Zynga Game Network, Inc. v. Williams et al

Filing 43

MOTION for Default Judgment as to DEFENDANTS JASON WILLIAMS, LUNA MARTINI AND WAN-WEN KUO; AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES filed by Zynga Game Network, Inc.. Motion Hearing set for 6/24/2011 09:00 AM in Courtroom 3, 5th Floor, San Jose before Hon. Jeremy Fogel. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Affidavit)(Caplan, David) (Filed on 5/6/2011)

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Larry W. McFarland (Bar No. 129668)
E-Mail: [e-mail]
Dennis Wilson (Bar No. 155407)
E-Mail: [e-mail]
David K. Caplan (Bar No. 181174)
E-Mail: [e-mail]
Tara D. Rose (Bar No. 256079)
E-Mail: [e-mail]
KEATS McFARLAND & WILSON LLP
9720 Wilshire Boulevard
Penthouse Suite
Beverly Hills, California 90212
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]

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Attorneys for Plaintiff
ZYNGA INC.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SAN JOSE DIVISION
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ZYNGA GAME NETWORK INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

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Plaintiff,
v.
JASON WILLIAMS, an individual, LUNA
MARTINI, an individual, WAN-WEN KUO, an
individual, and JOHN DOES 4-5 D/B/A MW
GROUP
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS
TO DEFENDANTS JASON WILLIAMS,
LUNA MARTINI AND WAN-WEN KUO;
AND
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES
Noted For Hearing:
DATE:
June 24, 2011
TIME:
9:00 a.m.
PLACE: Courtroom 3, 5th Floor

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CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION .............................................................................................. 1 

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ISSUE TO BE DECIDED .................................................................................................................... 1 

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... 1 

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I.  STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ....................................................................................... 1 

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A. Procedural Background ............................................................................................................. 1 

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B. Zynga’s Rights and the Mafia Wars Game ............................................................................... 1 

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II.  Defendants’ Unlawful Conduct ...................................................................................................... 3 

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III.  ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 4 

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A. Governing Law for Default Judgments..................................................................................... 4 

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B. The Eitel Factors Favor Entering Default Judgment ................................................................ 4 

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1.  Zynga Will Be Prejudiced if Default Judgment Is Not Entered ......................................... 5 

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2.  Zynga’s Claims Are Meritorious and its Complaint is Sufficient ...................................... 5 

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a.  Defendants are Liable for Federal False Designation of Origin, as well as

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California Statutory and Common Law Unfair Competition Claims ........................... 6 

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b.  Defendants are Liable for Violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ................... 8 

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c.  Defendants are Liable for Violating California Penal Code § 502 ............................... 8 

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d.  Defendants are Liable for Breach of Contract .............................................................. 9 

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e.  Defendants are Liable for Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations ........... 9 

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f.  Defendants’ Interference with Zynga’s Contractual Relationships With its

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Customers Is an Independent Basis for Liability Under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

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§ 17200........................................................................................................................ 10 

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g.  Defendants are Liable for Trespass to Chattels .......................................................... 10 

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3.  Zynga’s Requested Monetary Relief is Tailored to Defendants’ Misconduct .................. 11 

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4.  There Is No Possibility of a Genuine Issue of Material Fact ............................................ 11 

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5.  The Default Entered Against Defendants did Not Result from Excusable Neglect ......... 11 

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6.  The Policy Favoring Adjudication of Disputes on the Merits Does Not

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Weigh Against Default Judgment ..................................................................................... 12 
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MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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IV. ZYNGA’S REQUESTED RELIEF .............................................................................................. 12 
A. Zynga Is Entitled to an Injunction Prohibiting Defendant from Infringing the MAFIA
WARS Mark ......................................................................................................................... 12 
B. Zynga Is Entitled to an Injunction Prohibiting Defendants from: 1) “Selling”

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or Advertising Zynga’s “Virtual Goods”; and 2) Accessing Zynga’s Servers ....................... 13 

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C. Zynga Is Entitled to its Requested Monetary Award .............................................................. 14 

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D. Zynga Is Entitled to Recover its Attorneys’ Fees and Costs .................................................. 15 

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CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 16 

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-iiCASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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Cases 

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Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Lewis & Co.,
913 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1990) .......................................................................................................... 5

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5

Applied Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBay, Inc.,
511 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................................ 6

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7
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13

Bd. Of Trustees of the Carpenter Trust Fund for Northern California
v. JKJ, Inc., CV-09:636, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7354, at *12
(N.D. Cal. January 6, 2010) ............................................................................................................ 11
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
Corp., No. CV-98: 9074, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23244, at *8
(C.D. Cal. November 12, 1999) ...................................................................................................... 14
CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado,
158 Cal. App. 4th 1226 (2008) ......................................................................................................... 9
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin,
846 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1988) ........................................................................................................ 12

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Cleary v. News Corp.,
30 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1994) ............................................................................................................ 6
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Alta-Dena Certified Dairy,
4 Cal. App. 4th 963 (1992) ............................................................................................................. 14
Cortez v. Global Ground Support, LLC,
CV-09:4138, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110268, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009)............................................................................................................... 10
CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enters.,
479 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................................................ 10
Dabu v. Becks Creek Indus.,
No. CV-08:5626, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119737, at *3
(N.D. Cal., September 23, 2009) ...................................................................................................... 4
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,
547 U.S. 388, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 164 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006) ........................................................ 12, 13
Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc.,
100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) .................................................................................... 10, 11

