City of San Jose et al v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball et al

Filing 26

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT re 25 filed by Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, Allan Huber "Bud" Selig. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit-A, # 2 Exhibit-B, # 3 Exhibit-C, # 4 Exhibit-D, # 5 Exhibit-E, # 6 (Proposed) Order) (Keker, John) (Filed on 8/7/2013) Text modified on 8/7/2013 (fff, COURT STAFF).

EXHIBIT C

Calendar No. 231
105TH CONGRESS
"
1st Session

SENATE

!

REPORT
105–118

CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1997

OCTOBER 29, 1997.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. HATCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitted the following

REPORT
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 53]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill
(S. 53) to require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes, having considered
the same and amendments thereto, reports favorably thereon, with
an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and recommends that
the bill, as amended, do pass.
CONTENTS
Page

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

Purpose ...........................................................................................................
Legislative history .........................................................................................
Vote of the Committee ...................................................................................
Section-by-section analysis ............................................................................
Cost estimate ..................................................................................................
Regulatory impact statement ........................................................................
Minority views of Senators Grassley, Biden, Feinstein, and Durbin ........
Changes in existing law ................................................................................

2
3
5
5
6
8
9
11

The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Curt Flood Act of 1997’’.
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this legislation to clarify that major league baseball players
are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that major league players will have the
59–010

2
same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football
and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that the passage
of this Act does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context
or with respect to any other person or entity.
SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.

The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
‘‘SEC. 27. (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business
of organized professional major league baseball relating to or affecting employment
to play baseball at the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the
antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall
be construed as providing the basis for any negative inference regarding the caselaw
concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.
‘‘(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be deemed to change
the application of the antitrust laws to the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
by, between, or among persons engaging in, conducting, or participating in the business of organized professional baseball, except the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements to which subsection (a) of this section shall apply. More specifically, but not
by way of limitation, this section shall not be deemed to change the application of
the antitrust laws to:
‘‘(1) the organized professional baseball amateur draft, the reserve clause as
applied to minor league players, the agreement between organized professional
major league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the ‘Professional Baseball
Agreement’, the relationship between organized professional major league baseball and organized professional minor league baseball, or any other matter relating to professional organized baseball’s minor leagues;
‘‘(2) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to franchise expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues, including ownership transfers, and the relationship between the Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners;
‘‘(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected by Public Law 87–
331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the ‘Sports Broadcasting Act
of 1961’); or
‘‘(4) the relationship between persons in the business of organized professional
baseball and umpires or other individuals who are employed in the business of
organized professional baseball by such persons.
‘‘(c) As used in this section, ‘persons’ means any individual, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated association or any combination or association thereof.’’.

I. PURPOSE
The purpose of S. 53 is to clarify that major league baseball players and owners have the same legal rights, and are subject to the
same restrictions, under the antitrust laws as the players and owners in other professional sports leagues. As the bill expressly provides, it is not intended to affect the applicability or inapplicability
of the antitrust laws in any other manner or context.
As set forth in the S. Rept. 104–231, accompanying S. 627, the
‘‘Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995,’’ a bill that
was reported out of the Judiciary Committee but not enacted during the 104th Congress, the unfortunate baseball strike of 1994–95
reemphasized the need for Congress to clarify its intent to apply
to professional baseball the same rules of fair and open competition
that are followed by all other unregulated business enterprises in
this country, including other sports leagues. In short, other professional athletes and similarly situated employees have alternatives

3
to striking specifically because of the antitrust laws.1 It is the Committee’s belief that the applicability of the antitrust laws to major
league baseball player-owner employment relations will significantly reduce the likelihood of future baseball strikes.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION

OF

S. 53

Many bills have been introduced over the decades addressing the
subject of baseball’s antitrust exemption. During the 104th Congress, this Committee reported out S. 627, a bill intended to affirm
that major league baseball’s owners and players were subject to the
Nation’s antitrust laws. This bill, however, was not considered by
the full Senate during the 104th Congress.
On January 21, 1997, Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond, and
Moynihan introduced S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997, which was
virtually identical to S. 627 from the 104th Congress. On June 17,
1997, this Committee held a hearing on S. 53. The witnesses were
Donald A. Fehr, executive director of the Major League Baseball
Players Association, and Dan Peltier, a former minor league baseball player. Mr. Allan H. Selig, chairman of the Major League Executive Council, and Mr. Stanley Brand, vice president of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc., were also
invited to testify at the hearing, but did not attend.
B. THE AMENDMENT

