Barnes v. Schneider et al

Filing 7

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION. Signed by Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong on 4/18/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/21/2014)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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TURELL L. BARNES SR.,

Case No: C 13-5333 SBA

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Plaintiff,
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ORDER DISMISSING
ACTION

vs.
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EUGENE SCHNEIDER, et.al.,
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Defendants.
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On November 18, 2013, Turell L. Barnes, Sr. (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se,

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commenced the instant civil rights action against Judge Cecilia P. Castellanos (“Judge

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Castellanos”), Eugene Schneider (“Schneider”), and the State of California (collectively,

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“Defendants”). Compl., Dkt. 1. Plaintiff has also filed an application to proceed in forma

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pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the action pursuant

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to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and denies Plaintiff’s IFP application as moot.

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I.

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LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), federal courts are authorized to review claims filed

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IFP prior to service and to dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that: (1) the

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allegation of poverty is untrue; (2) the action is frivolous or malicious; (3) the action fails to

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state a claim; or (4) the action seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

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such relief. A pleading filed by a pro se plaintiff must be liberally construed. Balistreri v.

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Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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To determine whether an IFP complaint passes muster under § 1915, the Court

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applies the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

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1998). A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if the

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plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support

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a cognizable legal theory. Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). “To

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survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

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true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 678, (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim

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has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556

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U.S. at 678.

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II.

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DISCUSSION
The complaint alleges that an “illegal probate” was filed against Plaintiff’s real

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property1 by Schneider and his client Armaline Childress. Compl. ¶ 2. According to

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Plaintiff, Schneider failed to provide “Notice of Hearing to any heirs or party of interest,

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thereby violating the statutory laws that govern Probate.” Id. The complaint further alleges

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that Judge Castellanos willfully deprived Plaintiff of rights protected by the Constitution

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by: (1) “appointing . . . Schneider as “Special Administer”; (2) “[a]llowing proceeding in a

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close probate to continue”; and (3) “[d]isregarding to adhere to due process, equal

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protection and judicial procedures.” Id. ¶ 3.

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Plaintiff asserts that “upon the disregards to adhere to due process, equal protection,

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judicial procedures, [he] was deprived enjoyment of his real property. Resulting in a[] loss

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of ownership of the real property and slander of the title, causing an injury in the sum of

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$1,000,000.00.” Compl. ¶ 5. By this action, Plaintiff seeks, among other things,

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compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000,000, an order declaring that the judgment

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entered in the probate matter is “null and void,” and an order reflecting that Plaintiff is the

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owner of the subject property. Id. at 4.

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The real property is located at 6919 Hamilton Street, Oakland, California. Compl.

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A.

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To the extent Plaintiff seeks to disrupt or undo a prior state-court judgment, his

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

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action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d

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895, 901 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Rooker–Feldman bars any suit that seeks to disrupt or undo a

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prior state-court judgment. . . .”) (quotation marks omitted); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359

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F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal

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district courts “from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto

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appeal from a state court judgment.”). The above notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s claims fail on

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the merits, for the reasons discussed below.

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B.

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A judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for acts performed in her judicial

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capacity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978) (holding that a judge is

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absolutely immune from § 1983 damages even if the action he took “was in error, was done

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maliciously, or was in excess of his authority”); accord Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240,

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1243 (9th Cir. 1996) (superseded by statute on other grounds). Such immunity extends to

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claims for damages as well as claims for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief.

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Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, the claims

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alleged against Judge Castellanos are predicated on actions she undertook in her judicial

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capacity in the underlying state court case. Accordingly, because judges are absolutely

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immune for judicial acts, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Castellanos are DISMISSED

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without leave to amend. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000),

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overruled on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).

Claims Against Judge Castellanos

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C.

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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that

Claims Against Schneider

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a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that

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the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See

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West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). No liability for constitutional violations may

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attach to actions undertaken by private individuals. See Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92
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F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the actions attributed to Schneider were undertaken in

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his capacity as a lawyer in private practice. Therefore, because Schneider is alleged to have

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been acting in a private capacity and not under color of state law, Plaintiff cannot state a §

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1983 claim against him. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d

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1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the claims alleged against Schneider are

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DISMISSED without leave to amend.

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D.

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Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the State of California are barred by the Eleventh

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State of California

Amendment. See Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-1026 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The

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State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to

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claims brought under § 1983 in federal court, . . . and the Supreme Court has held that §

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1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.”) (citations

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and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the claims alleged against the State of

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California are DISMISSED without leave to amend.

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III.

CONCLUSION

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For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

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1.

The complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend.

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2.

Plaintiff’s IFP application is DENIED as moot.

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3.

The Clerk shall close the file and terminate any pending matters.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: 4/18/2014
_______________________________
SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG
United States District Judge

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