In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation

Filing 75

REPLY (re #65 MOTION for Settlement (Final Approval), #66 MOTION for Attorney Fees Expenses and Costs ) filed byPaloma Gaos. (Attachments: #1 Declaration Aschenbrener, #2 Declaration Nassiri, #3 Declaration Class Admin, #4 Proposed Order Final Approval & Fees, #5 Proposed Order Final Judgment)(Aschenbrener, Michael) (Filed on 8/22/2014)

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Exhibit A
Aschenbrener Declaration

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KASSRA P. NASSIRI (215405)
1 ([e-mail])
NASSIRI & JUNG LLP
2 47 Kearny Street, Suite 700
San Francisco, California 94108
3 Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
4
MICHAEL ASCHENBRENER (277114)
5 ([e-mail])
ASCHENBRENER LAW, P.C.
6 795 Folsom Street, First Floor
San Francisco, CA 94107
7 Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
8
9 ILAN CHOROWSKY (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
([e-mail])
10 PROGRESSIVE LAW GROUP, LLC
1 N LaSalle Street, Suite 2255
60602
11 Chicago, IL(312) 787-2717
Telephone:
12 Facsimile: [phone]
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION

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In re GOOGLE REFERRER HEADER PRIVACY
19 LITIGATION
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Case No. 5:10-cv-04809-EJD
CLASS ACTION

_______________________________________
This Document Relates To: All Actions

DECLARATION OF MICHAEL J.
ASCHENBRENER IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
FEES AND FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT
Date:
Time:
Place:
Judge:

August 29, 2014
9:00 a.m.
Courtroom 4, 5th Floor
Hon. Edward J. Davila
ASCHENBRENER DECLARATION
5:10-CV-04809

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1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I hereby declare and state as follows:
2

1.

I am an attorney admitted to practice in the States of California, Illinois, and

3 Minnesota, and represent Plaintiffs in the above-titled action. I am over the age of eighteen and am
4 fully competent to make this declaration. This declaration is based upon my personal knowledge,
5 except where expressly noted otherwise.
6

2.

I am the Managing Principal of Aschenbrener Law, P.C., which has been appointed

7 Class Counsel in this matter.
8

3.

As Class Counsel, I am familiar with (i) the claims, evidence, and legal arguments

9 involved in this settlement; (ii) the terms of the settlement; and (iii) the relevant defenses,
10 evidence, and legal arguments made to date.
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4.

I obtained my law degree from Chicago-Kent College of Law in May 2007.

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5.

I have no affiliation with the Berkman Center at Harvard, the Center for Internet

13 and Society at Stanford, or the Center for Information, Society and Policy at Chicago-Kent.
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6.

As of July 11, 2014, the Los Angeles Hearing Department for the State Bar Court

15 of California recommended that counsel for Objector Jan, Mr. Joseph Darrell Palmer, be placed on
16 two years’ stayed suspension and two years’ probation on conditions, including a 90-day actual
17 suspension. See In Matter of Joseph Darrell Palmer, attached here as Exhibit A-1.
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7.

The State Bar Court of California has found that Mr. Palmer made false statements

19 on three applications to appear pro hac vice that Palmer filed in various federal-court, class-action
20 lawsuits. See Exhibit A-1.
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8.

On August 30, 2002, following his conviction in Colorado for failure to pay taxes,

22 Mr. Palmer was placed on interim suspension from the practice of law in California. This
23 suspension ended on September 23, 2002. Exhibit A-2;
24 http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/125147.
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9.

On November 30, 2013, Law360 reported that Mr. Palmer and Mr. Theodore Frank

26 (who represents himself and Objector Melissa Holyoak in this matter) took unauthorized and
27 unapproved actions on behalf of objectors they claimed to represent in a class action settlement.
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ASCHENBRENER DECLARATION
5:10-CV-04809

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1 See “BP Deal Objectors Drop Appeal, Say Attys Misled Them,” attached here as Exhibit A-3.
2

10.

On December 5, 2012, Mr. Palmer was held in contempt in a class action

3 settlement to which he objected for failing to respond to a court order compelling discovery
4 participation. See Order Re Civil Contempt and Award of Sanctions, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel)
5 Antitrust Litigation, 289 F.R.D. 548 (2013), attached as Exhibit A-4.
6

11.

Mr. Palmer has a long history of filing objections to class action settlement that are

7 subsequently dismissed, abandoned, or withdrawn and/or appealing settlements without attaining
8 settlement changes or additional benefits for the class. See Exhibit A-5.
9
10 Dated: August 22, 2014

ASCHENBRENER LAW, P.C.

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s/ Michael Aschenbrener
Michael Aschenbrener

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ASCHENBRENER DECLARATION
5:10-CV-04809

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Exhibit A-1
In re Matter of Joseph Darrell Palmer

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FILED JULY 11, 2014

STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
HEARING DEPARTMENT – LOS ANGELES
In the Matter of
JOSEPH DARRELL PALMER,
Member No. 125147,
A Member of the State Bar.

)
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Case No.: 12-O-16924-LMA
DECISION

Introduction1
In this contested disciplinary proceeding, respondent JOSEPH DARRELL PALMER is
charged  with  three  counts  of  willfully  violating  section  6106’s  proscription  of  acts  involving  
moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption. Each count is based on the false statement, that
respondent made on or with respect to three applications to appear pro hac vice that he filed in
various federal-court, class-action lawsuits, to the effect that he had never been disciplined by a
court or state bar.
Respondent admits that he made these three statements and that they are false, but asserts
that he did not deliberately make the statements and that he made them inadvertently as a result
of negligence. Even though the record fails to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent deliberately made the false statements or that he made them with the intent to
mislead, the record does clearly establish that the false statements were not the results of

1

Unless otherwise indicated, all references to rules are to the State Bar Rules of
Professional Conduct. Furthermore, all statutory references are to the Business and Professions
Code unless otherwise indicated.

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respondent’s  mere  carelessness  or  negligence,  but  were  the  results  of  respondent’s  gross  
negligence. As discussed post, the court finds that respondent is culpable as charged in each of
the three counts because, even in the absence of an intent to mislead, a false statement made
through or as a result of gross negligence involves moral turpitude in willful violation of section
6106.
In light of the found misconduct and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
court  recommends  that  respondent  be  placed  on  two  years’  stayed  suspension  and  two  years’  
probation on conditions, including a 90-day actual suspension.
Significant Procedural History
The Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (State Bar or
California State Bar) initiated this proceeding by filing a notice of disciplinary charges (NDC)
against respondent on December 6, 2013. Respondent thereafter filed his response to the NDC
on January 17, 2014.
On April 15, 2014, the parties filed a partial stipulation as to facts and admission of
documents. Also, on April 15, 2014, a one-day trial was held. The court took the case under
submission for decision after the parties made their closing arguments on April 15, 2014.
The State Bar was represented by Senior Trial Counsel Michael J. Glass. Respondent
was represented by Attorney Kenneth C. Kocourek.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California on December 15, 1986, and
has been a member of the State Bar of California since that time. In addition, respondent has
been admitted to practice in the State of Colorado since December 1993. Respondent has also
been admitted to practice in the State of Arizona since at least February 2003.
///
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///
Facts
Respondent’s  Criminal  Conviction
For about three or four years in the early to mid-1990’s,  respondent  lived  in  Colorado  
where he owned and operated both American Family Homes, Inc. (AFH), which built and sold
homes, and Tri-County Supply, LLC (Tri-County), which sold construction materials to home
builders, including AFH. During that time, respondent rarely practiced law.
In 2001, in a Colorado state court, respondent was charged with, pleaded guilty to, and
was convicted on one felony count of violating Colorado sales-tax laws (Colorado Revised
Statutes 39-21-118(2) and 39-26-120).    Respondent’s  conviction  was  based  on  Tri-County’s  
failure to report and pay over to the Colorado Department of Revenue about $4,000 in sales taxes
that it charged (and presumably collected from) AFH for construction supplies that it sold to
AFH in 1995 and 1996 (Colorado Revised Statutes 39-26-104, 105, and 106).
Respondent did not deliberately violate the sales-tax laws or personally profit from TriCounty’s  failure  to  report  and  pay  the  sales  taxes  to  Colorado. In fact, a significant cause of this
failure was a turnover in Tri-County’s  full-time accountants and accounting assistants.
Following  respondent’s  conviction,  the  Colorado  state  court  sentenced  respondent  to  two  
years of unsupervised probation and ordered respondent to perform 200 hours of community
service in Colorado. Respondent thereafter successfully completed his probation and community
service.
Respondent’s  Discipline  in  Three  States
Colorado
Based  on  respondent’s  criminal  conviction  and on a stipulation that respondent and the
Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel entered into in June 2002, the Colorado
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Supreme  Court  entered  an  order  on  July  1,  2002,  suspending  respondent  “from  the  practice  of  
law [in Colorado] for a period of sixty days with all but thirty days stayed during a one-year
period  of  probation  [with  conditions].”    The  Colorado  Supreme  Court  imposed  that  discipline  on  
respondent under Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 251.5(b), which provides that any act
or omission  that  violates,  inter  alia,  Colorado’s  criminal  laws  is  grounds  for  disciplining  an  
attorney regardless of whether the attorney is ever charged with or convicted or acquitted of the
violation in a criminal proceeding and regardless of whether the attorney committed the act or
omission in the course of an attorney-client  relationship.    In  respondent’s  Colorado  disciplinary  
proceeding, there were no findings of moral turpitude of dishonesty. Nor were any aggravating
circumstances found. In mitigation, respondent did not have a prior disciplinary record, made
full and free disclosure, had a cooperative attitude towards the proceeding, and was remorseful.
California
Based  on  respondent’s  criminal  conviction  and  a  stipulation  regarding  facts,  conclusions
of law, and disposition that respondent and the California State Bar entered into in October 2002,
the State Bar Court of California filed an order on November 4, 2002, in case number
02-C-11878 (California Palmer I) imposing on respondent a public reproval with conditions
attached for 12 months that required respondent to complete his unsupervised criminal probation
and community service; to keep the California State Bar apprised of his office address; to file
quarterly reports; and to attend the California  State  Bar’s  Ethics  School.    In  California  Palmer I,
the  parties    stipulated  that  neither  respondent’s  criminal  conviction  nor  the  facts  and  
circumstances  surrounding  his  conviction  involved  moral  turpitude,  but  that  respondent’s  
conviction involved other misconduct warranting discipline. In addition, the parties stipulated
that there were no aggravating circumstances and that in mitigation respondent did not have a
prior record of discipline, promptly reported his conviction and Colorado discipline to the
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California State Bar, and cooperated extensively with the California State Bar. Moreover, the
parties stipulated that, even though respondent was convicted of a felony in Colorado, the crime
of which respondent was convicted does not, as a matter of law, rise to a felony in California.
Under California law, it is a felony to evade reporting, assessment, or payment of a tax only if
the tax liability aggregates at least $25,000 in a consecutive 12-month period. (Cal. Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 7153.5.) Respondent’s  conviction  involved  only  about  $4,000  in  unpaid  taxes  over  a  24month period.
Arizona
Based on the Colorado Supreme Court's July 1, 2002, disciplinary order, the Arizona
Supreme Court filed an order February 13, 2003, suspending respondent  “from  the  practice  of  
law [in Arizona] for a period of sixty (60) days, thirty (30) days stayed, to run concurrent with
Respondent’s  Colorado  discipline…”  and  placing  respondent  “on  probation  for  a  period  of  one  
(1) year, under the same terms as and to run  concurrent  with  Respondent’s  Colorado  discipline.”
Respondent’s  False  Statements
Notwithstanding the July 1, 2002, Colorado disciplinary order, the November 4, 2002,
California disciplinary order, and the February 13, 2003, Arizona disciplinary order, respondent
filed, on June 20, 2006, in a civil lawsuit styled Ingolf R. Dinklage v. Holland America LineWestours, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
(Dinklage), an application for leave to appear pro hac vice in which respondent falsely declared
under  penalty  of  perjury:    “I  have  not  been  disbarred  or  formally  censured  by  a  court  of  record  or  
by  a  state  bar  association….”2