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-iiiCASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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Eitel v. McCool,
782 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986) .......................................................................................... 4, 5, 11, 12
Geddes v. United Financial Group,
559 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1977) ............................................................................................................ 5
Gracie v. Gracie,
217 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2000) ........................................................................................................ 15
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Alphaville, Design, Inc.,
CV:08-3437, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103384, at *21
(N.D. Cal. October 22, 2009).................................................................................................... 12, 13
Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp.,
54 Cal. App. 4th 499 (1997) ........................................................................................................... 14
Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc.,
802 F.Supp. 278 (C.D. Cal. 1992) .................................................................................................. 14

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12
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Koninklijke Philips Elec. N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc.,
No. 05-1532, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50839, at *12 (D. Nev. Jul. 2, 2008)
(affirmed, Koninklijke Philips Elec., N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., No. 08-16794,
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 21156 (9th Cir., Sept. 24, 2009)) ................................................................ 5
Lifted Research Group, Inc. v. Salem,
No. CV-08:4497, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44850, at *8
(N.D. Cal., May 15, 2009) ................................................................................................................ 6

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Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp.,
982 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................................ 14
Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp.,
390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968) .................................................................................................... 14, 15
Marziliano v. Heckler,
728 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1984) ........................................................................................................... 12
Nat’l Leader Co. v. Wolfe,
223 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1955) .......................................................................................................... 15

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Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
50 Cal. 3d 1118 (1990) ..................................................................................................................... 8
People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc.,
159 Cal. App. 3d 509 (1984) ...................................................................................................... 9, 10
PepsiCo v. Triunfo-Mex, Inc.,
189 F.R.D. 431 (C.D. Cal. 1999) .................................................................................................. 4, 5
-ivCASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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PepsiCo v. Cal. Sec. Cans,
238 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2002) .................................................................................... 11, 12
Philip Morris U.S.A. Inc. v. Castworld Prods.,
219 F.R.D. 494 (C.D. Cal. 2003) .................................................................................. 11, 12, 13, 15
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., Inc.,
692 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) ........................................................................................................ 15
Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn, Inc.,
793 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1986) ......................................................................................................... 13

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Tagged, Inc. v. Doe,
CV-09:1713, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5428, at *23
(N.D. Cal. Jan 25, 2010) ................................................................................................................... 8
Taylor Made Golf Co. v. Carsten Sports,
175 F.R.D. 658 (S.D. Cal. 1997) .................................................................................................... 15

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TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal,
826 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1987) ............................................................................................................ 5
UFW of Am. v. Dutra Farms,
83 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1163-64 (2000) .......................................................................................... 14
United Bank of Kuwait PLC v. Enventure Energy Enhanced Oil
Recovery Assocs., 755 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ................................................................. 12
Vuitton Et Fils, S.A. v. Crown Handbags,
492 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ............................................................................................... 13

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William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
265 U.S. 526, 44 S.Ct. 615, 68 L.Ed. 1161 (1924) ......................................................................... 13
Zynga Game Network Inc. v. Greene, et al.,
United States District Court, Northern District of California, Case No. CV:09-2744 SI ............... 15
Zynga Game Network Inc. v. Erkan,
United States District Court, Northern District of California, Case No. CV:09-3264 SC ............. 15

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Statutes 
15 U.S.C. § 1057 ................................................................................................................................... 6

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15 U.S.C. § 1116 ................................................................................................................................. 12
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MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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15 U.S.C. § 1117 ................................................................................................................................. 15

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15 U.S.C. § 1125 ................................................................................................................................... 5

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18 U.S.C. § 1030 ........................................................................................................................... 5, 6, 8

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50 U.S.C. App. § 501 ............................................................................................................................ 4

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Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 ..................................................................................................... 6, 10

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Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17203 .......................................................................................................... 13

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Cal. Penal Code § 502 ................................................................................................................... 6, 8, 9

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Other Authorities 

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Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy Trademarks & Unfair Competition
§§ 30:25-30:26 (4th ed. 2007) ........................................................................................................ 15

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Rules 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 ............................................................................................ 1, 4, 12

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-viCASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
TO ALL PARTIES: Please take notice that on June 24, 2011 at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 3,

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Fifth Floor of the United States Federal District Courthouse, San Jose Courthouse, 280 South 1st

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Street, San Jose, California 95113, Plaintiff Zynga Inc. (“Zynga”) will move the Court pursuant to

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) for entry of default judgment against defendants Jason

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Williams, Luna Martini and Wan-Wen Kuo (“Defendants”). Zynga’s Motion is based on this Notice

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of Motion and Motion, the supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of

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David K. Caplan, the Proposed Default Judgment, all pleadings on file in this action, and any other

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matter that may be submitted in support of this Motion.

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ISSUE TO BE DECIDED
Whether the Court should enter default judgment against Defendants, awarding Zynga their

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profits from their unlawful conduct; permanently enjoining Defendants from infringing Zynga’s

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rights; and finding that this is an exceptional case meriting an award of attorney’s fees.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

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A. Procedural Background

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Zynga filed its original complaint in this action on March 10, 2010. (Dkt. No. 1.) Zynga filed

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its First Amended Complaint on September 7, 2010. (Dkt. No. 22.) On March 25, 2011, the Court

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authorized Zynga to serve Defendants with process by electronic mail. (Dkt. No. 35.) Zynga served

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Defendants with process on March 28, 2011. (See Dkt. No. 36.) Zynga filed its request for entry of

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default by the Clerk against Defendants on April 22, 2011. (Dkt. No. 39.). The Clerk entered

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Defendant’s default on May 2, 2011. (Dkt. No. 42.)

