Bartel et al v. Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. et al

Filing 1

COMPLAINT with Jury Demand against Does 5 through 200, General Electric, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0974-10361835.), filed by Adrian Lucina, Andrea Eisenhower, Bridget Waters, Lydia Salgado, Martin Hitson, Carissa Clark, Michael Leland, Justin Jaehnig, Brandon Montgomery, Randy Valentin, Donald H. Dellinger, Rachel Mendez, Alexander Tidd, Jonathan Muldowney, Edward Eluere, C.G., Carolyn Felix White, Patrick Walton, Casey Tucker, Corey Drewbell, Justine Fraley, Adriana Carbacas, Amanda Stemen, Derek Yoda, Michael Cross, Teresa Ready, Matthew Donaldson, Ramsiare Clinton, Brett Schmidt, Tymeshia Guidry, Eion Nelson, Brandon Zacharie, Christopher Carr, Janice Stewart, Tiffany Schad, Glenn Ofori, Quincy Shepherd, Shanee Brown, Shawn Velasquez, Mellony Snyder, Tim Palmer, Balthazar Reforsado, Michelle Scott, Francis Marlon, Nolan R Allen, Daniel Strohl, Ramon Jr. Enciso, Luis Torres, Devin Ritchey, Alexandra Campos, Quentin Richardson, Steven Gardner, Ronald L. Stemen, Scott Lieng, Christopher Coleman, Joshua Segree, Rene Landeros, Jestine Clayton, Jeremy Michaud, Ronald Stemen, Roderick Jessamy, Monty JR Barham, Ashley Cochran, Contrail Allen, Stewart Lowell, Annette Luckey, Grace Eunae Park, Levan Lawrence, Jennifer Boyle, Matthew Ayres, Cyrinthia Hambley, Kevin Jacobson, Darren Hanson, Charliemagne Aterrado, Eric I. Epps, Joshua Peoples, Beatrice Barthelemy, Lowell Stewart, Brian Cross, William Holt, Daniel Barbiero, Kirk Godair, Jerrid Sevart, Carl Slaubaugh, Luke Opyd, Lawrence Edwards, Cecilia Gutierrez, Christopher Woods, Jaime Clavito, Jonathan Burbach, Rodolpho Guerro, Eloi Whiteman, Crystal Souder, Tim White, Joshua Cunningham, Joe Lewis, Robert Venable, Justin Steinmetz, Trang Pham, Donald Vorhees, Ryan Kunin, Arnulfo Limon, Joseph Kyle Henry, Alejandro Perez, Matthew Anderson, Derek Cambridge, Mitchell Hodges, Francisco Jr. Marigundo, Christopher Morin, Nicholas Kovachev, Jacob Reed, Edward Mello, William E. Rigby, Angelina Reyna, Dustin Bartel, Haldane Hamilton, Cesar Salgado, Kyle Spurlock, Brian Drawlins, Gregory Smith, Logan Black, Patrick Crespo, Edwin Maher, Olivia Dimas, Nancy Jackson, Jose Suero, Marty Hill, Sy Byron, Brian Rawley, Robert Ochoa, Brittney Wachner, Esmeralda Kopka, Ryan Mclaughlin, Chad Martins, Matthew Knaust, James Souder, John Wesley Hyatt, Ashley Chitty, Derrek Luckey, Melissa Lester, Camry Campbell, Jeff Cook, Jessica Barlow, Gabriel Vasquez, Ruth Freeman, Andrew Anderson, Edward Zimmerman, Nicholas Swann, Marlon Francis, Samathan Bregant, Alvin Magno, Michael Harvey, Jeffrey Armstrong, Jason Ferguson, Janeth. Masinde, Garrett Nelson. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Case Cover Sheet)The new case number is 3:17-cv-01671-DMS-KSC. Judge Dana M. Sabraw and Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford are assigned to the case. (Bonner, Charles)(anh) (jao).

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PAUL C. GARNER, ESQ.
SB#132524
C/O LAW OFFICES OF BONNER &
BONNER
475 GATE FIVE RD, SUITE 212
SAUSALITO, CA 94965
Mail to: P.O. Box 232472
Encinitas, CA 92024
Tel: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
[e-mail]

CHARLES A. BONNER, ESQ.
SB# 85413
A. CABRAL BONNER, ESQ.
SB# 247528
LAW OFFICES OF BONNER &
BONNER
475 GATE FIVE RD, SUITE 212
SAUSALITO, CA 94965
TEL: [phone]
FAX: [phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]

JOHN R. EDWARDS, ESQ.
(N.C. State Bar No. 7706)
(admitted pro hac vice)
CATHARINE E. EDWARDS, ESQ.
SB# 304137
EDWARDS KIRBY
3201 Glenwood Ave. Suite 100
Raleigh, NC 27612
Tel: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

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ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN DIEGO DIVISION

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Case No.: '17CV1671 DMS KSC
DUSTIN BARTEL; NOLAN R ALLEN;
ANDREW ANDERSON; JEFFREY
ARMSTRONG; CHARLIEMAGNE
ATERRADO; JESSICA BARLOW;
BEATRICE BARTHELEMY; JENNIFER
BOYLE; SAMATHAN BREGANT;

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
1. NEGLIGENCE
2. STRICT LIABILITY FOR
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
3. STRICT LIABILITY FOR

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
1

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JONATHAN BURBACH; ADRIANA
CABARCAS; DEREK CAMBRIDGE;
CAMRY CAMPBELL; ALEXANDRA
CAMPOS ; CHRISTOPHER CARR ;
ASHLEY CHITTY; ASHLEY COCHRAN;
CHRISTOPHER COLEMAN; PATRICK
CRESPO; BRIAN CROSS; DONALD H.
DELLINGER; OLIVIA DIMAS;
MATTHEW DONALDSON; BRIAN
DRAWLINS; COREY DREWBELL;
ANDREA EISENHOWER; ERIC I. EPPS;
JASON FERGUSON; JUSTINE FRALEY;
RUTH FREEMAN; CYRINTHIA
HAMBLEY; MICHAEL HARVEY;
JOSEPH KYLE HENRY ; MARTY HILL;
MITCHELL HODGES; JOHN WESLEY
HYATT; KEVIN JACOBSON; JUSTIN
JAEHNIG; NICHOLAS KOVACHEV;
MELISSA LESTER; LAWRENCE LEVAN
; JOE LEWIS; SCOTT LIENG; ARNULFO
LIMON; ALVIN MAGNO; FRANCISCO
JR. MARIGUNDO; CHAD MARTINS;
EDWARD MELLO; BRANDON
MONTGOMERY; CHRISTOPHER
MORIN; JONATHAN MULDOWNEY;
EION NELSON; ROBERT OCHOA;
GLENN OFORI; LUKE OPYD; TIM
PALMER; JOSHUA PEOPLES;
ALEJANDRO PEREZ; CLINTON
RAMSIARE; JACOB REED;
BALTHAZAR REFORSADO; ANGELINA
REYNA; QUENTIN RICHARDSON;
WILLIAM E. RIGBY; LYDIA SALGADO;
JERRID SEVART; QUINCY SHEPHERD;
CARL SLAUBAUGH; GREGORY
SMITH; MELLONY SNYDER; JUSTIN
STEINMETZ; AMANDA STEMEN;
RONALD STEMEN; LOWELL
STEWART; JANICE STEWART; DANIEL
STROHL; JOSE SUERO; RANDY

DESIGN DEFECT
4. STRICT LIABILITY FOR
ULTRAHAZARDOUS
ACTIVITIES
5. NEGLIGENCE PER SE: RES
IPSA LOQUITUR
6. PRESUMPTION OF
NEGLIGENCE PER SE
7. LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
8. SURVIVAL ACTION-WRONGFUL DEATH
9. WRONGFUL DEATH
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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VALENTIN; GABRIEL VASQUEZ;
SHAWN VELASQUEZ; ROBERT
VENABLE; ROBERT VENABLE;
PATRICK WALTON; BRIDGET
WATERS; TIM WHITE; CHRISTOPHER
WOODS; DEREK YODA; EDWARD
ZIMMERMAN; ALEXANDER TIDD;
CONTRAIL ALLEN; MATTHEW
ANDERSON; MATTHEW AYRES;
DANIEL BARBIERO; LOGAN BLACK;
SHANEE BROWN; CARISSA CLARK;
JAIME CLAVITO; JESTINE CLAYTON ;
JEFF COOK; MICHAEL CROSS;
JOSHUA CUNNINGHAM ; LAWRENCE
EDWARDS; EDWARD ELUERE;
RAMON JR. ENCISO; MARLON
FRANCIS; STEVEN GARDNER;
RODOLFO GUERRA; TYMESHIA
GUIDRY; CECILIA GUTIERREZ;
HALDANE HAMILTON; DARREN
HANSON; MARTIN HITSON; WILLIAM
HOLT; NANCY JACKSON; RODERICK
JESSAMY; MATTHEW KNAUST; RYAN
KUNIN; RENE LANDEROS; MICHAEL
LELAND; STEWART LOWELL;
ADRIAN LUCINA; EDWIN MAHER;
FRANCIS MARLON; RYAN
MCLAUGHLIN; JEREMY MICHAUD;
GARRETT NELSON; TRANG PHAM ;
BRIAN RAWLEY; DEVIN RITCHEY;
CESAR SALGADO; TIFFANY SCHAD;
BRETT SCHMIDT; MICHELLE SCOTT;
JOSHUA SEGREE; GREGORY SMITH;
CRYSTAL SOUDER; JAMES SOUDER;
KYLE SPURLOCK; RONALD L.
STEMEN; NICHOLAS SWANN; LUIS
TORRES; CASEY TUCKER; DONALD
VORHEES; BRITTNEY WACHNER;
CAROLYN FELIX WHITE; ELOI
WHITEMAN; BRANDON ZACHARIE;
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
3

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MONTY JR BARHAM; ESMERALDA
KOPKA; AND BYRON SY; TERESA
READY Individually And As The
Administrator Of The Estate Of JESSE
READY deceased; DERRICK LUCKEY;
ANNETTE LUCKEY Individually And As
The Administrator Of The Estate Of
DANYELLE LUCKEY deceased;
GRACE EUNAE PARK Individually And
As The Administrator Of The Estate Of
Josh Park; RACHEL MENDEZ; KIRK
GODAIR Individually And As The
Administrator Of The Estate Of RUBY
PEREZ deceased; C. G. (a minor through
her guardian ad litem Kirk Godair);
JANETH. MASINDE Individually And As
The Administrator Of The Estate Of
BRENDA DOWNING deceased;

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Plaintiffs,
vs.
TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY,
INC. aka TEPCO, GENERAL ELECTRIC,
and Does 5 through 200, inclusive
Defendants

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PLAINTIFFS, by their attorneys, PAUL C. GARNER, ESQ., CHARLES

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A. BONNER ESQ., and JOHN R. EDWARDS ESQ, respectfully allege, upon

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information and belief, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, as

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follows:
At all relevant times, PLAINTIFFS were members of the armed forces, their
dependents, and support personnel, who served in a variety of capacities, and who
are and were, at all times mentioned, citizens of the United States of America.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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JURISDICTION

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1.

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filing the third amended complaint in the related action Cooper, et al. v. TEPCO,

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et al. 12-CV-3032-JLS-WMc had not discovered they had injuries caused by

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Defendants’ conduct as set forth below.

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2.

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lawsuit under the case entitled Cooper, et al. v. TEPCO, et al. 12-CV-3032-JLS-

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WMc. The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit being filed at this time were all similarly

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situated to those Plaintiffs who were named in the presently pending action,

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Cooper, et al. v. TEPCO, et al. 12-CV-3032-JLS-WMc, who have now

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This case is brought on behalf of the named plaintiffs who at the time of

This action is related and should be consolidated with the presently pending

discovered, since the filing of the Complaint in said pending lawsuit that their
injuries were caused by the wrongful and negligent conduct of the Defendants
named herein as hereinafter alleged. Accordingly, this lawsuit should therefore be
consolidated by this Honorable Court with the pending lawsuit under Cooper, et al.
v. TEPCO, et al. 12-CV-3032-JLS-WMc..
3.

The jurisdiction of this Court over the subject matter in this action is

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predicated upon Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §1332. The amount in

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controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.1
PARTIES

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4. The PLAINTIFFS:
1.) Dustin Bartel;
2.) Nolan R Allen;
3.) Andrew Anderson;
4.) Jeffrey Armstrong;
5.) Jessica Barlow;

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Diversity jurisdiction is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. §1332, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1332thml; also see

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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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6.)
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Beatrice Barthelemy;
Samathan Bregant;
Jennifer Boyle
Jonathan Burbach;
Adriana Cabarcas;
Derek Cambridge;
Camry Campbell;
Alexandra Campos ;
Christopher Carr ;
Ashley Chitty;
Ashley Cochran;
Christopher Coleman;
Patrick Crespo;
Brian Cross;
Donald H. Dellinger;
Olivia Dimas;
Matthew Donaldson;
Brian Drawlins;
Corey Drewbell;
Andrea Eisenhower;
Eric I. Epps;
Jason Ferguson;
Justine Fraley;
Ruth Freeman;
Cyrinthia Hambley;
Michael Harvey;
Joseph Kyle Henry ;
Marty Hill;
Mitchell Hodges;
John Wesley Hyatt;
Kevin Jacobson;
Justin Jaehnig;
Nicholas Kovachev;
Melissa Lester;
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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Lawrence Levan ;
Joe Lewis;
Scott Lieng;
Arnulfo Limon;
Alvin Magno;
Francisco Jr. Marigundo;
Chad Martins;
Edward Mello;
Brandon Montgomery;
Christopher Morin;
Jonathan Muldowney;
Eion Nelson;
Robert Ochoa;
Glenn Ofori;
Luke Opyd;
Tim Palmer;
Joshua Peoples;
Alejandro Perez;
Clinton Ramsiare;
Jacob Reed;
Balthazar Reforsado;
Angelina Reyna;
Quentin Richardson;
William E. Rigby;
Lydia Salgado;
Jerrid Sevart;
Quincy Shepherd;
Carl Slaubaugh;
Gregory Smith;
Mellony Snyder;
Justin Steinmetz;
Amanda Stemen;
Ronald Stemen;
Lowell Stewart;
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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Janice Stewart;
Daniel Strohl;
Jose Suero;
Randy Valentin;
Gabriel Vasquez;
Shawn Velasquez;
Robert Venable;
Robert Venable;
Patrick Walton;
Bridget Waters;
Tim White;
Christopher Woods;
Derek Yoda;
Edward Zimmerman;
Alexander Tidd;
Contrail Allen;
Matthew Anderson;
Matthew Ayres;
Daniel Barbiero;
Logan Black;
Shanee Brown;
Carissa Clark;
Jaime Clavito;
Jestine Clayton ;
Jeff Cook;
Michael Cross;
Joshua Cunningham ;
Lawrence Edwards;
Edward Eluere;
Ramon Jr. Enciso;
Marlon Francis;
Steven Gardner;
Rodolfo Guerra;
Tymeshia Guidry;
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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Cecilia Gutierrez;
Haldane Hamilton;
Darren Hanson;
Martin Hitson;
William Holt;
Nancy Jackson;
Roderick Jessamy;
Matthew Knaust;
Ryan Kunin;
Rene Landeros;
Michael Leland;
Stewart Lowell;
Adrian Lucina;
Edwin Maher;
Francis Marlon;
Ryan McLaughlin;
Jeremy Michaud;
Garrett Nelson;;
Trang Pham ;
Brian Rawley;
Devin Ritchey;
Cesar Salgado;
Tiffany Schad;
Brett Schmidt;
Michelle Scott;
Joshua Segree;
Gregory Smith;
Crystal Souder;
James Souder;
Kyle Spurlock;
Ronald L. Stemen;
Nicholas Swann;
Luis Torres;
Casey Tucker;
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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Donald Vorhees;
Brittney Wachner;
Carolyn Felix White;
Eloi Whiteman;
Brandon Zacharie;
Monty Jr Barham;
Esmeralda Kopka;
Byron Sy;
Annette Luckey Individually And As The Administrator Of
The Estate Of Danyelle Luckey deceased;
Derrick Luckey;
Grace Eunae Park Individually And As The Administrator
Of The Estate Of Josh Park;
Kirk Godair Individually And As The Administrator Of The
Estate Of RUBY PEREZ deceased;
Rachel Mendez
C. G. (a minor through her guardian ad litem Kirk Godair)
Teresa Ready Individually And As The Administrator Of
The Estate Of Jesse Ready deceased;
Janeth. Masinde Individually And As The Administrator Of
The Estate Of Brenda Downing deceased

at all times herein mentioned were among the members of the U.S. Navy crews of
the U.S.S. RONALD REAGAN (CVN-76), with its home port in San Diego,
California, the crews of other vessels participating as part of the Reagan Strike
Force, 7th Fleet, land-based service personnel, and/or their dependents. All of the