2

In the present proceeding, respondent is not charged with making this false statement in
his June 20, 2006, application in Dinklage. Nonetheless, the court admitted that false statement
into  evidence  because  it  is  relevant  on  the  issues  of  respondent’s  intent  to  mislead,  negligence,  
and gross negligence. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Moreover, the court considers that
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///
In addition, respondent made the same or a similar false statement in or in support of
each of the following applications to appear pro hac vice that respondent filed in three separate
federal-court lawsuits between 2010 and 2012 as charged in the NDC.
On June 2, 2010, respondent filed, in a class action lawsuit styled James Gemelas v. The
Dannon Company, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
(Dannon), an affidavit in support of a motion for admission of counsel pro hac vice in which
respondent  falsely  stated  under  oath:    “I  have  never  been  the  subject of disciplinary action of any
kind  before  any  bar  or  court.”  
On January 7, 2011, respondent filed, in a class-action lawsuit styled Mark A. Arthur, et
al. v. Sallie Mae, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
(Sallie Mae) an application for leave to appear pro hac vice in which respondent falsely declared
under  penalty  of  perjury:    “I  have  not  been  disbarred  or  formally  censured  by  a  court  of  record  or  
by  a  state  bar  association….”
On July 5, 2012, respondent filed, in a class-action lawsuit styled Alyson Herfert, et al. v.
Crayola, LLC in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
(Crayola), an application for leave to appear pro hac vice in which respondent falsely declared
under penalty  of  perjury:    “I  have  not  been  disbarred  or  formally  censured  by  a  court  of  record  or  
by  a  state  bar  association….”    On  August  10,  2012,  the  district  court  in  Crayola filed an order to
show cause (OSC) directing respondent to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for
submitting a pro hac vice application that contained a false statement. Thereafter, on August 15,
2012, respondent filed an amended application for leave to appear pro hac vice in Crayola in

uncharged  false  statement  only  for  the  limited  purpose  of  determining  respondent’s  intent,  
negligence, and gross negligence with respect to the three charged false statements.
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which he disclosed his prior discipline in Colorado, California, and Arizona. Respondent did
not, however, file such an amended application in Sallie Mae on August 15, 2012. As noted
///
post, respondent did not file an amended application in Sallie Mae until August 27, 2012.
Moreover, respondent never filed an amended application in Dannon.
On August 20, 2012, the district court in Crayola denied  respondent’s  pro  hac  vice  
application not because respondent had previously been disciplined in Colorado, California, and
Arizona, but because respondent failed to disclose his prior discipline and falsely stated in his
application that he had never been disciplined and because respondent failed to appear at a prior
hearing. Also, on August 20, 2012, the plaintiffs in Sallie Mae filed a motion to revoke the order
granting  respondent  admission  pro  hac  vice  because  of  respondent’s  false  statement  in
respondent’s  January  7,  2011,  pro  hac  vice  application.
On August 27, 2012, respondent finally filed an amended pro hac vice application in
Sallie Mae disclosing his prior discipline in Colorado, California, and Arizona. However, on
September 14, 2012, the district court in Sallie Mae revoked  respondent’s  admission  pro  hac  vice  
in that case not because respondent had previously been disciplined, but because respondent
falsely stated that he had never been disciplined in his original application and because
respondent did not file an amended pro hac vice application in Sallie Mae until August 27, 2012,
instead of promptly filing one after his application in Crayola was challenged in August 10,
2012, OSC in that case.
Conclusions
Count One - § 6106 [Moral Turpitude]
Count Two - § 6106 [Moral Turpitude]
Count Three - § 6106 [Moral Turpitude]

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Section 6106 provides, in part, that the commission of any act involving dishonesty,
moral turpitude, or corruption constitutes cause for suspension or disbarment. Even though the
term  “moral  turpitude”  in  section  6106  is  defined  very  broadly  (e.g.,  Chadwick v. State Bar
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 103, 110), the Supreme Court has always required a certain level of improper
intent  or  guilty  knowledge  before  holding  that  an  attorney’s  conduct  involves  moral  turpitude.    
(e.g., In the Matter of Temkin (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 321, 330; see also
Sternlieb v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal.3d 317, 332.)
Respondent credibly testified both that he did not make any of the three charged false
statements deliberately or with any intent to mislead or deceive and that he made each of the
false statements inadvertently. Respondent disclosed his prior discipline in Colorado, California,
and Arizona in his applications for admission to the bar of a number of other federal courts.
Moreover, respondent did not and could not have reasonably believed that his pro hac vice
applications would be denied because of his prior discipline in in Colorado, California, and
Arizona because the underlying misconduct was not serious (e.g., did not involve moral turpitude
or dishonesty) and was wholly unrelated to the practice of law.
The  court,  however,  rejects  respondent’s  claim  that  he  made  the  three  false  statement  as  a  
result of mere negligence. Without question, respondent was grossly negligent in signing and
filing his affidavit in support of his pro hac vice applications in Dannon and in signing and filing
his pro hac vice applications in Sallie Mae and Crayola, each of which contained a false
statement to the effect that respondent had never been disciplined. This conclusion of gross
negligence is clearly supported by the fact that, years earlier, respondent filed a pro hac vice
application that contained a virtually identical false statement in Dinklage.
Even in the absence of an intent to mislead, a false statement made through or as a result
of gross negligence involves moral turpitude in willful violation of section 6106. (In the Matter
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of Moriarty (Review Dept. 1999) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 9, 15, and cases there cited.) A
finding of gross negligence will support a charge of moral turpitude, even without an evil intent
behind the act committed. (In the Matter of Myrdall (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 363, 384; In the Matter of Dale (Review Dept. 2005) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 798, 808
[finding of gross negligence in creating a false impression involves moral turpitude in violation
of section 6106].) In short, just as an attorney may be discipline for a false statement made with
reckless disregard for the truth (In the Matter of Dixon (Review Dept. 1999) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 23, 29-30), an attorney may be disciplined for a false statement made through or as a result
of gross negligence.
Aggravation3
Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.5(a))
As noted ante, respondent has one prior record of discipline based on his criminal
conviction in 2001. The weight of that prior record is diminished because it is remote in time
and because the underlying misconduct was not serious.
Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.5(b))
Respondent’s  present  misconduct  involves three acts of misconduct.
Mitigation
Recognition of Wrongdoing (Std. 1.6(g))
Respondent revised his office procedures and now more thoroughly reviews all
pleadings, applications, and declarations he signs.
Good Character (Std. 1.6(f))

