Google Inc. et al v. Egger et al
Filing
441
Google Inc. et al v. Egger et al
Doc. 441 Att. 5
Exhibit 6
Dockets.Justia.com
94TH
2d Stvaion
CONGBESS >
SENATE
x0.
REPORT
94-755
SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS ROOK III -FINAL REPORT
OF THE
TO
STUDY
SELECT COMMITTEE GOVERNMENTAL
WITH RESPECT TO
OPERATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
UNITED
STATES
SENATE
APRIL
23 (under
authority
of the
order
of APRIL
14),
1976
U.S. GOVERNMENT 09464 0 WASHINGTON
PRINTING : 1976
OFFICE
For
sale by
the
Superintendent \Vashin&m.
of
Documents, D.C. 20402
U.S. Government
- Price $7.65
Printing
Oface
4
A. "Cow~terintelligence Program'?: A Misnomer for Domestic Covert Action COINTELPRO is an acronym for "counterintelligence program." Counterintelligence is defined as those actions by an intelligence agency intended to protect its own security and to undermine hostile intelligence operations. Under COIR'TEI~PRO certain techniques the Bureau had used against hostile foreign agents were adopted for use against perceived domestic threats to the established political and social order. The formal programs which incorporated these techniques were, therefore, also called "counterintelligence." *a "Covert action" is, however, a more accurate term for the Bureau's programs directed against American citizens. "Covert action" is the label applied to clandestine activities intended to influence political choices and social v~lues.~ A'. Who It'et,e the Tar~ggcts.~ 1. The Five Targeted Groups The Bureau's covert action programs were aimed at five perceived the "Communist Party, USA" prothreats to domestic tranquility: gram (1956-71) ; the "Socialist Workers Party" program (1961-69) ; (1964-71) ; the "Black Nationalistthe "White Hate Group" program Hate Group" program (1967-71) ; and the "New Left" program (1968-71). 8. Labels Without Meanhg The Bureau's titles for its programs should not be accepted uncritically. They imply a precision of definition and of targeting which did not exist. Even the names of the later programs had no clear definition. The Black Nationalist progra?, according to its supervisor, included &`a great number of organizations that you might not today characterize as black nationalist but which were in fact primarily black." 38 Indeed, the nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership Conference was labeled as a Black Nationalist "Hate Group." 4 Nor could anyone at the Bureau even define "New Left," except as "more or less an attitude." 5 Furthermore, the actual targets were chosen from a far broader group than the names of the programs would imply. The CPUSA program targeted not only Party members but also sponsors of the
ti For a discussiou of U.S. intelligence activities against hostle foreign intelligence operations, see Report on Counterintelligence. `See Senate Select Committee Report, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" and Staff Report : "Covert Action in Chile." * Black Nationalist Supervisor deposition, 10/17/75, p. 12. from FBI Headauarters to all SAC%. 8/25/W. D. 2. ' Memorandum ' New Left Supervisor's deposition, 10/28/75, p. 8. The cl&e&*any Bureau document comes to a definition is found in an investigative directive: "The term `New Left' does not refer to a definite organization, but to a movement which is providing ideologies or ulatforms alternate to those of existing communist and other basic revolutionary organizations, the so-called `Old Le&.' The New Left movement is a loosely-bound, free-wheeling, college-oriented movement spearheaded by the Students for a Demorcatic Society and includes the more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and anti-draft protest organizations." (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 10/%/68; Hearings. Vol. 6, Exhibit 61. p. 669.) Although this characterization is longer thau that of the New Left Supervisor, it does not appear to be substantively different.
