Hovsepian v. Apple, Inc.

Filing 250

Hovsepian v. Apple, Inc.

Doc. 250 Att. 3

EXHIBIT G

Dockets.Justia.com

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HENNIGAN, BENNETT & DORMAN LLP RODERICK G. DORMAN (SBN 96908) ALAN P. BLOCK (SBN 143783) KEVIN SHENKMAN (SBN 223315) 865 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2900 Los Angeles, California 90017 Phone: [phone] Fax: [phone] [e-mail] [e-mail] [e-mail] Attorneys for Plaintiff ACACIA MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION In re ACACIA MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION
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CASE NO. 05 CV 01114 JW MDL No. 1665 PLAINTIFF ACACIA MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION'S LEGAL MEMORANDUM RE THE DEFINITIONS OF CLAIM TERMS FROM THE `863 AND `720 PATENTS AND TERMS FROM THE `992 PATENT THAT THE COURT HAS ALREADY CONSTRUED DATE: TIME: CTRM: September 7-8, 2006 9:00 a.m. Hon. James Ware

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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I. II.

INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................... 1 CLAIM 14 OF THE `863 PATENT............................................................................ 2 1. "Transmitting Compressed, Digitized Data Representing a Complete Copy of at Least One Item of Audio/Video Information at a Non-Real Time Rate From a Central Processing Location" and "Wherein the Transmitting Step Comprises" (`863 Patent, Claim 14; `720 Patent, Claim 8) ................ 3 a) The Phrase "Representing a Complete Copy of at Least One Item of Audio/Video Information" is Not Indefinite ................................................................................. 4 The Court Should Not Limit an "Item Having Information" to a Physical Object and Should not Limit the "Complete Copy" to All of the Information That is Contained on One Physical Object.............................. 5 The Meaning of "Central Processing Location" ..................... 7 (1) (2) "Central Processing Location" is not Indefinite.......... 8 The Court Should Not Add Limitations to the Claim that There is a Plurality of "Local Distribution Systems" or that the "Local Distributions" Directly and Exclusively Receive Information from the Central Processing Location .................................................... 9

b)

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c)

"Inputting an Item Having Information Into the Transmission System" (`863 Patent, Claim 14 and 17) ........................................... 13 a) b) c) The Meaning of the Term "Inputting" .................................. 13 The Term "Inputting" is not Indefinite.................................. 14 The Court Should Not Import the Limitation of a "Source Material Library" From the Specification into Claims 14 and 17 ................................................................... 14

"Assigning a Unique Identification Code to the Item Having Information" (`863 Patent, Claims 14 and 17) .................................. 19 (1) The Court Should Not Import the Limitation of an "Identification Encoder" From the Specification into Claims 14 and 17.......................... 21
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4. 5.

"Formatting the Item Having Information as a Sequence of Addressable Data Blocks" (`863 Patent, Claims 14 and 17)............. 22 "Receiving the Transmitted Compressed, Digitized Data Representing a Complete Copy of the at Least One Item of Audio/Video Information, at a Local Distribution System, Remote From the Central Processing Location" (`863 Patent, Claims 14 and 17).............................................................................. 24 a) The Meaning of "Local Distribution System" ...................... 25 (1) The "Local Distribution System" Does Not Include Any Limitations Regarding "Local Geographic Regions" ................................................ 26 The Term "Local Distribution System" is Not Indefinite ................................................................... 27

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(2) 6.

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9. 8. 7.

"Storing the Received Compressed Digitized Data Representing the Complete Copy of the at Least One Item at the Local Distribution System" (`863 Patent, Claims 14 and 17)...................................................................................................... 28 "In Response to the Stored Compressed, Digitized Data, Transmitting a Representation of the at Least One Item at a Real-Time Rate" (`863 Patent, Claim 14, `720 Patent, Claim 8)........................................................................................................ 29 a) The Meaning of "Transmitting a Representation of the at Least One Item"................................................................. 29 (1) b) The Term "Representation" is Not Indefinite ........... 30

The Meaning of "In Response to the Stored Compressed, Digitized Data, Transmitting. . ." .................... 31

"At Least One of a Plurality of Subscriber Receiving Stations Coupled to the Local Distribution System" (`863 Patent, Claim 14) ........................................................................................... 32 (1) The Term "Subscriber Receiving Station" is Not Indefinite ............................................................ 35

"Decompressing the Compressed, Digitized Data Representing the at Least One Item of Audio/Video Information After the Transmission Step Wherein the
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Decompressing Step is Performed in the Local Distribution System to Produce the Representation of the at Least One Item For Transmission To The At Least One Subscriber Station" (`863 Patent, Claim 14) ....................................................... 36 III. CLAIM 15 OF THE `863 PATENT.......................................................................... 37 10. "Wherein the Inputting Step Comprises Inputting the Item Having Information as Blocks of Digital Data" (`863 Patent, Claims 15, 18) ................................................................................... 37

IV.