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Plaintiffs were repeatedly exposed to ionizing radiation on or after March 11,

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2011, due to the release of radioisotopes from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant

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(hereinafter, “FNPP”). All of the PLAINTIFFS were exposed during the mission

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known as “Operation Tomodachi.”2

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On March 14, 2011, the U.S. 7th Fleet, U.S. Naval personnel, and aircraft aboard
the vessels were repositioned away from Japan’s FNPP after detecting
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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5. PLAINTIFFS’ injuries, losses, damages, and harms are the results of

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DEFENDANTS’ and each of their subsidiaries, agents, servants and/or employees

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illegal conduct, including the negligently designed and maintained GE Boiling

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Water Reactors, situated at Fukushima Daiichi, which contain numerous design

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and manufacturing defects. These harms include, but are not limited to, the

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following: Illnesses such as Leukemia, ulcers, gall bladder removals, brain cancer,

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brain tumors, testicular cancer, dysfunctional uterine bleeding, thyroid illnesses,

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stomach ailments, birth defects, death, and a host of other complaints unusual in
such young adults and victims. The injured servicemen and women will require
treatment for their deteriorating health, medical monitoring, payment of their
medical bills, appropriate health monitoring for their children, and monitoring for
possible radiation-induced genetic mutations. Some of the radioactive particles
inside these service personnel have long half-lives, from 6 to 50 to 100 years.
6. PLAINTIFFS have only recently, within all the applicable statutes of

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limitation periods, discovered the facts pertaining to the nature and extent of their

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injuries and causes thereof. PLAINTIFFS also have just recently discovered facts

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which show DEFENDANTS’ illegal conduct, as well as DEFENDANTS’

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negligent conduct in the engineering, construction, maintenance, operation,

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management and control of the defectively designed Fukushima Nuclear Power

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Plant. PLAINTIFFS recently discovered facts showing that DEFENDANTS’

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negligence and defective design of FNPP which caused injuries to PLAINTIFFS

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occurred before, during and after the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

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Within all the relevant statutes of limitation periods, PLAINTIFFS discovered the

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facts which prove that DEFENDANTS, and each of them, are the actual and

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contamination in the air and on the helicopters returning to the U.S.S. Ronald
Reagan (CVN-76) from ferrying supplies to the land on aircraft deployed by the U.
Sed.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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proximate cause of their injuries, damages and harm. This delayed discovery tolls

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the expiration of the statutes of limitation, pursuant to all applicable principles, bot

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in law and equity.

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7. DEFENDANT TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, INC. aka

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TEPCO, (hereinafter, “TEPCO”), at all times herein mentioned, was and still is a

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foreign corporation, organized and existing under the laws of Japan, with its

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principal place of business situated at 1-1-3 Uchisai wai-Cho, Chiyoda-Ku, in the

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city of Tokyo, Japan, and with offices located at Suite 720, 1901 L Street N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In 2003, TEPCO registered as a California foreign
corporation with the California Secretary of State. TEPCO is the largest electric
utility in Japan and the 4th largest electric utility in the world. TEPCO enjoys
billions of dollars in revenue from electricity sales. During all times relevant,
TEPCO conducted business as a foreign Corporation registered in the State of
California. Hence, TEPCO is subject to the jurisdiction of this United States

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Federal District Court, which is empowered to enforce any Judgment against

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DEFENDANT TEPCO.

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8. DEFENDANT TEPCO is a Japanese public benefit corporation, charged
with the responsibility to provide electric power to the people of Japan.

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9. DEFENDANT GENERAL ELECTRIC, at all times herein mentioned, was

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and still is a for-profit corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the

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United States of America, with its principal place of business and Corporate

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Headquarters located at General Electric Company, 3135 Easton Turnpike,

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Fairfield, CT 06828.

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10. GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE) is an American multinational conglomerate

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corporation incorporated in New York. The company operates through the

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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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following segments: Energy, Technology Infrastructure, Capital Finance as well as

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Consumer and Industrial.

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11. In 2011, GE ranked among the Fortune 500 as the 26th-largest firm in the

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U.S. by gross revenue, as well as the 14th most profitable. The company is listed as

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the fourth largest in the world among the Forbes Global 2000.

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12. At all times herein mentioned, DEFENDANTS, and each of them, derived

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substantial revenue from their activities via goods used or consumed in the United

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States of America and its several States, including the State of California, through
the operation of the FNPP.
13. At all times herein mentioned, DEFENDANTS, and each of them, expected
or should reasonably have expected their acts to have consequences in the State of
California and elsewhere within the United States of America.
14. At all times herein mentioned, the DEFENDANTS, and each of them,
derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.
15. At all times herein mentioned, DEFENDANT TEPCO owned the premises
where the FNPP was situated, within the prefecture of Fukushima, Japan.
16. At all times herein mentioned, DEFENDANT TEPCO was one of the
owners of the FNPP.
17. At all times herein mentioned, DEFENDANT TEPCO was a lessee of the
FNPP.

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18. At all times herein mentioned, the DEFENDANTS, and each of them,

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DEFENDANTS’ servants, agents and DEFENDANTS’ employees operated the

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FNPP.

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19. At all times herein mentioned, the DEFENDANTS, and each of them,

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DEFENDANTS’ servants, agents and employees engineered, constructed,

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maintained, operated, managed and controlled the FNPP.

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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
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20. At all times herein mentioned, DEFENDANT TEPCO, TEPCO’S servants,
agents and employees supervised the FNPP.
21. On or before March 10, 2011, DEFENDANT TEPCO, TEPCO’S servants,
agents and employees negligently attempted to perform repairs at the FNPP.

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22. On or before March 10, 2011, DEFENDANT TEPCO, TEPCO’S servants,

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agents and employees negligently inspected and negligently failed to inspect the

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FNPP.

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23. On or before March 10, 2011, the DEFENDANTS, and each of them, the
DEFENDANTS’ servants, agents and employees negligently engineered,
constructed, maintained, operated, managed and controlled the FNPP.
24. More than 40 years ago, the DEFENDANTS, and each of them, the
DEFENDANTS’ servants, agents and employees negligently designed, engineered
constructed, maintained, operated, managed, controlled and built the FNPP.
DOE DEFENDANTS

15
16

25. PLAINTIFFS do not know the true names and capacities, whether

17

individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise of DEFENDANT Does 5 through 200

18

inclusive, and therefore sue these DEFENDANTS by such fictitious names.

19

PLAINTIFFS will amend their complaint to allege their true names and capacities

20

when this has been ascertained.

21

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

22

26. All of the described conduct, acts, and failures to act are attributed to

23

agents, servants and employees under the direction and control, and with the

24

permission, consent and authorization of DEFENDANTS. Said acts, conduct and

25

failures to act were within the scope of such agency and/or employment, and each

26

of the DEFENDANTS ratified, endorsed, and agreed to the acts and omissions of

27

each of the other DEFENDANTS. Each of these acts and failures to act is alleged

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
14

1

against each DEFENDANT, whether acting individually, jointly, or severally. At

2

all times relevant herein, each DEFENDANT was acting within the course and

3

scope of his or her employment, agreement, and ratification.

4
5

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

27. ON MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the coast of
Fukushima prefecture, Japan, the DEFENDANTS, and each of them, were
negligent. This negligence was underscored on December 12, 2013, by admission
of the former Prime Minister of Japan, Naoto Kan, who was in office when the
Fukushima disaster took place. It was at that time that he admitted, for the first
time: "People think it was March 12th [2011] but the first meltdown occurred 5
hours after the earthquake." Unaware of either the melt-down or any potentially
harmful radio-active release, the U.S. Sailor First Responders arrived off the coast

16

of Fukushima during the afternoon of March 12, 2011 in order to carry out their

17

mission of providing humanitarian aid to the victims of the earthquake and tsunami

18

disaster. At no time did this mission include, nor expand into a response to a melt-

19

down or a nuclear emergency at the FNPP. Rather, PLAINTIFFS were carrying

20

out their mission to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Japan by coming to

21

their aid by delivering clean water, blankets, food, and other aspects of providing

22

other humanitarian relief to the inhabitants of Fukushima Prefecture.

23

28. A Japanese Parliamentary Panel, The Fukushima Nuclear Accident

24

Independent Investigation Commission, charged by the government of Japan to

25

investigate the circumstances giving rise to the release of harmful radiation,

26

concluded on July 5, 2012 that TEPCO was negligent in having failed to avoid the

27

man-made disaster and in creating the conditions leading to the meltdown that

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
15

1

“occurred 5 hours after the earthquake”: The Commission accused TEPCO of

2

negligently failing to take adequate precautions, despite evidence that the area was

3

susceptible to powerful earthquakes and tsunamis. The Commission concluded that

4

“the accident was clearly 'man-made'. “We believe that the root causes were the

5

organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions

6

and actions…”

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

29. Before MARCH 11, 2011, which was before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off
the coast of Fukushima Prefecture, TEPCO was negligent, as determined by the
Commission, which found that TEPCO showed a negligent “disregard for global
[safety] trends and a disregard for public safety.” The commission's chairman,
Kiyoshi Kurokawa, a professor emeritus at Tokyo University, said in a scathing
introduction that TEPCO managers’ cultural traits had caused the disaster. He said:
“What must be admitted-very painfully-is that this was a disaster Made in Japan”.
The 10-member commission is the panel which is investigating the Fukushima

16

Daiichi accident. The report follows a six-month investigation involving more than

17

900 hours of hearings, and interviews with more than 1,100 people.”

3

18

30. ON MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the coast of

19

Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent as detailed in the report by the

20

Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. The

21

Commission outlines TEPCO’S “errors and willful negligence” at the FNPP before

22

the earthquake and tsunami which devastated swaths of northeastern Japan on

23

March 11, bluntly stating that TEPCO negligently created a “man-made disaster”.4

24
25
26
27
28

3

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jul/05/fukushima-meltdown-

manmade-disaster
4
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/05/world/asia/japan-fukushima-report/
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
16

1

31. Before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the coast of

2

Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent as detailed in the report by the

3

Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, finding that

4

the Fukushima plant operators: “…weren't adequately prepared to deal with a

5

nuclear accident.” And the Commission concluded that TEPCO failed to properly

6

prepare for the earthquake and tsunami, and that “the direct causes of the accident

7

were all foreseeable prior to March 11, 2011.”5

8
9
10
11
12
13

32. Both on and before the earthquake of MARCH 11, 2011, before the
PLAINTIFFS arrived off the coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent
because TEPCO negligently “failed to correctly develop the most basic safety
requirements-such as assessing the probability of damage, preparing for containing
collateral damage from such a disaster, and developing evacuation plans.”6
33. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

14
15

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent as evidenced by the “lack of

16

training and knowledge of the TEPCO workers at the facility [which] reduced the

17

effectiveness of the response to the situation at a critical time”7

18

34. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

19

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because TEPCO’S managers

20

were ineffective in “preventing or limiting the consequential damage” at

21

Fukushima Daiichi.8

22

35. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

23

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent, as admitted by TEPCO,

24

which publicly stated that it “was not fully prepared for the nuclear disaster.”

25
26
27
28

5

Id
Id.
7
Id.
6

8

Id.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
17

1

TEPCO's final report on the disaster said it “did not have sufficient measures to

2

prevent the accident. TEPCO's final report also acknowledged criticism that

3

TEPCO took too long to disclose information.”9

4

36. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

5

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent, as revealed by former Prime

6

Minister Naoto Kan, who said, “TEPCO and the nuclear safety agency had hidden

7

key details from him in the days after March 11, adding that he had been as open

8
9
10
11
12
13

as possible with the public, based on the information he had been given. Kan said
he feared further meltdowns that could result in the evacuation of Tokyo–a
metropolitan area of more than 30 million people. Deserting the capital, he added,
would have brought the government to a standstill and led to “a collapse of the
nation's ability to function”.10
37. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

14
15

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because TEPCO operators

16

of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant negligently ignored warnings that

17

the complex was at risk of damage from a tsunami of the size that hit north-east

18

Japan in March, negligently dismissing the need for better protection against

19

seawater flooding. TEPCO officials rejected and scoffed at “unrealistic” estimates

20

made in a 2008 internal report that the plant could be threatened by a tsunami of up

21

to 10.2 meters. The tsunami that crippled backup power supplies at the plant on the

22

afternoon of 11 March, leading to the meltdown of three (3) reactors, was more

23

than 14 meters high, yet a tsunami of that height and higher had happened more

24
25
26

9

27

10

28

kan?guni=Article:in%20body%20link

Id.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/29/fukushima-inquiry-naotoCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
18

1

than once in Japan’s recent history.11 The meltdown was caused by design and

2

manufacturing defects, which resulted in catastrophic “Loss of Coolant Accidents”,

3

resulting from the reactors’ piping failing, breaking, splitting apart and cracking

4

during the earthquake.

5

38. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

6

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because the “Assessments of

7

the aftermath of Fukushima tell a story of confusion at the site, and a lack of

8
9

communication between TEPCO and safety officials.” The Plant's manager, Masao
Yoshida, took early retirement last year after being diagnosed with cancer.12

10
11
12
13
14
15

39. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the
coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO’S then President Masataka Shimizu,
although knowing that his statements were factually untrue, repeatedly assured the
public that “There has been no meltdown,” and that the disaster was an
unforeseeable disaster. Both statements were patently false as the meltdowns were

16

in fact already occurring at the same time as Mr. Shimizu was providing statements

17

to the contrary and, far from being unforeseeable, the disaster had been repeatedly

18

forewarned by industry critics since 2008.