5 National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee 6 and civil rights leaders allegedly under Communist influence or simply not "anti-Communist." 7 The Socialist Workers Party program included non-SWP sponsors of antiwar demonstrations which were cosponsored by the SWP or the Young Socialist Alliance, its youth group .& The Black Nationalist program targeted a range of organizations from the Panthers to SNCC to the peaceful Southern Christian Leadership Conference," and included most black student groups. lo New Left targets ranged from the SDS I1 to the Interuniversity Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy,12 from all of Antioch College ("vanguard of the New Left") l3 to the New Mexico Free University I4 and other "alternate" schoo1s,15 and from underground newspapers lD to students protesting university censorship of a student publication by carrying signs with four-letter words on them." C. What WeTe the Pm-poses of COINTELPRO? The breadth of, targeting and lack of substantive content in the descriptive titles of the programs reflect the range of motivations for security, preventing COINTELPRO activity : protect+, v national violence, and maintaining the existmg social and political order by "disrupting" and "neutralizing" groups and individuals perceived as threats. 1. Protecting National Security against the CPUSA, was instituted to The first COINTELPRO, counter what the Bureau believed to be a threat to the national security. As the chief of the COINTELPRO unit explained it : We were trying first to develop intelligence so we would know what they were doing [and] second, to contain the threat. . . . to stop the effectiveness To stop the spread of communisv, of the Communist Party as a vehicle of Soviet intelligence, propaganda and agitation.17a Had the Bureau stopped there, perhaps the term "counterintelligence" would have been an accurate label for the program. The ex"Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64. `One civil rights leader, the subject of at least three separate counterintelligence actions under the CPUSA caption, was targeted because there was no "neither is there any substantial "direct evidence" that he was a communist, One of the actions utilized information evidence that he is anti-communist." gained from a wiretap ; the other two involved dissemination of personal life information. (Memorandum from J.A. Sizoo to W.C. Sullivan. 2/4/64 : Memorandum from Sew i'nrk Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/12)~&:' Memnranda from to New York Field Office, 3/26/64 and 4/10/64 : Memorandnm FBI Headquarters to New P&k Field Offic'e from FBI Headquarters, 4/21/64; Memorandum from FBI Headquaters to Baltimore Field Office, 10/6/65.) `Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Of&e, 11/29/68. * FBI Headquarters memorandum, 8/25/6'7, p. 2. loMemorandum from FBI Headquarters to Jackson Field Office, 2/8/71, pp. l-2. `lMemorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Ol3ce, 10/31/68. I' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/26/66. "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Offlce, 6/18/68. I' Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albuquerque Field Offlce, 3/14/69. I5 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office. i'/23/69. "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 11/14/69. "Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68. "`COINTELPRO Unit Chief deposition, 10/16/75. p. 14.
DR.
XARTIS
LUTHER
KING,
JR.,
CASE
STUDY
I. INTItODTCTlOS
From December 1963 until his death in 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. `was the target, of an intensive c.ampaign by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to "neutralize" him as an effective civil rights leader. In the words of the man in charge of the FBI's "war" against Dr. King : No holds were barred. We have used [similar] techniques against Soviet agents. [The same methods were] brought home against any organization against which we were targeted. We did not differentiate. This is a rough, tough businr2ss.l The FBI collected information about Dr. King's plans and activities through an extensive surveillance program, employing nearly every intelligence-gathering technique at the Bureau's disposal. Wiretaps, which were initially approved by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, were maintained on Dr. King's home telephone from O&otelephones were ber 1963 until mid-1965 ; the SCLC headquarter's covered by wiretaps for an even longer period. Phones in the homes and offices of some of Dr. King's close advisers were also wiretapped. 16 occasions on which microphones were The FBI has acknowledged hidden in Dr. King's hotel and motel rooms in an "attempt" `to obtain about the "private activities of King and his advisors" information for use to "completely discredit" them.2 in the civil rights movement and reports from FBI informants field offices kept the Bureau's headquarters informed of developments in the civil rights field. The FBI's presence was so intrusive that one major figure in the civil rights movement testified that his collea es referred to themselves ss members of "the FBI's golden mrd clu r ." 3 The FBI's formal program to discredit Dr. King with Government officials began with the distribution of a "monograph" which the FBI realized could "be regarded as a personal attack on Martin Luther King," 4 and which was subsequently described by a Justice De artment official as "a personal diatribe . . . a personal attack wit K out evidentiary support." 5 Congressional leaders were warned "off the record" about alleged dangers posed by Reverend King. The FBI responded to Dr. King's receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize by attempting to undermine his reception by foreign heads of state `and American ambassadors in the to the countries that he planned to visit. When Dr. King returned
' William Sullivan testimony, 11/l/75, p. 97. `Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William *Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/R%, p. 55. ' Memorandum from Alan Belmont to Clyde Tolson, 10/17/E!. `Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 32. Sullivan, l/28/&1.
