Hutchison v. California Prison Industry Authority et al

Filing 8

ORDER OF SERVICE OF AMENDED COMPLAINT. Habeas Answer or Dispositive Motion due by 6/3/2014. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 4/4/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/4/2014)

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1 2 3 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 EDWIN JAY HUTCHISON, 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 Plaintiff, 11 12 13 v. Case No.: C 13-4635 CW (PR) ORDER OF SERVICE OF AMENDED COMPLAINT CALIFORNIA PRISON INDUSTRY AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants. 14 15 16 INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Edwin Jay Hutchison, a state prisoner incarcerated 17 at San Quentin State Prison (SQSP), filed a pro se civil rights 18 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the violation of his 19 constitutional rights by the California Prison Industry Authority 20 (CALPIA), operating under the auspices of the California 21 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), and 22 individuals who are employees of CALPIA or of SQSP. 23 On January 13, 2014, the Court dismissed with leave to amend the claims asserted by Plaintiff because he did not causally connect the 24 actions of each Defendant to the alleged constitutional 25 26 27 28 deprivations. On February 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (1AC), which the Court now reviews. 1 2 3 DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any 4 case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity 5 or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 6 § 1915A(a). 7 claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail 8 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary 9 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 13 28 U.S.C. In its review, the court must identify any cognizable § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Id. Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the 14 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 15 (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 16 under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 17 (1988). 18 Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant’s 20 actions both actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a 21 federally protected right. Lemire v. California Dept. Corrections 22 & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. 23 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of 24 Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives 25 another of a constitutional right within the meaning of § 1983 if 26 he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative 27 act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, 28 2 1 that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. 2 Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 3 superior liability under § 1983. 4 in layman's terms, under no circumstances is there liability under 5 § 1983 solely because one is responsible for the actions or 6 omissions of another. 7 Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 8 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). 9 Under no circumstances is there respondeat Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074. Or, Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a 11 sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful 12 conduct and the constitutional violation. 13 Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation 14 omitted). 15 constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor 16 participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 17 violations and failed to act to prevent them." 18 at 1045. 19 "a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 20 constitutional rights and is the moving force of the 21 constitutional violation." 22 Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 917 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 II. 24 Redman v. County of San A supervisor therefore generally "is only liable for Taylor, 880 F.2d This includes allegations that a supervisor implemented Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446; Jeffers v. Plaintiff’s Allegations In his 1AC, Plaintiff asserts: (1) an Eighth Amendment claim 25 for deliberate indifference to the serious risk of harm from 26 exposing him to asbestos and lead at the CALPIA furniture factory 27 where he worked; (2) a state law claim against the CALPIA under 28 3 1 California Government Code section 835,1 which provides that a 2 public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by a 3 dangerous condition on its property; (3) an Eighth Amendment claim 4 for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need by failing 5 to provide testing to determine his exposure to asbestos or lead; 6 and (4) a state law claim for fraudulent concealment. 7 A. Claim for Deliberate Indifference to Serious Risk of Harm 8 The legal standard for this Eighth Amendment claim was 9 provided in the Court’s Order dismissing the complaint with leave United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 to amend. 11 Defendants in this claim: (1) Ronald Glass, CALPIA Industrial 12 Supervisor; (2) Gary S. Loredo, CALPIA Superintendent II; 13 (3) Philip Earley, CALPIA Industries Administrator/Lead Manager; 14 (4) Luu Rogers, CALPIA Industrial Supervisor/Health and Safety 15 Coordinator; (5) John Walker, SQSP Health and Safety Manager; 16 (6) Elizabeth Babcock, SQSP Hazardous Material Specialist; 17 (7) Brad Smith, Branch Manager at CALPIA Sacramento Headquarters; 18 (8) Charles Pattillo, General Manager at CALPIA Sacramento 19 Headquarters; and (9) Kevin Chappell, SQSP Warden. 20 See Doc. no. 5 at 6-7. Plaintiff names the following In the Order of Dismissal, the Court found that Plaintiff’s 21 allegations of exposure to lead and asbestos were sufficiently 22 serious to fulfill the objective requirement of an Eighth 23 Amendment violation but that he had failed to allege the 24 subjective component of the claim. 25 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 For Plaintiff to remedy this deficiency, 26 1 27 28 Plaintiff refers to California Government Code section 830, but he quotes from California Government Code section 835. The latter appears to be the relevant statute. 