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B. Zynga’s Rights and the Mafia Wars Game

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Zynga is the largest social gaming company, providing, inter alia, online poker games, word

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games, board games, role playing games and party games including Zynga Poker, Mafia Wars,

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YoVille, Vampires, Street Racing, Scramble and Word Twist. (Dkt. No. 22 (“FAC”), ¶ 11.)

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Zynga’s games are available on Facebook, MySpace, Bebo, Hi5, Friendster, Tagged, Yahoo!, and

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the iPhone and iPod Touch, among others. Id. Zynga’s games have been a runaway success. In
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CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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July, 2008, Zynga had over 1.3 million daily active users and 20 million registered users. As of

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January 1, 2009, Zynga had over 75 million registered users. As of May 2009, Zynga had more than

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9.5 million daily users. By September 2010, Zynga had over 100 million unique users playing its

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games every month. (See id. ¶ 12.)

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One of Zynga’s most popular properties is Mafia Wars (the “Game”), a computer game for

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use on wireless devices and computers that allows users to start a Mafia family with their friends and

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compete to become the most powerful family. (FAC, ¶ 13.) Zynga makes the Game available

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through social networking websites and applications (collectively “Providers”), including but not

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limited to those identified above. (Id. ¶ 18.)

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Zynga has made use of the trademark MAFIA WARS in commerce since at least September

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2008. (FAC, ¶ 14.) Zynga’s success and the success of the MAFIA WARS mark have been widely

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reported in the press, on the Internet and in blogs. (Id. ¶ 15.) As of February 2009, the Game had

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over 1.1 million daily active users. As of July 2009, the Game had more than 4 million daily active

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users. As of December 2009, the Game had over 7 million daily active users. (Id.)
The mark MAFIA WARS has acquired distinctiveness, and by virtue of the extensive online

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sales and advertising under the mark MAFIA WARS, the MAFIA WARS mark has become well-

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known within social gaming circles as a source identifier for the Game. (FAC, ¶ 16.) Zynga owns

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United States Federal Trademark Application Serial No. 77772110 for the mark MAFIA WARS in

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International Class 009 for downloadable computer game software for use on wireless devices and

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computers, and International Class 041 for entertainment services, namely, providing on-line

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computer games. (Id. ¶ 17.)

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Zynga owns or leases the computer servers that players must access in order to play the

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Game, and grants players who participate in the Game a revocable license to access its servers for

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the purpose of playing the Game. (FAC, ¶ 19.). Zynga’s Terms of Service govern users’ play of the

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Game, and players who use the Game must consent to the Terms of Service.1 (Id. ¶ 20.) Players

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The Terms of Service also establish that Defendants have consented to personal jurisdiction and
venue in this Court. See Declaration of David K. Caplan in Support of Zynga’s Motion for Default
Judgment (“Caplan Decl.”), Exs. 1 and 2, ¶ 12(a), Ex. 3, ¶ 8.2.
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CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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who use the Game in a manner not expressly authorized by Zynga, including without limitation in

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violation of the Terms of Service, are not authorized to participate in the Game or to access Zynga’s

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servers. (Id. ¶ 21.) When users sign up with Zynga to play the Game, they receive a certain amount

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of “Virtual Currency” that they use to compete in the Mafia Wars game with other players using the

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Providers’ sites and/or applications. Players can increase their total amount of “Virtual Currency”

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through their play, and can also purchase “Virtual Currency” from Zynga. (Id. ¶ 22.) Players use

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“Virtual Currency” to purchase various virtual, in-Game digital items (“Virtual Goods”). (Id. ¶ 23.)

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Zynga grants players a limited, revocable license to use the “Virtual Currency” or “Virtual

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Goods” while playing the Game, but retains sole and exclusive ownership of the “Virtual Currency”

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or “Virtual Goods” and the source code that allows the “Virtual Currency” or “Virtual Goods” to be

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used in the Game. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Zynga has not authorized any third party to sell the “Virtual

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Currency” or “Virtual Goods” required to play the Game. (Id. ¶ 25.) Among other things, the Terms

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of Service that govern users’ play of the Game prohibit users from selling “Virtual Currency” or

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“Virtual Goods” for real-world money or otherwise exchanging “Virtual Currency” or “Virtual

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Goods” for anything of value outside the Game. (Id. ¶ 26.)

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II. DEFENDANTS’ UNLAWFUL CONDUCT

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Without Zynga’s authorization or approval, Defendants have established and operated

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websites (the “Infringing Websites”) at the Internet domain names MWBLACKMARKET.COM,

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MAFIAWARSDIRECT.COM and MWFEXPRESS.COM (collectively the “Domain Names”)

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through which they “sell” (or previously “sold”) “Virtual Goods” that users, playing the Game

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through the Providers’ websites and/or applications, can use to compete with other players who

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obtained their “Virtual Goods” directly from Zynga. (FAC, ¶¶ 27, 28.)