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174 of the Secret Service, and the Attorney General.404 sent to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who had been interested in "King's activities in the civil rights movement but recently had become quite concerned as to whether there are any subversive influences which have caused King to link the civil rights movement with the anti-Vietnam VVar movement." The Domestic Intelligence Division recommended that a copy be given to the Marine Commandant because "it is felt would definitely be to the benefit of [the Commandant] and to the Bureau. . . ." 405 In February 1968, FBI Headquarters learned that Dr. King planned a `Washington Spring Project" for April 1968. According to a Domestic Intelligence Division memorandum, the Director suggested that the King monograph be again revised. That memorandfum noted: Bringing this monograph up-to-date and disseminating it at high level prior to King's "Washington Spring Project" should serve again to remind top-level officials in Government of the wholly disreputable character of King. . . . of doing a thorough job on this, Because of the importance we will conduct an exhaustive field review t.o bring together information and to present the most complete and up-to-date it in a hard-hitting manner.40G The revised monograph, dated March 12, 1968, was disseminated to the White House, the Attorney General, and the heads of various govagencies407 ernment intelligence
A copy was subsequently
fense, the Director
3. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King By Using the Press Despite Cartha DeLoach's assurances to Andrew Young and Ral h Abernathy that the FBI would never disseminate information to tphe press, the Bureau continued its efforts to cultivate "friendly" news sources that would be willing to release information unfavorable to Dr. King. Ralph McGill, the pro-civil rights editor of the Atlanta Constitution, was a major focus of the Bureau's attentions. The Bureau apparently first furnished McGill with derogatory information about Dr. King as part of an attempt to dissuade community leaders in Atlanta from participating in a banquet planned to honor Dr. King upon his return from the Nobel Prize ceremonies. After a meeting with McGill, William Sullivan reported that McGill said that he had stopped speaking favorably of Dr. King, that he had refused to take an for the banquet, and that he had even taken active part in preparing steps to undermine the banquet. McGill's version of what transpired will never be known, since McGill is deceased. According to Sullivan's memorandum, however : Mr. McGill told me that following my first discussion with him a few weeks ago he contacted a banker friend in Atlanta who was helping to finance the banquet to be given King next Wednesday night. The banker was disturbed and said he
`* Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General ; Director, U.S. Secret Service ; the Secretary of State ; the White House ; and the Secretary of Defense, 4/10/w. `= LMemorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, S/30/67. `OB Memorandum from George Moore to William Sullivan, 2/29/68. `mMemoranda from George Moore to William Sullivan, 3/11/68 and 3/19/68.
332 with a foreign Amendment.260
VII.
power
DOMESTIC
is
unconstitutional
ABUSE
under
QUESTIONS
the
Fourth
SURVEILLANCE
The possibilities for abuse of warrantless electronic surveillance have clearly been greatest when this technique is directed against American citizens and domestic organizations. The application of vague and elastic standards for wiretappin and bugging has resulted in electronic surveillances which, by any oEjective measure, were improper and seriously infringed the Fourth Amendment rights of both the targets and those with whom the targets communicated. Americans who violated no criminal law and represented no genuine threat to the "national security" have been targeted, regardless of the stated predicate. In many cases, the implementation of wiretaps and bugs has also been fraught with procedural violations, even when the required procedures were meager, thus compounding the abuse. The inherently intrusive nature of electronic surveillance, moreover, has enabled the Government to generate vast amounts of informationunrelated to any legitimate governmental interest-about the personal and political lives of American citizens. The collection of this type of information has, in turn, raised the danger of its use for partisan politends by senior administration officials. ical and other improper A. Qu.eationabZe and Improper Selection of Targets Judged against the principles established in the 1972 Keith case, nearly all of the Americans, unconnected with a foreign power, who were targets of warrantless electronic surveillance were improperly selected. Even without retrospective Fourth Amendment analysis of pre-Keith electronic surveillances, however, a close review of some of the particular cases 2698 outlined above suggests that (regardless of whether the ostensible redicate was violence, "subversion," or any other basis) the standar Bs for approval of electronic surveillances were far too broad to restrict the use of this technique to cases which involved a substantial threat to the nation. Moreover, the use of warrantless electronic surveillance against certain categories of individuals such as attorneys, Congressmen and Congressional staff members, an journalists, has revealed an insensitivity to the values inherent in the Sixth Amendment and in the doctrines of "separation of powers" and "freedom of the press." 2. Wiretaps Under the "Donwstic Security" Standard In 1940, President Roosevelt approved the use of wiretapping against "persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United States."27o As discussed in Section II, this formulation was supplemented by President Truman in 1946 t.~ include "cases vitally affecting the domestic security, or where human life is in -!I%@ omission of other cases from the discussion which follows is not intended to suggest the conclusion that the'use of electronic surveilIance was justfin such cases under the standards Roosevelt which existed at the time from President to the Attorney General, 5/21/40.
d
mSee p.