CLAIM 16 OF THE `863 PATENT.......................................................................... 38 11. "Wherein the Inputting Step Comprises Inputting the Item Having Information as an Analog Signal and Converting the Analog Signal to Blocks of Digital Data" (`863 Patent, Claims 16 and 19).............................................................................. 39

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V.

CLAIM 17 OF THE `863 PATENT.......................................................................... 40 12. "Formatting Items of Audio/Video Information as Compressed Digitized Data at a Central Processing Location" and "Wherein the Formatting Step Comprises" (`863 Patent, Claim 17) ........................................................................................... 41 a) 13. The Formatting Step Includes Other Steps............................ 42

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"Transmitting Compressed, Digitized Data Representing a Complete Copy of at Least One Item of Audio/Video Information at a Non-Real Time Rate From a Central Processing Location" (`863 Patent, Claim 17) .................................. 43 "Using the Stored Compressed, Digitized Data to Transmit a Representation of the at Least One Item to at a Plurality of Subscriber Receiving Stations Coupled to the Local Distribution System" (`863 Patent, Claim 17) .................................. 44 a) The Meaning of "Using the Stored Compressed, Digitized Data to Transmit a Representation of the at Least One Item"..................................................................... 45 The Meaning of "to at a Plurality of Subscriber Receiving Stations" ............................................................... 46 The Meaning of "Subscriber Receiving Stations" ................ 47

14.

b) c) 15.

Whether Each Step of Claims 14 and 17 of the `863 Patent
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and Claims 8 and 11 of the `720 Patent Begin and Occur Only After a Prior Step or Steps Have Been Completed ........................... 47 VI. CLAIMS 4, 7, 8, AND 11 OF THE `720 PATENT.................................................. 47 16. 17. "Subscriber Selectable Receiving Stations" (`720 Patent, Claims 4, 8, and 11)........................................................................... 49 "Means, Responsive to the Stored, Compressed Digitized Data, for Transmitting a Representation of the at Least One Item of Audio/Video Information at a Real-Time Rate to at Least One of the Plurality of Subscriber Selectable Receiving Stations" ('720 Patent, Claim 4)........................................................ 51 "Means for Inputting Items of Audio/Video Information" (`720 Patent, Claim 7) ....................................................................... 53 "Conversion Means for Placing Each Item of Audio Video Information Into a Predetermined Format as Formatted Data" (`720 Patent, Claim 7) ....................................................................... 55 "Transmitter Means for Sending Compressed Formatted Data for the at Least One Item of Audio/Video Information at the Non-Real Time Rate to the Reception System" (`720 Patent, Claim 7) ............................................................................................. 57 ". . . Transmitting, Using a Transmitting Means, a Representation of the at Least One Item at a Real-Time Rate to at Least One of a Plurality of Subscriber Selectable Receiving Stations" (`720 Patent, Claim 8) ...................................... 60

18. 19.

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20.

21.

CLAIM TERMS FROM THE `992 PATENT THAT THE COURT HAS ALREADY CONSTRUED ....................................................................................... 61 22. 23. 24. 25. "Transmission System" (`992 Patent, Claims 19 and 41; `275 Patent, Claims 2 and 5; `863 Patent, Claims 14 and 17) ................... 61 "Reception System" (`275 Patent, Claims 2 and 5) .......................... 65 "Storing Items Having Information in a Source Material Library" (`992 Patent, Claim 41) ...................................................... 68 "Items Containing (or Having) Information" (`992 Patent, Claims 19 and 41; `275 Patent, Claims 2 and 5; `863 Patent, Claims 14 and 17).............................................................................. 70 "Remote Locations" (`992 Patent, Claim 41).................................... 71
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27. 28. 29. 30.

"Retrieving the Information in the Items from the Source Material Library" (`992 Patent, Claim 41) ........................................ 72 "Assigning a Unique Identification Code to the Retrieved Information" (`992 Patent, Claim 41) ............................................... 74 "Placing the Formatted Data into a Sequence of Addressable Data Blocks" (`992 Patent, Claim 41)............................................... 75 "Storing, as a File, the Compressed, Formatted, and Sequenced Data With the Assigned Unique Identification Code" (`992 Patent, Claim 41) .......................................................... 79

VIII.