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Defendants advertise and “sell” these “Virtual Goods” using the MAFIA WARS mark and/or

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confusingly similar misspellings or variations of the MAFIA WARS mark. (FAC, ¶ 29.)

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Defendants “sell” “Virtual Goods” for use in the Game for real-world money, and at prices that are

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substantially lower than the prices paid by users who obtain their “Virtual Goods” from Zynga. (Id.

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¶ 30.)

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CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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Defendants have used the Game itself as part of their scheme, transferring the “Virtual

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Goods” they “sell” during game play in contravention of the Game’s terms of service and/or security

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measures, and in violation of the license they received from Zynga to participate in the Game. (FAC,

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¶ 31.) Zynga has never authorized Defendants to use the mark MAFIA WARS or to “sell” “Virtual

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Goods” for use in the Game, nor has Zynga authorized Defendants to use the Game to transfer

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“Virtual Goods” that Defendants have “sold” to players through the Infringing Websites. (Id. ¶ 32.)

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III. ARGUMENT

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A. Governing Law for Default Judgments

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Default judgments are governed by Rule 55. In this case, the controlling rule is Rule

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55(b)(2) because Zynga’s claims against Defendants are not for a sum certain. Fed. R. Civ. P.

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55(b)(1), (2). As such, default judgment against Defendants can only be entered by the Court upon

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application by Zynga. Id. As noted above, Defendants have failed to plead or otherwise defend

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against Zynga’s claims. To the best of Zynga’s knowledge, Defendants are not infants or

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incompetent persons, nor does the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 501 et seq.,

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apply to them. (Caplan Decl., ¶ 5.) Accordingly, the Court may properly enter default judgment

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against Defendants based solely on Zynga’s Motion.2

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B. The Eitel Factors Favor Entering Default Judgment

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“The decision to grant or deny default judgment under Rule 55(b) is within the discretion of

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the Court.” Dabu v. Becks Creek Indus., No. CV-08:5626, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119737, at *3

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(N.D. Cal., September 23, 2009) (citing Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986)).

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Courts in the Ninth Circuit consider the following factors (the “Eitel Factors”) in determining

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whether to grant default judgment: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of

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the plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake

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in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was

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due to excusable neglect; and (7) the policy favoring adjudication on the merits. Id. “In applying

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2

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Although Defendants have not participated in this litigation, Zynga has nevertheless served this
Motion and the supporting documents on Defendants by electronic mail pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and consistent with this Court’s order authorizing Zynga to serve
Defendants with process by electronic mail. (Dkt. No. 35.)
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CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

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this discretionary standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied.” PepsiCo v.

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Triunfo-Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999). As demonstrated below, the Eitel factors

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strongly favor entry of default judgment against Defendants.

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1. Zynga Will Be Prejudiced if Default Judgment Is Not Entered
With respect to the first Eitel factor, Zynga will suffer prejudice if default judgment is not

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entered. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. It is well-established that upon entry of default, the factual

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allegations of a complaint except those relating to the amount of damages are deemed to be true.

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TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987); Geddes v. United Fin.

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Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Logically, entry of default also generally establishes a

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defendant’s liability. See Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Lewis & Co., 913 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990).

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The truth of Zynga’s allegations having been established, default judgment is the only

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recourse available to Zynga, and Zynga will suffer prejudice if that relief is denied. See Koninklijke

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Philips Elec. N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., No. 05-1532, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50839, at *12 (D. Nev.

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Jul. 2, 2008), affirmed, Koninklijke Philips Elec., N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., No. 08-16794, 2009 U.S.

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App. LEXIS 21156 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2009)) (“The Court finds that if it does not enter default

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judgment, Plaintiff would be without other recourse for recovery and thus will suffer prejudice.”).

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Furthermore, the established facts alleged in Zynga’s First Amended Complaint are more than

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sufficient to demonstrate that Zynga will suffer prejudice in the form of, among other things,

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impairment of its trademark rights and interference with its relationships with its customers, if

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default judgment is not entered. On the record before the Court, there can be no doubt that the first

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Eitel factor supports entry of default judgment.

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2. Zynga’s Claims Are Meritorious and its First Amended Complaint is Sufficient

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The second and third Eitel factors require a plaintiff to state a claim on which it may recover.

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Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. As set forth above, Defendants’ liability is deemed established upon default

25

and all findings of fact necessary to support liability are accepted as true. Adriana Int’l Corp., 913

26

F.2d at 1414; Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560.

27
28

In this case, Zynga has adequately pled all of the following claims against Defendants: (1)
false designation of origin pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (2) violation of the Computer Fraud and
5

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1

Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; (3) California unfair competition pursuant to California Business &

2

Professions Code § 17200; (4) violation of California Penal Code § 502; (5) California common law

3

trademark infringement; (6) California common law passing off and unfair competition; (7) breach

4

of contract; (8) intentional interference with contractual relations; and (9) Trespass to Chattels.

5

Zynga’s First Amended Complaint properly alleges the necessary elements for each of these causes

6

of action, and Defendants’ failure to respond to the allegations establishes their liability for each of

7

the claims asserted in the First Amended Complaint.

8

a. Defendants are Liable for Federal False Designation of Origin, as well as

9

California Statutory and Common Law Unfair Competition Claims

10

Zynga’s claim for federal statutory false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, as well

11

as its claims for California statutory unfair competition and California common law trademark

12

infringement, passing off and unfair competition, all require Zynga to establish the same material

13

elements: that Zynga owns a valid and legally protectable mark, and that Defendants’ use of the

14

mark is likely to cause consumer confusion. See Lifted Research Group, Inc. v. Salem, No. CV-

15

08:4497, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44850, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2009) (citing Applied Info. Scis.