292.
fled or appropriate of the surveillance. 970 Memorandum
NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFECTING
I. INTRODUCTION
AGENCY SURVEILLANCE AMERICANS
AND SUMM-ARY
This report describes the Committee's investigation into certain questionable activities of the National Security Agency (NSA) .I The Committee's primary focus in this phase of its investigation was on NSA's electronic surveillance practices and capabilities, especially those involving American citizens, groups, and organizations. NSA has intercepted and disseminated international communications of American citizens whose privacy ought to be protected under our Constitution. For example, from August 1945 to May 1975, NSA obtained copies of many international telegrams sent to, from, or through the United States from three telegraph companies. In addition, from the early 1960s until 19'i3, NSL4 targeted the international communications of certain American citizens by placing their names on a "watch list." Intercepted messages were disseminated to the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Department of Defense. In neither program were ~~r~~~~btained 2 With one exception,3 NSS contends that its interceptions of Americans' private messages were part of monitoring programs already becommunications channels ing conducted against various international for "foreign intelligence" purposes. This contention is borne out by who have had their communicathe record. Yet to those Americans tions-sent with the expectation that they were private-intentionally and disseminated by their Government, the knowledge that intercepted NSA did not monitor specific communications channels solely to acquire their messages is of little comfort. In general, NSA's surveillance of Americans was in response to requests from other Government agencies. Internal NSA directives now forbid the targeting of American citizens' communications. Nonetheless, NSA may still acquire communications of American citizens as part of its foreign intelligence mission, and informat,ion derived from these intercepted messages may be used to satisfy foreign intelligence requirements. NSA's current surveillance capabilities and past surveillance practices were both examined in our investigation. The Committee recog1See the Committee's Foreign Intelligence Report for an overview of NSA's legal authority, organization and functions, and size and capabilities. a Since the NSA programs involving American citizens have never been challenged in court, the necessity of obtaining a warrant has not yet been determined. Although there have been court cases that involved NSA intercepts, NSA's ac tivities have never been disclosed in open court. See pp. 765-766 of this Report and the Committee's Report on Warrantless FBI Electronic Surveillance for a discussion of warrant requirements for electronic surveillance. `Between 1970 and 1973, NSA intercepted telephone calls between the United States and various locations in South America to aid the BNDD (now the Drug Enforcement Administration) in executing its responsibilitiees. See pp. 752756.
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755
This memorandum and subsequent testimony by NSA o5cials revealed that the CIA was monitoring these circuits to intercept the calls of American citizens suspected of illegal drug trafficking. During this period, NSA continued to monitor the same circuits at its East Coast site, but that site did not have the specific BNDD "sensitive" watch lists of American names which were supplied to the CIA. Thus, the conclusion reached by the Rockefeller Commission-that CIA intercepts were not undertaken for the purpose of gathering intelligence on American citizens-is not supported by the evidence. 3. Termimtion of Drug Activity Three months after the CIA monitoring was initiated, CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston issued an opinion which stated that the intercepts may violate Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.73 This law, as amended in 1968, prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of any private communication of an American citizen to another party, unless undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority to collect foreign intelligence which is crucial to the security of the United States.74 Since intercepted *Tessages were provided to BNDD, Houston concluded that the actlvlty was for law enforcement purposes, which is also outside the CIA's charter. As a result of this memorandum, the CIA suspended its collection. X%4, which has no charter, continued to monitor these links for drug information. NSA o5cials have testified that they were told in early 19'73 that the CIA was terminating collection because it was concerned about operating an intercept station within the United States. This concern is completely different from the one expressed in Houston's memorandum. NSA o5cials have told the Committee that questions concerning the legality of the activity were either not mentioned by the CIA,75 or else mentioned secondarily.76 NSA Deputy Director Buffham testified that after the CL4 decided to stop the United States-South American drug monitoring, NSB began to review the legality and appropriateness of its efforts m support of BNDD. Although NSA is not prohibited by statute or executive directive from disseminating information that may pertain to law enforcement, it has always viewed its sole mission as the collection and dissemination of foreign intelligence. A senior NSA official testin Memorandum from Houston to Acting Chief, Division D, l/29/73. " 18 U.S.C. 2511 (Omnibus Act, 1968) states : "nothing contained in . . . Section 605 . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States. . . ." However, the Keith ease (407 U.S. 297 (1972)) held that the Omnibus Act was simply a congressional recognition of the President's constitutional powers security and did not grant the Executive additional to protect the nation's powers. The Act did not further define the 1934 statute or provide the Executive with any additional authority to conduct foreign intelligence. m Senior NSA o5cial No. 2, g/18/75, p. 117. WBuffham, g/12/75, pp. 23, 71. See also former NSA Deputy Director Louis Tordella's testimony of g/21/75, p. 77 : "It was in their General Counsel's opinion beyond CIA's charter to monitor radio communication? on U.S. soil and I was told that if they could move a group of Cubans up to Canada it would be quite all right, but they would not do it in the United States."