19

40. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

20

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because problems with the

21

fractured, deteriorating, poorly repaired pipes and cooling system had been pointed

22

out for years. In September 2002, TEPCO admitted covering up data about cracks

23

in critically important circulation pipes. In their analysis of the cover-up, The

24

Citizen's Nuclear Information Centre wrote: “The records that were covered up had

25
26

11

27

kan?guni=Article:in%20body%20link

28

12

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/29/fukushima-inquiry-naotoId.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
19

1

to do with cracks in parts of the reactor known as recirculation pipes. These pipes

2

are there to siphon off heat from the reactor. If these pipes were to fracture, it

3

would result in a serious accident in which coolant leaks out.”

4

41. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

5

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because on March 2, only

6

nine days before the meltdown, the government watchdog, the Nuclear Industrial

7

Safety Agency (NISA), warned TEPCO in regard to its failure to inspect critical

8
9

pieces of equipment at the plant, including recirculation pumps. TEPCO was
ordered to make the inspections and perform repairs if needed.13

10
11
12
13
14
15

42. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the
coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because Kei Sugaoka, who
conducted on-site inspections at the plant and was the first to blow the whistle on
TEPCO’S data tampering, stated that he was not surprised by what happened. In a
letter to the Japanese government, dated 28 June, 2000, he warned that TEPCO

16

continued to operate a severely damaged steam dryer in the plant 10 years after he

17

pointed out the problem. “I always thought it was just a matter of time,” he says of

18

the disaster. “This is one of those times in my life when I'm not happy I was

19

right.”14

20

43. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

21

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent as explained by Katsunobu

22

Onda, author of TEPCO: The Dark Empire. Mr. Onda explains it this way: A

23

government or industry admission “raises suspicions about the safety of every

24

reactor they run. They are using a number of antiquated reactors that have the same

25
26

13

27

fukushimas-meltdown-2338819.html

28

14

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-explosive-truth-behindId.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
20

1

systematic problems, the same wear and tear on the piping.” Earthquakes, of

2

course, are commonplace in Japan.15

3

44. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

4

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO’s negligence was uncovered by Mr.

5

Onda’s research. Mr. Onda spoke with several engineers who worked at the

6

TEPCO plants. One told him that often piping would not match up to the

7

blueprints. In that case, the only solution was to use heavy machinery to pull the

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

pipes close enough together to weld them shut. Inspection of piping was often
cursory and the backs of the pipes, which were hard to reach, were often ignored.
Repair jobs were rushed.16
45. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the
coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because Mr. Onda adds:
“When I first visited the Fukushima Power Plant it was a web of pipes. Pipes on
the wall, on the ceiling, on the ground. You'd have to walk over them, duck under

16

them-sometimes you'd bump your head on them. The pipes, which regulate the

17

heat of the reactor and carry coolant, are the veins and arteries of a nuclear power

18

plant; the core is the heart. If the pipes burst, vital components don't reach the heart

19

and thus you have a heart attack, in nuclear terms: meltdown. In simpler terms, you

20

can't cool a reactor core if the pipes carrying the coolant and regulating the heat

21

rupture - it doesn't get to the core.”17 This is precisely what happened when the

22

earthquake struck the FNPP.

23

46. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

24

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent, as admitted by Tooru

25
26

15

Id.

27

16

Id.

28

17

Id.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
21

1

Hasuike, a TEPCO employee from 1977 until 2009 and former general safety

2

manager of the Fukushima plant, who stated: “The emergency plans for a nuclear

3

disaster at the Fukushima plant had no mention of using seawater to cool the core.

4

To pump seawater into the core is to destroy the reactor. The only reason you'd do

5

that is that no other water or coolant was available.”18

6

47. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

7

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because before dawn on

8
9
10
11
12

March 12, 2011, as the water levels at the reactor began to plummet and the
radiation began rising, a TEPCO press release published just past 4:00 am stated:
“The pressure within the containment vessel is high but stable.” This was willfully
false information.19
48. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

13
14
15

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent as evidenced by the fact that
at 9:51 pm, under the chief executive's orders, the inside of the reactor building

16

was declared a no-entry zone. At around 11 pm, radiation levels for the inside of

17

the turbine building, which was next door to the reactor, reached levels of 0.5 to

18

1.2 mSv per hour. In other words, the meltdown was already underway.20 The

19

reactors were already melted or deeply involved in melting down.

20

49. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

21

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because seawater was not

22

pumped in until hours after a hydrogen explosion occurred, at roughly 8 pm.

23

Sometime between 4 and 6 am on March 12, Masao Yoshida, the plant manager,

24
25
26

18

Id.

27

19

Id.

28

20

Id.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
22

1

decided it was time to pump seawater into the reactor core. By then, it was already

2

too late.21

3

50. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

4

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because Naomi Hirose,

5

president of TEPCO, admitted negligence: "After I became president [in 2012], we

6

formed a nuclear safety review committee. We focused mainly on what we could

7

do, what we could learn. We had a lot of data by then. Three other reports, one

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

from the Diet [Japan's parliament], one from government. We had a lot of
information. TEPCO’S own report, too. We concluded that we should have
avoided that catastrophic accident, and we could have. We could see what we
should have done. Preventative measures included fitting waterproof seals on all
the doors in the reactor building, or placing an electricity-generating turbine on the
facility's roof, where the water might not have reached it. In addition, wrong
assumptions were made.”22

16

51. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

17

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because they failed to have

18

12-volt batteries on the premises at FNPP to provide auxiliary power. TEPCO and

19

GE negligently failed nuclear power plant operation LESSON NO. 1: Emergency

20

generators should be installed at high elevations or in watertight chambers. The

21

Isolation Condenser (IC), which relied on convection and gravity to perform its

22

cooling function, should have helped keep the water level high in Unit 1's core

23

through the crisis. But operators had turned off the system just before the tsunami

24

by closing its valves. Thereafter, the electrical outage prevented the operators from

25
26

21

Id.

27

22

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/19/uk-government-new-

28

plant-fukushima-nuclear-disaster-warning
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
23

1

re-opening them to allow for the release of steam and the flow of cooling water.

2

Workers struggled to manually open the valves on the IC system.23. Nuclear-power

3

plants must continuously cool their unstable, radioactive fuel. These cooling

4

systems run on electricity, which the plants ordinarily pull from the nation’s power

5

grid. If the grid fails, on-site diesel generators kick on to keep the cooling systems

6

running. If the diesel generators don’t kick on, the plant is in danger of melting

7

down. “There’s no doubt TEPCO should have applied new designs” throughout

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Fukushima, says Masatoshi Toyota, 88 years old and a retired top TEPCO
executive who helped oversee the building of the reactors. Because TEPCO’s first
reactor buildings were too small, the generators had to be located somewhere else.
Therefore, engineers located them in neighboring structures which housed turbines.
The reactor buildings were fortress-like, with thick concrete walls and dual sets of
sturdy doors, but the turbine buildings were far less sturdy, especially their doors.
“Backup power generators are critical safety equipment, and it should’ve been a

16

no-brainer to put them inside the reactor buildings,” Mr. Toyota says. “It’s a huge

17

disappointment that nobody at TEPCO -including me- was sensitive enough to

18

notice and do something about this discrepancy.”24

19

52. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

20

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because TEPCO was not

21

prepared with backup power. In the plant's parking lots, workers raised car hoods,

22

grabbed their car batteries, and lugged them back to the control rooms. They found

23

cables in storage rooms and studied diagrams. They were vainly hoping if they

24
25

23

26

24

27

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304887904576395580035

28

481822

http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/24-hours-at-fukushima

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
24

1

could connect the batteries to the instrument panels, they could at least determine

2

the water levels in the pressure vessels.25

3

53. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

4

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO and GE were negligent because

5

DEFENDANTS, and each of them, failed nuclear power plant operation LESSON

6

NO. 2: If a cooling system is intended to operate without power, make sure all of

7

its parts can be manipulated without power. TEPCO did have a backup for the

8
9
10
11
12
13

emergency generators: power supply trucks outfitted with high-voltage dynamos.
That afternoon, emergency managers at TEPCO's Tokyo headquarters sent 11
power supply trucks racing toward Fukushima Daiichi, 250 km distant. They
promptly got stuck in traffic. The roads that were not damaged by the earthquake
or tsunami were clogged with residents fleeing the disaster sites.26
54. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

14
15

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO and GE negligently designed, maintained,

16

managed, and prepared the reactor buildings, designing and building them too

17

small to accommodate emergency equipment. In addition, this emergency

18

equipment was not stored close by, but rather more than 55KM away from the

19

plant,27 and therefore TEPCO and GE failed nuclear power plant operation

20

LESSON NO. 3: Keep power trucks, generators, and batteries on or very close to

21

the power plant site, a rule so basic and vital that it should not even have been an

22

issue. The containment vessel, which surrounds the pressure vessel, is a crucial line

23

of defense: It is a thick steel hull meant to hold in any tainted materials that have

24

escaped from the inner vessel. At 11:50 p.m., operators in the control room finally

25
26

25

http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/24-hours-at-fukushima

27

26

Id.

28

27

http://m.youtube.com/results?q=nhk%20fukushima%20documentary&sm=1
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
25

1

connected car batteries to the pressure gauge for the primary containment vessel.

2

But the gauge revealed that the containment vessel had already exceeded its

3

maximum operating pressure, increasing the likelihood that it would leak, crack, or

4

even explode.28

5

55. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

6

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because TEPCO failed

7

nuclear power plant operation LESSON NO. 4: Install independent and secure

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

battery systems to power crucial instruments during emergencies. In their initial,
improvised response, the fire crew pumped water into the trucks’ storage tanks,
then drove close to the side of the reactor building and injected the water into the
fire protection system's intake lines. It was 5:46 a.m. on March 12 when the first
drops of water sprayed across the molten fuel. Then the workers drove back to the
water tanks and began the slow, arduous operation all over again. Eventually
workers managed to use the fire engines’ hoses to connect the water tanks directly

16

to the intake lines and established a steady flow of water. By mid-afternoon, they

17

had injected 80,000 liters of water into the pressure vessel using this makeshift

18

system. But it was too little, too late.29

19

56. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

20

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO and GE were negligent because

21

DEFENDANTS, and each of them, failed nuclear power plant operation LESSON

22

NO. 5: Ensure that catalytic hydrogen re-combiners (power-free devices that turn

23

dangerous hydrogen gas back into steam) are positioned at the tops of reactor

24

buildings where gas would most likely collect. The workers in charge of the

25

venting operation took iodine tablets. It was a feeble attempt at protection against

26
27

28

http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/24-hours-at-fukushima

28

29

Id.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
26

1

the radiation they'd soon encounter, but it was better than nothing. They gathered

2

protective head-to-toe suits and face masks connected to air tanks. At 3:45 a.m.,

3

the vent crew tried to measure the radiation dose inside the reactor building, which

4

had been off limits for 6 hours. Armed with handheld dosimeters, they opened the

5

air lock, only to find a malevolent white cloud of some "gaseous substance"

6

billowing toward them. Fearing a radiation steam bath, they slammed the door

7

shut. They did not get their reading, but they had a good indication that things had

8

already gone seriously wrong inside the reactor.30

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

57. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the
coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO and GE were negligent, because
DEFENDANTS, and each of them, failed nuclear power plant operation LESSON
NO. 6: Install power-free filters on vent lines to remove radioactive materials and
allow for venting that won't harm nearby residents. The failure of reactor 1 made
efforts to stabilize the other reactors exponentially more difficult: Now workers

16

would be laboring in a radioactive hot zone littered with debris. In addition, when

17

work crews returned to the power truck sometime after the explosion, they couldn't

18

get the power flowing. So the disaster continued.31

19

58. On and before MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS arrived off the

20

coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because TEPCO had a

21

history of negligently causing other nuclear accidents including, but not limited to,

22

the following:

23
24
25
26
27

30

Id.

28

31

Id.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
27

1

a. 1981: almost 300 workers were exposed to excessive levels of

2

radiation after a fuel rod ruptured during repairs at the Tsuruga

3

Nuclear Power Plant.32

4

b. December 1995: the fast breeder Monju Nuclear Power Plant sodium

5

leak. State-run operator Donen was found to have concealed videotape

6

footage that showed extensive damage to the reactor.33

7

c. March 1997: the Tokaimura nuclear reprocessing plant fire and

8

explosion, northeast of Tokyo. 37 workers were exposed to low doses

9

of radiation. Donen later acknowledged it had initially suppressed

10

information about the fire.34

11

d. In 1999: A fuel loading system malfunctioned at a nuclear plant in

12

the Fukui Prefecture and set off an uncontrolled nuclear reaction and

13

explosions.35

14

e. September 1999: the critical accident at the Tokai fuel fabrication

15
16

facility. Hundreds of people were exposed to radiation; three workers

17

received doses above legal limits, two of whom later died.36

18

f. In 2000: Three Tokyo Electric Power Co. executives were forced to

19

quit after the company in 1989 ordered an employee to edit out

20

footage showing cracks in nuclear plant steam pipes in a video being

21

submitted to regulators.37

22
23

32

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_Japan

24

33

Id.

25

34

Id.

26

35

Id.

27

36

Id.

28

37

Id.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
28

1

g. August 2002: a widespread falsification scandal started, which led to

2

the shutdown of all Tokyo Electric Power Company’s 17 nuclear

3

reactors; Tokyo Electric's officials had falsified inspection records and

4

attempted to hide cracks in reactor vessel shrouds in 13 of its 17

5

units.38

6

h. In 2002: Two workers were exposed to a small amount of radiation

7

and suffered minor burns during a fire at Onagawa Nuclear Power

8

Station in northern Japan.39

9

i.

10

In August 2004: four workers were killed after a steam explosion at
the Mihama-3 station; the subsequent investigation revealed a serious

11

lack in systematic inspection in Japanese nuclear plants, which led to

12

a massive inspection program.40

13

j.

14

In 2006: A small amount of radioactive steam was released at the
Fukushima Daiichi plant and it escaped the compound.41

15
16

k. On July 16, 2007: a severe earthquake (measuring 6.8 on the Richter

17

scale) hit the region where Tokyo Electric's Kashiwazaki-Kariwa

18

Nuclear Power Plant is located and radioactive water spilled into the

19

Sea of Japan; as of March 2009, all of these reactors remain shut

20

down for damage verification and repairs; the plant with seven units

21

was the largest single nuclear power station in the world.42

22
23
24

38

Id.

25

39

Id.

26

40

Id.

27

41

Id.

28

42

Id.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
29

DESIGN DEFECTS IN MARK 1 BOILING WATER REACTORS

1
2
3

59. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant consists of six reactors. All six

4

reactors were designed by GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE). Units 1 through 5 are

5

based on the flawed Mark I design by GE. GE supplied the reactors for Units 1, 2,

6

3 and 6 and collaborated with the design of the reactors for Units 4 and 5.

7

DEFENDANTS TEPCO and GE, have been involved in maintenance and

8

servicing of the nuclear power plant during the past decades.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

60. DEFENDANT GE negligently and defectively designed, engineered and
constructed the Mark 1 Boiling Water Reactors (“BWR”), creating several
manufacturing and design defects. One design and manufacturing defect of the
Mark 1 Boiling Water Reactors is that the containment vessel, which is supposed
to contain radioactive material, was designed, manufactured and built too small for
its purpose. As a result, the first attempt to ameliorate this defect by the

16

DEFENDANTS in 1976 was to attach large straps to hold the Torus down against

17

inevitable uplift forces. The torus is the doughnut shaped structure at the bottom of

18

the containment. The defectively designed Torus-a water-filled vessel encircling

19

the primary containment vessel that is used to prevent reactor water from

20

slamming directly into the reactor core-could potentially jump off the floor when

21

reactor water rushes back from the steam turbines. Thus, the Torus prevents reactor

22

water from rushing from the steam turbines directly into the reactor core under

23

high pressure43. The reactor water returning from the steam turbines has a much

24

lower temperature than the steam leaving at the top of the reactor, and this much

25

cooler water could cause thermal damage and actual cracking of the reactor fuel

26

rods if it were to impinge directly onto the reactor core. An additional design

27
28

43

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/world/asia/16contain.html
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
30

1

defect: the Mark 1 containment is insufficient to contain radioactive leaks by

2

allowing radioactive materials to leak into the ground water and into the Pacific

3

Ocean. This reactor was designed to contain these radioactive materials, and it has

4

failed to do that. This is a fatal design defect.