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 81

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Page) Cases All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................................ 10 Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................... passim Comark Communs., Inc. v. Harris Corp. 156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................................... 11 Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc. 246 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................................... 11 Electro Medical Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, 34 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ........................................................................................................ 19 Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................ 22, 65 Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ..................................................................................................... 47 Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex International, Inc., 423 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ...................................................................................................... 10 Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc. 405 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ...................................................................................................... 11 Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, Inc. 222 F.3d 951 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ........................................................................................................ 16 Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries, Inc. 9 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ..................................................................................................... passim Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc. 381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................... 11 Intel Corp. v. Via Techs., Inc. 319 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................................ 5 Intervet America, Inc. v. Kee-Vet Laboratories, Inc. 887 F.2d 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ...................................................................................................... 12 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co. 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................... 12

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd) (Page) Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ............................................................................................ 19, 22, 64 Mantech Environmental Corp. v. Hudson Environmental Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................................... passim McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 110 (U.S. 1895) ............................................................................................................... 12 Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp. 401 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................... passim Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. 347 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................................... passim Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. ARM Holdings PLC 403 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ...................................................................................................... 16 Network Commerce, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 422 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................ 8, 26, 34 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................ 11, 14 Prima Tek II, LLC v. Polypap 318 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................................... passim Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 220 U.S.P.Q. 592 (Fed. Cir. 1983).................................................................... 13, 66 Renishaw, PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni 158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................................... passim Resonate, Inc. v. Alteon Websystems, Inc., 338 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................................... passim SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ................................................................................................ 13, 66 Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. 774 F.2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ................................................................................................. passim Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .......................................................................................... 16, 17, 22 Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Com., 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986) .......................................................................................... 19, 22, 64
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd) (Page) TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................... 58 Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ................................................................................................. passim Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co. 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ........................................................................................................ 16 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ........................................................................................................ 78 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co. 442 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................... passim Statutes 35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................................... passim Treatises IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms, Sixth Ed. (1996)........................... 15 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 8th Ed. Rev. No. 4, § 2173.05(e)................................................................................................. 7, 34 MPEP, § 2173.05(e) ........................................................................................................................... 26 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) (1993) ........................................ passim

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I.

INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Acacia Media Technologies Corporation ("Acacia") hereby submits its legal

memorandum in support of its definitions for the claim terms from the `863 and `720 patents and for the nine claim terms from the `992 patent for which the Round 3 defendants seek reconsideration of the Court's prior constructions. The claims at issue from the `863 patent are claims 14-19. Claims 14-19 of the `863 patent are asserted against only the Rounds 2 and 3 cable defendants. Claims 17-19 of the `863 patent are only asserted against the Round 2 satellite defendants. No claims from the `863 are asserted against the Internet defendants. The claims at issue from the `720 patent are claims 4, 6, 7, 8, and 11. The claims of the `720 patent are only asserted against the Round 2 satellite defendants. Additionally, because the Round 3 cable defendants were not parties to this MDL proceeding when the Court construed claim terms from the `992 and `702 patents in Markman I and Markman II, the Court has permitted the Round 3 defendants to seek reconsideration of terms from these patents which the Court has already construed. The Round 3 defendants seek reconsideration of nine claim terms from the `992 patent which the Court previously construed. This brief addresses 29 claim terms and one issue (whether the steps of the method claims only being and occur after a prior step or steps has been completed). In preparation of the Joint Chart, filed concurrently herewith, the parties exchanged their proposed constructions for nearly every term of the claims-at-issue in the `863 and `720 patents, including the order of the steps of each method claim. The parties were able to agree on the constructions of 19 claim terms and issues, as set forth in the concurrently-filed stipulation. As they did before, the defendants have divided themselves into two groups ­ (1) the Round 2 Defendants , and (2) the Round 3 Defendants .
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For the purposes of the issues involving the `863 and `720 patents, the Round 2 Defendants are the Cable and Satellite defendants whom Acacia sued in the first two rounds of complaints. The Round 2 Defendants are: Comcast Cable Communications, LLC; The DIRECTV Group, Inc.; EchoStar Satellite LLC; EchoStar Technologies Corp.; Charter Communications, Inc.; Armstrong Group; Block Communications, Inc.; East Cleveland Cable TV and Communications LLC; Wide Open
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As it did with respect to its brief on the additional claim terms from the `992 and `275 patent claims, Acacia has organized this memorandum to follow the claims at issue in consecutive order as they are presented, first in the `863 patent, then in the `720 patent, and then the reconsideration terms of the `992 patent. II. CLAIM 14 OF THE `863 PATENT Claim 14 of the `863 patent is an independent method claim: 14. A method of distributing audio/video information comprising: [1] transmitting compressed, digitized data representing a complete copy of at least one item of audio/video information at a nonreal time rate from a central processing location; [5] receiving the transmitted compressed, digitized data representing a complete copy of the at least one item of audio/video information, at a local distribution system remote from the central processing location; [6] storing the received compressed digitized data representing the complete copy of the at least one item at the local distribution system; [7] in response to the stored compressed, digitized data, transmitting a representation of the at least one item at a real-time rate to [8] at least one of a plurality of subscriber receiving stations coupled to the local distribution system; and [9] decompressing the compressed, digitized data representing the at least one item of audio/video information after the transmission step wherein the decompressing step is performed in the local distribution system to produce the representation of the at least one item for transmission to the at least one subscriber station; [1] wherein the transmitting step comprises:

