Smith v. Hedgpeth et al

Filing 78

ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SEVERING MISJOINED DEFENDANTS by Hon. Saundra Brown Armstrong 64 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(jebS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/11/2016)

Download PDF
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 OAKLAND DIVISION 4 5 GREGORY ANDRE SMITH, Plaintiff, 6 v. 7 8 L. TREXLER, et al., Defendants. Case No. 13-cv-01052-SBA (PR) ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SEVERING MISJOINED DEFENDANTS 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Plaintiff Gregory Andre Smith, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas 12 Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), brings the instant pro se civil rights action, pursuant to 42 13 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to 14 health and safety, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and retaliation, against 15 twenty-two SVSP prison officials. These claims are based on a number of separate events 16 occurring between March 2011 and August 2012. 17 The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary 18 judgment or dismissal based on misjoinder of party-defendants. Having read and 19 considered the papers submitted in connection with this matter, the Court hereby GRANTS 20 summary judgment as to the claims alleged against Chief Deputy Warden L. Trexler and 21 severs the remaining party-defendants without prejudice, including: Physician Richard 22 Mack; and Correctional Officers G. Bailey, H. Castillo, J. Ceja, J. Collier, R. Diaz, D. 23 Dornan, V. Franco, G. Gudino, A. Machuca, M. Mejai, A. Miramontes, E. Montano, L. 24 Ornealas, B. Powell, R. Reyes, M. Rodriguez, M. Roennman, J. Sanudo, J. Spaulding, and 25 J. Vinson. 26 27 28 1 I. BACKGROUND A. 2 FACTUAL SUMMARY On February 21, 2011, Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation at SVSP 3 for battery on another inmate with a weapon. Am. Compl. ¶ 29, Dkt. 10. On March 3, 4 2011, Plaintiff appeared at an Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) hearing 5 chaired by Defendant Trexler. Trexler Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. C. The ICC is responsible for 6 assigning inmates to a housing program when they are placed in administrative 7 segregation. Trexler Decl. ¶ 3. At the hearing, Plaintiff informed the ICC that he suffers 8 from certain mental health problems, including chronic depression and anti-social 9 personality disorders, which prevent him from sharing a cell with another inmate. Am. 10 Compl. ¶¶ 30-32, Dkt. 10. Plaintiff indicated that if he is forced to “double cell,” “serious 11 United States District Court Northern District of California bodily injury or death would result.” Id. Defendant Trexler denied Plaintiff’s request for a 12 single cell placement, in response to which he filed a grievance against Defendant Trexler. 13 Id. 14 On May 25, 2011, Plaintiff prepared an affidavit in support of his fellow inmate, 15 Tomas Meneweather, for “wrondoings” he observed when “Defendants C/Os B. Powell 16 and V. Franco” sprayed pepper spray in Meneweather’s cell.” Id. ¶ 38. In June 2011, 17 Lieutenant G. R. Salazar interviewed Plaintiff regarding that incident. Id. ¶ 41. Shortly 18 after cooperating with Lt. Salazar, Plaintiff and Meneweather allegedly began suffering 19 stomach and chest discomfort, which they believed to be the result of “unknown 20 substances” being placed in their food. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff alleges that from July 9, 2011 21 through September 22, 2011, he was repeatedly served meals that made him ill by 22 Defendants Spaulding, Vinson, Montona, Mejai, Gudino, Reyes, Ceja, Rodriguez, Diaz, 23 Sanudo, Machuca, Castillo, Powell, Franco, Dornan, Miramontes, Bailey and Ornealas. 24 Id. ¶¶ 59-75. 25 In the meantime, on August 23, 2011, Plaintiff complained to Defendant Mack, a 26 physician, about the contaminated food and related illness. Id. ¶ 48. Defendant Mack 27 ordered blood and urine samples to be taken from Plaintiff “to determine if there was any 28 2 1 substance to Plaintiff’s claims and to determine if any additional treatment was necessary 2 for [Plaintiff’s] stomach pains.” Mack Decl. ¶ 6. Defendant Roennman, however, 3 allegedly refused to allow a lab technician to take the blood and urine samples from 4 Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 49. 5 A week later, on September 8, 2011, the blood and urine tests were performed on Plaintiff. Mack Decl. ¶ 6. On September 9, 2011, Defendant Mack reviewed the test 7 results and determined that they were “within normal limits” and “did not indicate that 8 [Plaintiff] needed any additional medical care.” Id. Defendant Mack determined that the 9 test results “indicated that additional tests may be necessary” and thereafter ordered 10 additional tests on October 12, 2011. Id. Again, Defendant Mack concluded that the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 6 October 12, 2011 test results were “within normal limits and did not indicate any 12 additional tests were necessary.” Id. 13 In October 2011, Defendant Collier approached Plaintiff about his “allegations of 14 being poisoned by his colleagues,” and threatened him by saying that “if [Plaintiff] was 15 smart [he] would ‘leave that poisoing [sic] shit alone or else [his] stay in [administrative 16 segregation] could get unpleasant.’” Am. Compl. ¶ 48. 