Fletcher v. Sugura

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers on 1/10/17. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/10/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GREGORY L. FLETCHER,

Case No. 16-cv-03920-YGR (PR)

Plaintiff,
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE

v.
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SGT. G. SUGURA,
Defendant.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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stemming from an alleged constitutional violation at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). He

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names SVSP Sergeant G. Sugura, who he contends is responsible for the failure to compensate

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him for the destruction or loss of personal property that was sent to him from Richard J. Donovan

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Correctional Facility. See Dkt. 1. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which the

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Court will grant in a separate written Order.
II.

DISCUSSION

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A.

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Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

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redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

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which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se

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pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

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Cir. 1990).

Standard of Review

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

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(1) that a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,

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and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

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West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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B.

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In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts due process claims against Defendant Sugura related to

Legal Claims

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the failure to compensate him for the negligent or intentional destruction or loss of his personal

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property. Dkt. 1 at 3-15. However, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a federal claim for relief

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under section 1983.
Ordinarily, due process of law requires notice and an opportunity for some kind of hearing

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.

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Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978). However, neither the negligent nor intentional deprivation of

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property states a due process claim under section 1983 if the deprivation was random and

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unauthorized. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-44 (1981) (state employee negligently lost

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prisoner’s hobby kit), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-

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31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate’s

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property).

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The availability of an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, e.g., a state tort action,

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precludes relief because it provides sufficient procedural due process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494

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U.S. 113, 128 (1990) (where state cannot foresee, and therefore provide meaningful hearing prior

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to, deprivation statutory provision for post-deprivation hearing or common law tort remedy for

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erroneous deprivation satisfies due process); King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir.

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1986) (same). California law provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Barnett v.

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Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). Therefore,

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where a prison official acts in a random and unauthorized manner to deny an inmate his

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property—or in this case deny an inmate compensation due to destruction or loss of personal

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property—(that is, he fails to act in accord with established prison procedures), the claim must be

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pursued in state, not federal, court. As Plaintiff here alleges that Defendant Sugura failed to
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provide him with the required process before failing to grant him proper compensation for the

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destruction of loss of his personal property, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim for

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deprivation of his property. As such, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim under section 1983

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against Defendant Sugura and must be DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing his

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claims in a proper forum.

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III.

CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED. Further, this Court

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CERTIFIES that any IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v.

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Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous).
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate all pending motions, and close the

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file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 10, 2017
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YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS
United States District Judge

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