Delacruz v. The State Bar of California et al

Filing 347

ORDER denying 334 Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order; terminating 346 Motion to Appear by Telephone. The hearing scheduled for 10/26/2017 is VACATED. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 10/20/2017. (ejdlc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/20/2017) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/20/2017: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (amkS, COURT STAFF).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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DANIEL DELACRUZ SR.,

Case No. 5:14-cv-05336-EJD

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Plaintiff,
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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT OR
ORDER

v.
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MIKE ANTLE, et al.,

Re: Dkt. No. 334

Defendants.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Daniel Delacruz Sr. (“Plaintiff”) applied to practice law in this state but was

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unsuccessful in overturning an adverse moral character determination from the Committee of Bar

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Examiners (the “State Bar”), taking his challenge through each level of the state’s administrative

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process, then to the California Supreme Court, and eventually to the United States Supreme Court.

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Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action against no fewer than 50 defendants - essentially suing

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anyone involved in the proceedings before the State Bar. After granting 16 motions to dismiss

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filed in response to two versions of the complaint (Dkt. Nos. 250, 331), this court dismissed all of

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Plaintiff’s causes of action without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of the

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defendants. Dkt. No. 332.

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Plaintiff now moves for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Dkt. No.

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334. Several defendants have filed written opposition to the motion. The court finds this matter

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT OR ORDER
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suitable for decision without oral argument and will vacate the hearing scheduled for October 26,

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2017. Because Plaintiff has not presented any valid justification to set aside the order or judgment

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that ended this action, the Rule 60(b) motion will be denied for the reasons explained below.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff specifies two portions of Rule 60(b). The first permits the court to relieve a party

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from a final judgment or order due to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). When such a request is timely filed, mistake and inadvertence by the judge

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can be encompassed by this provision. Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d

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347, 350 (9th Cir. 1999); Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding the

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district could should give great weight to the interest of finality if a Rule 60(b) motion based on

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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judicial mistake is filed after expiration of the time to file a direct appeal). Importantly, however,

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the purpose of Rule 60(b)(1) is not provide disappointed litigants a “‘second bite of the apple’ . . .

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to submit additional argument or evidence” that was or could have been submitted previously. In

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re Exodus Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-01-2661-MMC, 2006 WL 3050829, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

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Oct. 26, 2006).
The second portion is a catchall provision based on “any other reason that justifies relief.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). This provision must be “used sparingly as an equitable remedy to

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prevent manifest injustice.” United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049

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(9th Cir. 1993). “[O]nly where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely

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action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment” should Rule 60(b)(6) be invoked. Id.

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III.

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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff believes the court made several errors in the most recent order addressing motions

to dismiss. Each purported error is addressed below, but none qualify for relief.

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A.

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First, Plaintiff believes the court misinterpreted two cases, Sandpiper Village

Case Law Cited by the Court Does Not Support Plaintiff

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Condominium Association, Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, 428 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2005),

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and Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445 (9th Cir. 2006), and contends instead these cases support his

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
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positions. As to Sandpiper Village, Plaintiff’s argument demonstrates a misunderstanding of the

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basis for citing this case, and in doing so persists in failing to appreciate the basic mechanics of res

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judicata and collateral estoppel. The quoted statement in the dismissal order from Sandpiper

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Village (Dkt. No. 331, at 6:14-18) reflects the unextraordinary principle that these preclusion

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doctrines only arise between prior and subsequent actions. See Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d

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953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on ‘any claims that

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were raised or could have been raised’ in a prior action.”); Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045,

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(9th Cir. 2010) (observing that collateral estoppel applies to preclude relitigation of issues

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conclusively determined in a prior action). Neither doctrine works to preclude parties from raising
arguments in the same case, and Plaintiff did not produce any authority supporting his apparent

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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proposition otherwise. Sandpiper Village, which itself required the court to compare a state court

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lawsuit with a federal one, certainly does not qualify as such authority.

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But even if Plaintiff were correct, the court provided other reasons why then-moving

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defendants were not precluded from raising the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the Noerr-Pennington

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doctrine against the First Amended Complaint. The court observed that neither doctrine was

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analyzed in relation the moving defendants as part of the first dismissal order, that no decision on

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their application to those defendants was therefore provided, and that it made little sense to

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preclude potential arguments challenging a new pleading that supersedes the previous one. In

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other words, there was no potential for the relitigation of any issue previously decided between the

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first round of motions to dismiss and the second round.