17 18 19 On January 20, 2012, Plaintiff was treated with antibiotics for “h pylori” bacteria which later was detected in his blood test results. Id. ¶ 54. In April 2012, Defendants Collier and Roennman “informed Plaintiff that life is 20 going to get rough for [him] for continuing to pursue an investigation into being 21 poisoned.” Id. ¶ 80. On April 15, 2012, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Collier refused to 22 provide him with his dinner tray. Id. ¶ 81. After Plaintiff filed a complaint to Defendant 23 Collier’s superior, Defendants Collier and Roennman allegedly began to “harass, 24 intimidate and threaten[] Plaintiff by kicking on Plaintiff’s cell door, taunting Plaintiff, 25 [and] using foul disrespect[ful] language when speaking to Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 83. On April 26 30, 2012 and August 3, 2012, Defendant Collier again denied Plaintiff his dinner tray, in 27 retaliation for filing complaints against Defendant Collier. Id. ¶ 85. 28 On August 6, 2012, Defendant Collier served Plaintiff a dinner tray with “chewing 3 1 tobacco spit in [his] food.” Id. ¶ 85. Defendant Collier’s alleged retaliatory actions of 2 denying Plaintiff his dinner tray continued to take place in June and July 2013. Id. ¶ 93. 3 Plaintiff claims he has lost between ten to fifteen pounds, due to lack of nutrients which 4 has exacerbated [his] stomach medical conditions . . . .” Id. ¶ 93. 5 B. 6 PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 1. Claims Plaintiff filed the instant action in this Court on March 7, 2013. Dkt. 1. On August 7 8 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against twenty-five Defendants, seeking 9 injunctive relief and monetary damages. Dkt. 10. The Amended Complaint names the twenty-two party-defendants named above and Warden Anthony Hedgpeth, and 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Correctional Sergeants R. Machuca, Jr. and M. Zornes. In its Order of Service, the Court dismissed: (1) the supervisory liability claims 12 13 against Defendants Hedgpeth, R. Machuca and Zornes; (2) the supervisory liability claim 14 against Defendants Hedgpeth and Trexler based on “wrongdoings” of subordinates 15 Defendants Franco and Powell; and (3) the claims of harassment and threats as to 16 Defendant Collier. Dkt. 15 at 9-10. The Court served the remaining twenty-two 17 Defendants as to the following claims: (1) Defendant Trexler was deliberately indifferent to his health and/or safety when 18 19 he approved Plaintiff for double-cell housing in March 2011; 20 (2) Defendants Spaulding, Vinson, Montona, Mejai, Gudino, Reyes, Ceja, 21 Rodriguez, Diaz, Sanudo, A. Machuca, Castillo, Powell, Franco, Dornan, Miramontes, 22 Bailey and Ornealas served him tainted meals from July to September 2011 in retaliation 23 for providing information regarding an incident involving another inmate; (3) Defendant Mack provided inadequate medical care in August and September 24 25 2011 in response to Plaintiff’s complaints of food poisoning; (4) Defendant Roennman interfered Plaintiff’s medical care on August 30, 2011; 26 27 28 and (5) Defendant Collier was deliberately indifferent and retaliated against him by 4 1 denying him his meals in 2012 and 2013. 2 2. Pending Motion Defendants’ motion presents the following arguments: (1) Plaintiff failed to 3 exhaust available administrative remedies against Defendants Vinson, Collier, Ceja, 5 Rodriguez, Powell, Mejai, Spaulding, Castillo, A. Machuca, Sanudo, Miramontes, Reyes, 6 Montano, Diaz, Bailey, Dornan, Franco, Ornealas and Gudino1; (2) Defendant Trexler was 7 not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health or safety; (3) Defendant Mack was not 8 deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs; (4) Defendants Mack and 9 Trexler are entitled to qualified immunity; and (5) the Defendants are misjoined because 10 Plaintiff’s claims against them arise out of distinct, unrelated incidents. Plaintiff has filed 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 4 an opposition to the motion in response to which Defendants have filed a reply. The 12 motion is now fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. Because the matter of whether 13 Defendants have been properly joined in this action is a threshold question, the Court 14 addresses that issue first. 15 II. 16 DISCUSSION A. MISJOINDER OF DEFENDANTS 17 Defendants contend that Plaintiff has improperly joined claims and party- 18 defendants based on “separate incidents involving different defendants.” Dkt. 64 at 22. 19 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), a plaintiff may bring a claim against 20 multiple defendants so long as (1) the claim against them arises out of the same transaction 21 or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, and (2) there are commons 22 questions of law or fact as to all defendants.2 When there is a misjoinder of parties or 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Defendants originally argued that Plaintiff also failed to exhaust his claim against Defendant Roennman for interfering with Plaintiff’s August 30, 2011 blood test; however, in their reply, Defendants have withdrawn such argument. See Dkt. 77 at 5. 