3

All references to standards (stds.) are to the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, title IV,
Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
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Respondent presented very credible testimony from three attorneys as to his good
character, honesty, and integrity. Respondent, however, is entitled to limited mitigation for this
testimony because, while three attorneys is a significant range of references in the legal
profession, three attorneys are not a significant range of references in the general community.
///
Discussion
The purpose of the State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but to
protect the public, to preserve public confidence in the profession, and to maintain the highest
possible professional standards for attorneys. (Std. 1.1; Chadwick v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d.
103, 111; Cooper v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1016, 1025.)
In determining the appropriate level of discipline, the court looks first to the standards for
guidance. (Drociak v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1085, 1090; In the Matter of Koehler (Review
Dept.  1991)  1  Cal.  State  Bar  Ct.  Rptr.  615,  628).    The  standards,  however,  “do  not  mandate  a  
specific  discipline.” (In the Matter of Van Sickle (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Ct. Rptr. 980,
994.)    It  is  well  established  that  the  court  is  “not  bound  to  follow  the  standards  in  talismanic  
fashion. As the final and independent arbiter of attorney discipline, [the Supreme Court is]
permitted to temper the letter of the law with considerations peculiar to the offense and the
offender.”    (Howard v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 215, 221-222.) Even though the standards are
not binding, they are entitled to great weight. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92.)
The applicable sanction in this proceeding is set forth in standard 2.7, which provides:
“Disbarment  or  actual  suspension  is  appropriate  for  an  act  of  moral  turpitude,  dishonesty,  fraud,  
corruption or concealment of a material fact. The degree of sanction depends on the magnitude
of the misconduct and the extent to which the misconduct harmed or mislead the victim and
related  to  the  member’s  practice  of  law.”    
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Respondent committed three acts involving moral turpitude in three separate client
matters. Thus, the magnitude of the misconduct is significant. Furthermore, the acts of moral
turpitude  directly  relate  to  and  involve  respondent’s  practice  of  law.    Thus,  significant  actual  
suspension from the practice of law is warranted under standard 2.7. In addition, actual
suspension  is  consistent  with  standard  1.8(a),  which  provides:    “If  a  member  has  a  single  prior  
record of discipline, the sanction must be greater than the previously imposed sanction unless the
prior discipline was so remote in time and the previous misconduct was not serious enough that
imposing  greater  discipline  would  be  manifestly  unjust.”  
Second, the court looks to decisional law. (Snyder v. State Bar (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302,
1310-1311; In the Matter of Taylor (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 563, 580.)
The court finds In the Matter of Downey (Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 151 and
In the Matter of Dahlz (Review Dept. 2001) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 269 instructive on the
issue of discipline even though the misconduct and aggravation in both of those matters are
greater than the misconduct and aggravation found here.
In Downey, the attorney signed and filed a verification in which he falsely attested under
penalty of perjury that his clients were out of the county on a specific date. Even though no
intent  to  defraud  was  found  based  on  the  attorney’s  testimony,  the  attorney  was  found  culpable  
of violating section 6106 when he filed the false verification because he was grossly negligent in
concluding that his clients were absent from the county on the date he specified in the
verification. The attorney in Downey was also found culpable of violating section 6068,
subdivision  (j)  because  he  failed  to  notify  the  State  Bar’s  membership  records  office  of  his  new  
office address until 28 months after he moved into the new office. In mitigation, the attorney
was given limited credit for the good character testimony he presented from six witnesses (four
of whom were attorneys) and for cooperating with the State Bar by entering into a pretrial
- 11 -

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page17 of 43

stipulation of facts, which were not difficult to prove. In aggravation, the attorney had a prior
record of discipline (the attorney  was  previously  placed  on  one  year’s  stayed  suspension  and  
three  years’  probation  on  conditions,  including  a  four-month actual suspension) and the
attorney’s  present  misconduct  was  followed  by  dishonesty  and  concealment.    In  Downey, the
///
attorney  was  placed  on  two  years’  stayed  suspension  and  two  years’  probation  on  conditions,  
including a 150-day actual suspension.
In Dahlz, the attorney was found culpable, in a single client matter, of failing to perform,
improperly withdrawing from representation,  and  misrepresenting  to  a  worker’s  compensation  
insurance adjuster that his client no longer wanted to pursue her claim. In aggravation, the
attorney committed multiple acts of misconduct, had one prior record of discipline, caused
significant client harm, and lacked candor toward the Court and the State Bar investigator. The
lack of candor was egregious in that the attorney presented a false telephone log and a falsified
stipulation  and  falsely  stated  that  he  was  in  court  when  his  client’s  claim  was settled. In
mitigation, slight weight was afforded for the limited pro bono services the attorney rendered.
As the review department recommended, the Supreme Court placed the attorney in Dahlz on four
years’  stayed  suspension  and  four  years’  probation on conditions, including a one-year actual
suspension
On balance, the court concludes that the appropriate level of discipline for the found
misconduct  in  the  present  proceeding  is  two  years’  stayed  suspension  and  two  years’  probation  
on conditions, including a ninety-day actual suspension. (See also Bach v. State Bar (1987) 43
Cal.3d 848 [60-day actual suspension imposed for misleading a judge; aggravation for prior
public reproval, but no mitigation].)
Recommendations
- 12 -

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page18 of 43

Discipline
It is recommended that respondent JOSEPH DARRELL PALMER, State Bar number
125147, be suspended from the practice of law in California for two years, that execution of that
///
///
period of suspension be stayed, and that respondent be placed on probation4 for a period of two
years subject to the following conditions:
1. Respondent Joseph Darrell Palmer is suspended from the practice of law for the first
90 days of probation.
2. Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and all  of  the  conditions  of  respondent’s  probation.
3. Within 10 days of any change in the information required to be maintained on the
membership records of the State Bar pursuant to Business and Professions Code
section 6002.1, subdivision (a), including respondent’s  current  office  address  and  
telephone number, or if no office is maintained, the address to be used for State Bar
purposes, respondent must report such change in writing to the Membership Records
Office  and  the  State  Bar’s  Office  of  Probation.
4. Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each
January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10. Under penalty of perjury, respondent
must state whether respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of
Professional  Conduct,  and  all  of  the  conditions  of  respondent’s  probation  during  the  
preceding calendar quarter. In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report,
containing the same information, is due no earlier than 20 days before the last day of
the probation period and no later than the last day of the probation period.
5. Subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully,
promptly, and truthfully, any inquiries of the Office of Probation or any probation
monitor that are directed to Respondent personally or in writing, relating to whether
Respondent  is  complying  or  has  complied  with  Respondent’s  probation  conditions.
6. Within 30 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter,
respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with
respondent’s  assigned  probation  deputy  to  discuss  these  terms  and  conditions  of  
probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, respondent must meet with

The period of probation will begin on the effective date of the Supreme Court order in
this matter. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.18.)
- 13 4

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page19 of 43

the probation deputy either in person or by telephone. Respondent must promptly
meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
7. Within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter,
respondent must submit to the Office of Probation satisfactory evidence of
completion  of  the  State  Bar’s  Ethics  School  and  of  passage  of  the  test  given  at  the  end  
of that session. This requirement is separate from any Minimum Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and respondent is order not to claim any MCLE
credit for attending Ethics School. (Accord, Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)
8. At the expiration of the probation period, if respondent has complied with all
conditions of probation, respondent will be relieved of the stayed suspension.
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination
It is further recommended that respondent be ordered to take and pass the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within one year after the effective date of the
Supreme Court order in this matter and to provide satisfactory proof of such passage to the State
Bar’s  Office  of  Probation  in  Los  Angeles  within  the  same  period.
California Rules of Court, Rule 9.20
It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to comply with the requirements of
rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court and to perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a)
and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme
Court order in this matter. Failure to do so may result in disbarment or suspension.
Costs
Finally, it is recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with
Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 and that the costs be enforceable both as
provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.

Dated: July ___, 2014.

LUCY ARMENDARIZ
Judge of the State Bar Court
- 14 -

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page20 of 43

- 15 -

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page21 of 43

Exhibit A-2
Joseph Darrell Palmer California
State Bar Registration Report

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page22 of 43

Wednesday, August 20, 2014

ATTORNEY SEARCH
Joseph Darrell Palmer - #125147
Current Status: Active
This member is active and may practice law in California.
See below for more details.

Profile Information
The following information is from the official records of The State Bar of California.
Bar
Number:

125147

Address:

Law Offices
of Darrell
Palmer
2244
Faraday Ave
Ste 121
Carlsbad, CA
92008

Phone
Number:

[phone]

Fax Number:

[phone]

e-mail:

[e-mail]"
class="bluenormal">[e-mail]

County:

San Diego

Undergraduate
School:

No Information Available;

District:

District 4

Sections:

None

Law School:

California Western SOL; San Diego CA

Status History
Effective Date

Status Change

Present

Active

9/23/2002

Active

9/23/2002

Inactive

8/30/2002

Not Eligible To Practice Law

8/1/2002

Inactive

12/15/1986

Admitted to The State Bar of California

Explanation of member status

Actions Affecting Eligibility to Practice Law
Effective Date Description
Disciplinary and Related Actions

Case Number Resulting Status

Overview of the attorney discipline system.
12/6/2013

Notice of Disc Charges Filed in SBCt

12-O-16924

11/26/2002

Public reproval with/duties

02-C-11878

8/30/2002

Interim suspension after conviction
Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page23 of 43
02-C-11878
Not Eligible To Practice Law

Administrative Actions
This member has no public record of administrative actions.
Copies of official attorney discipline records are available upon request.
Explanation of common actions

State Bar Court Cases
NOTE: The State Bar Court began posting public discipline documents online in 2005. The format and
pagination of documents posted on this site may vary from the originals in the case file as a result of
their translation from the original format into Word and PDF. Copies of additional related documents in
a case are available upon request. Only Opinions designated for publication in the State Bar Court
Reporter may be cited or relied on as precedent in State Bar Court proceedings. For further
information about a case that is displayed here, please refer to the State Bar Court's online docket,
which can be found at: http://apps.statebarcourt.ca.gov/dockets/dockets.aspx
DISCLAIMER: Any posted Notice of Disciplinary Charges, Conviction Transmittal or other initiating
document, contains only allegations of professional misconduct. The attorney is presumed to be
innocent of any misconduct warranting discipline until the charges have been proven.
Effective Date

Case Number

Description

Pending

12-O-16924

Initiating Document [PDF]

Pending

12-O-16924

Response [PDF]

Pending

12-O-16924

Decision [PDF] [WORD]

California Bar Journal Discipline Summaries
Summaries from the California Bar Journal are based on discipline orders but are not the official
records. Not all discipline actions have associated CBJ summaries. Copies of official attorney discipline
records are available upon request.
August 30, 2002
JOSEPH DARRELL PALMER [#125147], 45, of Fort Worth, Tex., was placed on interim suspension Aug. 30,
2002, following his conviction in Colorado for failure to pay over taxes. He was ordered to comply with rule 955.
The interim suspension was terminated Sept. 23, 2002.