16

Corp. v. eBay, Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d

17

1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1994) (“This Circuit has consistently held that state common law claims of

18

unfair competition and actions pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 are

19

‘substantially congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.”).

20

In this case, the MAFIA WARS trademark at issue is valid and legally protectable, as

21

evidenced by its application for registration on the Principal Register of the U.S. Patent and

22

Trademark Office. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). With regard to whether Defendants’ use of the mark is

23

likely to cause consumer confusion, the Ninth Circuit considers eight factors to assess the likelihood

24

of confusion: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4)

25

evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and degree of care

26

likely to be used by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of

27

expansion of the product lines. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979),

28
6

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1

abrogated in part on other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 n.

2

19 (9th Cir. 2003).

3

In its First Amended Complaint, Zynga has sufficiently alleged the likelihood of confusion

4

pursuant to the Sleekcraft factors. Zynga alleges the strength of its MAFIA WARS trademark that

5

“has acquired distinctiveness, and by virtue of the extensive online sales and advertising under the

6

mark MAFIA WARS, the MAFIA WARS mark has become well-known within social gaming

7

circles as a source identifier for the Game.” (FAC, ¶ 16.) Where, as here, the goods at issue are

8

“related or complementary,” the likelihood of confusion is heightened. M2 Software, Inc. v.

9

Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). Zynga alleges that it sells “Virtual Currency”

10

and “Virtual Goods” for use in the Game (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23) and that Defendants have used the MAFIA

11

WARS mark in conjunction with the advertising and sale of Zynga’s “Virtual Goods” (Id. ¶ 29). In

12

addition, the marks at issue in this case are not only similar, but appear to be identical. (See id. ¶

13

29.) Zynga supports these allegations by submitting evidence that Defendants have used the Marks

14

in the content of their Infringing Websites. (See Caplan Decl., Exs. 6-8.) The marketing channels

15

used by Zynga and the Defendants are also similar. When users sign up with Zynga to play the

16

Game, they receive a certain amount of “Virtual Currency” for use in purchasing various “Virtual

17

Goods,” and players can increase their total amount of “Virtual Currency” through their play or they

18

can purchase “Virtual Currency” from Zynga using the Providers’ websites and/or applications. (Id.

19

¶ 22.) Similarly, Defendants sell Zynga’s “Virtual Goods” through their Infringing Websites. (Id. ¶

20

28.) See M2 Software, 421 F.3d at 1083 (“‘Convergent marketing channels increase the likelihood

21

of confusion.’”) (quoting Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 606 (9th

22

Cir.1987)). Furthermore, Zynga has alleged that because the Defendants have duplicated the

23

MAFIA WARS mark and/or used confusingly similar misspellings or variations thereof, purchasers

24

are likely to be confused, deceived or mistaken as to the source of and authorization for the “Virtual

25

Goods” sold by Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 62.) With respect to Defendant’s intent, “[w]hen the alleged

26

infringer knowingly adopts a mark similar to another’s, [a court] must presume that the public will

27

be deceived.” M2 Software, 421 F.3d at 1085 (citing Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354).

28
7

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1

Moreover, Zynga’s uncontested allegations in its First Amended Complaint establish that

2

Defendants have used the MAFIA WARS mark in a manner that is likely to cause confusion. (See

3

e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 34, 62.) Zynga has sufficiently pled and established its statutory and common law

4

trademark infringement and unfair competition claims. (See also FAC, ¶¶ 33-35; 42-48; 61-69.)

5

b.

6

Defendants are Liable for Violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

A defendant is civilly liable for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act when that

7

defendant: 1) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,

8

and thereby obtains information from any computer involved in interstate and foreign commerce and

9

communication, or 2) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a computer involved in

10

interstate and foreign commerce and communication, without authorization or exceeds authorized

11

access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value; and

12

3) causes a loss to one or more persons during any one-year period aggregating at least Five

13

Thousand Dollars ($5,000) in value. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a), (e), (g). Zynga has sufficiently alleged

14

each of these elements in its First Amended Complaint.3 (See FAC, ¶¶ 36-41.) Furthermore, Zynga

15

has explained that Defendants have accessed Zynga’s computer servers without authorization to

16

carry out their unauthorized “Virtual Goods” selling activities. (See id. ¶ 31.) Thus, Zynga has

17

sufficiently pled and established its claim for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
c. Defendants are Liable for Violating California Penal Code § 502

18
19

A defendant is civilly liable for violating California Penal Code § 502 when that defendant

20

does any of the following, causing damage or loss to the plaintiff: 1) knowingly accesses and

21

without permission makes use of data from a computer, computer system or computer network

22

owned or leased by the plaintiff in order to wrongfully obtain money, property or data; 2) knowingly

23

accesses and without permission takes, copies or makes use of data from a computer, computer

24
3

25
26
27
28

Although allegations related to the amount of damages are not generally established by entry of
default, it is appropriate for the Court to find that Defendants’ default establishes that Zynga has
suffered the $5,000 in damage necessary to state its claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
See Tagged, Inc. v. Doe, CV-09:1713, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5428, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Jan 25, 2010)
(finding on motion for default judgment that plaintiff had stated a claim for violation of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act based in part on plaintiff’s allegation that defendant’s conduct had
“caused monetary damage of at least $5,000” to the plaintiff.).
8