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West Ohio LLC; Massillon Cable TV, Inc.; Mid-Continent Media, Inc.; US Cable Holdings LP; Savage Communications, Inc.; Sjoberg's Cablevision, Inc.; Loretel Cablevision; Arvig Communications Systems; Cannon Valley Communications, Inc.; NPG Cable, Inc.; Cable One, Inc.; Mediacom Communications Corp.; Bresnan Communications; Cequel III Communications I, LLC (dba Cebridge Connections); Coxcom, Inc.; Hospitality Network, Inc.; and Cable America, Inc. Although Defendants Insight Communications, Inc. and Bresnan Communications were sued in Round 3, they are joining the Round 2 Defendants' proposed constructions. The Round 1 defendants (the Internet defendants) are not participating in this round of claim construction, because Acacia has not asserted either of the `863 or `720 patents against any Internet defendant.
2

The Round 3 Defendants are two of the cable company defendants whom Acacia sued in New York in the third round of complaints: Time Warner Cable, Inc. and CSC Holdings, Inc.
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[2] inputting an item having information into the transmission system; [3] assigning a unique identification code to the item having information; [4] formatting the item having information as a sequence of addressable data blocks; compressing the formatted and sequenced data blocks; storing, as a file, the compressed, formatted, and sequenced data blocks with the assigned unique identification code; and sending at least a portion of the file at the non-real time rate to the local distribution system. 1. "Transmitting Compressed, Digitized Data Representing a Complete Copy of at Least One Item of Audio/Video Information at a Non-Real Time Rate From a Central Processing Location" and "Wherein the Transmitting Step Comprises" (`863 Patent, Claim 14; `720 Patent, Claim 8) The phrase "compressed, digitized data representing a complete copy of at least one item of audio/video information" means that the data is a reproduction of at least one entire item of audio/video information in a compressed, digitized data form. The term "central processing location" does not require construction, however, it may be described as the principle position or site where processing occurs. The phrase in claim 14 "wherein the transmitting step comprises" refers to the step of "transmitting compressed, digitized data . . .". The use of the open-ended transitional phrase "comprising" means that the transmitting step includes, but is not limited to, the "inputting. . .," "assigning . . .," "formatting . . .," "compressing . . .," "storing, . . .," and "sending . . ." steps listed thereafter and described below as Term Nos. 2-7. Round 2 Defendants Central Processing Location: Indefinite. (The Round 2 Defendants contend that "central processing location" is indefinite in each claim in which it is used: Claims 14, 17 of the `863 and Claims 8, 11 of the `720 patents). "transmitting . . . from a central processing location": This phrase does not require construction. Representing a complete copy of at least one item of audio/video information: Indefinite. Round 3 Defendants "Central Processing Location" means: The single (one and only one) location of the transmission system, at which all of the processing of audio/video information by the transmission system is exclusively performed and from which a plurality of "local distribution systems" directly and exclusively
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Acacia

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receive processed audio/video information. The step of "transmitting compressed, digitized data representing a complete copy of at least one item of audio/video information at a non real time rate" to at least one "local distribution system" must be exclusively performed at this single central processing location, as must the following steps: "inputting an item having information into the transmission system;" "assigning a unique identification code to the item having information;" "formatting the item having information as a sequence of addressable data blocks;" "compressing the formatted and sequenced data blocks;" "storing, as a file, the compressed, formatted, and sequenced data blocks with the assigned unique identification code;" and "sending at least a portion of the file at the non-real time rate to the local distribution system." In addition: "a complete copy of at least one item of audio/video information" means a copy of all of the audio/video information that is contained on one physical item. "compressed, digitized data" means the compressed and sequenced addressable data blocks. [See construction 29 of "sequence of addressable data blocks" below; see construction 5 of "local distribution system" below] The phrases "transmitting compressed, digitized data representing a complete copy of at least one item of audio/video information at a non-real time rate from a central processing location" and "wherein the transmitting step comprises" appear in claim 14 of the `863 patent. a) The Phrase "Representing a Complete Copy of at Least One Item of Audio/Video Information" is Not Indefinite

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The Round 2 defendants contend that the phrase "representing a complete copy of at least one item of audio/video information," which appears in Claims 14 and 17 of the `863 patent and in Claims 8 and 11 of the `720 patent, is indefinite. The Round 2 defendants have not yet articulated the reason why they believe that this phrase is indefinite and therefore Acacia reserves the right to address the Round 3 defendants' specific contentions in Acacia's reply brief.
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As with any issued patent, the `863 patent is presumed valid and therefore defendants bear the burden of proving facts critical to a holding of indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence. Intel Corp. v. Via Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A claim term is indefinite only if those skilled in the art are unable to understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification. Bancorp Servs. L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004). If, in light of a fully developed record, the claim is amenable to construction, i.e., it is not insolubly ambiguous, it is not invalid for indefiniteness. Bancorp, 359 F.3d at 1372. One of ordinary skill in the art in 1991 would have understood what is meant by this phrase when reading the claim in light of the specification. Bancorp, 359 F.3d at 1372. "Representing" has an ordinary meaning of "presenting by means of something standing in the place of: serve as the counterpart or image of." (Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) (1993) (hereinafter "Webster's"). (See Block Decl. Ex. A). Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood "representing" to mean that it is the compressed digitized data which represents at least one item of audio/video information, i.e., it is at least one item of audio/video information in a compressed, digitized data form, that is transmitted. b) The Court Should Not Limit an "Item Having Information" to a Physical Object and Should not Limit the "Complete Copy" to All of the Information That is Contained on One Physical Object

