminated.*** Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 9/8/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/8/2014)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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GABRIEL RALPH REYES,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
Case No.: C 13-0620 CW (PR)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Doc. nos. 27, 30-32
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
MICHAEL SAYRE, MD, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Plaintiff Gabriel Ralph Reyes, a state prisoner currently
incarcerated at California State Prison——Sacramento, filed this
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pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
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constitutional violations by four individuals employed at Pelican
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Bay State Prison (PBSP), where he was previously incarcerated.
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Specifically, Plaintiff claims that a fourteen-day discontinuance
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of Tylenol #3, which caused him to have withdrawal symptoms,
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constitutes deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
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Defendants filed four separate motions for summary judgment, which
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are fully briefed.
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motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.
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For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’
BACKGROUND
The following facts are from Plaintiff’s verified complaint
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and opposition and the parties' declarations and exhibits.
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where noted, the facts are undisputed.
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Except
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I. Dr. Williams
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Plaintiff suffers from several chronic medical conditions,
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including chronic pain.
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his chronic pain, Plaintiff has been prescribed both narcotic and
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non-narcotic medications and a pain patch.
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2009, Defendant Dr. Claire Williams, who was Plaintiff's primary
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care provider (PCP), prescribed for Plaintiff's pain Tylenol #3
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with Codeine, two tablets twice a day.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Williams Decl. ¶ 6; Reyes Decl. ¶ 2.
Id.
For
Since April 21,
Id. ¶ 10.
Codeine is an
opioid that has a moderate potential for addiction.
Id., Ex. G
(California Prison Health Care Services 2009 Pain Management
Guidelines) at 16.
On August 30, 2009, Plaintiff received a medical consultation
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with a pain management specialist, Dr. Capitano.
Williams Decl.
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¶ 8.
Dr. Capitano recommended that Plaintiff be prescribed
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Trileptal, a non-narcotic pain medication, starting at 50 mg to a
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maximum of 600 mg per day.
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Id.
On October 23, 2009, Dr. Williams
reviewed Dr. Capitano's recommendations and added Trileptal, 50 mg
a day, to Plaintiff's pain regimen.
Id. ¶ 9.
Dr. Williams
continued to see Plaintiff for follow-up visits and increased the
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dosage of the Trileptal because Plaintiff reported that the lower
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dosage was not helping his pain.
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Id. ¶¶ 10-13.
On April 2, 2010, Dr. Williams again examined Plaintiff.
Id.
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¶ 14.
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learned that the California Department of Corrections and
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Rehabilitation (CDCR) had modified its statewide chronic pain
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medication protocol in an effort to curb the overuse of narcotic
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medications by inmates.
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the use of narcotic medications, such as Tylenol #3, and
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substituting non-narcotic pain medications when medically
Dr. Williams states that, prior to Plaintiff's visit, she
Id.
The new protocol involved limiting
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appropriate.
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increased Plaintiff's Trileptal to 400 mg three times a day for
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pain control, cancelled his prescription for Tylenol #3 and
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scheduled a follow-up visit in two weeks.
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Dr. Williams' medical note for this visit states, "The use of Tyl.
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#3 was discontinued by Sacramento so he is here for an alternate
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treatment plan."
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disputes that there was such a new pain management protocol
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Id.
In accordance with this protocol, Dr. Williams
Id.; Reyes Decl. ¶ 11.
Williams Decl., Ex. A at 453.
Plaintiff
because Dr. Williams does not submit it as evidence.
Plaintiff states that, at his April 2, 2010 follow-up visit,
Dr. Williams told him that she was decreasing his Tylenol #3
pursuant to orders from Dr. Sayre, who, at that time, was Chief
Medical Officer (CMO) at PBSP.
Reyes Opp. ¶ 9.
Plaintiff states
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that he told Dr. Williams that he needed Tylenol #3 to manage his
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chronic pain and that his current regimen of medications was the
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best he had experienced.
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Reyes Decl. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff also
reminded Dr. Williams that he had been taking a high dose of
Tylenol #3 for a long time and, because of this, he was worried
about withdrawal symptoms and requested that she slowly reduce the
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Tylenol #3.