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1

system or computer network owned or leased by the plaintiff; 3) knowingly and without permission

2

uses computer services owned or leased by the plaintiff; 4) knowingly and without permission

3

disrupts or causes the disruption of computer services or denies or causes the denial of computer

4

services to an authorized user of a computer, computer system, or computer network owned or

5

leased by the plaintiff; 5) knowingly and without permission provides or assists in providing a means

6

of accessing a computer, computer system, or computer network owned or leased by the plaintiff; 6)

7

knowingly and without permission accesses or causes to be accessed a computer, computer system,

8

or computer network owned or leased by the plaintiff. Cal. Penal Code. §§ 502(c), (e). Zynga has

9

sufficiently alleged each of these elements in its First Amended Complaint. (See FAC, ¶¶ 49-60.)

10

Furthermore, Zynga has explained that Defendants have accessed Zynga’s computer servers without

11

authorization to carry out their unauthorized “Virtual Goods” selling activities. (See id. ¶ 31.) Thus,

12

Zynga has sufficiently pled and established its claim for violation of California Penal Code § 502.

13

d. Defendants are Liable for Breach of Contract

14

“A cause of action for breach of contract requires proof of the following elements:

15

(1) existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3)

16

defendant’s breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach.” CDF Firefighters v.

17

Maldonado, 158 Cal. App. 4th 1226, 1239 (2008). Zynga has sufficiently pled each of these

18

elements in its First Amended Complaint. (See FAC, ¶¶ 70-75.) Zynga has further developed this

19

claim by explaining that Defendants have not only “sold” “Virtual Goods” in violation of the Terms

20

of Service, but that they have also exploited the Game itself to transfer their “Virtual Goods” in

21

violation of the Terms of Service. (See id. ¶¶ 26, 31, 32.) Zynga has sufficiently pled its claim for

22

breach of contract.

23
24

e. Defendants are Liable for Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations
“The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action for intentional

25

interference with contractual relations are: (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party;

26

(2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a

27

breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual

28

relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d
9

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1

1118, 1126 (1990). Zynga has sufficiently alleged each of these elements. (See FAC, ¶¶ 76-81.)

2

Zynga has further developed this claim by explaining that Defendants have deliberately interfered

3

with Zynga’s contractual relationships with its customers by offering their unauthorized “Virtual

4

Goods” at prices far below the prices paid by customers who obtain their “Virtual Goods”

5

legitimately from Zynga, and by using the Game itself to transfer “Virtual Goods” to their customers

6

in contravention of the Game’s terms of service and/or security measures, and in violation of the

7

license they received from Zynga to participate in the Game. (See id. ¶¶ 30-31.) In so doing,

8

Defendants have deliberately sought to induce Zynga’s customers to breach the Terms of Service by

9

“purchasing” unauthorized “Virtual Goods” from them, and by participating in unauthorized in-

10

game “Virtual Goods” transfers. Zynga has sufficiently pled its claim for intentional interference

11

with contractual relations.

12

f. Defendants’ Interference with Zynga’s Contractual Relationships With its

13

Customers Is an Independent Basis for Liability Under Cal. Bus. & Prof.

14

Code § 17200

15

California Business & Professions Code § 17200 (the “UCL”) prohibits “unlawful, unfair or

16

fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s].” “[C]ommon law torts can generally be used as a predicate

17

for a claim under the UCL.” Cortez v. Global Ground Support, LLC, CV-09:4138, 2009 U.S. Dist.

18

LEXIS 110268, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) (citing CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner

19

Enters., 479 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding a claim for intentional interference with the

20

plaintiff’s employment contracts was sufficient to sustain a claim under the UCL)). In this case,

21

Defendants’ intentional interference with Zynga’s contracts with its customers is an independent

22

basis for the Court to find Defendants liable for violating the “unlawful” prong of the UCL.

23

g. Defendants are Liable for Trespass to Chattels

24

“In order to prevail on a claim for trespass based on accessing a computer system, the

25

plaintiff must establish: (1) defendant intentionally and without authorization interfered with

26

plaintiff’s possessory interest in the computer system; and (2) defendant’s unauthorized use

27

proximately resulted in damage to plaintiff.” Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d

28
10

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1

1058, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2000). Zynga has sufficiently alleged each of these elements. (See FAC,

2

¶¶ 82-87.)

3
4
5
6

Zynga has sufficiently pled its claims, and the undisputed facts establish that Zynga’s claims
are meritorious. Therefore, the second and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of Zynga’s Motion.
3. Zynga’s Requested Monetary Relief is Tailored to Defendants’ Misconduct
The fourth Eitel factor requires the Court to consider the amount at stake in the action “in

7

relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d

8

1172, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Requested relief is reasonable, and this factor

9

weighs in favor of default, when the “sum of money being sought by Plaintiff is . . . tailored to the

10

specific misconduct of Defendant.” Bd. Of Trustees of the Carpenter Trust Fund for Northern

11

California v. JKJ, Inc., CV-09:636, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7354, at *12 (N.D. Cal. January 6, 2010).