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The Round 3 defendants contend that "a complete copy of at least one item of audio video/information" means "a copy of all of the audio/video information that is contained on one physical object." Again, as Acacia discussed with respect to the `992 patent terms, there is no limitation that the "item having information" is a "physical object;" it may be a physical object, or it may be a non-physical object, such as a computer file (which itself resides on a physical object or objects, possibly with other computer files). The fallacy with the Round 3 defendants' proposed construction is that defendants misconstrue an "item having information" as a "physical object." The term "item having information" does not specify whether the item is or is not a "physical object," the specification does not state that an "item having information" is only a physical object and the patentees chose not to include such a limitation in the claim that the item having information is limited to physical objects.
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Defendants contend that "items having information" is limited only to physical objects, because "items having information," as used in Claim 41 of the `992 patent, are stored in the "source material library." But, as discussed below in Section No. 2, neither claims 14 nor 17 of the `863 patent nor its specification require that the "item having information" be input to a source material library. Further, nothing in the specification even requires that the "items having information," whether or not in the source material library, are limited only to physical objects. (See `863 patent, 5:63-6:4). If the Court were to limit "items having information" to physical objects, then the Court would be impermissibly importing a limitation from the specification into a claim term "items having information" that does not require such limitation. See, Resonate, Inc. v. Alteon Websystems, Inc., 338 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Courts may not rewrite claim language based on what has been omitted from the claim, and the district court's attempt to do so here was legal error.") Further, nothing in claim 14 requires that the complete copy of at least one item of audio/video information be all of the information of an "item having information." Id. The Round 3 defendants' inclusion of the limitation that an "item having information" is limited to a physical object and that all of the information contained on the physical object be the "complete copy" invites the Court to ignore one of the basic principles of patent claim construction which holds that the Court must read the claims in the context of the specification and interpret their meaning consistent with the specification. The Federal Circuit made this point in Renishaw, PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998): Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389, 38 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1461, 1470, 134
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See, Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("We cannot look at the ordinary meaning of the term ... in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and the prosecution history."); Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("the descriptive part of the specification aids in ascertaining the scope and meaning of the claims inasmuch as the words of the claims must be based on the description. The specification is, thus, the primary basis for construing the claims."); Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("A fundamental rule of claim construction is that terms in a patent document are construed with the meaning with which they are presented in the patent document. Thus claims must be construed so as to be consistent with the specification, of which they are a part.")
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L. Ed. 2d 577, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction. See Young Dental, 112 F.3d at 1142, 42 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1593 (affirming the district court's claim construction as "a more natural reading of the claim language" than the appellant's construction); cf. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 401 ("Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon: The good sense of the situation and a simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense, by tenable means, out of the statutory language."). A claim construction is persuasive, not because it follows a certain rule, but because it defines terms in the context of the whole patent. c) The Meaning of "Central Processing Location"