Start New Search »

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Copyright © 2014, The State Bar of California

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page24 of 43

Exhibit A-3
Law 360:“BP Deal Objectors Drop
Appeal, Say Attys Misled Them”

8/18/2014

BP Deal
Case5:10-cv-04809-EJDObjectors Drop Appeal, Say Attys Misled Them - Law360
Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page25 of 43

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BP Deal Objectors Drop Appeal, Say Attys
Misled Them
Share us on: By Lance D uroni
Law360, Chicago (November 26,2013,2:04 PM ET) - Three Florida property owners who challenged
BP PLC’s estimated $9.2 billion Deepwater Horizon oil spill settlement dropped their appeal Friday, telling
the Fifth Circuit that they were misled by their lawyers at every turn.
After retaining new counsel, the property owners filed a joint motion to voluntarily dismiss their appeal,
accusing their prior counsel — Theodore Frank and Joseph Darrell Palmer — of taking “unauthorized and
unapproved actions” on their behalf.
“Appellants now realize, much to their extreme chagrin, prior counsel’s machinations and subterfuge, of
which they were unaware and do not countenance, and appellants certainly wish to take remedial measures
to rectify matters,” their new attorney, Ronnie G. Penton, wrote in the motion.
The move comes three weeks after lawyers for the broader class of plaintiffs in the case moved to dismiss
the appeal, arguing that the objectors — which also included a fourth property owner, James H. Kirby III,
who hasn’t dropped his appeal — were not actually part of the class. In an Oct. 31 filing, class counsel said
that the three properties owned by the objectors were outside the affected region subject to the settlement
The objectors “are strangers to the settlement whose rights are unaffected by the settlement terms. As a
result, they have no standing to appeal, and their appeals should be dismissed ” lawyers for the class wrote.

http://www.law360.com/articles/491665/bp-deal-objectors-drop-appeal-say-atlys-misled-thein

8/18/2014BP Deal Objectors Drop Appeal, Say Attys Misled Them - Law360

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page26 of 43
According to Friday’s withdrawal motion, Frank and Palmer failed to inform their clients of “most, if not
all” significant developments in the case, and never told their clients about the need to post an appeal bond.
They also kept their clients in the dark about “multiple factual inaccuracies” in various filings and oral
arguments before the court, the motion said.
The two attorneys’ misconduct was revealed to the objectors only when they appeared for their depositions
last month, Penton wrote.
In addition to withdrawing the appeal, the three objectors asked the Fifth Circuit to release them from any
personal liability under the appeal bond or for sanctions “due to the undeniably improper, undisclosed and
unknown actions of prior counsel.”
Frank, who founded the Washington-based Center for Class Action Fairness, told Law360 Tuesday that
allegations that his clients were kept in the dark on important aspects of the case are simply not true.
"I don't know how their counsel could say that," he said. "They're entitled to decide that they no longer
want to pursue their appeal, and we would have taken appropriate steps to do so."
Frank added that he and Palmer tried repeatedly to contact his former clients' new counsel, but they filed
their motion to dismiss the appeal before ever speaking with the two.

Palmer, whose office is based in Carlsbad, Calif., did not immediately respond to a call seeking comment
Tuesday.
BP faced a barrage of lawsuits from thousands of Gulf businesses asserting losses allegedly caused by the
April 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion and resulting spill. The following March, BP and plaintiffs'
lawyers reached an $7.8 billion settlement — which has ballooned to an estimated $9.2 billion — that
resolved most of the property damage, economic loss and medical claims in the multidistrict litigation.
The rising cost of the deal prompted BP to ask the Fifth Circuit last week to force the Louisiana federal
judge overseeing the MDL to stop payments on the settlement, arguing that some claims could be
fictitious. In an emergency motion seeking an injunction, BP asked the appeals court to enforce its
O ctober o rd er that U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier stay some of the payments until he has sorted out
which class members have legitimate claims.
The energy giant requested a decision on its motion for an injunction by Wednesday.
The objectors are represented by Ronnie G. Penton of the Penton Law Firm and James M. Gamer, Martha
Y. Curtis and Kevin M. McGone of Sher Gamer Cahill Richter Klein & Hilbert LLLC.
The class is represented by Herman Herman & Katz LLC. Domengeaux Wright Rov & Edwards LLC.
Levin Papantonio Thomas Mitchell Rafferty & Proctor PA . Lundv Lundv Soileau & South LLP and Weitz
& Luxenberg PC . among others.
The defendants are represented by Gibson Dunn. Kirkland & Ellis LLP. Liskow & Lewis. Covington &
Burling LLP. Arnold & Porter LLP. Dentons and Williams & Connolly LLP.
The case is In re: Deepwater Horizon — Appeals of the Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement, case
number 13-30221. in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
--Additional reporting by Kurt Orzeck. Editing by Richard McVay.
http://www.law360.com/articles/491665/bp-deal-objectors-drop-appeal-say-attys-misled-them

2/4

8/18/2014

BP Deal Objectors Drop Appeal, Say Attys Misled Them -

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page27 of 43

Related Articles
•
•
•
•
•

BP's Tab Nears $5B In Deepwater Horizon Settlement
BP To Halt Deepwater Loss Payments During Review
5th Circ. Grants BP's Bid To Halt Further Deepwater Payouts
Clement Brief Backs BP In Row Over $8B Deepwater Settlement
B P s Deepwater Medical Benefits Deal Unfair. 5th Circ. Hears

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Related
Sections
• Appellate
• Class Action
• Energy
• Environmental
• Product Liability
• Texas

Case Information
Case Title
In Re: Deepwater Horizon

Case Number
13-30221

http://www.law360.com/articles/491665/bp-deal-objectors-drop-appcal-say-atlys~inisled-them

BP Deal Objectors Drop Appeal, Say Attys Misled Them - Law360

8/18/2014

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page28 of 43

Court

Appellate - 5th Circuit
N ature of Suit
3893 Environmental Matters
Date Filed
March 6,2013
Law Firms
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Arnold & Porter
Covington & Burling
Dentons
Domengeaux Wright
Gibson Dunn
Herman Herman
Kirkland & Ellis
Levin Papantonio
Liskow & Lewis
Lundv Lundv
Sher Gamer
Weitz & Luxenberg
Williams & Connolly

Companies
•

BP p.l.c.

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Privacy Policy Beta Tools: Track docs I Track attorneys I Track judges

http://www.law360.com/articles/491665/bp-deal-objectors-drop-appeal-say-attys-misled-them

Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page29 of 43

Exhibit A-4
In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust
Litigation, 289 F.R.D. 548 (2013)

In re TFT-LCD Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD 289 F.R.D. 548 (2013) Filed08/22/14
(Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, Document75-1

Page30 of 43

2013-1 Trade Cases P 78,275

To hold an individual in civil contempt for
violation of a court order, that order must be clear
in its commands.
Cases that cite this headnote
[3]

Contempt
Disobedience to Mandate, Order, or
Judgment
Contempt
Weight and sufficiency
To succeed on a motion for civil contempt,
moving party must show by clear and convincing
evidence that nonmoving party violated a court
order beyond substantial compliance, and that
the violation was not based on a good faith and
reasonable interpretation of the order.

Synopsis
Background: In antitrust class action against manufacturers,
sellers, and distributors of thin film transistor liquid crystal
display (TFT-LCD) panels and products, plaintiff moved
for order to show cause why objectors and their attorney
should not be held in civil contempt for failing to appear for
deposition.

Cases that cite this headnote
[4]

[Holding:] The District Court, Susan Illston, J., held that
objectors to proposed settlement, and their attorney, were in
civil contempt of court's order compelling depositions.

Party being held in civil contempt must show that
he or she took every reasonable step to comply
with court's order.

Contempt order entered and sanctions imposed.

West Headnotes (7)

[1]

Cases that cite this headnote
[5]

Contempt
Disobedience to Mandate, Order, or
Judgment

Cases that cite this headnote
[2]

Contempt
Disobedience to Mandate, Order, or
Judgment

Contempt
Costs and fees
In fashioning civil contempt sanctions, court has
discretion to award reasonable fees and costs as
a remedial measure, regardless of whether party
that is in contempt acted wilfully.

Contempt
Civil contempt

“Civil contempt” consists of a party's
disobedience to a specific and definite court
order by failure to take all reasonable steps
within the party's power to comply.