12

In this case, Zynga is requesting that Defendants be ordered to account for and to disgorge their

13

profits from the sale of “Virtual Goods” for use in the Game to Zynga. This is tailored directly to

14

Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of Zynga’s Motion.

15

4. There Is No Possibility of a Genuine Issue of Material Fact

16

The fifth Eitel factor weighs the possibility of a dispute regarding any material facts in the

17

case. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472-73. As set forth above, Zynga has established that no possibility of a

18

genuine issue of material fact exists in this matter because Defendants’ default has established as

19

true the allegations of material fact in Zynga’s First Amended Complaint. “Thus, no dispute has

20

been raised regarding the material averments of the complaint, and the likelihood that any genuine

21

issue may exist is, at best, remote. This factor therefore favors the entry of default.” Philip Morris

22

U.S.A. Inc. v. Castworld Prods., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003).

23
24

5. The Default Entered Against Defendants did Not Result from Excusable Neglect
The sixth Eitel factor considers the possibility that default resulted from excusable neglect.

25

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1473. That is not the case here. In the time since they were served with the

26

summons and the First Amended Complaint, Defendants have chosen not to participate in this

27

litigation in any capacity.

28
11

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1

Under these circumstances, courts have rightfully concluded that “the possibility of

2

excusable neglect is remote.” Philip Morris, 219 F.R.D. at 501; see also United Bank of Kuwait

3

PLC v. Enventure Energy Enhanced Oil Recovery Assocs., 755 F. Supp. 1195, 1205 (S.D.N.Y.

4

1989) (“A default is deemed willful where a defendant simply ignores the complaint without

5

action.”) (citing Marziliano v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 1984)). This factor also favors

6

the entry of default judgment.

7
8
9

6. The Policy Favoring Adjudication of Disputes on the Merits Does Not Weigh
Against Default Judgment
Finally, the seventh Eitel factor does not weigh against Zynga’s Motion because Defendants’

10

failure to participate in the litigation prevents the Court from considering this dispute on the merits.

11

See Philip Morris, 219 F.R.D. at 501 (“‘Defendant’s failure to answer [Plaintiff’s] Complaint makes

12

a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible. Under FRCP 55(a), termination of a case

13

before hearing the merits is allowed whenever a defendant fails to defend an action.’ This is

14

precisely what occurred in the present case. Therefore, the seventh Eitel factor does not preclude the

15

Court from entering default judgment against Defendant.”) (quoting PepsiCo Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans.,

16

238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177)).

17
18
19
20

IV. ZYNGA’S REQUESTED RELIEF
A. Zynga Is Entitled to an Injunction Prohibiting Defendants from Infringing the
MAFIA WARS Mark
The Lanham Act explicitly authorizes the Court to “grant injunctions, according to the

21

principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent” Defendants

22

from infringing Zynga’s trademark rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). “Indeed, ‘[i]njunctive relief is the

23

remedy of choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at

24

law for the injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringement.’” Herman Miller, Inc. v.

25

Alphaville, Design, Inc., CV:08-3437, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103384, at *21 (N.D. Cal. October 22,

26

2009) (quoting Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)).

27

When a defendant’s “refusal to answer or appear . . . makes it difficult for plaintiff to prevent further

28

infringement,” the “traditional equitable principles established by eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,
12

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1

547 U.S. 388, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839-40, 164 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006) are satisfied and injunctive relief

2

is warranted.” Herman Miller, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103384, at *22; see also Philip Morris, 219

3

F.R.D. at 502 (“[I]njunctive relief is appropriate because the claims otherwise warrant an injunction,

4

and Defendant, though well aware of serious claims brought against it, has chosen to ignore this

5

lawsuit. Failure to grant the injunction would needlessly expose the Plaintiff to the risk of continuing

6

irreparable harm.”).

7

In fashioning an appropriate injunction, “‘any doubt in respect of the extent thereof must be

8

resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor as the innocent producer and against the [defendant], which has

9

shown by its conduct that it is not to be trusted.’” Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn, Inc., 793 F.2d

10

1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1986). Id. at 1135 (quoting William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265

11

U.S. 526, 532, 44 S.Ct. 615, 618, 68 L.Ed. 1161 (1924)). In Polo, the court emphasized that

12

injunctive relief was appropriate even though the defendants voluntarily ceased their infringement

13

after the suit was filed. “We should not require Polo also to introduce concrete evidence that the

14

defendants are likely to infringe again. If the defendants sincerely intend not to infringe, the

15

injunction harms them little; if they do, it gives Polo substantial protection of its trademark.” Polo

16

Fashions, 793 F.3d at 1135-36; see also Vuitton Et Fils, S.A. v. Crown Handbags, 492 F. Supp.

17

1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“mere possibility of [infringement] is sufficient to warrant an

18

injunction”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, Zynga respectfully

19

requests that the Court enter the proposed permanent injunction filed concurrently herewith.

20
21
22

B. Zynga Is Entitled to an Injunction Prohibiting Defendants from: 1) “Selling”
or Advertising Zynga’s “Virtual Goods”; and 2) Accessing Zynga’s Servers
The California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) authorizes the Court to “make such orders

23

or judgments . . . as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any

24

practice which constitutes unfair competition[.]” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203.

