Paredes Worrell v. JP Morgan Chase Bank et al

Filing 8

ORDER REASSIGNING CASE TO A U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE; REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by Margaret A Paredes Worrell. Signed by Judge Paul S. Grewal on November 15, 2012. (psglc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/15/2012) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/15/2012: # 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE) (ofr, COURT STAFF).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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MARGARET ANN PAREDES WORRELL,

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Plaintiff,
v.

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JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, CHASE
SUCCESSOR BY MERGER WITH
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.

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Case No.: C 12-04331 PSG
ORDER REASSIGNING CASE TO A
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE; REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION
(Re: Docket Nos. 2)

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Plaintiff Margaret Ann Paredes Worrell (“Worrell”) proceeding pro se applies to proceed in
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forma pauperis. Having reviewed the papers,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case be reassigned to a District Judge with the
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recommendation that the IFP be denied. 1

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This court is ordering reassignment to a District Judge because, absent consent of all parties, a
Magistrate Judge does not have authority to make case-dispositive rulings. See 28 U.S.C. §636(c);
Tripati v. Rison, 847 F.2d 548, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit has left open the question
of whether a remand to state court is a “pretrial matter” which may be referred to a magistrate
judge for determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A). See Nasca v. Peoplesoft, 160 F.3d
578, 580 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We express no opinion regarding [the magistrate judge’s] authority
[to remand the case] had the matter been referred under 28 U.S.C. §636(b).”). It nonetheless
appears that all other appellate courts that have addressed the issue have found that remand is not
merely a pretrial matter. See, e.g., In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1998)
(finding that a remand order is the “functional equivalent” of an order of dismissal for purposes of
28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A)). Accordingly, out of an abundance of caution, the court proceeds by way
of a recommendation and reassignment order.
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Case No.: C 12-04331 PSG
ORDER

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a

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claim and the unlawful detainer action be remanded to state court based on lack of subject matter

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or diversity jurisdiction.

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Granting or refusing permission to proceed in forma pauperis is a matter within the sound

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discretion of the trial court. 2 It is the court’s duty to examine any IFP application “to determine

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whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit,

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the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.” 3 Moreover, a

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federal court must dismiss a case such as this if the court determines that the case is: (1) frivolous;

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(2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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defendant who is immune from such relief. 4

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Here, Worrell filed a complaint and removed Plaintiff JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.’s (“JP

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Morgan”) unlawful detainer action to federal court. Both were filed under the same case number.

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In the complaint, Worrell alleges that she has been deprived access to case files and transcripts in

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state court. She appears to suggest that the case files at issue are related to the unlawful detainer

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action. Upon review of the sparse allegations supporting this claim, it appears that the complaint is

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frivolous and should be dismissed. Worrell also removed the unlawful detainer action to federal

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court but it should be remanded because this court has neither subject matter nor diversity

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jurisdiction over Worrell’s claims. It is well-settled that federal courts do not have federal question

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jurisdiction over unlawful detainer actions, where federal law does not create the cause of action

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and Worrell’s right to relief does not depend on a resolution of a question of federal law. 5 The

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court further finds no diversity jurisdiction based on JP Morgan’s unlawful detainer action, which

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See Shobe v. People of State of California, 362 F.2d 545, 545 (9th Cir. 1966).

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Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965).

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See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2).

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See, e.g., Eden Housing Mgmt., Inc. v. Muhammad, No. C 07-4325 SBA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90294, 2007 WL 4219397, at *2-3 (no federal question on the face of unlawful detainer
complaint); Oritz, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86925, 2008 WL 4771932, at *1.
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Case No.: C 12-04331 PSG
ORDER

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was filed in the superior court as a case of “limited civil jurisdiction” amounting to less than

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$10,000 in controversy.

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In sum, the undersigned finds that there is no basis for jurisdiction over Worrell’s complaint

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and JP Morgan’s unlawful detainer action in this court and therefore no basis on which to grant

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Worrell’s IFP application.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

11/15/2012

_________________________________
PAUL S. GREWAL
United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Case No.: C 12-04331 PSG
ORDER