Contempt
Disobedience to Mandate, Order, or
Judgment

Cases that cite this headnote
[6]

Federal Civil Procedure
Contempt
Objectors to proposed settlement of antitrust
class action, and their attorney, were in civil
contempt of court's order requiring objectors
to appear for deposition, and their attorney to
produce them; order clearly and specifically
set forth that objectors were to be deposed
and that it was their attorney's responsibility to

© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

1

In re TFT-LCD Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD 289 F.R.D. 548 (2013) Filed08/22/14
(Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, Document75-1

Page31 of 43

2013-1 Trade Cases P 78,275

affirmatively communicate and coordinate with
plaintiff's counsel to schedule the depositions,
yet objectors and their attorney failed to take
efforts to comply with the order, and provided no
sufficient justification for their failure to do so.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 37(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[7]

Contempt
Nature and grounds in general
In determining appropriate sanctions for civil
contempt, consideration of prejudice to the
movant is only relevant in cases where severe
sanctions, such as dismissal, may be awarded.
Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*549 Samuel W. Lanham, Jr., Lanham & Blackwell,
Bangor, ME, Ian Otto, Straus & Boies LLP, Fairfax, VA,
Mario Nunzio Alioto, Trump Alioto Trump & Prescott
LLP, Eric B. Fastiff, Brendan Patrick Glackin, Richard
Martin Heimann, Marc Pilotin, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann &
Bernstein LLP, Bruce Lee Simon, Aaron M. Sheanin, Thomas
Kay Boardman, Pearson, Simon, Warshaw & Penny, LLP,
Beatrice B. Nguyen, Gregory D. Call, Suzanne E. Rode,
Nathanial John Wood, Crowell & Moring LLP, Douglas
R. Young, Farella Braun & Martel LLP, Joseph M. Alioto,
Sr., Theresa Driscoll Moore, Alioto Law Firm, Christopher
T. Micheletti, Craig C. Corbitt, Francis Onofrei Scarpulla,
Heather T. Rankie, Patrick Bradford Clayton, Qianwei Fu,
Zelle Hofmann Voelbel & Mason LLP, Derek G. Howard,
Jack Wing Lee, Minami Tamaki LLP, Judith A. Zahid,
Zelle Hofmann Voelbel Mason & Gette, LLP, Tracy R.
Kirkham, Cooper & Kirkham, P.C., Joseph R. Saveri, Saveri
Law Firm, Blaire Zina Russell, John R. Foote, Karl David
Belgum, Nixon Peabody LLP, Euphemia Nikki Thomopulos,
Joren Surya Bass, Troy Philip Sauro, Perkins Coie LLP,
David Mark Goldstein, Esq., Shannon Christine Leong,
Stephen V. Bomse, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP,
Margaret Branick-Abilla, Richard James Mooney, Bryan
Cave LLP, Robert L. Stolebarger, Holmes Roberts & Owen
LLP, Allan Steyer, Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez
& Smith LLP, San Francisco, CA, Alberto Rodriguez,
Vanek Vickers and Masini PC, Mark E. Ferguson, Mark S.

Ouweleen, Attorney at Law, Barlitt Beck Herman Palenchar
& Scott, Kimball Richard Anderson, Winston and Strawn
LLP, Blake Lee Harrop, Office of the Attorney General,
David Paul Germaine, Chicago, IL, Jason C. Murray, Janet
Irene Levine, Joshua Courtney Stokes, Robert Brian McNary,
Crowell & Moring LLP, Robert William Finnerty, Girardi
Keese, David Martinez, Elizabeth Diemphuc Le, Matthew
David Taggart, Attorney at Law, Roman M. Silberfeld,
Robins Kaplan Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., Marc M. Seltzer,
Steven Gerald Sklaver, David Humberto Orozco, Susman
Godfrey LLP, Mark D. Baute, Sean Adrian Andrade, Baute
Crochetiere & Wang LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Daniel L.
Warshaw, Clifford H. Pearson, Pearson, Simon, Warshaw &
Penny LLP, Sherman Oaks, CA, Hilary Kathleen Ratway,
Hausfeld, LLP, Astor Henry Lloyd Heaven, III, Jeffrey
H. Howard, Jerome A. Murphy, David P. Ross, Crowell
and Moring LLP, Christopher T. Leonardo, Kenneth L.
Adams, R. Bruce Holcomb, Adams Holcomb LLP, William
A. Isaacson, Boies Schiller & Flexner, Ross Christopher
Paolino, Orrick Herrington Sutcliffe LLP, Melissa Willett,
William A. Isaacson, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, Melissa
B. Felder, Washington, DC, Andre Mauricio Pauka, Bryan
Leach, Daniel R. Brody, Fred H. Bartlit, Jr., Karma
Micaela Giulianelli, Lester Houtz, Bartlit Beck Herman
Palenchar & Scott, Denver, CO, Brian Parker Miller, Donald
MacKaye Houser, Edward Paul Bonapfel, Joann Elizabeth
Johnston, Kacy Christine McCaffrey, Kevin Michael Pitre,
Lisa Kathleen Bojko, Matthew D. Richardson, Peter Konito,
Valarie Cecile Williams, Andrew Jacob Tuck, Debra Dawn
Bernstein, Elizabeth Helmer Jordan, Matthew David Kent,
Melissa Mahurin Whitehead, Michael P. Kenny, Rodney
J. Ganske, Alston & Bird LLP, Matthew Scott Orrell,
Atlanta, GA, Randall Lee Allen, Steven Daniel Hemminger,
Alston and Bird, Menlo Park, CA, Richard W. Stimson,
Alston & Bird LLP, Allan Diamond, Jason Paul Fulton, Jim
McCarthy, *550 McCarthy D. James, Diamond McCarthy
LLP, Lewis Titus LeClair, Mike McKool, Jr., Scott R.
Jacobs, McKool Smith, P.C., Dallas, TX, Philip J. Iovieno,
Christopher V. Fenlon, Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP,
Anne M. Nardacci, Albany, NY, Daniel R. Shulman, Gray,
Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A., Elliot S. Kaplan,
Laura Elizabeth Nelson, Robins Kaplan Miller & Ciresi,
K. Craig Wildfang, Attorney at Law, Minneapolis, MN,
Steven J. Foley, Hellmuth and Johnson PLLC, Edina, MN,
Brady R. Johnson, Attorney General of Washington, Cori
Gordon Moore, David Burman, Eric J. Weiss, Nicholas H.
Hesterberg, Steven Douglas Merriman, Perkins Coie LLP,
Jordan Connors, Parker C. Folse, III, Rachel S. Black,
Brooke Ashley-May Taylor, Parker C. Folse, III, Susman

© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

2

In re TFT-LCD Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD 289 F.R.D. 548 (2013) Filed08/22/14
(Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, Document75-1

Page32 of 43

2013-1 Trade Cases P 78,275

Godfrey L.L.P., Chase C. Alvord, Christopher Ian Brain, Kim
D. Stephens, Tousley Brian Stephens PLLC, Seattle, WA,
Michael E. Haglund, Michael Kevin Kelley, Michael G. Neff,
Shay S. Scott, Haglund Kelley Horngren Jones & Wilder,
LLP, Portland, OR, Tim David Nord, Oregon Department
of Justice, Financial Fraud/Consumer Protection, Salem, OR,
David Bedford Esau, James Blaker Baldinger, Carlton Fields
PA, West Palm Beach, FL, Robert L. Ciotti, Carlton Fields,
P.A., Tampa, FL, Anne E. Schneider, Attorney General
of Missouri, Jefferson City, MO, David A. Curran, Kevin
Wells, Arkansas Attorney General's Office, Little Rock,
AR, Mary Elizabeth Lippitt, Michigan Attorney General,
Assistant Attorney General, Lansing, MI, Douglas Lee
Davis, Attorney General, Jill L. Miles, Assistant Attorney
General, Charleston, WV, Gwendolyn J. Cooley, Wisconsin
Attorney General, Madison, WI, Liz Ann Brady, Nicholas
J. Weilhammer, Robert Scott Palmer, Office of the Attorney
General, Gregory S. Slemp, Tallahassee, FL, Erica W. Harris,
H. Lee Godfrey, Johnny William Carter, Jonathan Jeffrey
Ross, Kenneth S. Marks, Adam Carlis, Susman Godfrey LLP,
Houston, TX, Amy Elizabeth McFarlane, Geralyn Jeanette
Trujillo, Jeremy R. Kasha, Richard L. Schwartz, Office
of the Attorney General, Daniel B. Rapport, Edward A.
Friedman, Hallie B. Levin, Jason C. Rubinstein, Alexander
David Levi, Friedman Kaplan Seiler Adelman LLP, New
York, NY, Stuart H. Singer, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP,
Fort Lauderdale, FL, Robert S. Green, Green & Noblin,
P.C., Larkspur, CA, Barry R. Himmelstein, Himmelstein
Law Network, Emeryville, CA, Mitchell E. Widom, Robert
William Turken, Scott N. Wagner, Robert William Turken,
Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod, LLP, Miami, FL,
James Michael Terrell, Nicholas W. Armstrong, Phillip W.
McCallum, Robert Gordon Methvin, Jr., McCallum Methvin
& Terrell, P.C., Birmingham, AL, Julie A. Bays, P. Clayton
Eubanks, Tom Bates, Office of the Oklahoma Attorney
General, Oklahoma City, OK, Phillip F. Cramer, Ryan
Thomas Holt, Sherrard and Roe, PLC, Nashville, TN, John
Jacob Pentz, Class Action Fairness Group, Sudbury, MA,
Joseph Darrell Palmer, Solana Beach, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Trump, Alioto, Trump & Prescott, pro se.
Chet Alan Kronenberg, Benjamin A. Gold, Simpson Thacher
& Bartlett LLP, Gregory J. Weingart, Jonathan E. Altman,
Munger, Tolles and Olson LLP, Jonathan Michael Weiss, Los
Angeles, CA, Hojoon Hwang, Jerome Cary Roth, Munger
Tolles & Olson LLP, Christopher Alan Nedeau, Nossaman
LLP, Holly A. House, Kevin C. McCann, Lee F. Berger,
Sean David Unger, Paul Hastings LLP, Michael Williams
Stevens, San Francisco, CA, Arman Oruc, Jane Jung Ah