25

The remedial power granted under this section is “extraordinarily broad. Probably

26

because . . . unfair business practices can take many forms, the Legislature has given

27

the courts the power to fashion remedies to prevent their ‘use or employment’ in

28
13

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1

whatever context they may occur.” . . . . Injunctive relief “may be as wide and

2

diversified as the means employed in perpetration of the wrongdoing.”

3

Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 54 Cal. App. 4th 499, 540 (1997) (quoting Consumers Union of

4

U.S., Inc. v. Alta-Dena Certified Dairy, 4 Cal. App. 4th 963, 972 (1992); People v. Casa Blanca

5

Convalescent Homes, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 509, 536 (1984)).4
In this case, Defendants rely on two distinct but related means to perpetrate their unlawful

6
7

conduct: The advertisement for the “sale” of “Virtual Goods” through the Infringing Websites and

8

possibly other means such as email and instant messages; and the use of the Game itself to transfer

9

“Virtual Goods”. Zynga is entitled to an injunction that will ensure Defendants can neither advertise

10

“Virtual Goods” nor gain access to the Game to transfer “Virtual Goods.”5 Zynga therefore

11

respectfully requests that the Court enter the proposed permanent injunction filed concurrently

12

herewith.

13

C. Zynga Is Entitled to its Requested Monetary Award

14

The Ninth Circuit has held that where, as here, trademark infringement is deliberate and

15

willful, both the trademark owner and the buying public are slighted if a court provides no greater

16

remedy than injunctive relief. Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117,

17

123-24 (9th Cir. 1968); see also Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir.

18

1993). “Monetary recovery for trademark infringement and unfair competition is measured

19

variously by defendant’s profits, plaintiff’s actual business damages and losses caused by the wrong,

20

or plaintiff’s loss of profits caused by the wrong.” Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F.

21

Supp. 278, 292 (C.D. Cal. 1992); see also Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast

22

Entertainment Corp., No. CV-98: 9074, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23244, at *8 (C.D. Cal. November

23

12, 1999) (noting same). Accordingly, the question before the Court is not whether Zynga is entitled

24

to monetary relief, but rather the appropriate amount of recovery.

25
4

26
27
28

Hewlett was subsequently superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in UFW of Am. v.
Dutra Farms, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1163-64 (2000).
5
An injunction prohibiting Defendants from advertising Zynga “Virtual Goods” is also appropriate
because it will confirm that third party service providers should decline to run Defendants’
advertisements for Zynga “Virtual Goods” if Defendants violate the Court’s injunction.
14

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1

Courts have routinely awarded the infringing parties’ profits to the injured parties as means

2

of compensation for the injury caused in trademark infringement cases. See Thomas McCarthy,

3

Trademarks & Unfair Competition §§ 30:25-30:26 (4th ed. 2007). The Ninth Circuit has frequently

4

provided to injured parties profits gained from the deliberate and willful infringement of their

5

trademarks. See e.g., Maier Brewing, 390 F.2d at 123 (granting plaintiffs the infringer’s profits);

6

Nat’l Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195, 205 (9th Cir. 1955) (ordering an accounting of defendant’s

7

profits). In this case, the undisputed facts show that Defendants have willfully and deliberately acted

8

to benefit from the goodwill established in Zynga’s trademark. Accordingly, Zynga is entitled to

9

recover the profits reaped from their deliberate infringement of Zynga’s trademark.6

10

D. Zynga Is Entitled to Recover its Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

11

Zynga is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 35(a) of the Lanham Act,

12

15 U.S.C. § 1117, which gives the Court discretion to award reasonable attorneys’ fees in

13

“exceptional cases.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). A trademark case is generally exceptional for purposes of

14

an award of attorneys’ fees when the infringement is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful.

15

Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000); Philip Morris, 219 F.R.D. at 502. In fact, the

16

Ninth Circuit has found an abuse of discretion when a court has failed to award attorneys’ fees for

17

willful infringement. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., Inc., 692 F.2d 1272, 1276

18

(9th Cir. 1982). Furthermore, a defendant’s failure to participate in the litigation constitutes an

19

exceptional circumstance that justifies an award of attorneys’ fees. See Philip Morris, 219 F.R.D. at

20

502 (citing Taylor Made Golf Co. v. Carsten Sports, 175 F.R.D. 658, 663 (S.D. Cal. 1997)).

21

Here, Defendants have chosen to disregard these proceedings, and the undisputed factual

22

allegations of Zynga’s First Amended Complaint establish that Defendants’ infringement is willful

23

and deliberate. Thus, Zynga has established that this is an exceptional case warranting an award of

24

attorneys’ fees.

25
26
27
28

6

Courts in this district have awarded Zynga the defendants’ profits in other cases very similar to the
case at bar. See Zynga Game Network Inc. v. Greene, et al., No. CV:09-2744 SI, Dkt. No. 80, ¶ 12;
and Dkt. No. 88, ¶ 12; Zynga Game Network Inc. v. Erkan, et al., No. CV:09-3264 SC, Dkt. No. 47,
¶ 13.
15

CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH

1
2

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Zynga respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion and enter

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default judgment against Defendants permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their

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unlawful conduct; awarding Zynga Defendants’ profits from their sale of “Virtual Goods”; and finding

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that this is an exceptional case warranting an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.

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Dated: May 6, 2011

By:

/s/
David K. Caplan
Keats McFarland & Wilson LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
ZYNGA INC.

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CASE NO. CV-10:01022 JF (PSGx)
MOT. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT & MEMO. OF PTS & AUTH