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As to Marder, the court disagrees that it supports Plaintiff’s contention that relevant legal

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arguments raised in a subsequent lawsuit are precluded by a written release of “claims” made in

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prior litigation. Marder was cited for the rule that “[t]he interpretation of a release is governed by

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the same principles applicable to any other contractual agreement.” 450 F.3d at 449. Under such

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rules, a contract is interpreted with “[t]he ‘clear and explicit’ meaning” of its words as used “in

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their ‘ordinary and popular sense,’ unless ‘used by the parties in a technical sense or a special

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meaning is given to them by usage.’” In re Marriage of Lafkas, 237 Cal. App. 4th 921, 932

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT OR ORDER
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(2015). The term “claims” does not encompass legal arguments when considered in its “ordinary

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and popular sense,” and there is no indication the parties attached a special meaning to that word

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in the settlement agreement.

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Because Plaintiff’s assessments of Sandpiper Village and Marder are unpersuasive, the
court rejects the argument based on purported misinterpretation of those cases.
Plaintiff’s Arguments Against Noerr-Pennington are Ineffective

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B.

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Next, Plaintiff argues the court mistakenly determined the defendants’ alleged conduct

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constituted immunized “petitioning activity” under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Notably, the

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parsing of specific conduct as uncovered by Noerr-Pennington, which Plaintiff attempts to do in
this motion, could have been accomplished in response to the defendants’ motions to dismiss

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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raising the doctrine. Plaintiff cannot obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(1) based on a belated parsing

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after the court has ruled on the issue. See Exodus Commc’ns, 2006 WL 3050829, at *2.

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In any case, Plaintiff’s arguments are nonetheless misplaced if considered on their

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substance. Plaintiff does not explain how any of the conduct he believes escapes a Noerr-

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Pennington bar is relevant to the elements of the federal claims addressed by the court.

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Furthermore, the superficial designation of the defendants’ pretrial contact with the State Bar as

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part of a “discovery process” is unpersuasive. As opposed to “communication between parties as

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an aid to litigation” which is not protected petitioning conduct (Freeman v. Lasky, Haas & Cohler,

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410 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2005)), the allegations in the First Amended Complaint established

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that the defendants communicated information directly to a state agency in conjunction with a

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licensing proceeding. This distinction is important when applying a doctrine that seeks to “to

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avoid burdening conduct that implicates the protections afforded by the Petition Clause.” Sosa v.

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DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Plaintiff’s alternative analysis of the judicial sham exception to Noerr-Pennington is

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similarly of no moment. Like his preceding arguments, Plaintiff could have raised his thoughts

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concerning the judicial sham exception in opposition to the defendants’ motions to dismiss, but

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did not. Indeed, the court noted as much in the dismissal order (Dkt. No. 331, at 10:13), but

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT OR ORDER
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considered the exception in the spirit of completeness. The failure to present a potentially relevant

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argument cannot support relief under Rule 60(b)(1). And, at any rate, the court is not convinced

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its analysis of the exception was mistaken.
In sum, the arguments against application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine do not show

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the court mistakenly applied it to the allegations of the First Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments are Unpersuasive

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C.

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As a final matter, the court dismisses Plaintiff’s remaining arguments because they are

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unpersuasive. As the court understands it, Plaintiff contends the order dismissing his First

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Amended Complaint treats him as a “second class citizen” and renders him unable to enforce a
stipulated restraining order. Assuming Plaintiff invokes Rule 60(b)(6) with this statement, he does

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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not describe the sort of “extraordinary circumstances” which can qualify for relief under that

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provision. See Alpine Land, 984 F.2d at 1049. Nor is it established how this court, by simply

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ruling on motions to dismiss, prevented Plaintiff from seeking to enforce the restraining order

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before the state court that actually issued it.
Plaintiff also contends this court retains subject matter jurisdiction over his state-law

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causes of action because he invoked Rule 60’s “independent action” provisions “for injunctive

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relief from the permanent injunction.” According to the First Amended Complaint, the referenced

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permanent injunction was issued by the Monterey County Superior Court. Since a Rule 60

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“independent action only permits a party to move for relief from judgment or order entered by the

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district court to which the motion is made, and “does not apply to challenges to state courts’ final

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judgments,” the precise relief requested by Plaintiff is improper as a matter of law. See N.

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Highlands I, II, LLC v. Comerica Bank, 328 Fed. App’x 358, 360 (9th Cir. 2009). The fact the

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allegation is in the First Amended Complaint cannot effectively bestow federal jurisdiction, or

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change the outcome.

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IV.

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ORDER
The motion for relief under Rule 60 (Dkt. No. 334) is DENIED. The hearing scheduled for

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October 26, 2017, is VACATED. Any pending motions to appear telephonically are

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT OR ORDER
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TERMINATED AS MOOT.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 20, 2017
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EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
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