4 1 the Court indicated that he must allege how each Defendant knew 2 that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm and how that 3 Defendant failed to take reasonable steps to abate that risk of 4 serious harm. 5 Plaintiff’s amended allegations indicate what each Defendant 6 knew about the hazardous conditions at the furniture factory, that 7 each Defendant had a responsibility to remedy the hazardous 8 conditions, and that each Defendant failed to do so. 9 allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 The amended against all the above-named Defendants. 11 B. Public Entity Liability Claim Against CALPIA 12 Plaintiff alleges that CALPIA, operating under the auspices 13 of the CDCR, is a public entity responsible for the operation of 14 the furniture factory where Plaintiff worked. 15 Plaintiff was allegedly exposed to the hazardous conditions of 16 latent asbestos fibers and lead-based paints. 17 that CALPIA was responsible for creating these dangerous 18 conditions and failed to remedy them, even after it became aware 19 of their existence. At that factory, Plaintiff alleges 20 California Government Code section 835 provides: 21 Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: 22 23 24 25 26 27 (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or 28 5 1 2 3 4 5 (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. Cal. Gov. Code § 835. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim against CALPIA under section 835. 6 C. Claim for Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs 7 The legal standard for this Eighth Amendment claim also was 8 provided in the Court’s Order dismissing the complaint with leave 9 to amend. See Doc. no. 5 at 7-8. Plaintiff names the following United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Defendants in this claim: (1) Dr. John Cranshaw, Plaintiff’s 11 primary care provider (PCP) during the time at issue; (2) R. 12 Dixon, RN, who denied Plaintiff’s appeal pertaining to his lack of 13 adequate medical treatment at the first level of review; (3) 14 Andrew W. Deems, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of SQSP Health Care 15 Services, who denied Plaintiff’s appeal at the second level of 16 17 18 19 review; (4) C. Harless, Health Care Appeals Coordinator, who denied Plaintiff’s request for an interview regarding the delay in the response to his original appeal; and (5) Chief L.D. Zamora, who denied Plaintiff’s appeal at the third level of review. In its previous Order, the Court found that Plaintiff had 20 alleged a serious medical need, but had failed to allege that 21 Defendants were aware that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of 22 serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take 23 24 25 reasonable steps to abate it. In his 1AC, Plaintiff alleges the following against Dr. Cranshaw. On July 4, 2012, while Plaintiff was working at the 26 CALPIA factory, he submitted a health care services request form 27 to Dr. Cranshaw seeking comprehensive blood and lungs testing for 28 6 1 possible exposure to lead and/or asbestos while he was assigned to 2 the CALPIA furniture factory. 3 Cranshaw mailed a note to Plaintiff stating, “Plaintiff have [sic] 4 not been identified by PIA as significantly exposed to lead or 5 asbestos. 6 Department] can do to evaluate you. 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 1AC, Ex. R. On July 5, 2012, Dr. Therefore, there is nothing we [SQSP Medical IF you believe you are significantly exposed, please discuss it with the appropriate individuals in the PIA.” 1AC, Ex. R. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Cranshaw’s denial of testing was the result of action by P. Early who had notified the SQSP Medical Department of the inmates to be tested as a result of a June 6, 11 2012 exposure incident. 12 Plaintiff claims that Dr. Cranshaw’s reliance on P. Early’s 13 notification was contrary to recognized rules and procedures which 14 15 16 17 18 provide that only health care staff are authorized to diagnose illnesses, prescribe medication and treat inmates and, because Dr. Cranshaw did not obey these procedures, he was deliberately indifferent toward Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Even if Dr. Cranshaw’s reliance on P. Early’s notification 19 violated prison regulations, it does not rise to the level of 20 deliberate indifference. 21 submitted one request for testing to Dr. Cranshaw based on his 22 possible exposure to asbestos or lead while working at the CALPIA 23 factory, which Dr. Cranshaw denied. 24 testing, without more, does not show deliberate indifference. 25 Furthermore, even though Plaintiff alleges in his 1AC that, from 26 August 2009 to the present he suffers from severe pain, frequent 27 headaches, nasal and sinus problems, coughing and chest pains, see 28 1AC at 12, in his request for testing, Plaintiff did not inform The allegations show that Plaintiff 7 The denial of one request for 1 Dr. Cranshaw that he had any physical signs or symptoms from 2 asbestos or lead exposure, see 1AC, Ex. R. 3 allegations fail to show that, at the time Dr. Cranshaw denied 4 Plaintiff’s request, he was aware that Plaintiff had a serious 5 medical need and that his denial of testing would create a 6 substantial risk of serious harm. 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Thus, Plaintiff’s Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Cranshaw is dismissed, without leave to amend further. Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Dixon denied his first level appeal for medical testing. In her denial, Nurse Dixon wrote that Plaintiff was not “identified by P. Earley on the day of the 11 incident. Plaintiff can go to the PIA supervisor to file a 12 workman’s compensation form and the medical department will 13 address any and all medical issue reported. 14 15 16 At this time there is no definitive test for exposure to asbestos.” Plaintiff argues that Nurse Dixon was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because she should have provided 17 Plaintiff with the “mandatory medical questionnaire” which must be 18 administered to all employees who are exposed to asbestos. 19 also alleges that, contrary to Nurse Dixon’s statement, tests for 20 exposure to asbestos do exist. 21 above in regard to Dr. Cranshaw, these allegations are 22 insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference against 23 Nurse Dixon. 24 grievance does not amount to a constitutional violation. 