.
756
fied: `(We do not understand our mission to be one of supporting an agency with a law enforcement responsibility." `I7 Although BNDD clearly was a law enforcement agency, NSA initially held that the intelligence it was supplying BNDD was a part of a legitimate USIB-approved effort to prevent drugs from entering the United States.78 This international aspect of the requirement was interpreted by NSA as su5cient justification for classifying the activity as part of its "foreign intelligence" mission. After discussions with the General Counsel's 05ce at NSA and within the 05ce of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of NSA terminated the activity in June 1973.79 All of NSA's drug materialsproduct, internal memoranda, and administrative documents-were NSA destroyed in late August or early September 1973. Ordinarily, keeps material for five years or more. According to a senior NSA "it wasn't thought we would get back into the narcotics 05cial: effort anytime soon. There didn't seem to be any point in keeping them." 8o 4. Continuation of NSA's United States-South American Monitoring In June 1975 the Committee received information that NSA conUnited St.ates-South American telephone tinued to monitor calls after the June 1973 termination of the drug watch list activity. NSA officials confirmed that the same links targeted for the purpose of curbing illegal drug tra5c were monitored by NSA for foreign intelligence after June 1973. Certain of these links were monitored until July 9,1975.*l According to NSA, this activity was terminated when. "it did not prove productive. " 82While this effort was underway, NSA states that it did not collect or disseminate any information on narcotics tra5c from the United States-South American links. A Eenior NSA official stated : "Nothing ever came. No by-product. The problem was dead." 83 5. Current Intewml Policy Concerning Telephone Mmitoting No statute or executive directive prohibits NSA's monitoring a telephone circuit with one terminal in the United States.% An internal NSA instruction was issued on August 7, 1975, that requires the personal approval of the chief of a major element within the Agency before monitoring of voice communications with a terminal in the United States is initiated. According to Deputy Director Buffham, "It is obvious that no such collection will be undertaken unless it is extremely important and is properly reviewed within the Agency." w F. Termination of the Ci& Disturbance Watch L&t Activity The watch list activity involving civil disturbances was o5cially terminated in the fall of 1973. This was due to a combination of facn Senior 7o Senior * Allen, sa Senior " Ibid., "Ibid; 81Senior *Ibid., NSA ofacial No. 1,9/M/75, NSA omcial No. 1,9/M/75, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, NSA ofacial No. 2, g/18/75, p. 125. Buffham. g/12/75. p. 26. NSA official No. 2, g/18/75, pp. 127-128. 86 Bumam, g/12/75, p. 30. p. p. pp. p. 10. 10 ; Banner, 14-15. 91. g/15/75, pp. 49-50.
p. 126.
757 tors: growing concern within NSA regarding the program's vulnerability and propriety ; the fact that courts were beginning to require the Government to reveal electronic surveillance conducted against particular cri, uinal defendants ; and the questions, raised by the drug watch list act,rvity, about NSA's authorit,y to engage in monitoring for law enforc bment purposes. What follows is a description of events leading to the termination of the watch lists. The only Supreme Court case addressing the issue of electronic surveillance purportedly undertaken for national securit purposes IS United Bates v. United States District Court, common 9y referred to as the Keith case.= The Supreme Court's decision was handed down on June 19, 1972, over a year before the watch list activity was terminated. The case involved warrantless wiretaps on three U.S. citizens who were subsequently indicted for conspiracy to destroy Government property. There was no evidence of foreign participation in the alleged logs of the wiretaps in camera, the Distriot &uti coveys r examining judge had held th& the surveillance on the defendants was unlawful and required that the overheard conversations be disclosed.*6b The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's ruling. While recognizing the President's oonst'itutional duty to "protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means," *5c the Court held that the power inherent in such a duty does not extend to the authorization of warrantless eleotronic surveillance deemed necessary to protect the nation f ram subversion by donwstic organizations. The Court declared that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for electronic surveillance developed in two 1967 cases 86 applied, and that the electronic surveillances employed in the instant case were found to be unlawful. The Court did not reach the issue of whether the Executive has the constitutional power to authorize eleotronic surveillance without a warrant in cases involving the actSvities of foreign powers or agents. Although the Keith ruling involved wiretaps and did not apply specifioally to NSA, it did have a bearing on NSA's aotivities. Operation MINARET did entail warrantless electronic surveillance ag&st certain domestic organizations. If there was no evidence to show that these domestic organizations were acting in concert with a foreign power, the Keith case would seem
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