2 “Even once these requirements are met, a district court must examine whether permissive joinder would comport with the principles of fundamental fairness or would result in prejudice to either side.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000). 5 1 claims, “the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; 2 see Rush v. Sport Chalet, Inc. 779 F.3d 973, 975 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that a court may 3 sever misjoined parties and dismiss them, provided that it evaluates the potential prejudice 4 to the plaintiff). In other words, the improper joinder problem can be solved by merely 5 dismissing or severing the improperly joined parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 6 The claims alleged in the Amended Complaint do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 20(a) for permissive joinder. By its terms, the first prong of the test “requires factual 8 similarity in the allegations supporting Plaintiffs’ claims.” Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 9 733 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). That similarity is absent in this case. Plaintiff’s first 10 claim is based on Defendant Trexler’s decision at a March 2011 administrative hearing 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 7 where he declined Plaintiff’s request for a single cell and instead placed him in a double 12 cell. In contrast, the next claim is based on incidents occurring several months later, from 13 July to September 2011, during which time eighteen different Defendants allegedly served 14 Plaintiff contaminated food in retaliation for his cooperation in a prison investigation 15 regarding the treatment of another inmate (Meneweather). There is no indication that the 16 alleged retaliation was connected to Defendant Trexler’s decision to place Plaintiff in a 17 double-cell. As for Plaintiff’s remaining claims, they too are predicated on incidents 18 involving different defendants that are unrelated to the claim against Defendant Trexler. 19 Nor do Plaintiff’s claims present any “question of law or fact common to all 20 defendants . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that 21 Defendant Trexler acted with deliberate indifference to his health and safety by refusing 22 his request for a single cell placement. The other claims arise from separate, subsequent 23 incidents involving the alleged contamination of food in retaliation for Plaintiff’s 24 cooperation in an investigation regarding another inmate and inadequate medical care 25 following Plaintiff’s consumption of that food. Because those claims involve the 26 application of different legal standards to different parties and factual contexts, the second 27 prong of the test for permissive joinder also is not satisfied. See Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 28 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that claims “involv[ing] different legal issues, 6 1 2 standards, and procedures” do not involve common factual or legal questions). In the event the test for permissive joinder is not satisfied, the Court may sever or 3 dismiss the misjoined parties. Visendi, 733 F.3d at 870. In deciding whether to dismiss, 4 as opposed to sever, the district court must evaluate the prejudice to the plaintiff. Rush v. 5 Sport Chalet, Inc., 779 F.3d 973, 975 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “[m]any of our fellow 6 circuits have held that district courts who dismiss rather than sever must conduct a 7 prejudice analysis, including ‘loss of otherwise timely claims if new suits are blocked by 8 statutes of limitations.’”) (citation omitted). Here, it is not entirely clear whether 9 Plaintiff’s claims against the misjoined Defendants (i.e., all Defendants other than Defendant Trexler) would be timely in the event Plaintiff were to refile a separate action 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 against them. Some of the incidents against the misjoined Defendants took place more 12 than four years ago, which is beyond the limitations period.3 Accordingly, the Court finds 13 that severance, as opposed to dismissal, is the appropriate remedy to address the 14 misjoinder of parties. The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s remaining claim against Defendant Trexler. 15 16 B. 17 18 SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT TREXLER 1. Legal Standard “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate where there ‘is no genuine issue as to any 19 material fact” and the moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” 20 Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 344 (2010) (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c)) 21 22 3 23 24 25 26 27 28 “For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). As applied to prisoners, the limitation period for bringing an action under California law is four years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1(a) (providing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which may be tolled for an additional two years for prisoners). The Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners are entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations while completing the mandatory exhaustion process. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 94243 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff properly exhausted all of his claims. 7 1 (citing cases). “The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a ‘genuine issue’ is on the 2 party moving for summary judgment.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). 3 The movant must inform the district court “of the basis for its motion, . . . identifying those 4 portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 5 together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 6 issue of material fact.” Id. 7 Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non- 8 moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of 9 material fact. Id. at 324. “This burden is not a light one. The non-moving party must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” In re Oracle Corp. Secs. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 12 242, 252 (1986)). An issue is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a 13 reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 14 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 322-23 (1986). All reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of 15 the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 16 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 17 2. Analysis 18 The gist of Plaintiff’s first claim for relief, liberally construed, is that Defendant 19 Trexler was deliberately indifferent to his mental condition and safety by declining his 20 request for a single cell placement. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30-36, 96. The Eighth Amendment’s 21 prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials take reasonable 22 measures for the health and safety of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 23 (1994). Establishing a violation of the Eighth Amendment requires a two-part showing. 24 First, the plaintiff “must objectively show that he was deprived of something ‘sufficiently 25 serious.’” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. 26 at 834). 27 28 Second, the plaintiff “must then make a subjective showing that the deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety.” Id. As will be 8 1 discussed below, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim fails, as a matter of law, with 2 respect to both the objective and subjective prongs of the aforementioned test. 3 4 a) Sufficiently Serious Deprivation Under the objective prong of the test for establishing an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must show “extreme deprivations” of the 6 “minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 7 (1992). The court looks to whether “society considers the risk that the prisoner complains 8 of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone 9 unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993); see also Estelle 10 v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Here, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to establish 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 5 that, because he suffers from certain mental health illnesses, he necessarily should have 12 been assigned single cell status. Plaintiff’s subjective fears regarding sharing a cell do not 13 rise to the level of demonstrating that a single cell assignment was mandated for mental 14 health or safety reasons. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058; Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332. The 15 Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact as to 16 whether he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation within the meaning of the Eighth 17 Amendment. 18 b) Deliberate Indifference 19 Even if Plaintiff had shown a sufficiently serious deprivation, he has failed to 20 demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the subjective component of a deliberate 21 indifference claim. 22 “To establish a prison official’s deliberate indifference, an inmate must show that 23 the official was aware of a risk to the inmate’s health or safety and that the official 24 deliberately disregarded the risk.” Foster, 554 F.3d at 814. In other words, the official 25 must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 26 of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 27 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due care 28 for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. 9 1 The record does not support a finding of deliberate indifference on the part of 2 Defendant Trexler. As an initial matter, the record demonstrates that Defendant Trexler 3 evaluated Plaintiff’s request in accordance with California regulations. Those regulations 4 specify that, as a general rule, all inmates are required to share a cell, and that “[i]nmates 5 are not entitled to single cell assignment, housing location of choice, or to a cellmate of 6 their choice.