25 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no federal 26 constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or 27 grievance system for California inmates); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d He For the same reasons discussed Furthermore, the denial of an administrative 28 8 See 1 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 2 (7th Cir. 1996). 3 Plaintiff alleges that CEO Deems, C. Harless and L.D. Zamora 4 are also liable because they denied his appeals at higher levels 5 of review. 6 insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim against these 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Defendants. For the reasons discussed above, these allegations are See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860. Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment claim based on the allegations that Defendants denied Plaintiff’s appeals is dismissed without leave to amend further. However, Plaintiff also alleges that Deems, as CEO of SQSP 11 Health Care Services, created a policy, custom and practice of 12 denying prisoners, including Plaintiff, adequate medical attention 13 and treatment for exposure to asbestos, as evidenced by CEO 14 15 16 Deems’s delay and denial of testing Plaintiff for signs and symptoms of asbestos or lead exposure. As stated above, a supervisor may be liable if he implemented "a policy so deficient 17 that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights 18 and is the moving force of the constitutional violation." 19 942 F.2d at 1446; Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 917. 20 did not have sufficient information to be aware that his denial of 21 testing might cause a serious risk to Plaintiff’s health, 22 Defendant Deems, as CEO of SQSP Health Care Services, allegedly 23 knew or should have known of a risk of exposure to asbestos and 24 lead at the CALPIA factory, and yet did not implement a policy 25 that allowed Plaintiff, who feared he had been exposed to asbestos 26 and lead, to be tested for such. 27 alleges a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 28 repudiation of constitutional rights. Redman, Although Dr. Cranshaw Liberally construed, this 9 Therefore, Plaintiff 1 sufficiently alleges an Eighth Amendment violation against CEO 2 Deems. 3 D. Claim for Fraudulent Concealment 4 Plaintiff sues SQSP Appeals Coordinator Steve Hay and SQSP 5 Correctional Officer Keith Davis for fraudulent concealment. 6 Plaintiff alleges that Appeals Coordinator Hay received a 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 directive to decide Plaintiff’s appeal, regarding unsafe conditions, within thirty days. Although Plaintiff’s next allegations are difficult to follow, it appears that he faults Appeals Coordinator Hay for writing that B. Smith, PIA Branch Manager, was no longer available when Appeals Coordinator Hay knew 11 that B. Smith was available. Plaintiff argues that this, and the 12 fact that Appeals Coordinator Hay responded after the thirty-day 13 deadline, show that Appeals Coordinator Hay is liable for 14 15 16 fraudulent concealment because he “assisted the Defendants from answering their own wrongs” and hindered Plaintiff “from discovering his course of action in this matter, thereby 17 preventing Plaintiff’s due process of exhausting administrative 18 remedies.” 19 notice from Appeals Coordinator Hay that his appeal was screened 20 out and rejected. 21 Plaintiff’s original filing, his appeal was denied at the third 22 level of review. 23 Appeals Coordinator Hay intentionally concealed and misrepresented 24 material facts under a “Code of Silence” which encourages prison 25 employees to remain silent about improper behavior of their fellow 26 employees. 27 28 1AC at 61-61. On April 12, 2013, Plaintiff received On May 13, 2013, approximately ten months after Plaintiff claims that this also shows that These allegations do not state a claim against Appeals Coordinator Hay. As discussed above, the denial of an appeal does 10 1 not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 2 Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege the elements of common law 3 fraud or fraudulent concealment. 4 Appeals Coordinator Hay is dismissed. 5 to amend further because Plaintiff has had an opportunity to 6 remedy this claim and has failed to do so. 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Further, Therefore, this claim against Dismissal is without leave Plaintiff alleges that Officer Davis observed the dangerous conditions from asbestos at the CALPIA furniture factory when supervising Plaintiff’s work detail, but remained silent. Based on this, Plaintiff claims that Officer Davis is liable for implementing the Code of Silence regarding the improper behavior 11 of other employees. 12 This allegation is insufficient to state a claim against 13 Officer Davis. 14 15 16 Officer Davis may not have been aware of any danger from asbestos exposure. This can be inferred from the fact that Officer Davis’s presence in the factory supervising Plaintiff’s work detail may have exposed him to the same hazardous 17 conditions as Plaintiff. 18 insufficient to state a claim for fraud or fraudulent concealment. 19 Furthermore, the allegations are Therefore, this claim against Officer Davis is dismissed. 20 Dismissal is without leave to amend further because Plaintiff has 21 had an opportunity to remedy this claim and has failed to do so. 22 CONCLUSION 23 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 24 1. Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for 25 fraudulent concealment. 26 amend. 27 28 This claim is dismissed without leave to 2. Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against 11 1 Dr. Cranshaw. 2 against Nurse Dixon, CEO Deems, C. Harless and L. D. Zamora based 3 on their denial of his appeals. 4 Defendants is dismissed without leave to amend. 5 Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against CEO 6 Deems who, as CEO of the Health Services Department, allegedly 7 created a policy, custom or practice of failing to test inmates 8 who may have been exposed to asbestos. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 He also fails to state this Eighth Amendment claim The claim against these However, 3. Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to hazardous conditions against all the Defendants he names in that claim. Plaintiff also states a cognizable state law claim against CALPIA. 