The term "central processing location" is not used in the patent specification. There is no requirement that each word in a claim be used in the specification. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 8th Ed. Rev. No. 4, § 2173.05(e) ("MPEP") ("There is no requirement that the words in a claim must match those used in the specification disclosure. Applicants are given a great deal of latitude in how they chose to define their invention so long as the terms and phrases used define the invention with a reasonable degree of clarity and precision."); See also, Network Commerce, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 422 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (construing the term "download component" which was not used in the specification by reference to the context of the claims and the teachings in the specification). The Wilson Sporting Goods case is on point. See, Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In Wilson Sporting Goods, the claim term "annular" appeared in the claims, but was not used in the patent specification. The court held that, because there was no evidence in the claims or the specification that the inventor intended to impart a novel meaning to "annular" and no evidence that "annular" had a peculiar meaning in the field of art, the court could give "annular" its ordinary and customary meaning: This court notes that the adjective `annular' appears only within the claims, not in the patent specification. Nothing in the specification, including the claims, indicates explicitly or implicitly, that the inventor intended to impart a novel meaning to `annular.' The record also contains no evidence that `annular' has a peculiar meaning in the field of art encompassed by the `398 patent. This court concludes, therefore, that the ordinary and customary meaning attributed to this term by those of ordinary skill in this art at the time of invention `involves little more than the application of [its] widely accepted meaning.' Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
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Wilson Sporting Goods, 442 F.3d at 1328. Here, as in Wilson Sporting Goods and Network Commerce, the meaning of "central processing location" would have been easily understood by persons of skill in the art in 1991 from the context of claim 14 and the patent specification. According to the transmitting step of claim 14: (1) the item having information is input to the transmission system; (2) the compressed, digitized data is sent from "a central processing location," and (3) the compressed digitized data is received by a local distribution system that is remote from the central processing location. Figures 1d, 1e, 1f, and 1g of the `863 patent depict examples of systems having a transmission system 100 that is at a location (or locations) that are remote from one or more local distribution systems (depicted as "reception systems" 200 and 200'). A "processing location" would have been understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art in 1991 as a location (already defined by the Court to mean a site or position) where processing occurs. The "transmitting step" of claim 14 of the `863 patent sets forth a number of processing steps, i.e., inputting, assigning, formatting, compressing and storing, which are described in the specification as occurring in a transmission system. The term "central" means that the "central processing location" is the principal processing location. Thus, from claim 14 and the specification, the term "central processing location" would have been understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to refer to the location at which the transmission system is located, which is the principal location where processing occurs. (1) "Central Processing Location" is not Indefinite
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The Round 2 defendants contend that the phrase "central processing location" is indefinite. Defendants bear the burden of proving indefiniteness but they have not articulated the reasons why they believe this term is indefinite. Acacia therefore reserves the right to address defendants' specific contentions in its reply brief. Defendants may contend that the phrase "central processing location" is indefinite, because it is not used in the patent specification. This fact, however, does not

The term "central" is defined in Webster's as "belonging to the center as the most important part: basic, essential, principal, dominant: not peripheral or incidental: cardinally related."
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mean that the term "central processing location" is indefinite. In Bancorp, the claim term "surrender value protected investment credits" did not have a definition in an industry publication and was not defined in the patent specification. The similar term "stable value protected investment credits," however, did appear in the claims and in the specification and its meaning was well-understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art. The district court held that the two terms were not synonyms for each other, and therefore held the patent invalid as being indefinite. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the meaning of the term "surrender value protected investment credits" could be discerned from the claims and the specification: We agree with Bancorp that the meaning of the term "surrender value protected investment credits" is reasonably discernible and that the asserted claims of the `792 patent are therefore not invalid for indefiniteness. It is true that the entire term "surrender value protected investment credits" is not defined in the patent, and Bancorp has not pointed us to any industry publication that defines the term. Nonetheless, the components of the term have well-recognized meanings, which allow the reader to infer the meaning of the entire phrase with reasonable confidence. Bancorp, 359 F.3d at 1372.
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As discussed above, persons of ordinary skill in the art in 1991 would have understood the meaning of "central processing location" when the claims are read in light of the specification, and thus this term is not indefinite, even though this term is not itself used in the specification. (2) The Court Should Not Add Limitations to the Claim that There is a Plurality of "Local Distribution Systems" or that the "Local Distributions" Directly and Exclusively Receive Information from the Central Processing Location