IN THE

NATURE

OF A

SUBSTITUTE

1. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL OWNERS AND
PLAYERS TO SEEK ANTITRUST LEGISLATION

The 1990 collective-bargaining agreement between the major
league baseball players union and major league owners (‘‘Basic
Agreement’’) expired in December 1993, subsequent to which the
industry, and the Nation, suffered through the unfortunate strike
that suspended portions of the 1994 and 1995 seasons, including
the 1994 World Series. After protracted negotiations, a new Basic
Agreement was finally signed in March 1997. As part of this new
agreement, the owners and players reached what was described by
both sides as a landmark pact regarding the applicability of the
antitrust laws to major league baseball. The parties memorialized
this agreement in article XXVIII of the Basic Agreement, which
reads in pertinent part as follows:
The Clubs and the Association will jointly request and
cooperate in lobbying the Congress to pass a law that will
clarify that Major League Baseball players are covered
under the antitrust laws (i.e. that Major League Players
have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do other
professional athletes, e.g. football and basketball players),
1 As described in S. Rept. 104–231, the courts have developed a ‘‘nonstatutory’’ labor exemption from the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996). Although courts and academics have disagreed on the precise extent and scope of this exemption,
it is clear that, at some point, the nonstatutory labor exemption ends and employees have a
right to invoke the antitrust laws. Like its predecessor S. 627, S. 53 is intended to clarify the
applicability of the antitrust laws in those contexts where the nonstatutory labor exemption does
not apply, and is not intended to affect the scope or extent of that exemption.

4
along with a provision that makes it clear that passage of
that bill does not change the application of the antitrust
laws in any other context or with respect to any other person or entity.
2. THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE

The sponsors of S. 53 continue to support it as introduced. After
introduction, however, the owners and players reached the abovereferenced agreement regarding the applicability of the antitrust
laws to major league baseball. Senators Hatch and Leahy subsequently made clear their willingness to substitute language designed to implement the intent of the owners’ and players’ agreement, believing that a bill which enjoyed both the owners’ and
players’ support would be passed expeditiously.
After considerable prodding from Senator Hatch, on June 12,
1997, the owners ratified specific legislative language, earlier
agreed to by representatives of the owners and the players, intended to clarify that major league baseball players have the same
rights under the antitrust laws as other professional athletes. This
language provided the basis for the amendment in the nature of a
substitute to S. 53, offered by Senator Hatch at the Committee’s
Executive Business Meeting on July 31, 1997.
C. THE MINOR LEAGUES

AND

SENATOR HATCH’S AMENDMENT

The Committee has consistently sought not to adversely affect
the legal status of the minor leagues or minor league players.
Thus, S. 53 (much like its predecessor, S. 627) expressly states
that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect * * *
the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws
to the amateur draft of professional baseball, the minor
league reserve clause, the agreement between professional
major league baseball teams and teams of the National Association of Baseball, commonly known as the ‘‘Professional Baseball Agreement’’, or any other matter relating
to the minor leagues.
Notwithstanding this relatively clear language, Mr. Stanley
Brand indicated to the Committee that he still had concerns. As a
consequence, Mr. Selig stated in a June 16, 1997, letter to the
Chairman that, although the owners’ Executive Council had formally approved the legislative language which ultimately became
the amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 53, their ‘‘support was tempered by the fact that our business partner, the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (NAPBL) has
concern as to whether the proposed legislation adequately protects
their interests.’’
Responding to this concern, when the amendment in the nature
of a substitute to S. 53 was marked up at the Committee’s July 31,
1997, Executive Business Meeting, Senator Hatch offered an
amendment intended to clarify even further that S. 53 would have
no impact on the legal status of the minor leagues. This amendment stated that ‘‘nothing in this subsection shall be construed as

5
providing the basis for any negative inference regarding the
caselaw concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor
league baseball,’’ and was incorporated by voice vote.
III. VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE
On July 31, 1997, with a quorum present, the Committee on the
Judiciary ordered S. 53 favorably reported by a vote of 11 yeas to
6 nays, with Senator Kohl having recused himself. In compliance
with paragraph 7 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
the members of the Committee voted as follows on S. 53:
YEAS