5

61. In 1989, due to the likelihood of hydrogen generation, DEFENDANTS

6

attempted a second Band-Aid fix. They installed vents on the side of the

7

containment vessel to prevent over-pressurization. This installation was another

8
9
10
11
12
13

negligent and defective design and construction since the purpose of the
containment is to contain radiation releases in the event of an accident, yet these
vents allow for the release of such radiation. Additionally, once open there is a risk
that they will not to be able to be closed. These vents failed catastrophically three
times at Fukushima Daiichi.
62. The Second design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water

14
15

Reactors is that their control rods 44,45 enter through holes in the floor of the reactor

16

vessel, presenting a myriad of opportunities for melted core materials to leak

17

directly onto the containment floor. This is exactly what happened at Fukushima

18

Daiichi. The BWR design is uniquely prone to melt through because it is built in a

19

containment that is already inadequate by being too small to contain normal

20

reactive forces.

21
22

44

23

startup).http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_rod.

24

45

25

a nuclear reactor. They constitute a real-time control of the fission process, which

26

is crucial for both keeping the fission chain reaction active and preventing it from

27

accelerating beyond control.

28

http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2011/ph241/grayson1/ themselves.

Control rods are used for rapid changes to the reactor power (e.g. shutdown and
Control rods are used for maintaining the desired state of fission reactions within

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
31

1

63. A Third design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water

2

Reactor is the positioning of the spent fuel pools at the top of the reactor buildings.

3

Three reactor buildings blew up at Fukushima. The reactor buildings have their

4

fuel pools more than 100 ft in the air, exposing them and releasing radioactive

5

material directly into the atmosphere.46 As a result of the hydrogen explosions,

6

there was no more available containment, directly exposing the spent fuel rods and

7

making them highly susceptible to an explosion. This scenario was especially

8
9

dangerous in the case of reactor 4, as it contained fuel rods equivalent to those of
all the other reactors combined.47

10
11
12

SAFETY RELEASE (“SR”) VALVE DESIGN DEFECT CAUSED CHAIN OF
MELTDOWNS

13

64. At Fukushima Daiichi there was a “chain of meltdowns”, with Hydrogen

14
15

explosions at reactors 1 and 3, and then in 2 and 4, one after another. The

16

explosion in reactor 1 occurred on Saturday March 12, 2014 at 3:36 PM; the next

17

explosion in reactor 3 took place on Monday March 14, 2014 at 11:01; the third

18

explosion in reactor 2 was on Tuesday March 15, 2014 at 6:10 and was followed

19

by the final explosion in reactor 4 later that same day, Tuesday March 15, 2014 at

20

9:38. This is the first time in history that a meltdown of multiple reactor cores in

21

succession has occurred.

22

65. A Fourth design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water

23

Reactor that contributed to the chain meltdown was a pipe connecting reactor 3 and

24

4. Even though the core had been completely unloaded from reactor 4, the last

25
26
27

46

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GTTNKTThFQ8

28

47

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMaEjEWL6PU
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
32

1

explosion was due to a build-up of hydrogen, which entered the reactor via this

2

joint pipe from reactor 3.

3

66. A Fifth design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water

4

Reactor was the failure of the SR valves, each of which failed to open in each of

5

the reactors, largely contributing to “the chain of meltdowns”. The SR valves are

6

used to release steam from a reactor when the cooling system breaks down. There

7

are eight SR valves attached to the outside of each reactor. Had the opportunity

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

existed of opening even one of these valves, the internal pressure would have been
lowered enough to allow for the necessary and urgent injection of water as a
coolant. Instead, each of the 32 SR valves failed to open.
67. The SR valves are located in the primary containment vessel that houses the
reactor, where no one is allowed access, and therefore they must be opened
remotely from the main control room. If the pressure in the containment vessel
surges, the pressure inside the SR valve also goes up, which, in effect, prevents the

16

valve from opening. The nitrogen pressure line must be greater than the pressure

17

inside the SR valve in order for it to be able to open the SR valve. Unless the

18

pressure in the nitrogen valve increases, the pressure from above (inside the SR

19

valve) will keep the valve from opening. If the SR valves remain closed, there is no

20

way to prevent a meltdown, and the situation will deteriorate as the meltdown

21

progresses. This is because the temperature will keep surging, and the pressure

22

within the primary containment vessel will also continue to rise. The purported

23

safety mechanism was supposed to prevent a meltdown, and yet it became less

24

effective as the meltdown worsened. Due to the increase of heat from the melting

25

fuel, the higher pressure within the primary containment vessel prevented the SR

26

valves from opening.

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
33

1

68. A Sixth design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water

2

Reactor is the failure to design a periodic testing of the SR valves to insure they

3

would open under different emergent conditions. TEPCO and GE never tested the

4

SR valves under these circumstances. The failure of the SR Valves caused the

5

Drywell and Suppression Chamber pressures to go down to zero, resulting in a

6

massive release of radioactive materials.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

69. A Seventh design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water
Reactors is the failure to build into the design of the power plant a storage facility
for auxiliary electric power, including 12-volt batteries, which are highly portable
and weigh as little as 10 kilograms. Ten batteries provide enough power to open an
SR valve. In addition to this failure and omission in design by GE, TEPCO failed
to prevent a meltdown even though time was on their side. Operators thought they
had the time to prevent a crisis, but they did not. Two (2)-volt batteries were
delivered rather than the desperately needed 12-volt batteries which had been
requested at the onset of the disaster.

17

70. Atsufumi Yoshizawa, TEPCO’s senior official in charge of procurement,

18

brought forth the excuse that he and his team were not able to prioritize the request

19

for 12 volt batteries. Such conduct glaringly displays TEPCO’s recklessness and

20

negligence in the training, preparation and response to a foreseeable disaster such

21

as a nuclear meltdown: “People responding to the disaster needed all kinds of

22

things, we were trying to juggle all of the requests at the same time trying to get

23

them delivered as quickly as we could, we didn’t have time to prioritize. We just

24

tried to grab whatever was on the list regardless of quantity…I believe we were in

25

a situation where screening each request according to priority was very difficult.”

26

This chaotic and ill-designed approach to providing essential materials worsened

27

the disaster. The workers at Fukushima were left without the necessary batteries to

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
34

1

prevent a meltdown. On March 13, 2011, the day after the USS Reagan and the

2

PLAINTIFF Sailors arrived, the radiation rate at the main gate rose to 281

3

microSieverts/hour, at which rate the annual exposure rate would be reached in

4

four hours, at this dangerous and inappropriate level. The 12-volt batteries TEPCO

5

had procured were at a stock plant more than 55KM away from the plant…there

6

were over 1,000 of them, unavailable when desperately needed. There were also

7

small generators and pumps stranded at the distribution center, but no plan or

8

adequate training existed to ensure their transport to the contaminated plant.48

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

71. An Eighth design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water
Reactor is the failure to build into the design Isolation Condensers which will
operate continuously. The Reactors were equipped with two isolation condensers
for cooling. They were designed to continue cooling without power, once engaged.
Hot steam from the reactor cools and condenses as it passes through a tank of
water. At the time of the meltdown, TEPCO workers had been operating the

16

machinery at intervals: That is, turning the machinery on and off, repeatedly. The

17

machinery happened to be in the idle position when the plant lost power. From that

18

point on, the reactor (#1) headed into meltdown, about 4 hours after the quake and

19

tsunami. Rapid cooling could damage the reactor, so they turned the cooling

20

system on and off at intervals. In the confusion, the operators forgot that they had

21

turned the isolation condensers off before the loss of power. When the power went

22

out, the operators in the main control center could not tell if the cooling system

23

was operating or not, since the indicators are lights powered by electricity, with no

24

back up or auxiliary power-another design defect. Operators mistakenly and

25

negligently assumed that the Isolation Condensers were operating and providing

26

cooling after the power outage. TEPCO communicated falsely to the public that

27
28

48

http://m.youtube.com/results?q=nhk%20fukushima%20documentary&sm=1
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
35

1

reactor 1 was safe and that the Isolation Condensers were operating 5.5 hours after

2

the power loss.

3

72. A Ninth design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water

4

Reactors is the failure to build into the design a periodic testing of the Isolation

5

Condensers.49 None of the DEFENDANTS had ever tested the Isolation

6

Condensers in 40 years. TEPCO operators twice missed obvious signs that the

7

Isolation Condensers were not working: (1) One hour after the power outage, the

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

water level gauges came back online and it became apparent that the water level
had dropped two meters in one hour. The operators in the quake proof room
calculated that it was only going to take another hour until the water dropped down
to the top of active fuel. Failing to verify that the condensers were on, and indeed
cooling the reactor without power as they are designed to do was a major design
and manufacturing defect in training and preparation for emergency situations as
presented. (2) Operators observed only “faint” steam coming out of the “pig nose”,

16

the two release valves of the condensers. This phenomenon indicates that the

17

condensers are failing, compared to the blast of a major rush/cloud of steam when

18

they are functioning properly and provide cooling to the reactor. Faint steam

19

emerges two to three hours after the condensers have been turned off. This

20

indicates that the condensers had not been working for a full three hours. Each one

21

of the DEFENDANTS negligently failed to activate and test the Isolation

22
23

49

24

of water open to atmosphere. In operation, decay heat boils steam, which is drawn

25

into the heat exchanger and condensed; then it falls by weight of gravity back into

26

the reactor. This process keeps the cooling water in the reactor, making it

27

unnecessary to use powered feed-water pumps.

28

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boiling_water_reactor_safety_systems

An Isolation Condenser is a heat exchanger located above containment in a pool

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
36

1

Condensers in Reactor 1 for about 40 years. Consequently, none of the operators

2

had ever seen or even been briefed on what kind of steam should be visible when

3

the condensers are turned on. In comparison, at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Plant

4

in the U.S., located in the Town of Scriba, approximately five miles northeast of

5

Oswego, New York, the Mark 1 reactors are put through a start-up test every four

6

years. Additionally, even if the Isolation Condensers had been online and

7

functioning, they would not have prevented the meltdowns because there were

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

ruptures in the reactor piping, which was draining all the reactor water out of the
reactor vessel. The Isolation Condensers can only function properly when there is
proper water-tight integrity within the reactor piping system; but with leaks in the
reactor piping and the operators unable to keep sufficient water in the reactor
vessels, the Isolation Condensers are rendered ineffective.
73. A Tenth design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water
Reactors was that GE reduced the height of the cliff on which the plant was built.

16

The DEFENDANTS failed to understand and consider this most devastating and

17

egregious oversight: Originally, in 1960, the cliff at Fukushima Daiichi was 35

18

meters high (about 115 feet), a buffer from the sea. The engineers at GE reduced

19

this natural barrier to 10 meters, making it a 30-foot cliff. “Tsunami” is a Japanese

20

word derived from “Tsu” meaning harbor; and “Nami” meaning waves. The entire

21

ocean rises up. On a boat at sea one is not aware of a tsunami because the entire

22

ocean rises up. However, when a tsunami hits a harbor, it travels at close to the

23

speed of sound and has enormous destructive power.

24

74. DEFENDANTS knew that tsunamis, all through history, have periodically

25

hit the coast of Japan. In 1896, there was a 40-meter high tsunami. In 1923, there

26

was a 13-meter tsunami. In 1933, there was a 28-meter tsunami, the most deadly

27

before the Daiichi tsunami. In 1944, there was a 12-meter tsunami. In 1946, there

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
37

1

was another 12-meter tsunami. In 1954 and 1955, 10 years before Fukushima

2

Daiichi was designed, there were 3 tsunamis, and all of them were over 13 meters.

3

None of the DEFENDANTS could claim ignorance of the height of previous

4

tsunamis.

5

75. The tsunami that hit Fukushima Daiichi in 2011 was just a middle-of-the-

6

road tsunami compared to the hundred years of history before it. Yet, in spite of

7

that history and knowledge, the tsunami wall was built by the DEFENDANTS at a

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

mere 4 meters, and later raised to a barely higher 5.7 meters. The 14 meter (46 ft)
high tsunami overwhelmed the plant's 5.7 meter high seawall. The tsunami water
flooded the low-lying rooms in which the emergency generators were housed. The
diesel generators were quickly flooded and then began to fail soon, their job being
taken over by emergency battery-powered systems. When the batteries for the
emergency system ran out the next day, on March 12, the active cooling systems
stopped, and the reactors began to heat up. The power failure also initiated the
failure of many of the vital reactor control instruments.

17

76. DEFENDANTS defectively reasoned that the lowered height of the sea wall

18

would keep the operating costs of the seawater pumps low. And lowering the bluff

19

was to allow the base of the reactors to be constructed on solid bedrock in order to

20

mitigate the threat posed by earthquakes. The DEFENDANTS’ defective design of

21

lowering the site’s elevation increased the reactor’s vulnerability to a tsunami

22

larger than anticipated in the design of the reactor. This was a catastrophic and

23

preventable design defect since there had clearly been many tsunamis far higher,

24

evidence the DEFENDANTS completely ignored in their planning.

25

77. An Eleventh design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water

26

Reactors is that GE designed and placed the emergency power diesel generators in

27

the basement, and not even within any sort of waterproof container. Consequently,

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
38

1

when the tsunami hit, the emergency power diesel generators were flooded. The

2

emergency pumps, also called service water pumps, were placed in a location

3

where they ended up under water. And finally, the diesel tanks were placed in a

4

location where they too were flooded. In addition, the service water pumps had to

5

be at the water, but they were so badly designed that in any tsunami they would be

6

flooded.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

78. A Twelfth design and manufacturing defect of the Mark 1 Boiling Water
Reactors is that GE failed to design and build a fraud-proof system that oversees
inspection and repair reports in order to ensure compliance with safety standards
and guidelines. On Feb 28, 2011, TEPCO submitted a report to the Japanese
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, admitting that the company had previously
submitted fake inspection and repair reports. The report revealed that TEPCO
failed to inspect more than 30 technical components of the six reactors, including
power boards for the reactor's temperature control valves, as well as components of

16

the cooling systems such as water pump motors and emergency power diesel

17

generators. In 2008, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) warned

18

TEPCO that the FNPP was built using outdated safety guidelines and could be a

19

“serious problem” during a large earthquake.

20

79. A Thirteenth design and manufacturing defect is the failure by GE to design

21

an emergency back-up manual cooling system in order to allow fresh water to be

22

pumped directly into the reactors by fire hoses. TEPCO’s workers attempted to

23

inject water from fire trucks into piping leading to the reactor, only to discover,

24

after hours into this failed effort, that 55 percent of the water they injected was

25

being diverted into auxiliary pipes. Consequently, the meltdown raged unabatedly

26

because the injected water never reached the targeted reactor as it was actively

27

melting down. This design defect was also magnified by the failure of TEPCO and

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
39

1

GE to provide adequate training at periodic intervals. The workers who were

2

attempting to inject water from the fire trucks had an utter lack of understanding of

3

the piping system, as well as a lack of training. None of the workers had ever

4

practiced any of these emergency procedures.