Lee, Xavier Blake Sparrow, Simpson Thacher and Bartlett
LLP, Washington, DC, Jonathan Charles Sanders, Simpson
Thacher Bartlett LLP, Roxana Niktab, Palo Alto, CA, Kevin
J. Arquit, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York, NY,
for Defendants.
Opinion
ORDER RE CIVIL CONTEMPT AND AWARD
OF SANCTIONS AGAINST OBJECTORS
ALISON PAUL, LEVETA CHESSER, AND
THEIR COUNSEL JOSEPH DARRELL PALMER
SUSAN ILLSTON, District Judge.
On December 5, 2012, class counsel for the Indirect–
Purchaser Plaintiff Class Actions (“IPPs”) filed a Renewed
Motion for an Order to Show Cause re Finding of Civil
Contempt and Award of Sanctions against Objectors Alison
Paul, Leveta Chesser, and their counsel, Joseph Darrell
Palmer. The Court *551 issued an Order to Show Cause on
January 9, 2013, setting a deadline for Objectors and Palmer
to respond and a hearing date of February 12, 2013. Docket
No. 7465. Objectors and their counsel filed a Response on
February 2, 2012, and IPP Counsel filed a Reply on February
6, 2012. Docket Nos. 7584 and 7590. A hearing was held on
February 12, 2013; IPP class counsel and Palmer appeared.
Having considered the parties' papers and the arguments
of the parties, the Court hereby finds Alison Paul, Leveta
Chesser, and Joseph Darrell Palmer in civil contempt and
awards sanctions in the amount of $9,254.11.

BACKGROUND
Objectors Alison Paul and Johnny Kessel, unnamed class
members in the Indirect–Purchaser Class Action, first filed
an objection around April 13, 2012, in response to the IPP
Motion for Preliminary Approval to the Round 1 Settlements.
Docket No. 5531. On April 20, 2012, IPP counsel served Paul
and Kessel with deposition notices and document production
demands. In response, Joseph Darrell Palmer, counsel to
Paul and Kessel, sent a letter to IPP counsel explaining that
he would not produce his clients for deposition without a
court order. Docket No. 6885–13. The Court preliminarily
approved the Round 1 Settlements on July 11, 2012, see
Docket No. 6130, and Paul and Kessel filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Ninth Circuit on August 6, 2012, see Docket
No. 6388.

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On September 6, 2012, IPP counsel served Paul with a
subpoena issued from the Southern District of California,
where she lives, 1 later following up with Palmer to schedule
the deposition. Palmer reiterated that Paul would not appear
for a deposition without a court order. Around the same time,
IPP counsel requested that Palmer accept service on behalf of
Kessel, since Kessel had failed to include his address on the
objection, and informed Palmer that they would be seeking a
court order compelling discovery participation.
In October of 2012, IPP counsel moved to compel the
depositions of various objectors, including Paul and Kessel,
see Docket No. 6884. Palmer opposed the motion, arguing
that the Court lacked jurisdiction, that the objectors were not
subject to the Special Master's jurisdiction, that IPP counsel
sought privileged material as well as irrelevant material, and
that the requests were unduly burdensome, see Docket No.
6952. In addition, a motion that Paul had filed in the Southern
District of California, to quash the deposition subpoena
served on Paul there, was transferred to this District for
decision here; it was opposed by IPP counsel.
On October 18, 2012, the Special Master conducted a
telephonic hearing on these issues, 2 and on October 19,
2012, issued a written order. The Special Master ordered Paul
and Kessel to appear for deposition and produce documents,
according to guidelines set out in the Order. Docket No. 7011.
He denied the motion to quash the Paul subpoena issued by
the Southern District of California. Id.
A few days before the Special Master issued this Order,
Kessel and a new objector, Leveta Chesser, 3 both
represented by Palmer, filed new objections to the Round 2
Settlements, again failing to include their addresses on the
objection. See Docket No. 6991. 4
IPP counsel followed up with Palmer by phone and email to
schedule the depositions of Paul and Kessel, and requested
that he accept service on behalf of Chesser. Palmer responded
by email, threatening to bring claims of legal malpractice
against the Zelle *552 Hoffman firm and “every firm you
put on the signature pages for these subpoenas.” Docket
No. 7129–11. IPP counsel continued to follow up with
Palmer about Chesser's deposition, and on the day of
Chesser's noticed deposition, Paul and Kessel, via Palmer,
filed objections to the Special Master's Order compelling
their depositions, asserting the same arguments that the

Special Master had specifically overruled. See Docket No.
7096. The next day, IPP counsel followed up with Palmer,
inquiring about the depositions, to which Palmer replied,
“what depositions?” IPP counsel appeared at the scheduled
depositions of Paul and Kessel on the noticed date of
November 5, 2012, but neither Paul nor Kessel appeared.
In response to their objections to the Special Master's Order,
IPP counsel filed a(1) Response to Paul and Kessel Objections
to Special Master's Order and (2) Cross–Motion for Order to
Show Cause regarding finding of Civil Contempt and Award
of Sanctions Against Paul, Kessel, and Palmer. Docket No.
7129. The motion also requested that the Court compel Leveta
Chesser to participate in discovery on the same terms as
Paul and Kessel, as set out in the Special Master's Order. On
November 14, 2012, this Court issued an Order (1) denying
Paul's and Kessel's objections to Special Master's Order,
(2) denying the IPP's requested OSC re civil contempt and
sanctions, and (3) compelling the depositions of Paul, Kessel,
and Chesser by November 21, 2012. Dkt. No. 7152. Palmer
was specifically “ORDERED to communicate with and
cooperate with IPP counsel in scheduling these depositions.”
Id. Kessel appeared for deposition on November 20, 2102, but
Paul and Chesser did not.
IPP counsel thereafter filed a Renewed Motion for Order
to Show Cause re Finding Civil Contempt and Award of
Sanctions Against Paul, Chesser, and Palmer for failure to
comply with the Court's November 14, 2012 Order and
for Palmer's unprofessional conduct at Kessel's deposition.
Docket No. 7296. IPP counsel seek a civil contempt finding
and award of monetary and dismissal sanctions in the
amount of $10,000 for attorneys' fees and $1,154.11 in costs
associated with its efforts in pursuing these depositions. Id.
Palmer filed an Opposition to the IPP's Renewed Motion
raising the same objections as in previous briefings and
arguing that IPP counsel exceeded the scope of permissible
topics ordered by the Special Master at Kessel's deposition.
Docket No. 7397.
On January 9, 2013, the issued an OSC, ordering Paul,
Chesser, and Palmer to show cause why the Court should not
find them in civil contempt and award sanctions. Docket. No.
7465.

LEGAL STANDARD

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[1] [2] [3] [4] Rule 37(b)(1) of the Federal Rules ofarguments and informs the Court that on February 1, 2013
Civil Procedure provides, “[i]f the court where the discovery
(the day after Palmer's response was due) Palmer called
is taken orders a deponent to be sworn or to answer a
IPP counsel and asked them if they would agree to take
question and the deponent fails to obey, the failure may be
these contempt proceedings off-calendar in exchange for the
5
deposition of Mr. Palmer's aunt, Ms. Chesser, in Little Rock,
treated as contempt of court.” Civil contempt consists of a
Arkansas, at an unspecified time in the future. See Docket No.
party's disobedience to “a specific and definite court order by
7590–1, Declaration of Patrick B. Clayton, ¶ 2. IPP counsel
failure to take all reasonable steps within the party's power
note that Palmer further stated that his wife, Alison Paul,
to comply.” Reno Air Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. McCord, 452
would not appear for deposition as ordered. Id. IPP Counsel
F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.2006). To hold an individual in
rejected Palmer's offer in writing that day. Id.
civil contempt for violation of a court order, that order must
be clear in its commands. See Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of
Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir.1989) (court order must
be “specific and definite”). To succeed on a *553 motion
for civil contempt, the moving party must “show by clear
and convincing evidence that [the nonmoving party] violated
the [court order] beyond substantial compliance, and that
the violation was not based on a good faith and reasonable
interpretation of the [order].” Wolfard Glassblowing Co.
v. Vanbragt, 118 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir.1997). The
party being held in contempt must show that he or she
took every reasonable step to comply with the Court's
order. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 544 F.2d 396, 404 (9th
Cir.1976).
[5] In fashioning civil contempt sanctions, the court has the
discretion to award reasonable fees and costs as a remedial
measure, regardless of whether the party that is in contempt
acted wilfully. Perry v. O'Donnell, 759 F.2d 702, 704–705
(9th Cir.1985); General Ins. Co. v. Eastern Consol. Util.,
Inc., 126 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir.1997) (upholding monetary
sanction of expenses and attorney's fees for non-party's failure
to appear at a deposition).