NAYS

Hatch
Grassley
Thurmond
Sessions
Specter (proxy)
Biden
Thompson (proxy)
Feinstein
Kyl (proxy)
Durbin
DeWine
Torricelli
Ashcroft (proxy)
Abraham
Leahy
Kennedy
Feingold
Senator Hatch, together with Senator Leahy, offered a substitute
amendment to reflect the agreement that had been reached between major league baseball owners and players. This amendment
was agreed to by unanimous consent.
Senator Hatch offered an amendment to the substitute, to further clarify that this bill shall not be construed to affect the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball. The amendment was agreed to by voice vote, with Senators Biden and Feinstein noted as having voted nay.
IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1 states the bill’s short title, the ‘‘Curt Flood Act of
1997.’’
Section 2 states that the bill’s purpose is to clarify that major
league professional baseball players have the same rights under
the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes.
Section 3 amends the Clayton Act to add a new section 27. New
subsection 27(a) states that the antitrust laws apply to actions relating to professional baseball players’ employment to play baseball
at the major league level. Reflecting the Committee’s interest in reporting a bill enjoying the support of both the owners and players,
subsection 27(a) implements the owners’ and players’ agreement
that major league baseball players have the same rights under the
antitrust laws as, for example, do professional football and basketball players. The phrase ‘‘the antitrust laws shall apply’’ is intended to incorporate the entire jurisprudence of the antitrust
laws, as it now exists and as it may develop. Subsection 27(a) also
specifies that nothing within the subsection provides a basis for
any negative inference regarding the caselaw concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.

6
S. 53 was specifically drafted so that it would not implicate issues or actions other than those specified in subsection 27(a). Thus,
subsection 27(b) makes explicit the Committee’s intent that the
passage of this bill does not affect the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws in any other context beyond that
specified in subsection 27(a). With regard to contexts, actions or issues outside the scope of subsection 27(a) (that is, not constituting
‘‘conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business
of organized professional major league baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the major league level’’), the
law as it exists today is not changed by this bill. The specific areas
listed in the four subparts of new subsection 27(b) are intended to
be merely illustrative of the areas and/or issues as to which the law
remains unchanged by this bill. The specific reference to the minor
leagues in subsection 27(a) is only intended to clarify that the passage of the bill will have no impact on the law, or the future development of the law, governing the applicability of the antitrust laws
to the minor leagues. This reference is not intended to provide any
inference or limitation regarding the scope of other issues and/or
areas as to which the law remains unchanged by this bill.
V. COST ESTIMATE
U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, September 23, 1997.
Hon. ORRIN G. HATCH,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of
1997.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be please to
provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Susanne S. Mehlman (for
federal costs) and Matt Eyles (for the private-sector impact).
Sincerely,
JUNE E. O’NEILL, Director.
Enclosure.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
S. 53—CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1997; AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON JULY 31, 1997

S. 53 would remove major league baseball’s current exemption
from antitrust laws, except that it would retain the antitrust exemption for minor league baseball and for decisions regarding
league expansion, franchise location, the amateur draft and broadcast rights, and employment relations with nonplayers, such as
umpires. By removing the antitrust exemption under these limited
circumstances, S. 53 would allow the players to challenge in federal
court certain conduct by the team owners. Therefore, enacting S.
53 would impose additional costs on the U.S. court system to the
extent that additional antitrust cases are filed. However, CBO does