5

DEFENDANTS’ PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF DESIGN DEFECTS

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

80. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, at all times before the PLAINTIFFS
arrived off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture to provide rescue and humanitarian
assistance, knew of the design and manufacturing defects and intentionally,
recklessly and negligently failed to take corrective and remedial action for the
protection of the public, including the PLAINTIFF U.S. Sailors, foreseeable
rescuers. Mitsuhiko Tanaka, a former engineer with HITACHI, says the company
covered up faults in the pressure vessel it produced for Fukushima’s reactor 4.
When Tanaka tried to make this information public after the Chernobyl disaster in

16

1986, HITACHI threatened him, warning, “Think of your family.” Tanaka says

17

other engineers in Japan were also concerned about the reactor’s safety.50

18

81. GE and TEPCO, and each of them, knew that FNPP, like the other oldest

19

nuclear plants in operation today, the GE Mark 1 boiling water reactors, was

20

vulnerable to catastrophic accidents due to a flawed reactor containment structure.

21

GE and TEPCO, and each of them, have known since the early 1970s that the

22

Mark 1 BWR could likely explode during a meltdown, releasing massive quantities

23

of toxic radiation and radioactive particles, endangering the lives of millions of

24

people and making large areas of land uninhabitable for generations to come.

25
26

50

27

threat/Resources/Background-documents/QA-GE-Hitachis-role-in-the-Fukushima-

28

disaster-in-Japan/

http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/campaigns/Energy/end-the-nuclear-

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
40

1

82. GENERAL ELECTRIC, whose motto in the 1960’s was, “Progress is our

2

most important product”, announced in 1961: “We’re going to ram this nuclear

3

thing through”. Their chairman is quoted as saying that, and ram it through they

4

did. GE threatened to go out of business unless the Mark 1 design was continued.

5

Scientists in the United States, in 1965, recognized that this Mark 1 design had

6

flaws, and as Dr. Okrent, a scientist, said, “I think it was kind of a threat”.

7

Engineers at GE resigned because they “didn’t have the power to stop GE’s faulty

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

design in 1966!” The turmoil that GE willfully chose to avoid in 1972 became the
turmoil Fukushima Daiichi experienced 40 years later. Essentially the fuse was lit
on Fukushima Daiichi in 1970, and it exploded on March 11, 2011.
83. Thirty-five years ago, Dale G. Bridenbaugh and two of his colleagues at
General Electric resigned from their jobs after becoming increasingly convinced
that the nuclear reactor design they were reviewing-the Mark 1-was so flawed that
it could lead to a devastating accident. Questions persisted for decades about the

16

ability of the Mark 1 to handle the immense pressures that would result if the

17

reactor lost cooling power. As early as the 1970s, its own engineers, e.g. Dale G.

18

Bridenbaugh, warned GE about critical flaws in the design of some reactors when

19

they were being built in Fukushima. These are the same flaws in the design of the

20

reactor Mark I, the same defects which have contributed to the radioactive

21

contamination after the tsunami. GE built five Mark I reactors at Fukushima

22

Daiichi, and 4 of them failed on March 11, 2011.

23

84. GE never made any serious effort to revise the design and tackle the safety

24

flaws of those reactors. In addition, GE did not even bother to properly incorporate

25

Japanese anti-seismic standards to the Mark I construction. Dale G. Bridenbaugh

26

stated: “The problems we identified in 1975 were that, in planning the design of

27

the containment, they did not take into account the dynamic loads that could be

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
41

1

experienced with a loss of coolant. “The impact loads the containment would

2

receive by this very rapid release of energy could tear the containment apart and

3

create an uncontrolled release.” In addition, the Mark 1 included an absolutely

4

insane design element: storing huge quantities of radioactive fuel rods 100 feet up

5

in the air.51

6

85. In 1972, Stephen H. Hanauer, then a safety official with the Atomic Energy

7

Commission, recommended that the Mark 1 system be discontinued because it

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

presented unacceptable safety risks. Among the concerns cited was the smaller
containment design, which was more susceptible to explosion and rupture from a
build-up in hydrogen: the exact situation that unfolded at the Fukushima Daiichi
plant. Later that same year, Joseph Hendrie, who would later become chairman of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a successor agency to the Atomic
Commission, said the idea of a ban on such systems as the Mark I was attractive.
86. In 1986, Harold Denton, then the NRC's top safety official, told an industry

15
16

trade group, “The Mark I containment, especially being smaller with lower design

17

pressure, in spite of the suppression pool, if you look at the WASH 1400 safety

18

study, you'll find something like a 90% probability of that containment failing.”
DESIGN DEFECTS WERE COST CUTTING

19
20

87. Interviews with a dozen current and former senior Tokyo Electric Power

21

engineers, including several who were intimately involved when the fateful design

22

decisions were made in the 1960’s and 1970’s, reveal that GE and TEPCO had

23

many opportunities over the decades to retrofit the oldest reactors. The engineers

24

blame a combination of complacency and cost-cutting pressures. All the Reactors

25
26

51

27

reactor-design-was-unsafe-so-why-isnt-ge-getting-any-heat-for-

28

fukushima/5361300?print=1

http://www.globalresearch.ca/fukushima-general-electric-knew-its-nuclear-

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
42

1

in the Fukushima plant were based on GE designs. GE maintained lucrative

2

contracts to service GE reactors in Japan.

3

88. To keep the reactor compact and economical, engineers from Defendant

4

GE’s partner company EBASCO made the reactor building too small, said Mr.

5

Toyota, the engineer who helped to oversee the construction. “Backup power

6

generators are critical safety equipment, and it should’ve been a no-brainer to put

7

them inside the reactor buildings,” Mr. Toyota says. “It’s a huge disappointment

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

that nobody at TEPCO- including me-was sensitive enough to notice and do
something about this discrepancy.”
89. Another TEPCO engineer who visited the Fukushima Daiichi plant many
times, starting in the 1970’s, says the cramped reactor buildings barely allowed
room to install a valve during routine work. “It was super-inefficient,” this
engineer says. “Some of us knew all along and were concerned about the
inconsistent placements of diesel generators at Fukushima Daiichi between reactor

16

No. 6 and the older reactors 1 through 5, and their potential vulnerability,” says

17

one of TEPCO’s top engineers who has guided the company’s nuclear division.

18

The engineer says that when he was preparing for a regularly scheduled

19

government inspection in 1987, the inconsistent placement of the backup

20

generators “stood out like a sore thumb.”

21

90. Says Mr. Toyota, the former TEPCO executive: “Over the years, a lot of

22

engineers have come up with different ideas to improve safety. But my guess is

23

that they couldn’t come forward and point their ideas out to management because

24

of the high costs associated with back-fitting older reactors with new designs.”

25

91. Warnings and design critique: In 1990, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

26

Commission (NRC) ranked the failure of the emergency electricity generators and

27

subsequent failure of the cooling systems of plants in seismically very active

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
43

1

regions as one of the most likely risks. The Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety

2

Agency (NISA) cited this report in 2004. According to Jun Tateno, a former NISA

3

scientist, TEPCO did not react to these warnings and did not respond with any

4

measures.

5

92. Safety is a non-delegable duty. GE is responsible for each and every design

6

and manufacturing defect and all design flaws at the Fukushima reactors, including

7

the design defect of the location of emergency diesel generators at the Fukushima

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Nuclear-power plants which must continuously cool their unstable, radioactive
fuel. These cooling systems run on electricity, which the plant ordinarily pulls
from the nation’s power grid. If the grid fails, on-site diesel generators kick on to
keep the cooling systems running. If these generators don’t work, the plant is then
in immediate danger of melting down. Because TEPCO’s first reactor buildings
were designed and built too small, the generators had to be stored somewhere else.
Engineers put them into neighboring structures that house turbines and are neither
sturdy nor water-tight.

17

93. In the case of Fukushima’s Unit 1, during the loss of coolant on March 11,

18

2011, the pressure inside the containment vessels exceeded their design capacity

19

almost up to twice. In 1976, GE and TEPCO knew that the Mark 1 system had not

20

been designed to withstand the accident it was supposed to contain. In 2011,

21

reactors 1, 2, and 3 were operating at the time and blew up, spewing radiation

22

worldwide. Radioactive cesium, strontium, iodine, and hot particles including

23

molten uranium, from the four reactors spread all over Northern Japan, and the

24

resulting radioactive plume blew across the ocean and was measured around the

25

world.

26

RADIOACTIVE CANCER-CAUSING RELEASES PREVENTABLE

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
44

1

94. This is the worst industrial accident in the history of the world, and is largely

2

due to inherent design flaws, inaccurate risk assumptions, and the failure of every

3

safety system designed to operate in such an event. This tragedy WAS preventable.

4

Corporate financial goals, world politics and engineering hubris put money and

5

power before the lives and health of people who farm, fish, and live… affecting

6

them and foreseeable rescuers, including the U. S. Sailors-for hundreds of years.

7

The areas around the plant, including the Pacific Ocean, are contaminated to a

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

point that could not be imagined; no method of mitigation exists. The Fukushima
Daiichi site will continue to bleed radiation into the Pacific for 100 years or
longer.52
95. The initial nuclear meltdown from the Fukushima reactors released several
radioactive isotopes, such as iodine-131, cesium-134 and cesium-137 and
strontium-90. Cesium-137 has a half-life of 30 years and remains in the
environment for decades. Nuclear fuel is loaded with noble gases. The noble gases,

16

such as xenon or krypton, are called noble because they don’t react with anything.

17

All the noble gases were released. The data indicates that the concentration of

18

xenon in Chiba-which is a noble gas-was 400,000 times more than normal

19

immediately after the accident. Also, that the concentration of xenon in Chiba was

20

1,300 Becquerels per cubic meter for 8 days. A cubic meter is 3 feet by 3 feet by 3

21

feet, and inside every cubic meter of air over Chiba, there were 1,300

22

disintegrations emitting radioactivity every second, for 8 days and each and every

23

disintegration releases a radiation particle or gamma ray.

24

96. This data was just recently released by FNPP. There were 4 radiation

25

detectors that continued to work after the Daiichi accident. Almost all of them

26
27

52

28

designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-23-sisters-in-us

http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electricCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
45

1

didn’t have power, but a couple of them were battery powered, and TEPCO just

2

recently discovered the data. Normal background on these radiation detectors was

3

about 0.04 microsieverts. At 5 o’clock in the morning, right after the accident, the

4

radiation in the detectors was 10 times greater than background. At 6 o’clock, 60

5

times background. At 9 o’clock, 150 times background. 10 o’clock, 700 times

6

background. This means that people in the vicinity of these radiation detectors

7

were getting a yearly dose in 12 hours. Then the vents were open. So this is a clear

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

indication that the containments were leaking well before the vents were open. At
3 o’clock, the same detectors were measuring 30,000 times background. That
means a yearly dose in ten minutes for the people near FNPP. It is also important
to realize this may not have been the worst. This happens to be where the detector
was. But it doesn’t mean that the main plume chose to go to the detector and get
that reading.
97. Five (5) soil samples and a piece of pavement from a children’s park right

16

next to a school were analyzed by Marco Kaltofen at Worcester Polytech. Each of

17

the samples exceeded 7,000 Becquerels per kg. This means that in a two pound

18

box of sample there were 7,000 disintegrations per second of cesium in Tokyo-

19

more than a hundred miles away from the accident. 7,000 becquerels/kg qualifies

20

as radioactive waste in the United States.

21

98. When compared to Chernobyl, the total available cesium at Chernobyl was

22

2.9 petabecquerels or pbecquerels, with 17 zeros behind it, of cesium

23

(290,000,000,000,000,000 counts per minute of cesium). There was almost three

24

times more cesium available to be released at Daiichi 1, 2 and 3. The releases of

25

noble gases at Fukushima were 3 times the releases of Chernobyl, and the

26

containment leak rate was 300% per day, that’s an NRC number, and the

27

decontamination for cesium was zero. Nothing was getting filtered out, or scrubbed

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
46

1

out in the suppression pool, recombiners, or vent stack filters. “TEPCO says a

2

groundwater sample taken from a well at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant last

3

July contained a record high 5 million becquerels per liter of radioactive strontium-

4

90.”53 PLAINTIFF U. S. Sailors were trapped in the prevailing wind blowing out

5

to sea, carrying the deadly plume of all these radioactive particles.

6

99. The radioactive liquid releases will continue for years and years into the

7

future. The liquid releases are 10 times the amounts of Chernobyl. On July 11,

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

2014, Environmental Science & Technology, an authoritative source of
information for professionals in a wide range of environmental disciplines,
published: The Novel Insights into Fukushima Nuclear Accident from Isotopic
Evidence of Plutonium Spread along Coastal Rivers. The results of this
organization’s study “indicated the presence of Plutonium (“Pu”) from FNPP, in
slight excess compared to the Pu background from global fallout…. These results
demonstrate that this radionuclide has been transported relatively long distances (

16

45 km) from FNPP and has been deposited in rivers, representing a potential

17

source of Pu to the ocean.”54
100.

18

In a leaked TEPCO report dated June 2011, it was revealed that

19

plutonium-238, -239,-240, and -241 were released "to the air" from the site during

20

the first 100 hours after the earthquake, the total amount of plutonium said to be

21

120 billion becquerels (120 GBq)-perhaps as much as 50 grams. The same paper

22

mentioned a release of 7.6 trillion becquerels of neptunium-239-about 1 milligram.

23

As neptunium-239 decays, it becomes plutonium-239. TEPCO made this report for

24
25

53

26

level-in-fukushima-groundwater-sample-last-july/#.U_ONilh0yM8The

27

54

28

Sci. Technol., Article ASAP, DOI: 10.1021/es501890n)

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/07/national/record-strontium-90http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es501890n, (Environ.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
47

1

a press conference on 6 June 2011. Plutonium-239 is particularly long-lived and

2

toxic with a half-life of 24,000 years and remains hazardous for tens of thousands

3

of years. The isotope iodine-131 is easily absorbed by the thyroid. Persons exposed

4

to releases of I-131 from any source have a higher risk for developing thyroid

5

cancer or thyroid disease, or both. Iodine-131 has a short half-life at approximately

6

8 days. Caesium-137 is also a particular threat because it behaves like potassium

7

and is taken up by cells throughout the body. Additionally, it has a long, 30-year

8
9
10
11
12
13

half-life. Cs-137 can cause acute radiation sickness, and increases the risk for
cancer because of exposure to high-energy gamma radiation. Internal exposure to
Cs-137, through ingestion or inhalation, allows the radioactive material to be
distributed in the soft tissues, especially muscle tissue, exposing these tissues to the
beta particles and gamma radiation and increasing cancer risk.
101.

14
15

Strontium-90 behaves like calcium, and tends to deposit in bone and

blood-forming tissue (bone marrow). 20–30% of ingested Sr-90 is absorbed and

16

deposited in the bone. Internal exposure to Sr-90 is linked to bone cancer, cancer

17

of the soft tissue near the bone, and leukemia. The risk of cancer increases with

18

increased exposure to Sr-90.55
102.