The Round 3 defendants contend that the Court should construe the phrase "central processing location" as being the location from which "a plurality of `local distribution systems' directly and exclusively receive processed audio/video information." These limitations are not present in either claim 14 or in the patent specification. The Round 3 defendants are asking the
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Additionally, the Court stated that "[t]he failure to define the term is, of course, not fatal, for if the meaning of the term is fairly inferable from the patent, an express definition is not necessary (although of course the inclusion of a definition would have avoided the need for this timeconsuming and difficult inquiry in definiteness). See All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002)" Bancorp, 359 F.3d at 1373.
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Court to re-write the claim. Claim 14 is not limited to a plurality of local distribution systems. Claim 14 states that the transmitted information is received at "a local distribution system remote from the central processing system," which means "one or more local distribution systems." See, Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex International, Inc., 423 F.3d 1343, 1350-1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (construing "a linking cable" as "one or more linking cables" and stating that "the claim term "'a' or `an' in patent parlance carries the meaning of `one or more' in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase `comprising.'"). The patent specification is also not limited to a plurality of "local distribution systems," because the specification discloses and supports "one or more" local distribution system. (See, Figures 1d, 1e 1f, and 1g). Claim 14 is also not limited to local distribution systems which "directly and exclusively" receive audio/video information from the central processing system. The claim merely states that the information is received at the local distribution system from the central processing location. There is no limitation as to how the local distribution system receives the information from the central processing location, i.e., whether it receives the information directly or indirectly from the central processing location or whether it receives the information exclusively from the central processing location or from some other location in addition to the central processing location. See, Resonate, 338 F.3d at 1365 ("Courts may not rewrite claim language based on what has been omitted from the claim, and the district court's attempt to do so here was legal error.") Further, the use of the transitional phrase "comprising" in claim 14 means that receiving the information at the local distribution system indirectly from the central processing location or receiving information from locations in addition to the central processing location is not precluded. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1371-1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("The word `comprising' transitioning from the preamble to the body signals that the entire claim is presumptively open-ended."); Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("The transition `comprising' creates a presumption that the recited elements are only a part of the device, that the claim does not exclude additional unrecited elements.")
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The Federal Circuit has repeatedly instructed district courts that limitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims. Comark Communs., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998). "It is a `bedrock principle' of patent law that `the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.'" Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005), quoting, Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Courts only interpret what is meant by the words in the claims; courts do not add extraneous limitations or rework claims: Kee-Vet also cites this case [E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988)] but has apparently not taken adequate notice of that section's several times repeated statement to the effect that this court has consistently adhered to the proposition that courts cannot alter what the patentee has chosen to claim as his invention, that limitations appearing in the specification will not be read into claims, and that interpreting what is meant by a word in a claim "is not to be confused with adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the specification, which is improper." The court quoted with approval from Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 395-96, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 701 (Ct.Cl. 1967), the statement that "No matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not rework claims. They only interpret them." The panel found it necessary in Du Pont to reverse the district court's interpretation of claims which read into them properties of a polymer which were not recited in the claims. We have to do the same here. Intervet America, Inc. v. Kee-Vet Laboratories, Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In addition, claims cannot be limited to devices operated precisely as the embodiment(s) described in the specification; if so, there would be no need for claims. See, SRI Int'l. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("'[T]hat claims are interpreted in light of the specification does not mean that everything expressed in the specification must be read into all the claims.' Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957, 220 U.S.P.Q. 592, 597 (Fed. Cir. 1983). If everything in the specification were required to be read into the claims, or if structural claims were to be limited to devices operated precisely as a specification-described embodiment is operated, there would be no need for claims. Nor could an applicant, regardless of the prior art, claim more broadly than that embodiment."); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) ("Consistent with its scope definition and notice functions, the claim requirement presupposes that a patent applicant defines his invention in the claims, not in the specification. After all, the claims, not the specification, provide the measure of
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the patentee's right to exclude."); McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 110, 116, 40 (U.S. 1895) ("We know of no principle of law which would authorize us to read into a claim an element which is not present, for the purpose of making out a case of novelty or infringement. The difficulty is that if we once begin to include elements not mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim ..., we should never know when to stop.") In Resonate, the claim at issue included the phrase "transmitting the requested resource to the client." Resonate, 338 F.3d at 1365. The district court had held that, because every step of the claim-at-issue was described in detail, the "transmitting" step of the claim must include additional detail, not specified in the claim, e.g., that a load balancer is bypassed by the transmitted requested resource. The Federal Circuit reversed, because the disputed claim language ­ "transmitting the requested resource to the client" ­ specified nothing regarding the transmission path over which the requested data must be sent. The patentees' choice not to include such detail in the claims means that a court is not permitted to rewrite the claim to add such missing details: The district court's `level of detail' analysis does not withstand close scrutiny. The patentee's apparent choice not to specify a transmission path from the server to the client led the district court to add a limitation that the requested resource be transmitted directly to the client. But patentees are not required to claim each part of an invention with the same amount of detail; indeed, such a rule likely would prove unworkable. Courts may not rewrite claim language based on what has been omitted from a claim, and the district court's attempt to do so here was legal error. See K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Courts do not rewrite claims; instead, we give effect to the terms chosen by the patentee."); Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("Courts can neither broaden nor narrow the claims to give the patentee something different than what he has set forth."). Resonate, 336 F.3d at 1365. Similarly, in Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the district court interpreted the claim term "straw-shaped" to means "straw-sized." The Federal Circuit reversed, because the "straw-shaped" limitation does not impose any limitation as to size and it was therefore improper for the district court to use the term "straw-shaped" to incorporate a size limitation into the claim: It is improper for a court to add "extraneous" limitations to a claim, that is, limitations added "wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim." E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
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& Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433, 7 USPQ2d 1129, 1131 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986, 102 L. Ed. 2d 572, 109 S. Ct. 542 (1988). That appears to be what the district court did, however, by emphasizing the smallness of the fibers. The phrase "straw-shaped" unambiguously relates to shape not size. Thus, it was improper for the court to use that phrase as the vehicle for incorporating a size limitation into the claim. Hoganas, 9 F.3d at 950. Accordingly, the Court should not construe the term "central processing location" to include the limitations that there are a plurality of "local distribution systems" or that the local distribution systems directly and/or exclusively receive information from the central processing location, because these limitations are not stated in the claims and are not required to interpret the meaning of term "local distribution system." 2. Acacia "Inputting an Item Having Information Into the Transmission System" (`863 Patent, Claim 14 and 17)
The phrase "inputting an item having information into the transmission system" means the act of providing an item having information to the transmission system. The term "transmission system" has already been construed by the Court to mean "an assembly of elements, hardware and software, that function together to convert items of information for storage in a computer compatible form and subsequent transmission to a reception system." In the context of claims 14 and 17 of the `863 patent, the subsequent transmission is to the local distribution system. The transmission system therefore is the system in which the steps of "inputting," "assigning," "formatting," "compressing," "storing," and "sending" occur.