DISCUSSION
The Court's January 9, 2013, Order required Objectors Paul
and Chesser, and their counsel Palmer, to show cause why
the Court should not find them in civil contempt and award
sanctions. The Order set a hearing date of February 12, 2013.
See Docket No. 7465. In their response, Objectors and Palmer
argue that IPP counsel were attempting to conduct “needless
depositions” of the Objectors; that Objectors and Palmer
have not engaged in any sanctionable or improper conduct;
and that IPP counsel have not shown any prejudice by the
inability to conduct the depositions. Docket No. 7584. 6
Palmer also asserts that IPP counsel did not attempt to conduct
the depositions after the Court's order compelling them on
November 14, 2012. Id. In reply, IPP counsel rejects Palmer's

At the hearing on February 12, 2013, Palmer argued that his
wife, Ms. Paul, did not want to appear for deposition, and
Mr. Palmer knew of no precedent where an attorney could be
held responsible for his client's failure to attend a deposition.
He also challenged IPP's service of Paul, arguing that after
the motion to quash the subpoena was transferred from the
Southern District of California to the Northern District of
California, the date for the noticed deposition had passed,
and thus, IPP counsel were required to issue a new subpoena.
IPP counsel asserted its repeated attempts, in light of each
objectors' failure to provide their address on their objections,
to serve objectors and their requests to Palmer that he accept
service on their behalf.
[6]
The Court concludes that IPP counsel have
demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Objectors Paul and Chesser, and their counsel, Palmer,
violated the Court's November 14, 2012 Order requiring
Paul and Chesser to appear for deposition. Although Palmer
asserted at the hearing that he should not be held accountable
for Paul's refusal to comply with the Court Order, the Court
finds this assertion disingenuous. From the time Paul was
served with a deposition notice on April 20, 2012, Palmer
refused to produce his client without a Court order. Once
a Court order was issued requiring his clients to appear for
deposition, Palmer continued to refuse to produce his clients
on the same grounds he had asserted to the Special Master
and to the Court and that had been repeatedly rejected. He
has never asserted in any briefing that Paul did *554 not
want to appear, nor has he filed any declaration or provided
any evidence that he attempted to persuade Paul to appear
for deposition. In any event, the Court also ordered Palmer to
affirmatively communicate and coordinate with IPP counsel
to schedule the depositions. Thus, Palmer's argument that
IPP counsel did not make efforts to conduct the depositions
after the Order was entered is irrelevant. Palmer has failed
to provide the Court with evidence that he affirmatively
communicated with IPP counsel to schedule Paul and/or

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Chesser's deposition after the Court order. This is further
supported by IPP's assertion that Palmer continued to refuse to
produce Paul for deposition as recently as February 1, 2012. 7
[7] The Court also finds Palmer's assertion that IPP
counsel were attempting to conduct “needless depositions”
of Objectors without merit. This Court's Order compelling
discovery participation of Paul and Chesser speaks to the
contrary. The November 14, 2012 Order observed and
approved the Special Master's order that the scope of
document requests and depositions be limited to relevant
information. Palmer also asserts that IPP counsel have
not been prejudiced and thus, sanctions are unwarranted.
Consideration of prejudice to the movant, however, is only
relevant in cases where sever sanctions such as dismissal
may be awarded. See Adriana Intern. Corp. v. Thoeren, 913
F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir.1990). The cases cited by Palmer
similarly involve more severe sanctions than monetary
sanctions. Although the Court could find that Palmer acted
willfully, and thus award dismissal sanctions, the Court
declines to strike the objections raised by Paul and Chesser.
See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability
Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1233 (9th Cir.2006) ( [d]ismissal, the
most drastic sanction, generally requires a finding that the
conduct was “due to willfulness, bad faith or fault of the
party,” including “[d]isobedient conduct not shown to be
outside the litigants's control.”). As such, Palmer's argument
is without merit.
Accordingly, because Paul, Chesser, and Palmer have failed
to demonstrate that they took efforts to comply with the
Court's order or provide sufficient justification for failing to
comply with the Order, the Court hereby holds Paul, Chesser,

and Palmer in civil contempt and awards monetary sanctions
to compensate IPP counsel for fees incurred pursuing the
depositions after the Court issued its November 14, 2013
Order. The Court will award sanctions in the amount of
$9,254.11, which represents $8,100 of attorneys' fees spent
attempting to secure compliance with this Court's November
14, 2012 Order plus an additional $1,154.11 in costs. See
Docket No. 7613, Supplemental Declaration of Patrick B.
Clayton, ¶ 6; Docket No. 7296–1, Scarpulla Declaration, ¶ 4.
The Court therefore orders as follows:
1. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(1), Joseph Darrell
Palmer, Alison Paul, and Leveta Chesser are in civil
contempt of this Court for their failure to comply
with the Order filed on November 14, 2012, directing
Paul and Chesser to appear for deposition and Palmer
to communicate and coordinate with IPP counsel to
schedule the depositions.
2. Objectors Alison Paul and Leveta Chesser, and their
counsel, Joseph Darrell Palmer, are SANCTIONED in
the amount of $9,254.11, jointly and severally.
3. This Order is stayed for ten days from the date of the
Order to Show Cause hearing held on February 12, 2013,
in order to allow contemnors to seek a stay from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Parallel Citations
2013-1 Trade Cases P 78,275

Footnotes

1
2
3
4

5

Alison Paul is attorney Palmer's wife.
Palmer did not appear for this telephonic hearing.
Leveta Chesser is Palmer's aunt.
In its Order for Final Approval of the Round 1 Settlements, the Court overruled objections to the Round 1 Settlements. See Docket
No. 6130, ¶ 14. Alison Paul did not file objections to the Round 2 Settlement. However, the substance of Paul's Round 1 objections
involved topics that were specifically reserved for later review in the Round 2 Settlement process. See Docket No. 6130, ¶ 15. As to
such topics (class attorneys' fees, expenses, and awards, and allocation) Paul's objections remain at issue.
Although the deposition was noticed in the Southern District of California, where Paul lives, that court transferred Paul's motion to
quash to the Northern District of California and held that “[a]ny determinations relating to the district court's jurisdiction pending the
appeal to the Ninth Circuit should be made by the MDL court in Northern District of California.” Thus, Rule 37(b)(1), which refers
to “where the discovery is taken,” will still be applicable here, in the Northern District of California. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b)
(authorizing the transferee judge to “exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial
depositions”); U.S. ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of America, Inc., 444 F.3d 462, 468–69 (6th Cir.2006) (“A judge
presiding over an MDL case ... can compel production by an extra-district nonparty; enforce, modify, or quash a subpoena directed

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6
7

to an extra-district nonparty; and hold an extra-district nonparty deponent in contempt, notwithstanding the nonparty's physical situs
in a foreign district where discovery is being conducted.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b)).
Palmer's response was due by 1/31/13 but was not filed until February 2, 2013. Palmer requested that the Court allow the late filing,
offering several dramatic reasons for the late filing. See Dkt. No. 7584. The Court has allowed and considered the late filing, and
the IPP's subsequent reply, in making its determination.
Palmer's conduct could be sanctioned under the Court's inherent authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“Any attorney .... who so multiplies
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct”).

End of Document

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Exhibit A-5
Palmer Objection History, Kramer v.
Autobytel, 4:10-cv-02722-CW, Dkt. 139-1

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!
!
!
!

EXHIBIT 1

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Motion to Compel Objector Discovery - Appendix A
Examples of Cases in Which Darrell Palmer Has Filed Objections and Dismissed, Abandoned or Withdrawn
the Objections or Appeal Without Attaining Settlement Changes or Additional Benefits for the Class
Case
Berger v. Property I.D.
Corp. (C.D. Cal., No.
CV 05-5373 GHK
(CWx))
In re Broadcom
Corporation Class
Action Litigation (C.D.
Cal., No. 06-cv-5036-R
(CWx))
Browning v. Yahoo!
Inc., et al. (N.D. Cal.,
No. C04-01463 HRL)
In re Cellphone
Termination Fee Cases
(Alameda Super. Ct.,
JCCP No. 4332)
In re Chiron
Shareholder Deal Litig.
(Alameda Super. Ct.,
No. RG05230567)
Collins v. American
Honda Motor Co.
(Alameda Super. Ct.,
No. RG03099677)

1

Client(s)
Joseph Palmer –
actually Darrell
Palmer,
appearing pro
per, under his
first name
Smokestack
Lightening Ltd.
“Marisco”

Outcome of Objection
Award of fees, to which Palmer had
objected, granted 1/28/09 (Dkt. 899);
final approval granted in separate order
of that date (Dkt. 900). Objections not
mentioned in either order.

Appeal
Not filed.

Outcome of Appeal
Not applicable.

Overruled and $10,000 appeal bond
required (Dkt. 356; 8/11/10).

Filed 9/10/10 (9th Cir.,
No. 10-56435).

Voluntarily dismissed
(Dkt. 8, 11/4/10).

Norman
Palmer1,
Richard Oster;
Jeff Heinrichs
Carol Barrett;
Robert R.
Oubre, Sr.

Overruled (2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86266; 11/16/07).

Filed 12/14/07 (9th Cir.,
No. 07-17326).

Voluntarily dismissed
(Dkt. 12, 5/2/08).

Final approval granted and fees
awarded 7/21/10 in separate orders.
Objections not mentioned in either of
the orders.
Final approval granted and fees
awarded 7/25/06 in separate orders.
Objections not mentioned in either of
the orders.
Final approval granted and fees
awarded 12/28/06. The order states
that the objections were considered but
does not otherwise mention them.

Filed 9/17/10 (Cal. App.
1st Dist., No. A129887).

Voluntarily dismissed
(3/10/11).

Filed 9/6/06 (Cal. App.
1st Dist., No. A115432).