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3269(d). Single cell status may be appropriate for 7 inmates who demonstrate a history of in-cell abuse, significant in-cell violence towards a 8 cell partner, verification of predatory behavior towards a cell partner, or who have been 9 victimized in-cell by another inmate. Id. In addition, single cell status may be approved if 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 recommended by clinical staff due to mental health or medical concerns. Id. § 3269(f). SVSP is “designed for the majority of inmates to be double-celled.” Trexler Decl. 12 ¶ 8. SVSP Operational Procedure 42 provides a list of circumstances to consider before 13 assigning an inmate to single-cell status, and requires the ICC to determine whether an 14 inmate “has a history of in-cell assaultive, abusive, or predatory behavior” before granting 15 an inmate single-cell status.” Id. ¶ 5. In order to determine if an inmate should be 16 assigned single-cell status, the ICC is to consider documented reports of prior in-cell 17 incidents and staff is instructed to consider the inmate’s pattern of behavior, not just an 18 isolated incident. Id. Operational Procedure 42 does not allow an inmate to be placed on 19 single-cell status simply because he has made unsubstantiated claims of mental illness or 20 threats against potential future cellmates.” 21 Here, the record shows that Plaintiff was “cleared for double-cell housing because 22 he did not have a history of in-cell violence or sexual predatory behavior towards 23 cellmates.” Trexler Decl. ¶ 9. Although Plaintiff stated he would “kill any cellmate he 24 gets,” id., Ex. C, inmate threats are not sufficient under prison policy to assign an inmate to 25 single cell status, id. ¶ 9. In addition, there is no evidence to substantiate the credibility of 26 Plaintiff’s claim that he would apply deadly force upon a cellmate. The record shows that 27 Defendant Trexler (as well as other committee members) considered appropriate factors 28 when assigning Plaintiff to double-cell housing. There is no evidence that Defendant 10 1 Trexler was aware of any risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety by placing him in a double cell 2 or that he deliberately disregarded the risk. 3 c) Injury 4 Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim also fails for lack of injury. Under the 5 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o federal civil action may be brought 6 by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or 7 emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 8 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Plaintiff must plead an actual physical injury within the meaning of the 9 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in order to recover damages for mental or emotional 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 damages. Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that he suffered any injury as a result of being 12 double-celled. Plaintiff’s fear of double-celling is insufficient to satisfy the Eighth 13 Amendment deliberate indifference standard. Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 270 (7th 14 Cir. 1996). In Babcock, the Seventh Circuit assessed whether an inmate “who was not 15 assaulted by, and who is no longer at risk from, fellow inmates may nevertheless maintain 16 a Bivens claim for money damages based solely on prison officials’ past failure to take 17 measure to protect the prisoner.” Id. The Court concluded that “it is the reasonably 18 preventable assault itself, rather than any fear of assault, that gives rise to a compensable 19 claim under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 272. In this case, Plaintiff has only shown a 20 fear of injury to himself or a cellmate—not a reasonably preventable injury that he has, in 21 fact, suffered. Plaintiff has not claimed any other specific injuries after he was placed in a 22 double cell. His conclusory statements and fears of being assigned to double cell status 23 fail to show that he suffered a cognizable injury as a result of Defendant Trexler’s double 24 cell assignment.4 25 26 27 28 4 The Court’s finding that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Trexler obviates the need to address Defendant Trexler’s alternative argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity. 11 1 III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT 3 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the misjoinder of Defendants is 4 GRANTED. The Court SEVERS all Defendants other than Defendant Trexler from this 5 action. The Clerk of the Court shall open a new action, and file a copy of the Amended 6 Complaint (dkt. 10) and copies of the Court’s service order in this action (dkt. 15) as well 7 as this Order in the new action. 8 2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to 9 Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Trexler. The motion is DENIED in all other respects 10 without prejudice to reasserting the remaining arguments presented therein in a motion 11 United States District Court Northern District of California filed in the newly-opened action. 12 3. The Clerk shall close the instant file, terminate all pending matters, and enter 13 judgment in favor of Defendant Trexler. 14 4. This Order terminates Docket No. 64. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 Dated: 3/10/16 ______________________________ SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG Senior United States District Judge 18 19 20 P:\PRO-SE\SBA\CR.13\Smith1052.grantIP&denyIP-MSJ_022916.docx 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.

Why Is My Information Online?