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replied, "I'm sorry, my hands are tied.
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I have an email from him ordering me to cancel your medication,"
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and also said that she was not going to give Plaintiff anything
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for withdrawal symptoms because, "that's the consequences of long
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term use of Narcotic Pain Medication, now your [sic] just going to
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have to pay the Piper."
Id. ¶ 13.
According to Plaintiff, Dr. Williams
The CMO is in charge. . .
Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.
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In her declaration, Dr. Williams states that the reason she
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discontinued Plaintiff's Tylenol #3 was because of the new state
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protocol, but she does not specifically dispute Plaintiff's
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statements that she said Dr. Sayre ordered her to discontinue
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Plaintiff's Tylenol #3 or that she told Plaintiff that withdrawal
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symptoms were the consequences of his use of Tylenol #3.
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Decl. ¶ 14.
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Williams
Immediately after Dr. Williams discontinued Plaintiff's
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Tylenol #3, Plaintiff experienced pain and withdrawal symptoms
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such as muscle cramps, loss of appetite, vomiting, severe
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diarrhea, hallucinations, loss of sleep and hot and cold flashes.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Reyes Decl. ¶ 20.
fourteen days.
Plaintiff suffered like this for approximately
Id. ¶ 23.
physically and mentally.
Plaintiff lost weight and was exhausted
Id.
After forty-eight hours of suffering from withdrawal
symptoms, Plaintiff submitted a health care request form seeking
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medical help.
Id. ¶ 17.
In response to this request, on April 5,
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2010, Plaintiff was seen by Registered Nurse (RN) Heather
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Williams.
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Id. ¶ 19.
RN Williams noted that Plaintiff looked
strange and stated, "Reyes, are you OK?
Can you sit up?"
Williams left the room to consult with Dr. Adams.
RN Williams' Progress Notes.
Id.
RN
Id. at Ex. G.,
When RN Williams returned, she
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prescribed medication for Plaintiff's nausea and regular Tylenol
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for Plaintiff's fever and pain.
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two-day prescription, which did not help his symptoms.
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Id. ¶ 19.
Plaintiff received a
Id.
On April 16, 2010, fourteen days after Dr. Williams
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discontinued Plaintiff's Tylenol #3 prescription, Dr. Williams saw
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Plaintiff again and re-prescribed Tylenol #3.
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According to Plaintiff, Dr. Williams stated, "It was a mistake to
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take you off your medication the way that it was done."
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night, Plaintiff received the same dosage of Tylenol #3 he had
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been receiving before Dr. Williams discontinued it.
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Id. ¶ 24.
Id.
Id.
That
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Dr. Williams states that, when she saw Plaintiff on April 16,
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2010 for a follow-up visit, he told her that his chronic pain was
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not adequately controlled, that he was experiencing pain in his
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upper back and arms and decreased sensation in his right
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fingertips and that the increase in Trileptal had not helped him.
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Williams Decl. ¶ 15.
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did not observe any adverse effects from the discontinuance of
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Tylenol #3 for two weeks but, given Plaintiff's indication that he
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Dr. Williams states that, clinically, she
was in pain, she decreased his Trileptal to 200 mg a day and
restarted him on Tylenol #3.
Id.
In her medical progress note,
Dr. Williams wrote, "The restrictions on Tyl. #3 have been lifted
and it is now up to the PCP if he wants to use it for long term
pain so I will decrease his Trileptal back to 200 mg . . . and
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restart his Tyl. #3 at two BID."
Id., Ex. A at 487.
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Dr. Williams states that, based upon her examination of
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Plaintiff, his clinical presentations, her review of his record
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and the nature of his chronic pain symptoms, the medical care he
received for his chronic pain complaints was proper and
appropriate.
Id. ¶ 16.
II. Medical Guidelines
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In support of his claims, Plaintiff submits the 2009 Pain
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Management Guidelines from the State of California Prison Health
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Care Services.
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indicates, "Physical dependence is a common feature of opioids,
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corticosteroids, barbiturates, benzodiazepines and anti-
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hypertensive's," and that "physical dependence is easily managed
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by gradually tapering the drug if it is no longer needed."