19

The radioactive isotopes from the FNPP have already reached North

20

America. Two radioactive cesium isotopes, cesium-134 and cesium-137, have been

21

detected offshore Vancouver, British Columbia56

22
23
24

55

25

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiation_effects_from_the_Fukushima_Daiichi_nucl

26

ear_disaster

27

56

28

meltdown-detected-near-vancouver/

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/radioactive-isotopes-from-fukushimaCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
48

DESIGN CONTENT OF THE MARK 1 BOILING WATER REACTOR:

1

103.

2

The Fukushima Daiichi reactors are GE boiling water reactors (BWR)

3

of an early (1960s) design supplied by DEFENDANT GE with what is known as a

4

Mark I containment. Reactors 1-3 came into commercial operation from 1971-75.

5

Reactor power is 460 MWe for unit 1, 784 MWe for units 2-5, and 1100 MWe for

6

unit 6. The fuel assemblies are about 4 m long, and there are 400 fuel rods in unit

7

1; 548 in units 2-5; and 764 in unit 6. Each assembly has 60 fuel rods containing

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

the uranium oxide fuel within zirconium alloy cladding. Unit 3 has a partial core of
mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel (32 MOX assemblies, 516 LEU). They all operate
normally at 286°C at core outlet under a pressure of 6930 kPa and with 115-130
kPa pressure in dry containment. The four reactors all began operation in the
1970s. Units 1, 3 and 4 were built by DEFENDANT GE in collaboration with
other contractors, while Unit 2 was a GE project with a different partner.
Reactor

Design

Size Commercial Operation

16

Fukushima I-1

General Electric Mark I BWR 439MW

March 1971

17

Fukushima I –2

General Electric Mark I BWR 760 MW

July 1974

18

Fukushima I - 3

General Electric Mark I BWR 760 MW

March 1976

19

Fukushima I - 4

General Electric Mark I BWR 760 MW

October 978

20

Fukushima I - 5

General Electric Mark I BWR 760 MW

April 1978

21

Fukushima I - 6

General Electric Mark II BWR 1067 MW

October 97957

22
23

DEFENDANTS PLACED MARK 1 INTO STREAM OF COMMERCE

24

104.

25

Today, in the United States, there are 23 aging Mark 1 reactors

identical to Fukushima, including Vermont Yankee on the Connecticut River in

26
27

57

28

Power-Plant

http://www.scribd.com/doc/50550192/NIRS-Fact-Sheet-on-Fukushima-NuclearCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
49

1

Vermont. These plants pose a particular hazard with their over-crowded, high-level

2

nuclear waste spent fuel pools that are not in hardened containment structures,

3

making them vulnerable to natural disasters and terrorist attacks. These highly

4

poisonous nuclear waste materials need to be kept out of the environment for

5

250,000 years.58 There are 23 BRW Nuclear Power Plants in the United States and

6

10 additional around the world, similar in design to those at FNPP.

7
8
9
10
11
12

105.

The NRC database of nuclear power plants shows that 23 of the 104

nuclear plants in the U.S. are GE boiling-water reactors with GE's Mark I systems
for containing radioactivity, the same containment system used by the Reactors at
the Fukushima Daiichi plant. The location of the U.S. GE Mark 1 reactors are as
follows:
1. Browns Ferry 1, Athens, Alabama, operating license since 1973, reactor

13

type GE 4.

14

2. Browns Ferry 2, Athens, Alabama, 1974, GE 4

15
16

3. Browns Ferry 3, Athens, Alabama, 1976, GE 4.

17

4.Brunswick 1, Southport, North Carolina, 1976, GE 4.

18

5. Brunswick 2, Southport, North Carolina, 1974, GE 4.

19

6. Cooper, Brownville, Nebraska, 1974, GE 4.

20

7. Dresden 2, Morris, Illinois, 1970, GE 3.

21

8. Dresden 3, Morris, Illinois, 1971, GE 3.

22

9. Duane Arnold, Palo, Iowa, 1974, GE 4.

23

10. Fermi 2, Monroe, Michigan, 1985, GE 4.

24

11. FitzPatrick, Scriba, New York, 1974, GE 4.

25

12. Hatch 1, Baxley, Georgia, 1974, GE 4.

26

13. Hatch 2, Baxley, Georgia, 1978, GE 4.

27
28

58

http://www.fairewinds.org/japan-friends-tv-documentary-10-pm-june-1-japan/
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
50

1

14. Hope Creek, Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey, 1986, GE 4.

2

15. Monticello, Monticello, Minnesota, 1970, GE 3.

3

16. Nine Mile Point 1, Scriba, New York, 1969, GE 2.

4

17. Oyster Creek, Forked River, New Jersey, 1969, GE 2.

5

18. Peach Bottom 2, Delta, Pennsylvania, 1973, GE 4.

6

19. Peach Bottom 3, Delta, Pennsylvania, 1974, GE 4.

7

20. Pilgrim, Plymouth, Massachusetts, 1972, GE 3.

8

21. Quad Cities 1, Cordova, Illinois, 1972, GE 3.

9

22. Quad Cities 2, Moline, Illinois, 1972, GE 3.

10

23. Vermont Yankee, Vernon, Vermont, 1972, GE 459

11

HOW BWR PRODUCES ELECTRICITY:

12

106.

13

In a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR for short) the nuclear fuel heats

14

water, the water boils and creates steam, the steam then drives turbines that create

15

the electricity, and the steam is then cooled and condensed back to water, and the

16

water returns to be heated by the nuclear fuel. The reactor operates with the nuclear

17

fuel that is uranium oxide. Uranium oxide is a ceramic with a very high melting

18

point of about 2800 °C. The fuel is manufactured in pellets (cylinders that are

19

about 1 cm tall and 1 cm in diameter). These pellets are then put into a long tube

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

made of Zircaloy (an alloy of zirconium) with a failure temperature of 1200 °C
(caused by the auto-catalytic oxidation of water), and sealed tight. This tube is
called a fuel rod. These fuel rods are then put together to form assemblies, several
hundred of which make up the reactor core. The solid fuel pellet (a ceramic oxide
matrix) is the first barrier that retains many of the radioactive fission products
produced by the fission process. The Zircaloy casing is the second barrier to
59

http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electric-

designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-23-sisters-in-us
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
51

1

release that separates the radioactive fuel from the rest of the reactor. The core is

2

then placed in the pressure vessel. The pressure vessel is a thick steel vessel that

3

operates at a pressure of about 7 MPa 60(1000 psi), and is designed to withstand the

4

high pressures that may occur during an accident. The pressure vessel is the third

5

barrier to radioactive material release.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

107.

The entire primary loop of the nuclear reactor-the pressure vessel,

pipes, and pumps that contain the coolant (water)-are housed in the containment
structure. This structure is the fourth barrier to radioactive material release. The
containment structure is a hermetically (air tight) sealed, very thick structure made
of steel and concrete. This structure is designed, built and tested for one single
purpose: To contain, indefinitely, a complete core meltdown. To aid in this
purpose, a large, thick concrete structure is poured around the containment
structure and is referred to as the secondary containment. Both the main
containment structure and the secondary containment structure are housed in the

16

reactor building. The reactor building is an outer shell that is supposed to keep the

17

weather out, but nothing in. (this is the part that was damaged in the explosions).
108.

18

Fundamentals of nuclear reactions: The uranium fuel generates heat

19

by neutron-induced nuclear fission. Uranium atoms are split into lighter atoms (aka

20

fission products). This fission process generates heat and more neutrons (one of the

21

particles that forms an atom). When one of these neutrons hits another uranium

22

atom, that atom can split, generating more neutrons and so on. That is called the

23

60

24
25
26
27
28

Megapascal (MPa) is a metric pressure unit and equals to 1 000 000 force of
newton per square meter which is known as a Pascal. Pound-per-square-inch
(abbreviated as PSI) is a unit of pressure, which measures the quantity of pressure
per square inch of area. It is defined as the pressure of a force of 1 pound applied
homogeneously above an area of 1 sq inch. Pound or pound force per square inch
(psi, pfsi, lb/in², or lbf/in²) is a commonly used British plus American unit of
measurement for pressure. (1 psi = 6,894.76 Pascal)
http://convertmpatopsi.com/Pound-per-square-inch-psi.html
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
52

1

nuclear chain reaction. During normal, full-power operation, the neutron

2

population in a core is stable (remains the same) and the reactor is in a critical

3

state. There is a multitude of fission products that are produced in a reactor,

4

including cesium and iodine. Others decay more slowly, like some cesium, iodine,

5

strontium, and argon.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

FOUR (4) HYDROGEN EXPLOSION RELEASES
109.

What happened at Fukushima (as of March 11, 2011): The earthquake

which hit Japan was several times more powerful than the worst earthquake the
nuclear power plant was designed and built to withstand. This was a design defect.
When the earthquake hit, the nuclear reactors all automatically shut down. Within
seconds after the earthquake started, the control rods had been inserted into the
core and the nuclear chain reaction stopped. At this point, the cooling system was
supposed to carry away the residual heat, about 7% of the full power heat load
under normal operating conditions. The earthquake destroyed the external power

16

supply of the nuclear reactor, and is referred to as a “loss of offsite power.” For the

17

first hour, the first set of multiple emergency diesel power generators started and

18

provided the electricity that was needed. However, when the tsunami arrived, it

19

flooded the diesel generators, causing them to fail. One of the fundamental tenets

20

of nuclear power plant design is “Defense in Depth.” This approach leads

21

engineers to design a plant that can withstand severe catastrophes, even when

22

several systems fail. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, failed to design a Defense

23

in Depth system, resulting in a core meltdown. Since the cooling cannot be

24

restored, the core eventually melts. Since hydrogen gas is extremely combustible,

25

when enough hydrogen gas is mixed with air, it reacts with oxygen. If there is

26

enough hydrogen gas, it will react rapidly, producing an explosion. At some point

27

during the venting process enough hydrogen gas built up inside the containment

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
53

1

(there is no air in the containment), so when it was vented to the air, an explosion

2

occurred in four of the six (6) reactors-Reactors 1-4. These hydrogen explosions

3

destroyed the top and some of the sides of the reactor buildings.

4

110.

ON AND BEFORE MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS

5

arrived off the coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because

6

TEPCO's spokesman, Masayuki Ono, admitted that “up to 300 tons of highly

7

contaminated water from the FNPP site were seeping into the sea and had been

8
9
10
11
12

leaking radioactive matter since the plant suffered a triple meltdown on 11 March
2011.” One PLAINTIFF declared: “ship was still taking in sea water - but
obviously the ship can't filter out the radiation. Water we all showered with, drank,
brushed our teeth, and had our food cooked with…”
111.

13
14
15

ON AND BEFORE MARCH 11, 2011, before the PLAINTIFFS

arrived off the coast of Fukushima prefecture, TEPCO was negligent because
Minister Yoshihiko Noda is admitting that TEPCO created a man-made disaster,

16

admitting liability and fault: “TEPCO must compensate those affected with

17

sincerity and generosity as well as carry out a thorough reorganization,” and he

18

wants TEPCO to “speedily” pay compensation to victims of the Fukushima nuclear

19

disaster.”61

20

112.

On March 14, 2011, the Navy published: “The U.S. 7th Fleet has

21

temporarily repositioned its ships and aircraft away from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi

22

Nuclear Power Plant after detecting contamination in the air and on its aircraft

23

operating in the area. The source of this airborne radioactivity is a radioactive

24

plume released from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant. Using sensitive

25

instruments, precautionary measurements of three helicopter air crews returning to

26
27
28

61

http://www.nuc.berkeley.edu/node/5833
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
54

1

USS Ronald Reagan after conducting disaster relief missions near Sendai

2

identified [measureable] levels of radioactivity on 17 air crew members.”62

3

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
Against ALL DEFENDANTS

4
5
6
7

113.

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

114.

California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1714 provides, in

pertinent part, the following: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his
or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want
of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except
so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury
upon himself or herself.”
115.

15

At all times herein mentioned, DEFENDANT TEPCO and TEPCO’s

16

servants, agents and/or employees owed PLAINTIFFS the same duty of care it

17

owed to those in the vicinity of FNPP by reasonably and safely operating FNPP.

18

DEFENDANT GE and its servants, agents and/or employees, owed PLAINTIFFS

19

the same duty of care they owed to those in the vicinity of FNPP to reasonably and

20

safely design, maintain, manage and control the BWR at FNPP in a safe and

21

suitable condition, and in good repair. The facts above make abundantly clear that

22

DEFENDANT TEPCO’S acts and omissions and the acts and omissions of

23

DEFENDANT GE and its servants, agents and/or employees, clearly breached the

24

duties owed to people in the vicinity of FNPP and breached the duties owed to

25

PLAINTIFFS. The breach of the duties owed by DEFENDANT TEPCO and by

26

DEFENDANT GE directly resulted in FNPP’s radioactive releases, causing the

27
28

62

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=59065
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
55

1

PLAINTIFFS, along with the general public in Fukushima and surrounding areas,

2

to incur severe, life-threatening harm.

3

116.

DEFENDANT TEPCO negligently maintained, managed, and

4

controlled FNPP, and these negligent actions and omissions caused direct and

5

proximate harm to PLAINTIFFS. DEFENDANT GE negligently designed,

6

maintained, managed, and controlled FNPP and these negligent actions and

7

omissions caused direct and proximate harm to PLAINTIFFS.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

117.

Prior to March 12, 2011, TEPCO knew that the U.S. Navy rescue

mission personnel were in danger of being irradiated by spreading radiation from
Unit 1 at the six-reactor Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear complex. At least three other
Units were in danger of failing, including the spent fuel pool of reactor Unit 4,
holding 1,535 bundles of irradiated fuel.
118.

On March 11, 2011, before the USS Ronald Reagan and Carrier Strike

Group 7 arrived two miles off the coast, Fukushima Unit 1 blew up. Then Unit 3

16

exploded, releasing plums of hydrogen gases migrating through a shared vent,

17

which destroyed the containment building at Unit 4, exposing the spent fuel pool to

18

the air. Unit 2 followed suit. TEPCO announced that most of the fuel rods in Units

19

1, 2, and 3 were intact. They were not intact. This was a false, misleading,

20

consciously negligent act and omission. The true facts were that the fuels in Units

21

1, 2, and 3 had fused into a molten mass and were oozing through the bottom of

22

their destroyed reactors. PLAINTIFFS suffered harms, damage and suffered, and

23

continue to suffer, life-threatening injuries as a result of TEPCO’s negligence, and

24

the negligence of all DEFENDANTS.

25
26
27

119.

At all relevant times, DEFENDANT TEPCO was aware that the U.S.

Navy and its personnel would provide rescue and humanitarian relief operations,
including performance of their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance during its

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
56

1

relief mission to ferry food, blankets and water to the inhabitants of the ravaged

2

city of Sendai, located within the prefecture of Fukushima, Japan, following the

3

earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011.

4

120.

At all relevant times herein mentioned, the radiation produced at the

5

FNPP does not occur naturally. Rather, the radiation releases were admittedly

6

DEFENDANT’S negligent “man-made disaster.”

7
8

121.

utilized to boil water in order to produce steam-generated power.

9
10
11
12
13

122.

At all relevant times all of the DEFENDANTS were aware that

exposure to even a low dose of radiation creates grave danger to people’s health.
DEFENDANT TEPCO was also aware of the importance of accurately reporting
actual radiation release levels.63
123.

