Wells Fargo Bank N.A., v. Brown et al

Filing 12

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: COURT'S JURISDICTION. Signed by Judge Jeffrey S. White on 6/14/17. Show Cause Response due by 6/30/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/15/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.,,
Plaintiff,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 17-cv-02854-JSW
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE
COURT'S JURISDICTION

v.
CAROL A. BROWN, et al.,
Defendants.

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Federal courts have a duty to raise and decide issues of subject matter jurisdiction sua

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sponte at any time it appears subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12;

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Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). It appears that this Court lacks

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jurisdiction to hear this matter.

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On January 31, 2017, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint for

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unlawful detainer in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Alameda

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(“Alameda County Superior Court”) against Defendant Carol A. Brown and five “Doe”

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defendants. On May 17, 2017, Rudolph J. Davis (an individual who is not named as a defendant

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in Plaintiff’s complaint) removed this action on the basis that “this Court has original jurisdiction

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . in that it arises under U.S.C. 42 Deprivation of Rights.” (Dkt. No. 1,

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Notice of Removal, at 1-2.)

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“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States

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have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United

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States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” Franchise

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Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983) (citation omitted); see also 28

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U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen

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v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, the burden of

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establishing federal jurisdiction for purposes of removal is on the party seeking removal, and the

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removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372

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F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

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“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first

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instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

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“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

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complaint rule.’” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 382, 392 (1987). The well-pleaded

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complaint rule recognizes that the plaintiff is the master of his or her claim. “[H]e or she may
avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id. Thus, under the well-pleaded

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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complaint rule, federal-question jurisdiction arises where the “complaint establishes either that

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federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on

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resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28.

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This action is an unlawful detainer action and, thus, federal law does not create the cause

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of action. Moreover, the Court finds that the claim will not necessarily depend on the resolution

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of a substantial question of federal law, because Plaintiff need not prove compliance with any

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provision of Title 42 of the United States Code in order to establish its claim. See, e.g., Grable &

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Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314-15 (2005). To the extent Mr. Davis

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believes that a provision of Title 42 will be relevant or essential in mounting a defense to the

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unlawful detainer action, this is an insufficient basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.

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Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10, 14; see also Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (“[I]t is now settled

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law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if

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the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint and even if both parties concede that the

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federal defense is the only question truly at issue.”).

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It thus appears that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter, and that

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the action must be remanded back to Alameda County Superior Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c);

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see also Maniar v. FDIC, 979 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 1992).

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Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ISSUES this order to show cause to Rudolph J. Davis to
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res
spond in writ
ting no later than June 30, 2017 why this case sh
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y
hould not be remanded t Alameda
e
to

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County Superio Court. In addition, Mr. Davis sha address w he has st
or
n
M
all
why
tanding to re
emove this

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act
tion when it appears he is not a name defendant See 28 U.
ed
t.
.S.C. § 1441(a) (“[A]ny civil action

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bro
ought in Stat court of which the dist
te
w
trict courts o the United States have original jur
of
d
e
risdiction,

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ma be remove by the def
ay
ed
fendant . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Tanha v. Macy’s Inc., No. 12.
s
a

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cv-6471-SC, 20 WL 136
013
65953 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013) (“Ma
,
acy’s West i not a party to this
is
y

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act
tion and has no standing to remove Plaintiff’s ca under the removal sta
P
ase
e
atutes.”). Sh
hould Mr.

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Da fail to re
avis
espond, this case shall be remanded f lack of su
c
e
for
ubject matte jurisdiction
er
n.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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IT IS SO ORDER
S
RED.
Da
ated: June 14 2017
4,
___
__________
___________
__________
________
JEF
FFREY S. W
WHITE
Un
nited States D
District Judg
ge

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