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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Round 2 Defendants Round 3 Defendants

The phrase "inputting an item having information into the transmission system" in Claims 14 and 17 of the `863 patents is indefinite. Placing a physical object containing audio/video information into the source material library of the transmission system. "The transmission system" must be contained at one, and only one, location. The location of "the transmission system" is the "central processing location." [See construction 22 of "transmission system" below]

The phrase "inputting an item having information into the transmission system" appears in claims 14 and 17 of the `863 patent. It is part of the transmitting step. a) The Meaning of the Term "Inputting"
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transmission system" should be given its ordinary and customary meaning. Nothing in the specification, including the claims, indicates explicitly or implicitly, that the inventors intended to impart a novel meaning to "inputting." There is also no evidence of which Acacia is aware that "inputting" has a peculiar meaning in the field of art encompassed by the `863 patent. Thus, the term "inputting" should be given its ordinary and customary meaning, which "involves little more than the application of [its] widely accepted meaning." Wilson Sporting Goods, 442 F.3d at 1328, quoting, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. The term "inputting" is widely understood to mean the act of putting in or providing. See, e.g., Webster's ("the act, process, or instance of putting in") (see Block Decl. Ex. 2) and IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms, Sixth Ed. (1996) (hereinafter "IEEE Dictionary") ("To provide data from an external source") (see Block Decl. Ex. 11). b) The Term "Inputting" is not Indefinite

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The Round 2 defendants contend that the "inputting" step is indefinite. The Round 2 defendants bear the burden of proving indefiniteness, but they have not yet articulated the reason why they believe that this phrase is indefinite and therefore Acacia reserves the right to address the Round 3 defendants' specific contentions in Acacia's reply brief. One of ordinary skill in the art in 1991 would have understood what is meant by this phrase when reading the claim in light of the specification. Bancorp, 359 F.3d at 1372. As discussed above, persons of ordinary skill in the art in 1991 would have understood the meaning of "inputting" when the claims are read in light of the specification, and thus this term is not indefinite. c) The Court Should Not Import the Limitation of a "Source Material Library" From the Specification into Claims 14 and 17
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The Round 3 defendants construe the "inputting" step to require that a physical object

containing audio/video information be placed into the source material library of the transmission system. There is no limitation in claim 14 that the transmission system includes a source material library and there is no limitation that the item is placed into a source material library. Claim 14 is
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As discussed above in Section No. 1.b. and at the last Markman hearing, the Court should not limit the term "item having information" to "physical objects."
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silent as to the structural elements of the transmission system and is silent as to where within the transmission system the item is input. The patentees chose to omit these limitations when they drafted the claims. This is consistent with the specification, which states that there is no requirement for the transmission system to even have a source material library. (See, e.g., `863 patent, 5:60-62: "A preferred embodiment of transmission system 100 may preferably include only some of the elements shown in FIGS. 2a and 2b.") The fact that Figure 2a of the `863 patent depicts a source material library in the transmission system does not operate to limit claims 14 and 17 to include a source material library. Prima Tek II, LLC v. Polypap, 318 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Similarly, the mere fact that the patent drawings depict a particular embodiment of the patent does not operate to limit the claims to that specific configuration."), citing, Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Claim 14 is perfectly understandable to persons skilled in the art without the limitation of inputting the item to a source material library. For instance, the item could be input directly to an identification encoder (or to another element(s) capable of assigning a unique identification code; the claim does not specify any specific structure) or to an input receiver of the converter (or to another element(s) capable of formatting; the claim does not specify any specific structure). The item could also be input to a source material library (or another element capable of storage; the claim does not specify). See, Resonate, 338 F.3d at 1365; Hoganas, 9 F.3d at 950; Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[T]he court may conclude that the scope of the various claims may differ, some embracing different subject matter than is illustrated in the specific embodiments in the specification."), citing, Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Device claims are not limited to devices which operate precisely as the embodiments described in detail in the patent.") The point is that there is no limitation or requirement in the claims that the item be input to a source material library, and the Court should not add such a limitation where no such limitation exists in the claims (because the patentees chose to omit such a limitation) or in the specification. This was the holding in Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
-15ACACIA'S LEGAL MEMORANDUM RE `863 AND `720 PATENT CLAIM TERMS CASE NO. 05 CV 01114 JW (MDL NO. 1665)

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Case 5:05-cv-01114-JW

Document 184

Filed 07/21/2006

Page 25 of 90

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In Teleflex, the district court, relying on the patent specification, construed the claim term "clip" to mean "a structure that has a single pair of legs." Id., at 1319. On appeal, Teleflex contended that the court erred by importing limitations