14
15

The radiation, which was produced as a result of nuclear fission, was

As a direct and proximate consequence of the negligence of all the

DEFENDANTS, the reactors were damaged, and power to the cooling mechanism

16

of the FNPP was interrupted, resulting in a meltdown of the fuel and reactors

17

themselves, thereby triggering the release of high levels of ionizing radiation,

18

including radioactive cesium.64

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

63

Numerous studies indicate that even low dose radiation poses a severe danger to
health; see eg., “No Safe Dose - Japan’s Low -Dose Radiation Disaster,”
http://rense.com/general95/no-safe-dose.htm; “Even Low-level radioactivity is
damaging. Broad analysis of many radiation studies finds no exposure threshold
that precludes harm to life,”
http://www.sc.edu/news/newsarticle.php?nid=5214#.UKljmkvma6X; MetaReview of 46 Studies: Even the Lowest-Level Radiation is Damaging to Human
Health,
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/11/meta-review-of-42-studies-even-thelowest-level-radiation-is-damaging-to-human-health.html
64
At Fukushima, large releases of radioactivity apparently came from the concrete
pools, where spent fuel rods, clad with a special alloy, were placed to cool down
after their use in the reactors. These spent fuel rods were extremely hot – up to
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
57

1

124.

Nuclear radiation is a known human carcinogen that is linked to many

2

human health problems. The U.S. Environmental Agency (“EPA”) classifies it as a

3

human carcinogen.65

4

125.

When radiation from a reactor is spilled or leaks, it contaminates the

5

environment and poses a serious health threat to humans and other species. The

6

greater the concentration of radiation that escapes from the reactor or fuel rods, the

7

higher the risk to humans, creating an enhanced threat to human health.

8
9
10
11
12

126.

Radiation does not readily break down and does not biodegrade in the

ground or water or apparatus exposed to it. Research shows that it will persist in
the environment for decades, since it has a half-life in excess of 77 years, far
longer than the life expectancy of humans exposed to it.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2,000 degrees Fahrenheit – and needed a constant circulation of cold water to keep
them from burning up.
65
According to experts, “[t]here is a near universal acceptance that
epidemiological data demonstrates an excess risk of delayed cancer incidence
above a dose of 0.1 sieverts. All who met with Fukushima’s radioactive fallout are
probably to have some problem with the thyroid.” See http://enenews.com/watchall-people-met-fukushimas-radioactive fallout-problem-thyroid-many-tokyoalready-developing-problems-video;
Nuclear expert Claudia French, who was professor emeritus of molecular
and cell biology at UC Berkeley, who worked on the “Manhattan Project” on
uranium effects, and established the Biomedical Research Division of the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, wrote in his 1990 book that “by any
reasonable standard of biomedical proof” there is no threshold level (no harmless
dose) of ionizing radiation with respect to radiation mutagenesis and
carcinogenesis – a conclusion supported in 1995 by a government-funded radiation
committee.
“The results of surveys and biological monitoring of children and adults of
Chernobyl point unambiguously to a steady, rapid and dramatic deterioration of
health of all victims of the impact of the Chernobyl accident,” wrote Drs. E.B.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
58

1

127.

The FNPP was constructed at Fukushima more than 40 years ago.

2

According to a local labor commission, low-skilled workers, illegally recruited in

3

Japan's poorest areas, were used in building the nuclear power plant in the 1960s.

4

The poor quality of construction, as well as structural defects, negligent

5

maintenance and personnel negligence eventually triggered the disastrous

6

consequences on March 11, 2011.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

128.

During their lifetimes before March 12, 2011, the PLAINTIFFS, and

each of them, had never been exposed to harmful levels of radiation, including the
time they served aboard the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), aboard other vessels
within the strike force, on land or air or sea, or at any other times or places.
129.

As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts and negligence

of DEFENDANTS, and each of them, as described above, PLAINTIFFS suffered
damages as alleged herein.
130.

DEFENDANTS, and each of them, controlled all of the activities at

16

the FNPP, and therefore are responsible for the enhanced threat of radiation

17

exposure and for causing the damages alleged in this Complaint.

18

131.

The intentional and tortious conduct of the DEFENDANT TEPCO

19

was aimed at and encompassed the entire area surrounding the FNPP, including the

20

waters, land and air adjacent to the Fukushima FNPP, where the PLAINTIFFS

21

were employed and operating.

22

132.

DEFENDANT TEPCO knew, or in the exercise of due care should

23

have known, that the PLAINTIFFS, among several thousand other crewmen

24

aboard the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), as well as others, would be directly

25

and harmfully impacted by DEFENDANT TEPCO’s conduct. In the aftermath of a

26

natural disaster, it is foreseeable that foreign military and aid-workers would be

27

among those in the vicinity.

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
59

1

133.

This

is

further

substantiated

by

the

Japanese

Independent

2

Commission’s determination that TEPCO negligently created a “man-made

3

disaster” by failing to adequately prepare and respond to a nuclear accident. Such

4

conduct included a failure to inspect and repair vital components of the coolant

5

system, and failing to have emergency backup power sources to measure and

6

monitor temperatures inside the reactors. The Independent Commission concluded

7

that “the direct causes of the accident were all foreseeable prior to March 11,

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

2011.”
134.

Upon information and belief, based upon currently available data,

through their conduct, DEFENDANTS, and each of them, rendered the
PLAINTIFFS infirm and poisoned their bodies.
135.

The PLAINTIFFS must now endure a lifetime of radiation poisoning

and suffering which could have and should have been avoided. PLAINTIFFS must
now fear, as any reasonable person who has been irradiated would, for their future
health and the health of their children, born and unborn.
136.

Upon information and belief, DEFENDANT TEPCO failed to timely

18

and adequately test the water to which the PLAINTIFFS were exposed in order to

19

detect contamination.

20

137.

Upon information and belief, DEFENDANT TEPCO, its agents,

21

servants and/or employees failed to perform proper and adequate testing within the

22

theater of their operation of the radiation levels to which the PLAINTIFFS and/or

23

their vessels would be exposed, to the PLAINTIFFS’ detriment.

24

138.

Upon information and belief, each and all DEFENDANTS

25

constructed and operated the FNPP with the knowledge that the nuclear fuel had a

26

potential to leak, or in reckless disregard of the knowledge as to whether or not the

27

FNPP could leak radiation into the environment.

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
60

139.

1

DEFENDANT TEPCO breached its duty of reasonable care in

2

operating its facilities, and by creating a “man-made” disaster, causing radioactive

3

contamination of PLAINTIFFS’ bodies, resulting in life threatening consequences

4

to their physical and emotional well-being.

5

140.

All DEFENDANTS also knew, or should have known, that the system

6

they were using for storing spent fuel rods and for the containment of radiation and

7

utilization of nuclear material at the FNPP was faulty, inadequate and leaking.

8
9
10
11
12

141.

that the radiation released at the FNPP is remarkably recalcitrant to natural
degradation and, once dispersed into the environment, it is extremely difficult to
clean up.
142.

13
14
15

DEFENDANTS, and each of them also knew or should have known

According to data existing at that time, and uniquely known to

DEFENDANT TEPCO at the time, the PLAINTIFFS’ consequent exposure to
radiation within their zone of operation indicated that radiation levels had already

16

reached levels exceeding the levels of exposure which the people living the same

17

distance from Chernobyl experienced, and who subsequently developed cancer.66
143.

18

Consequently, the potential for the development of cancer in the

19

PLAINTIFFS has also been dangerously heightened, due to the levels of exposure

20

experienced by them during “Operation Tomodachi.”

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

66

The nuclear community has now created a special rating system for Fukushima –
assigning it to a new category, above Chernobyl, as a no. 8 level nuclear disaster.
Fukushima is a “[m]ulti-source major nuclear accident requiring international
assistance and monitoring. See Nuclear incident scales:
http://www.coasttocoastam.com/pages/portzline-images;
Measured as quadrillions or petabecquerals (10 to the 15th Power) See, Becqueral:
http://www.//wikipedia.org/wiki/Becquerel , the radiation was comparable to
Chernobyl, being well over half, if not equivalent in volume. See, Chernobyl:
Assessment of Radiological and Health Impact 2002 Update of Chernobyl: Ten
Years On, http://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/chernoble/c02.html
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
61

1
2
3
4
5

144.

DEFENDANTS’

negligence

proximately

caused

widespread

contamination of PLAINTIFFS’ environs, including their air and water supply.
145.

PLAINTIFFS have suffered and been damaged, all as described above

and herein, as a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANTS’ negligence.
146.

Upon information and belief, as a further direct and proximate result

6

of DEFENDANTS’ negligence, PLAINTIFFS have been and will be required to

7

undergo further medical testing, evaluation and medical procedures, including but

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

not limited to chelation therapy, bone marrow transplants and/or genetic reprogramming for leukemia, in an effort to seek cure, and will be required to
employ extraordinary means to achieve cure.
147.

As a further direct and proximate result of DEFENDANTS’

negligence, the PLAINTIFFS incurred losses and damages for personal injury and
property damage, loss of use and enjoyment of life and their property, the need for
periodic medical examination and treatment, and economic losses, including wage

16

loss, and the expenditure of time and money, and will continue to incur losses and

17

damages in the future.

18
19
20

148.

PLAINTIFFS also face additional and irreparable harm to their life

expectancy, which has been shortened and cannot be restored to its prior condition.
149.

Solely as a result of the DEFENDANTS’ negligence, carelessness and

21

recklessness, the PLAINTIFFS suffered severe and serious personal injuries to

22

mind and body, and further, the PLAINTIFFS were subjected to great physical

23

pain and mental anguish.

24

150.

By reason of the foregoing, the PLAINTIFFS were severely injured

25

and damaged, sustained severe nervous shock and mental anguish, great physical

26

pain and emotional upset, some of which injuries are believed to be permanent in

27

nature and duration, and the PLAINTIFFS will permanently suffer pain,

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
62

1

inconvenience and other effects of such injuries; the PLAINTIFFS incurred and in

2

the future will necessarily incur further hospital and/or medical expenses in an

3

effort to be cured of said injuries; and the PLAINTIFFS will be unable to pursue

4

their usual duties with the same degree of efficiency as prior to this incident, all to

5

the PLAINTIFFS’ great damage.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

151.

malicious and/or exhibited a gross indifference to, and a callous disregard for
human life, safety and the rights of others, and more particularly, the rights, life
and safety of the PLAINTIFFS; and was motivated by consideration of profit,
financial advantage, monetary gain, economic aggrandizement and/or cost
avoidance, to the virtual exclusion of all other considerations.
152.

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Strict Liability--Manufacturing Defect)
Against DEFENDANT GE

17
18

20
21

Due to DEFENDANTS’ negligence, each of the PLAINTIFFS is

entitled to compensatory damages in a sum to be determined by the jury.

16

19

The DEFENDANTS’ conduct was willful, wanton, reckless,

153.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
154.

DEFENDANT GE manufactured, distributed, and sold the subject

22

defective Mark 1 Boiling Water Reactors (“BWR”), an unreasonably dangerous

23

product.

24

155.

The Boiling Water Reactors, which malfunctioned, melted down,

25

exploded, and released copious quantities of radiation at the Fukushima Daiichi

26

Power Plant on March 11, 2011, contained manufacturing defects when each of the

27

subject reactors left the possession of GE.

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
63

1

156.

As manufacturer, designer, distributor, supplier, seller and marketer,

2

DEFENDANT GE breached this duty by manufacturing, distributing, selling and

3

marketing the Boiling Water Reactors with the actual and constructive knowledge

4

that the product posed a high degree of risk to the safety and well-being of all

5

persons within the vicinity of the FNPP, including PLAINTIFFS.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

157.

The DEFENDANT GE had actual and constructive knowledge of the

properties of radiation that would ensure that, once released into the environment,
radiation would spread further and in concentrations that would cause injury to all
persons within the vicinity of the FNPP, including PLAINTIFFS.
158.

DEFENDANT GE’S conduct was unreasonable in the circumstances.

As set forth above, available scientific data, of which the DEFENDANT GE had
actual and constructive knowledge, gives rise to the reasonable inference that the
manufacturing defects created foreseeable dangers to all persons within the vicinity
of the FNPP, including PLAINTIFFS.
159.

The Boiling Water Reactor’s manufacturing defects were substantial

17

factors in causing PLAINTIFFS’ injuries, damages, and harm. The Boiling Water

18

Reactor’s manufacturing defects proximately caused reasonably foreseeable

19

damages to the PLAINTIFFS.

20

160.

At all times herein mentioned, DEFENDANT GE acted with malice,

21

fraud and oppression, and engaged in despicable conduct that should not be

22

tolerated in a civilized society, displaying a conscious, willful and intentional

23

disregard for the health, safety and welfare of the public, the environment and the

24

PLAINTIFFS. As a result of DEFENDANT GE’S conduct, PLAINTIFFS are

25

entitled to punitive damages as a means of protecting the public by deterring such

26

wanton, callous and intentionally injurious conduct.

27

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
64

1

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Strict Liability for Design Defect)
Against DEFENDANT GE,

2
3
4
5

161.

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

6
7

162.
163.

12
13
14
15
16

DEFENDANT GE had a duty of due care to design and manufacture

reasonably safe Nuclear Power BWRs.

10
11

DEFENDANT GE, during the relevant time period, were the

designers, manufacturers, distributors, sellers, and creators of the BWRs.

8
9

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

164.

DEFENDANT GE had a duty of care to test the Nuclear Power BWRs

to determine the risks posed to all persons within the vicinity of the FNPP,
including the PLAINTIFFS, the environment, water, and the air in the surrounding
vicinity. The BWRs did not perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have
expected it to perform when used or misused in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable way.
165.

17

DEFENDANT GE had a duty not to put on the market an unsafe and

18

defectively designed product that posed a serious danger to all persons within the

19

vicinity of the FNPP, including the PLAINTIFFS.
166.

20

DEFENDANT GE breached said duties of due care when they

21

manufactured a defectively designed product, namely the BWRs, with actual or

22

constructive knowledge of the defects.67 Due to the design and manufacturing

23
24
25
26

67

There exists an accumulation of evidence that the earthquake itself was not the
primary cause of the meltdowns, something [TEPCO] does not want to admit–that
there are other inherent flaws in the way the power plant was built and operated.
See Report on Nuclear Disaster Holds Key to Reactor’s Fate,

27
28

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230444140577482113658775518.
html
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
65

1

defects, the FNPP was not reasonably safe and protective of the environment

2

generally and of PLAINTIFFS’, among others, health and well-being.68

3

167.

DEFENDANT GE’s defective design BWRs, as alleged herein,

4

actually and proximately caused reasonably foreseeable damages to the

5

PLAINTIFFS. The BWRs’ failure to perform safely was a substantial factor in

6

causing PLAINTIFFS harm.

7
8
9
10
11

168.