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at 8.
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tapering of drugs that no longer meet treatment goals.
Reyes Decl., Ex. G.
Plaintiff cites page 8, which
Ex. G
Plaintiff points to other guidelines which urge the
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See e.g.,
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Ex. G at 13, 24, 36 ("If a patient has been on a significant dose
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of opioid for more than a couple of weeks, when discontinuing
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consider short taper of opioid to avoid withdrawal symptoms.").
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The guidelines indicate that Codeine has a moderate addiction
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potential.
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III. Dr. Sayre
Id. at 16.
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Plaintiff states that, on April 2, 2010, Dr. Sayre, in his
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role as CMO, instructed Dr. Williams to discontinue Plaintiff's
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Tylenol #3.
Reyes Decl. ¶¶ 13-15.
Dr. Sayre declares that he did
not participate in Dr. Williams' April 2, 2010 decision to
discontinue Plaintiff's Tylenol #3 and that he was not involved in
Dr. Williams' decision to restart Plaintiff on Tylenol #3 two
weeks later.
Sayre Decl. ¶ 10.
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IV. J. Torrance
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On April 4, 2010, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Health Care
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Appeal Form (602 appeal) seeking relief from the pain and
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withdrawal symptoms he was experiencing.
Reyes Decl. ¶ 32.
J.
Torrance, a Licensed Vocational Nurse, and the Medical Appeal
Coordinator, screened out Plaintiff's 602 appeal on the ground
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that it was duplicative of two previous 602 appeals Plaintiff had
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filed.
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Id.
Torrance cites the California Code of Regulations to explain
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that she can screen out a 602 appeal if it "duplicates an inmate's
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previous appeal upon which a decision has been rendered or is
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pending."
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Regulations (CCR), tit. 15, § 3084.6(c)(2)).
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regulation providing that a 602 appeal can be screened out if "the
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appeal issue or complaint emphasis has been changed . . . to the
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the extent that the issue is entirely new, and the required lower
Torrance Decl. ¶ 5 (citing California Code of
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She cites another
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levels of review and assessment have been circumvented."
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(citing CCR, tit. 15, § 3084.6(b)(16)).
Id.
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Torrance states that, on April 4, 2010, Plaintiff submitted
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his 602 appeal about the cancellation of his Tylenol #3 in which
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he requested that he (1) be given relief; (2) be given proper pain
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medication; (3) be given a written explanation of why the Tylenol
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#3 had been cancelled; and (4) be compensated for his pain and
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suffering.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Id. ¶ 6.
On April 12, 2014, Torrance reviewed
Plaintiff's 602 appeal.
Id. ¶ 7.
She noted that Plaintiff's 602
appeal history included two prior 602 appeals, filed on September
8, 2008 and December 17, 2009, where he also complained that he
was dissatisfied with his chronic pain management medication.
¶ 8.
Id.
Torrance determined that Plaintiff's April 2010 appeal,
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which sought changes to his chronic pain medication, was
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duplicative of his prior 602 appeals and screened it out on that
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basis.
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Id. ¶ 12.
On April 15, 2010, Plaintiff resubmitted his April 4, 2010
602 appeal, contending it was not duplicative.
Id. ¶ 13.
Torrance noted Plaintiff's additional grounds for relief about his
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need for medication to counteract his withdrawal symptoms, and
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determined that it was a change in emphasis and a new issue in his
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appeal.
Torrance screened out Plaintiff's amended appeal on this
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ground.
Id.
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On April 21, 2010, Plaintiff again resubmitted his April 4,
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2010 appeal and Torrance advised Plaintiff that he must present
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the new issues in a separate 602 appeal form.
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Id. ¶ 14.
Plaintiff states that Torrance knew that this was the only
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602 appeal that Plaintiff submitted regarding his withdrawal
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symptoms between April 2 and April 4, 2010 and, thus, it was
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impossible for Torrance to think that it was a duplicate of any
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other 602 appeal.