Abandonment of appeal
filed (10/18/06).

Blanks/Cummins appeal
filed 2/22/07 (Cal. App.
1st Dist., No. A117120);
Bergrin appeal filed
2/26/07 (Cal. App. 1st
Dist., No. A117125).

Blanks/Cummins and
Bergrin appeals
voluntarily dismissed
(6/15/07).

Carrie B.
Savage
Elizabeth
Blanks; Ancle
W. Cummins,
Jr.; Irving S.
Bergrin

Norman Palmer is Darrell Palmer’s brother.

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Case
In re: Countrywide
Financial Corp.
Customer Data
Security Breach Litig.
(W.D. Ky., No. 08MD-01998)
In Re: Currency
Conversion Fee
Antitrust Litig.
(S.D.N.Y., No. 1:01MD-01409)

Dervaes v. California
Physicians’ Service
d/b/a Blue Shield of
California (Alameda
Super. Ct., No.
RG06262733)
Elihu v. Toshiba
America Information
Systems (Los Angeles
Super. Ct., No.
BC328556)

Client(s)
Winfield C.
Scott

Outcome of Objection
Memorandum Opinion on final
approval and fees found objections to
be without merit (Dkt. 297, 8/23/10).

Richard Melton
Construction,
Inc.; Dirk F.
Sutro

Final approval granted and fees
Not filed.
awarded on 10/22/09 (263 F.R.D. 110).
There were 76 objectors to the
settlement. For each of their points, the
court said the objections were either
without merit or moot.

Alison H. Paul

David Schaefer

Certain objectors sought fees. “The
objectors in this case did little to aid
this Court. While there were
modifications to the notice program,
these modifications were entirely on
the Court’s initiative and devised by
the Special Master and the parties. As
for fees, the objections were so general
and repetitive that they were of no
assistance to an area with which this
Court is intimately familiar.” Id. at
132.
Final approval granted and fees
awarded 4/2/10. Objections not
mentioned in order and judgment.

Appeal
Filed 9/22/10 (6th Cir.,
No. 10-6194).

Outcome of Appeal
Voluntarily dismissed
(Doc. No. 006110805529,
12/2/10).

Not applicable.

2

Abandonment of appeal
filed (6/4/10).

Filed 7/27/07 (Cal. App.
2nd Dist., No. B201331).

Judgment entered 5/31/07.

Filed 6/1/10 (Cal. App.
1st Dist., No. A128696).

Voluntarily dismissed
(4/24/08).

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Case
In re Enron
Corporation Securities
Litig. (S.D. Tex., No.
H-01-3624)

Client(s)
Larry Fenstad;
Dorothy
Lancaster
McCoppin

In re: Epson Ink
Cartridges (Los
Angeles Super. Ct.,
JCCP 4347)
In re: Ford Explorer
Cases (Sacramento
Super. Ct., JCCP Nos.
4266 and 4270)
Friedman v. 24 Hour
Fitness USA, Inc. (C.D.
Cal., No. CV-0606282)
Gemelas v. Dannon Co.
(N.D. Ohio, No. 08CV-236)

Elaine Savage;
Edward Siegel;
Andy Lui;
Albert Lui
JWC
Construction,
Inc.; Misty
Carter
Toni Ozen

Steven P. Cope

Outcome of Objection
On 9/8/08, all objections were
overruled or found to be without merit
in the order awarding fees (586
F.Supp.2d 732) and the plan of
allocation of the settlement proceeds
(2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84656).
Judgment entered 10/23/06.

Objections overruled in 6/27/08 fee
order and 7/30/08 judgment.

Appeal
Filed 10/3/08 (5th Cir.,
No. 08-20648).

Outcome of Appeal
Stipulated dismissal filed
9/10/09 (Doc. No.
0051920399).

Filed 12/18/06 (Cal. App. Voluntarily dismissed
2nd Dist., No. B195818). (1/29/07 – Savage, Andy
Lui and Albert Lui;
3/13/07 – Siegel).
Filed 9/26/08 (Cal. App. Abandonment of appeal
3rd Dist., No. C060067). filed (11/21/08).

Overruled 7/12/10.

Filed 8/11/10 (9th Cir.,
No. 10-56289).

Stipulated dismissal (Dkt.
3, 8/20/10).

Judgment, Final Order and Decree
(Dkt. 71, 6/24/10) indicates objections
were considered.

Not filed.

Not applicable.

In his Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Bond to Secure Payment of Costs and
Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal, Judge Dan
Aaron Polster stated, “The only
objections to the settlement were
lodged by what now appear to be
‘serial objectors.’” 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99503, *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31,
2010).

3

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Case
Client(s)
Jonathan L.
In re General Motors
Dex-Cool Gasket Cases Booze
(Alameda Super. Ct.,
JCCP No. 4495)

Outcome of Objection
Overruled in 10/23/08 final approval
and fee order.
On 12/5/08, all of the objectors filed a
joint notice of withdrawal of their
objections.
Fees awarded (12/17/10 and 12/22/10)
and settlement approved (12/22/10) in
separate orders. Objections not
mentioned in the orders.
Objection filed 1/25/10; withdrawn
2/1/10.

Hoffman v. Citibank
(South Dakota) N.A.
(C.D. Cal., No. No.
CV-06-00571)
Koller v. Int’l. Rectifier
Corp. (C.D. Cal., No.
CV-07-02544)
In re: Lifelock, Inc.
Marketing and Sales
Practices Litig. (D.
Ariz., No. 2:08-MD01977-MHM)

Joseph Balla;
Andrew J.
Cesare; Todd
Bates
Cascia II, LLC

Papadakis v.
Northwestern Mutual
Life Ins. Co. (Los
Angeles Super. Ct., No.
BC322788)

Marci R.
Frenkel; Eric
Zeigenhorn;
Norma
Hoffman; Stuart
Mintz; Kirk
Stewart; Steven
Sindell; Paul M.
Kaufman
Cassie Griffin
Objection filed 8/28/09; withdrawn
9/24/09.

Salcido v. Iovate
Health Sciences USA,
Inc. (Los Angeles
Super. Ct., No.
BC387942)

Billy Daniels

The final approval and fee order of
8/31/10 (Dkt. 218) states: “[T]he
Parties demonstrated in their Response
to Objections that none of the asserted
bases for objection is valid.” Slip op.
at 9.
Final approval order and judgment
entered 2/20/09.

4

Appeal
Not filed.

Outcome of Appeal
Not applicable.

Filed 1/18/11 (9th Cir.,
No. 11-55106).

Voluntarily dismissed
(Dkt. 7, 3/23/11).

Not filed.

Not applicable.

Filed 9/30/10 (9th Cir.,
No. 10-17177).

Voluntarily dismissed
(Dkt. 16, 1/5/11).

Filed 4/2/09 (Cal. App.
2nd Dist., No. B214789).

Voluntarily dismissed
(8/24/10).

Not filed.

Not applicable.

Case4:07-md-01819-CW Document75-1 Filed08/22/14 Page43 ofof66
Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document1386-2 Filed01/12/12 Page6 of 43
Case4:10-cv-02722-CW Document139-1 Filed09/14/11 Page6
Case
Savaglio v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. (Alameda
Super. Ct., No. C835687)

Client(s)
Joseph D.
Wilkins; Evelyn
Zientek

In re Smokeless
Tobacco Cases I, II
(San Francisco Super.
Ct., JCCP Nos. 4250,
4258, 4259, 4262)
Troyk v. Farmers
Group, Inc. (San Diego
Super. Ct., No.
GIC836844)
In re Vitamins Antitrust
Litig. (D.D.C., MDL
No. 1285)
In re: Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. Wage and Hour
Litig. (N.D. Cal., No.
06-CV-02069 SBA)
Wilson v. Airborne,
Inc. (C.D. Cal., No.
CV-05-00770)
Yeagley v. Wells Fargo
& Co. (N.D. Cal., No.
C-05-3403-CRB)

Norman D.
Palmer

3225507v3

Arthur Carapia

Neil Freedman;
Teri
Cunningham
Joseph D.
Wilkins; Nicole
Clemente;
Lolita Wells
Denise
Fairbank;
Falicia Estep
Rose A. Munoz

Outcome of Objection
Final approval of settlement granted
4/8/10, overruling objections except as
to amount of attorneys’ fees. The
9/10/10 order on fees indicated that the
court had “rejected all objections to the
requested fee award.”
At the 3/12/08 final approval hearing,
Judge Richard A. Kramer questioned
Darrell Palmer at length about Norman;
earlier that day, the objection was
withdrawn.
Judgment entered 11/23/10.

Appeal
Not filed.

Outcome of Appeal
Not applicable.

Not filed.

Not applicable.

Filed 1/15/10 (Cal. App.
4th Dist., Div. 1, No.
D056803).

Abandonment of appeal
filed (3/4/10).

Objections found to be without merit in
final approval order (Dkt. 4888,
6/25/10).
Objections filed 9/7/10; withdrawn
11/6/10.

Filed 7/23/10 (D.C. Cir.,
No. 10-7096).
Not filed.

Stipulated dismissal
entered 9/2/10 (Doc. No.
1263938).
Not applicable.

Objections overruled in final approval
and fee order (Dkt. 170, 8/13/08).

Filed 11/4/08 (9th Cir.,
No. 08-56819).

Voluntarily dismissed
(Dkt. 10, 2/20/09).

Objection filed 6/8/07; withdrawn as
indicated in 10/18/07 order stating that
plaintiffs’ counsel had agreed to pay
the objectors’ attorneys fees.

Not filed.

Not applicable.

5