4. In order to encourage the just, speedy and inexpensive 13 determination of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases filed in this district, 14 15 16 the parties may waive their right to proceed before a district judge and consent to proceed before a magistrate judge for all purposes. Attached to this Order is a Notice of Option to Consent 17 to Proceed Before United States Magistrate Judge and an Order 18 requiring the parties to notify the Court whether they consent or 19 decline to so proceeding. 20 requisite consent or declination form and return it to the Court 21 no later than thirty days from the date of this Order. 22 The parties shall complete the 5. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and 23 Request for Waiver of Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver 24 of Service of Summons, a copy of the 1AC (docket no. 6) and all 25 attachments thereto, a copy of this Order, the Order Dismissing 26 Claims with Leave to Amend, (docket no. 5), and a copy of the form 27 “Consent or Declination to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction” to SQSP 28 employees John Walker, Health and Safety Manager; Elizabeth 12 1 Babcock, Hazardous Material Specialist; Kevin Chappell, Warden; 2 and A. Deems, CEO of Health Services and to CALPIA employees 3 Ronald Glass, Industrial Supervisor; Gary S. Loredo, 4 Superintendent II; Philip Earley, Industries Administrator/Lead 5 Manager; Luu Rogers, Industrial Supervisory/Health and Safety 6 Coordinator; Brad Smith, Branch Manager; and Charles Pattillo, 7 General Manager. 8 CALPIA in care of its chief executive officer or other agent 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 The Clerk shall send the same documents to authorized by law to receive service of process. The Clerk shall also mail a copy of the 1AC and a copy of this Order and the Order Dismissing Claims with Leave to Amend to the California Attorney General’s Office. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff. 13 6. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules 14 of Civil Procedure requires them to cooperate in saving 15 unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 16 17 18 Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the Court, on behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, they will be required to 19 bear the cost of such service unless good cause be shown for the 20 failure to sign and return the waiver forms. 21 waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served 22 on the date that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 23 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be required to serve and file an 24 answer before sixty days from the date on which the request for 25 waiver was sent. 26 be required if formal service of summons is necessary.) 27 28 If service is (This allows a longer time to respond than would Defendants are advised to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver form that more completely describes the duties 13 1 of the parties with regard to waiver of service of the summons. 2 If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but 3 before Defendants have been personally served, the answer shall be 4 due sixty days from the date on which the request for waiver was 5 sent or twenty days from the date the waiver form is filed, 6 whichever is later. 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 7. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action: a. No later than thirty days from the date the answer is due, Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. If Defendants file a motion for summary 13 judgment, it shall be supported by adequate factual documentation 14 and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil 15 Procedure 56. 16 17 18 19 If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff. At the time of filing the motion for summary judgment or 20 other dispositive motion, Defendants shall comply with the Ninth 21 Circuit’s decisions in Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 22 2012), and Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012), and 23 provide Plaintiff with notice of what is required of him to oppose 24 a summary judgment motion or a motion to dismiss. 25 b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for summary 26 judgment or other dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 27 and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight days after the 28 date on which Defendants’ motion is filed. 14 1 Before filing his opposition, Plaintiff is advised to read 2 the notice that will be provided to him by Defendants when the 3 motion is filed, and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 4 Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (party 5 opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing 6 triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his 7 claim). 8 of proving his allegations in this case, he must be prepared to 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears the burden produce evidence in support of those allegations when he files his opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Such evidence may include sworn declarations from himself and other witnesses to the incident, and copies of documents authenticated by sworn declaration. Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment 13 simply by repeating the allegations of his complaint. 14 c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 15 fourteen days after the date Plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 16 17 18 19 20 21 d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 8. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be 22 served on Defendants, or Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been 23 designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants 24 or Defendants’ counsel. 25 10. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. 26 Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address by 27 filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed “Notice of Change of 28 Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 15 1 fashion. 2 action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 3 Procedure 41(b). 4 11. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable 5 extensions will be granted. Any motion for an extension of time 6 must be filed no later than fourteen days prior to the deadline 7 sought to be extended. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Dated: 4/4/2014 ________________________ CLAUDIA WILKEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16

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