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opportunities to review, investigate and assess Plaintiff's
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medical situation and, in each instance, she chose to disregard
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Plaintiff's suffering, even after Plaintiff explained it to her.
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Id.
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V. J. Walker
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Plaintiff states that Torrance had three
J. Walker was Chief of the Office of the Third Level Appeals-
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Id.
Health Care (OTLA) from July 1, 2009 to December 4, 2010 and is
currently retired.
Walker Decl. ¶ 1.
As Chief of the OTLA,
Walker was responsible for overseeing the review of Health Care
Appeals at the third level of review and responded to inmate
appeals after the inmate's specific institution had responded to
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the appeal at the second level of review.
Id. ¶ 3.
Decisions at
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the third level of review were approved by Walker or by a
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designated manager within the OTLA.
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Id.
Walker notes that Plaintiff's April 4, 2010 602 appeal was
screened out three times at Plaintiff's prison as duplicative of
previous appeals and that Plaintiff appealed this decision to the
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OTLA.
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appeal, agreed it was duplicative of his previous appeals and also
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screened it out as not complying with CCR, title 15, section
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3084.3(c)(2).
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his printed name, as Chief of the OTLA, appears on the OTLA
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decision, the review of Plaintiff's appeal was performed by an
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OTLA Associate Health Program Advisor, whose signature appears on
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the OTLA's decision.
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Id. ¶ 11.
On May 18, 2010, the OTLA reviewed Plaintiff's
Id., Ex. A at 893.
Id.1
Walker declares that, although
Walker declares that he was not
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The OTLA decision appears to be signed by D. Sanchez, for
J. Walker, Chief. Walker Decl., Ex. A at 893.
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involved in the decision regarding Plaintiff's 602 appeal and that
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he was not aware, prior to being served with this lawsuit, that
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Plaintiff had submitted a 602 appeal.
Id.
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Plaintiff states that Walker's name on the Third Level
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Screen-Out Form indicates that she was the person signing off on
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the decision to screen out his appeal and, thus, denied him the
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medical care he needed.
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Walker was aware of the pain management guidelines that instructed
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Reyes Decl. ¶ 35.
Plaintiff states that
the tapering of narcotic medications and, thus, she was aware of
Plaintiff's suffering and did nothing to relieve it.
Opp.
¶¶ 15-16.
DISCUSSION
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I.
Motion for Summary Judgment
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A. Legal Standard
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Summary judgment is only proper where the pleadings,
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discovery, and affidavits show there is “no genuine issue as to
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any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Material
facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case.
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such
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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
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party.
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A
Id.
The court will grant summary judgment “against a party who
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fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
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an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
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will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
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initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that
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Celotex Corp. v.
The moving party bears the
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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
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burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the
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pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions,
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answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ designate
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‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
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Id. at 324.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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The
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.
Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999).
The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make
credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with
respect to a disputed material fact.
T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific
Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
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A district court may consider only admissible evidence in
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ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(c); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).
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A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under
Rule 56, as long as it is based on personal knowledge and sets
forth specific facts admissible in evidence.
Schroeder v.
McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995).
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B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
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Plaintiff argues Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
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his serious medical needs by completely discontinuing his Tylenol
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#3 prescription for fourteen days without tapering it off to
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prevent him from experiencing withdrawal symptoms.
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Defendants were also deliberately indifferent by failing to
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prescribe any treatment for his withdrawal symptoms.
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He argues that
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1.
Deliberate Indifference Legal Standard
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the
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Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
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punishment.
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v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other
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grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136
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(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin
A determination of “deliberate
seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the
defendant’s response to that need.
McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.
A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a
prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
Id.
The existence
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of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find
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important and worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a
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medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily
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activities, or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are
examples of indications that a prisoner has a serious need for
medical treatment.
Id. at 1059-60.
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A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows a
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prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards
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that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it.
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v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)(equating the standard with
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that of criminal recklessness).
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“be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
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substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but he “must also draw
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the inference.”
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established, therefore, there must be a purposeful act or failure
Id.
Farmer
The prison official must not only
In order for deliberate indifference to be
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to act on the part of the defendant and resulting harm.