7
not expect any resulting increase in case load or court costs to be
significant.
Because enactment of S. 53 would not affect direct spending or
receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply to the bill. S. 53
contains no intergovernment mandates as defined in the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) and would impose no costs
on state, local, or tribal governments.
S. 53 would impose a new private-sector mandate as defined in
UMRA by applying the antitrust laws to the conduct of owners of
major league baseball teams in employment relations with major
league players. As a result, the owners would be prohibited from
engaging in anticompetitive employment-related activities that are
now permissible under their judicially-created exemption from the
antitrust laws. Thus, if enacted, S. 53 would place owners of major
league baseball teams in the same position as owners in the other
major professional sports leagues by making their actions subject
to judicial review. In most lawsuits alleging an antitrust violation,
federal courts would review the conduct of owners under the ‘‘rule
of reason’’ standard and examine the economic consequences of the
action for its procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. Some conduct, such as collusion, would be per se violations of antitrust law.
Owners found to be in violation would be subject to treble monetary damages.
If enacted, S. 53 would represent an explicit reversal by the Congress of a portion of baseball’s 75-year-old exemption from the antitrust laws created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal
Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In that case, the Court determined that
baseball was not a business involved in interstate commerce and,
therefore, was not subject to the antitrust laws, which prohibit
anticompetitive behavior and unreasonable restraint of trade. In
subsequent legal challenges to the ruling in Federal Baseball, the
most noteworthy being Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), the Supreme Court acknowledged that its 1922 decision was flawed, yet
it declined to overturn baseball’s antitrust exemption on the
grounds that this anomaly should be rectified by the Congress.
Thus, the bill would impose a new legislatively-crafted enforceable
duty on the business of baseball, which fits the definition of a private-sector mandate in UMRA.
CBO estimates that the direct cost, as defined in UMRA, of the
private-sector mandate in S. 53 would not likely exceed the $100
million statutory threshold. Direct costs would be imposed on owners to the extent that they would have to employ counsel to defend
their actions against antitrust suits from which they are now immune. Moreover, baseball operates under a collective bargaining
agreement that runs through the 2000 season, and players have
the option to extend the current agreement through the 2001 season. Under that agreement players have recourse against owners
who engage in collusion on the terms of player contracts and can
recover treble damages through a process of binding arbitration.
Consequently, S. 53 would probably impose no direct costs from
1998 through 2000 or 2001 because no antitrust suits would be initiated while the collective bargaining agreement is in effect. Costs
in subsequent years are not likely to exceed the $100 million statu-

8
tory threshold. CBO does not count possible monetary damages
that may be assessed against owners for antitrust infractions a cost
of complying with a private-sector mandate because CBO assumes
that owners would comply with the law’s prohibition against anticompetitive behavior.
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Susanne S.
Mehlman (for federal costs) and Matt Eyles (for the private-sector
impact). This estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
VI. REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT
In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee concluded that no significant
additional regulatory impact or impact on personal privacy would
be incurred in carrying out the provisions of this legislation. After
due consideration, the Committee concluded that enactment of the
Act would not create any significant additional paperwork.

VII. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS GRASSLEY, BIDEN,
FEINSTEIN, AND DURBIN
We oppose passage of this legislation for a number of reasons.
We advocate a comprehensive approach, from the fans’ perspective,
to examining the problems in professional baseball. Most of these
problems would exist regardless of antitrust liability. Indeed, in attempting to solve baseball’s labor relations difficulties by modifying
the antitrust laws, we run too great a risk of creating more problems than we solve.
Unfortunately, as reported by this Committee, S. 53, ‘‘The Curt
Flood Act of 1997,’’ takes the potentially counterproductive step of
engaging in a piecemeal approach to the issues confronting baseball by addressing only the application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball labor relations. What is more, it is far from
clear that S. 53 even adequately addresses the labor relations
issue. Under current law, major league owners can unilaterally impose new labor conditions on players following the expiration of a
collective-bargaining agreement. Players then have two choices: (1)
accept the unilateral terms and ‘‘play ball’’ or (2) go on strike. This
bill is designed to give the players a third option. It would allow
players to sue the owners under the antitrust laws for unilaterally
imposing collusive and unfair labor conditions. We support the goal
of encouraging the owners and the players to resolve their differences at the bargaining table prior to Opening Day. But, it is far
from clear that S. 53 will generate the promised benefit of
strengthening the players’ hand and reducing the likelihood of future strikes. For one thing, the bill says nothing about the nonstatutory labor exemption, which removes union members engaged
in collective bargaining from the reach of applicable antitrust laws.
In other words, if S. 53 became law in its current form, the players
may not be able to sue without decertifying their union.
We also believe that the ability of the players to sue the owners
is not the only issue in professional sports today. Other important
issues include league expansion and franchise movement, taxpayerfinanced stadiums, revenue sharing, player salaries, and fan access
to television coverage. Despite the Committee’s efforts, we have not
addressed these issues, other than to say that this legislation will
not affect the current system in these areas. This legislation continues to leave fans vulnerable to major league franchise relocations
and broadcasting decisions. In short, S. 53 in our view attempts a
simple fix to a complex problem and risks further alienating the
fans and irreparably harming the national pastime.
We are particularly concerned about the consequences of this bill
for minor league baseball. The minor leagues legitimately fear that
if S. 53 becomes law without being modified to protect them, the
major league teams will discontinue their financing of the minor
leagues and look for an alternative to the minors for developing
(9)