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974 F.2d at 1060.
McGuckin,
Deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials
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deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or
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it may be shown in the way in which they provide medical care.
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Id. at 1062.
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patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment, nor a
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difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one course
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Neither a difference of opinion between a prisoner-
of treatment over another is sufficient to establish deliberate
indifference.
2004).
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1059-61 (9th Cir.
In order to prevail on a claim involving choices between
alternative courses of treatment, a plaintiff must show that the
course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable
13
under the circumstances, and they chose this course in conscious
14
disregard of an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health.
Id. at
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1058.
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A claim of mere negligence related to medical problems is
insufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim.
Id.;
Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).
2.
Analysis
Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff does not have a
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serious medical need for treatment for his chronic pain.
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they argue that the discontinuance of his Tylenol #3 prescription
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for fourteen days does not constitute deliberate indifference.
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Rather,
a. Defendant Williams
The following facts regarding Plaintiff's claim against Dr.
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Williams are undisputed:
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for many chronic ailments, including pain; (2) since April 2009,
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Dr. Williams' treatment for Plaintiff's pain included Tylenol #3;
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(3) in August 2009, pain specialist, Dr. Capitano, recommended
(1) Dr. Williams was treating Plaintiff
12
1
Trileptal for Plaintiff's pain; (4) on April 2, 2010, Dr. Williams
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discontinued Plaintiff's prescription for Tylenol #3, increased
3
his prescription for Trileptal and scheduled him for a two-week
4
follow-up visit; (5) Dr. Williams was familiar with the fact that
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Codeine is an opioid that is moderately addictive and that
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Plaintiff could experience withdrawal symptoms from its complete
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discontinuance; (6) on April 5, 2010, Plaintiff told RN Williams
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that he was suffering from pain, nausea, fever and other
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
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withdrawal symptoms, and RN Williams consulted with Dr. Adams who
prescribed regular Tylenol for Plaintiff's pain and medication for
his nausea; and (7) on April 16, 2010, fourteen days after Dr.
Williams discontinued Plaintiff's Tylenol #3, she re-prescribed it
for him at the original dosage.
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There are few facts regarding this claim that are disputed.
14
The main one is whether Dr. Williams discontinued Plaintiff's
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Tylenol #3 on the basis of a new state protocol requiring her to
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do so.
Dr. Williams' statements in her declaration and her
medical notes of her meetings with Plaintiff on April 2 and April
16, 2010, support her claim that the state had issued a new
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protocol regarding discontinuing narcotic medications like Tylenol
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#3.
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submit a copy of the state protocol.
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summary judgment, Plaintiff's evidence must be taken in the light
23
most favorable to him.
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the Court assumes that a new state protocol did not exist.
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However, as Plaintiff points out, Dr. Williams does not
On Defendants' motion for
Therefore, for purposes of this motion,
However, even if a new state protocol did not exist,
26
Plaintiff's evidence has not raised a disputed issue of material
27
fact regarding whether Dr. Williams' treatment constituted
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deliberate indifference.
13
1
Plaintiff's claim focusses on the fourteen days between April
2
2, 2010, when Dr. Williams' discontinued his Tylenol #3 and
3
increased his Trileptal and April 16, 2010, when she resumed the
4
Tylenol #3 and Trileptal at their previous dosages, during which
5
time Plaintiff experienced withdrawal symptoms.
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after Dr. Williams discontinued the Tylenol #3, Dr. Adams treated
7
Plaintiff for the withdrawal symptoms.
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Plaintiff informed Dr. Williams he was experiencing severe pain
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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However, two days
Twelve days later, when
and withdrawal symptoms, she re-instituted his previous pain
management regimen.
This evidence shows that on April 2, 2010, Dr. Williams was
trying another treatment regimen for Plaintiff's pain, just as
different pain treatment regimens had been prescribed for him in
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the past.
Along with this change in regimen, she scheduled a
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follow-up visit in two weeks to evaluate it.
When Dr. Williams
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saw that the new regimen did not work, she immediately
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reinstituted the old regimen.
Thus, even though the new regimen
did not work, the evidence shows that Dr. Williams' goal for the
new regimen was to treat Plaintiff's pain in a different way, not
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to deny, delay or interfere with his treatment or to cause him
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increased pain.
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original regimen when she saw the new regimen was not working is
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further evidence that she intended to treat Plaintiff's pain, not
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to deny him treatment.
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That Dr. Williams immediately reinstituted the
Furthermore, the fact that Plaintiff wanted the Tylenol #3 to
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be tapered off rather than discontinued at once means that he had
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a difference of opinion with Dr. Williams.
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a claim involving choices of alternate courses of treatment,
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Plaintiff must show that Dr. Williams' treatment plan was
14
In order to prevail on
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medically unacceptable and chosen in conscious disregard of an
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excessive risk to his health.
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Plaintiff's evidence fails to show this.
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Plaintiff submits only suggest an opioid like Tylenol #3 should be
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reduced gradually; they do not require tapering.
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follow-up visit in two weeks, Dr. Williams ensured that she would
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be able to evaluate the results of the new regimen very soon after
8
she implemented it, so that if it did not work, she would be able
9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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to change it, which she did.
See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1059-61.
The medical guidelines
By scheduling a
As stated above, Dr. Williams'
actions demonstrate care and concern for Plaintiff, not deliberate
indifference to his pain.
For all these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to raise a
disputed issue of material fact that Dr. Williams' treatment
13
constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
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Dr. Williams' motion for summary judgment is granted.
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b. Other Defendants
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Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference against Dr.
Sayre is based upon Plaintiff's statement that Dr. Sayre ordered
Dr. Williams to discontinue Plaintiff's Tylenol #3.
Even taking
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Plaintiff's evidence against Dr. Sayre as true, his claim against
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Dr. Sayre fails because it is predicated upon his claim against
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Dr. Williams.
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to discontinue Plaintiff's Tylenol #3 does not constitute
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deliberate indifference because, in following that order and
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discontinuing the Tylenol #3, Dr. Williams was not deliberately
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indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs.
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liable for ordering Dr. Williams to implement a medically
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appropriate treatment plan.
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judgment is granted.
In other words, Dr. Sayre's order to Dr. Williams
Dr. Sayre cannot be
Dr. Sayre's motion for summary
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1
Plaintiff's claims for deliberate indifference against J.
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Torrance and J. Walker fail for the same reason.
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predicated on the fact that these Defendants did not grant
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Plaintiff's appeals challenging Dr. Williams' fourteen-day
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discontinuance of his prescription for Tylenol #3.
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Williams was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious
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need for chronic pain treatment by discontinuing his prescription
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of Tylenol #3, Torrance and Walker could not be deliberately
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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The claims are
Because Dr.
indifferent by denying Plaintiff's 602 appeals about Dr. Williams'
behavior.
Furthermore, Plaintiff's claims against Torrance and Walker
fail for another reason.
By the time Torrance and Walker denied
Plaintiff's appeals about Dr. Williams' behavior, she had re13
prescribed the Tylenol #3 so that there was no behavior for them
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to remedy.
This situation is distinguishable from one in which
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there is an ongoing medical need and the inmate's appeal requests
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a remedy for the ongoing problem.
In the latter case liability
can be based on the denial of the appeal, just as it could be
based on the denial of a verbal request from the inmate.
See Jett
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v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006) (supervisor may be
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liable for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need if he
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or she fails to respond to a prisoner’s request for help).
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Williams' fourteen-day discontinuance of Plaintiff's prescription
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for Tylenol #3 was not an ongoing medical need that could result
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in the officers' liability for denying Plaintiff's appeals.
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Therefore, Plaintiff's evidence against Torrance and Walker fails
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to raise a disputed issue of material fact on this ground as well.
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Torrance and Walker's motions for summary judgment are granted.
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Dr.
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CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:
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1. Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.
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Docket nos. 27, 30-32.
2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter a separate judgment,
terminate all motions and close the file.
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3. This order terminates Docket nos. 27, 30-32.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Dated: 9/8/2014
________________________
CLAUDIA WILKEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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