10
players. Minor league teams in our home States promote community-based and affordable events for citizens who for financial or
geographic reasons cannot attend major league games. Destruction
of minor league baseball, the sport for the fans in towns and small
cities across America, cannot be the effect of any bill we pass.
The proponents of this legislation argue that the current language adequately protects the minor leagues. The limited evidence
before the Committee does not support their argument. At a February 15, 1995, Antitrust Subcommittee hearing, the former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the United
States Department of Justice, James F. Rill, testifying on behalf of
the owners, expressed the minor leagues’ fears that removal of the
antitrust exemption, even on a limited basis, threatens to end the
major league funding upon which the minor leagues’ viability depends. The reason is clear: the majors pay 100 percent of the salaries of all minor league players, managers, coaches, and trainers—
and supply five dozen baseballs per game—in return for the prospect of major league talent someday down the line. Without the
ability to reserve their players, major league teams will no longer
have assurance that they can realize their investment in minor
league players. Moreover, the current major and minor league systems are inextricably intertwined. Attempting to address the major
league separately in this bill may lead to extensive litigation and
ultimately prove unworkable.
This Committee needs to understand the relationship between
minor league baseball and major league baseball’s antitrust exemption more fully before we pass this bill. Left unresolved, this issue
may generate more litigation, more lawyers’ fees, and more uncertainty than we already have today. We hope that future consideration of this issue will explore more fully the intended and unintended consequences of congressional action in this area. And, most
important, we urge our colleagues to focus on how repeal of the
antitrust exemption for major league baseball would affect fans of
both the minor and the major leagues.
CHUCK GRASSLEY.
JOE BIDEN.
DIANNE FEINSTEIN.
DICK DURBIN.

VIII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by S. 53, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law which would be omitted
is enclosed in bold brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman type):

UNITED STATES CODE
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

TITLE 15—COMMERCE AND TRADE
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

CHAPTER 1—MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

§ 12. Definitions; short title
(a) ‘‘Antitrust laws,’’ as used herein, includes the Act entitled ‘‘An
Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies,’’ approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety;
sections seventy-three to seventy-seven, inclusive, of an Act entitled ‘‘An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes,’’ of August twenty-seventh, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four; an Act entitled ‘‘An Act to amend sections
seventy-three and seventy-six of the Act of August twenty-seventh,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled ‘An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes,’ ’’ approved February twelfth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
and also this Act.
*

*

*

*
(11)

*

*

*

12
SEC. 27. (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
in the business of organized professional major league baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the major
league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports
business affecting interstate commerce; provided, however, that
nothing in this subsection shall be construed as providing the basis
for any negative inference regarding the caselaw concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.
(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be
deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws to the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements by, between, or among persons
engaging in, conducting, or participating in the business of organized professional baseball, except the conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements to which subsection (a) of this section shall apply. More
specifically, but not by way of limitation, this section shall not be
deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws to:
(1) the organized professional baseball amateur draft, the reserve clause as applied to minor league players, the agreement
between organized professional major league baseball teams
and the teams of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the ‘‘Professional Baseball
Agreement’’, the relationship between organized professional
major league baseball and organized professional minor league
baseball, or any other matter relating to professional organized
baseball’s minor leagues;
(2) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in
the business of organized professional baseball relating to franchise expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues, including ownership transfers, and the relationship between the Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners;
(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected by
Public Law 87–331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known
as the ‘‘Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961’’); or
(4) the relationship between persons in the business of organized professional baseball and umpires or other individuals
who are employed in the business of organized professional
baseball by such persons.
(c) As used in this section, ‘‘persons’’ means any individual, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated association or any combination or association thereof.

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