GE’s conduct in the design, manufacture, and maintenance of the

BWRs, a defective or unreasonably dangerous product, makes each of
DEFENDANT GE strictly liable to the PLAINTIFFS.
Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Nuclear expert Gundersen points out that the service pumps failed because they
were positioned in such a way that they were flooded by the tidal wave on 311.
These pumps send water from the ocean to cool the back-up diesel generators.
“There could have been 14 meltdowns and not three. If you look at the data, there
were six units at Fukushima Daiichi (Power Station No. 1), there are four at
Fukushima Daini (Station No. 2), three at Onagawa and one at Tokai. The net
affect is that there were 37 diesel generators between those plants. 24 of those
diesels were knocked out by the tsunami. You need the diesels to cool the plant.”
At FNPP no. 1 the tsunami flooded the actual diesel generators, but at the other
plants, the “tsunami knocked out the cooling water to the diesels, something called
service water. So, Japan narrowly missed 14 meltdowns and not three because the
cooling water to 24 of 37 diesels was destroyed.” See Gundersen, July 6, 2012,
Pacifica Radio Host Ian Masters and Fairewinds’ Arnie Gundersen: Lessons Not
Learned From Fukushima Daiichi, http://www.fairewinds.com/radio; SolarilMG
Podcast with Arnie Gundersen–Aug 10/2012, http://solarimg.org/?p=3021
68
The FNPP site is fraught with danger, with constant reports of highly toxic water
leaking from this pipe or that, or this reactor or that. For example, water in Unit 2
turbine basement was found to have 47 million becquerals per liter. Unit 2 Water
10 Times More Radioactive than Unit 1,
http://enenews.com/unit-2-10-times-more-radioactive-than-unit-1-47000000Becquerals-per-liter-in-turbine-room-basement
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
66

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Strict Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities)
Against ALL DEFENDANTS

1
2
3
4
5

169.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
170.

DEFENDANTS, and each of them, engaged in an ultra-hazardous

6

activity that caused harm, damages, losses, injuries, including fear of contracting

7

cancer, birth defects for their children, born and unborn, and economic and non-

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

economic damages.
171.

DEFENDANTS, and each of them, are responsible for that harm,

injuries, damages, both economic and non-economic because DEFENDANTS
engaged in producing nuclear power, an ultra-hazardous activity, at FNPP.
172.

PLAINTIFFS’ injuries, damages, losses and harm are the kind of

harm that would be anticipated as a result of the risk created by exposure to a
radiation release as the nature and kind that was released at Fukushima.
173.

DEFENDANTS’ acts proximately caused harm and damage to the

17

PLAINTIFFS, including personal injury, property damage, loss of enjoyment of

18

their property and life, the need for periodic examination and treatment, as well as

19

economic losses including loss of earnings, stigma damages, the cost of obtaining

20

potential cure, and other needless expenditures of time and money. PLAINTIFFS

21

will continue to incur losses and damage in the future. Based on PLAINTIFFS’

22

repeated exposure to ionizing radiation, PLAINTIFFS have a reasonable fear that

23

said exposure more likely than not increases their risk of developing cancer in the

24

future.

25
26
27

174.

DEFENDANTS, and each of them, intended to cause or acted with

conscious disregard of the probability of causing injury to PLAINTIFFS, and
therefore, are liable for punitive damages.

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
67

1

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

2

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence per se: Res Ipsa Loquitur)
Against ALL DEFENDANTS

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

175.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
176.

PLAINTIFFS’ harm was caused by a release of radiation from the

FNPP, which only DEFENDANTS controlled.
177.

PLAINTIFFS’ voluntary actions did not cause or contribute to the

events which harmed them.
178.

PLAINTIFFS’ harm, injuries, damages and losses ordinarily would

not have happened unless someone was negligent.
179.

PLAINTIFFS’ injuries, damages, losses and harm are the kind of

harm that would be anticipated as a result of the risk created by exposure to a
radiation release of the nature and kind that was released at Fukushima.
180.

DEFENDANTS’ acts actually and proximately caused harm and

18

damage to the PLAINTIFFS, including personal injury, property damage, loss of

19

enjoyment of their property and life, the need for periodic examination and

20

treatment, as well as economic losses including loss of earnings, stigma damages,

21

the cost of obtaining potential cure, and other needless expenditures of time and

22

money. PLAINTIFFS will continue to incur losses and damage in the future. Based

23

on PLAINTIFF’S repeated exposure to ionizing radiation, PLAINTIFFS have a

24

reasonable fear that said exposure more likely than not increased their risk of

25

developing cancer in the future.

26

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
68

1

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Presumption of Negligence Per Se)
Against ALL DEFENDANTS

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

181.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
182.

DEFENDANTS’ illegal, intentional, reckless and negligent conduct

as herein above alleged, violated several State, Federal, and International laws,
regulations, and statutes, which were enacted to protect the public, the
communities and the environment, including the class of individuals to which
PLAINTIFFS

belong:

Good

Samaritans,

rescue

workers,

indeed,

the

“TOMODACHIS” (friends), who offered help to the victims of the Fukushima
earthquake and tsunami. The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, to which Japan is a signatory,
bans the dumping of pollution at sea.
183.

The Inter-Governmental Conference on the Convention on the

17

dumping of Wastes at Sea, which met in London in November 1972 at the

18

invitation of the United Kingdom, adopted this instrument, generally known as the

19

London Convention. The London Convention, one of the first international

20

conventions for the protection of the marine environment from human activities,

21

came into force on August 30, 1975.

22

184.

The London Convention contributes to the international control and

23

prevention of marine pollution by prohibiting the dumping of certain hazardous

24

materials. In addition, a special permit is required prior to dumping of a number of

25

other identified materials and a general permit for other wastes or matter.

26
27

185.

"Dumping" has been defined as the deliberate disposal at sea of

wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
69

1

structures, as well as the deliberate disposal of these vessels or platforms

2

themselves. Annexes list wastes which cannot be dumped and others for which a

3

special dumping permit is required.

4

186.

Amendments adopted in 1993 (which entered into force in 1994)

5

banned the dumping into sea of low-level radioactive wastes. In addition, the

6

amendments phased out the dumping of industrial wastes by 31 December, 1995

7

and banned the incineration at sea of industrial wastes.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

187.

DEFENDANT TEPCO engaged in intentionally dumping in excess of

11,500 tons of radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean during and following the
meltdown of the FNPP.
188.

PLAINTIFFS’ injuries, damages, losses and harm are the kind of

harm that would be anticipated as a result of the risk created by exposure to a
radiation release of the nature and kind that was released at Fukushima.
189.

DEFENDANTS’ acts proximately caused harm and damage to the

16

PLAINTIFFS, including personal injury, property damage, loss of enjoyment of

17

their property and life, the need for periodic examination and treatment, as well as

18

economic losses including loss of earnings, stigma damages, the cost of obtaining

19

potential cure, and other needless expenditures of time and money. PLAINTIFFS

20

will continue to incur losses and damage in the future. Based on PLAINTIFFS’

21

repeated exposure to ionizing radiation, PLAINTIFFS have a reasonable fear that

22

said exposure more likely than not has increased their risk of developing cancer in

23

the future.

24

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

25
26
27
28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
70

1

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Loss of Consortium)
Against ALL DEFENDANTS

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

108.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs, as though fully set forth herein.
109.

Each spouse of each PLAINTIFF herein alleges he/she has been

harmed by the injury to his/her husband/wife/domestic partners. Each
spouse/domestic partner of each Plaintiff seeks to be reasonably compensated for
the loss of his/her husband/wife’s/domestic partner’s companionship and services,
past and future, including:

12

1.

13
14

protection, affection, society, moral support; and
2. The loss of the enjoyment of sexual relations and/or the ability to

15
16

The loss of love, companionship, comfort, care, assistance,

have children.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Survival Action--Wrongful Death)
By TERESA READY Individually And As The Administrator Of The Estate
Of JESSE READY deceased
Against All Defendants
109.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
110.

Plaintiff The Estate Of JESSE READY, By TERESA READY as

Personal Representative brings this “Survival Action”, pursuant California Code of
Civil Procedure Section 377.30.

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
71

1

111.

DEFENDANTS’ negligent and intentional conduct cause JESSE

2

READY to be exposed to excessive radiation during Operation Tomodachi,

3

causing his injuries, illness, damages and harms, and his death.

4

112.

DEFENDANTS’ negligent and intentional conduct are the actual and

5

proximate cause of the decedent’s damages, injuries, losses and harms, including

6

the following: ALL loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before

7

death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent

8
9

would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and including medical
expenses and lost wages, as well as penalties, punitive or exemplary damages.

10

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Wrongful Death)
By TERESA READY Individually And As The Administrator Of The Estate
Of JESSE READY deceased
Against ALL DEFENDANTS
110.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
111.

TERESA READY individually and as the Administrator Of The

19

ESTATE OF JESSE READY alleges that JESSE READY is survived by wife

20

TERESA READY.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

112.

PLAINTIFF TERESA READY has sustained two categories of

damages, economic and noneconomic. PLAINTIFF has lost the financial support
that her husband, JESSE READY, would have contributed to her during either the
life expectancy that JESSE READY had before his death or the life expectancy of
his last remaining heirs.
113.

PLAINTIFF TERESA READY has also sustained the loss of gifts and

benefits that she would have expected to receive from JESSE READY.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
72

1

PLAINTIFF TERESA READY has also sustained the loss of funeral and burial

2

expenses; and the reasonable value of household services that JESSE READY

3

would have provided.

4

114.

PLAINTIFF also claims the following noneconomic damages:

5

1. The loss of JESSE READY's love, companionship, comfort, care,

6

assistance, protection, affection, society, moral support;

7

2. The loss of JESSE READY the loss of the enjoyment of sexual

8

relations.

9
10

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Survival Action--Wrongful Death)
By ANNETTE LUCKEY Individually And As The Administrator Of The Estate
Of DANYELLE LUCKEY deceased
Against All Defendants
113.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
114.

Plaintiff The Estate Of DANYELLE LUCKEY, By ANNETTE

19

LUCKEY as Personal Representative brings this “Survival Action”, pursuant

20

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.30.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

115.

DEFENDANTS’

negligent

and

intentional

conduct

caused

ANNETTE LUCKEY to be exposed to excessive radiation during Operation
Tomodachi, causing her injuries, illness, damages and harms, and her death.
DANYELLE LUCKEY died on October 10, 2016.
116.

DEFENDANTS’ negligent and intentional conduct are the actual and

proximate cause of the decedent’s damages, injuries, losses and harms, including
the following: ALL loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
73

1

death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent

2

would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and including medical

3

expenses and lost wages, as well as penalties, punitive or exemplary damages.

4

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Wrongful Death)
By ANNETTE LUCKEY Individually And As The Administrator Of The Estate
Of DANYELLE LUCKEY deceased and DERRICK LUCKEY
Against All Defendants
115.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
116.

ANNETTE LUCKEY individually and as the Administrator Of The

13

Estate Of DANYELLE LUCKEY and Derrick Luckey allege that Annette Luckey

14

is survived by her parents ANNETTE LUCKEY and DERRICK LUCKEY.

15

117.

PLAINTIFFS have sustained the loss of funeral and burial expenses;

16

and the reasonable value of household services that DANYELLE LUCKEY would

17

have provided.

18

118.

PLAINTIFFS also claim the following noneconomic damages: The

19

loss of Annette Luckey 's love, companionship, comfort, care, assistance,

20

protection, affection, society, moral support;

21

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Survival Action--Wrongful Death)
By GRACE EUNAE PARK Individually And As The Administrator Of The
Estate Of JOSH PARK
Against All Defendants
117.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
74

1

118.

Plaintiff The Estate Of JOSH PARK, By GRACE EUNAE PARK

2

as Personal Representative brings this “Survival Action”, pursuant California Code

3

of Civil Procedure Section 377.30.

4

119.

DEFENDANTS’ negligent and intentional conduct cause JOSH

5

PARK to be exposed to excessive radiation while in the area of Fukushima power

6

plant, causing his injuries, illness, damages and harms, and his death.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

120.

proximate cause of the decedent’s damages, injuries, losses and harms, including
the following: ALL loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before
death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent
would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and including medical
expenses and lost wages, as well as penalties, punitive or exemplary damages.
Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

DEFENDANTS’ negligent and intentional conduct are the actual and

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Wrongful Death)
By GRACE EUNAE PARK Individually And As The Administrator Of The
Estate Of JOSH PARK
Against ALL DEFENDANTS
119.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
120.

GRACE EUNAE PARK Individually And As The Administrator

Of The Estate Of JOSH PARK alleges that JOSH PARK is survived by wife
GRACE EUNAE PARK.
121.

PLAINTIFF GRACE EUNAE PARK has sustained two categories

of damages, economic and noneconomic. PLAINTIFF has lost the financial
support that her husband, JOSH PARK, would have contributed to her during

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
75

1

either the life expectancy that JOSH PARK had before his death or the life

2

expectancy of his last remaining heirs.

3

122.

PLAINTIFF GRACE EUNAE PARK has also sustained the loss of

4

gifts and benefits that she would have expected to receive from JOSH PARK.

5

PLAINTIFF GRACE EUNAE PARK has also sustained the loss of funeral and

6

burial expenses; and the reasonable value of household services that JOSH PARK

7

would have provided.

8

123.

9

PLAINTIFF also claims the following noneconomic damages:
1. The loss of JOSH PARK 's love, companionship, comfort, care,

10

assistance, protection, affection, society, moral support;

11

2. The loss of JOSH PARK the loss of the enjoyment of sexual

12

relations.

13
14

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Survival Action--Wrongful Death)
By KIRK GODAIR Individually And As The Administrator Of The Estate Of
RUBY PEREZ deceased
Against All Defendants
121.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
122.

Plaintiff The Estate Of RUBY PEREZ, By KIRK GODAIR as

Personal Representative brings this “Survival Action”, pursuant California Code of
Civil Procedure Section 377.30.
123.

DEFENDANTS’ negligent and intentional conduct caused RUBY

PEREZ to be exposed to excessive radiation during Operation Tomodachi, causing

28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
76

1

his injuries, illness, damages and harms, and her death from ovarian cancer. Ruby

2

Perez died on December 7, 2016 in San Diego CA.

3

124.

DEFENDANTS’ negligent and intentional conduct are the actual and

4

proximate cause of the decedent’s damages, injuries, losses and harms, including

5

the following: ALL loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before

6

death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent

7

would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and including medical

8

expenses and lost wages, as well as penalties, punitive or exemplary damages.

9

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Wrongful Death)
By KIRK GODAIR Individually And As The Administrator Of The Estate Of
RUBY PEREZ deceased, RACHEL MENDEZ and C. G.
Against All Defendants
124.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
125.

KIRK GODAIR Individually And As The Administrator Of The

18

Estate Of RUBY PEREZ alleges that RUBY PEREZ is survived by her husband

19

KIRK GODAIR, her daughter C. G. (a minor through her guardian ad litem Kirk

20

Godair) and her mother RACHEL MENDEZ.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

126.

PLAINTIFFS have sustained two categories of damages, economic

and noneconomic. PLAINTIFF C. G. and KIRK GODAIR have lost the financial
support that their Mother and spouse, RUBY PEREZ, would have contributed to
during either the life expectancy that Ruby Perez had before her death or the life
expectancy of his last remaining heirs.
127.

PLAINTIFFS have also sustained the loss of gifts and benefits that

her heirs would have expected to receive from Ruby Perez. PLAINTIFFS have
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
77

1

also sustained the loss of funeral and burial expenses; and the reasonable value of

2

household services that Ruby Perez would have provided.

3

128.

PLAINTIFFS also claims the following noneconomic damages:

4

1. The loss of Ruby Perez 's love, companionship, comfort, care,

5

assistance, protection, affection, society, moral support;

6

2. The loss of Ruby Perez 's training, guidance and the loss as a role

7
8

model for adulthood; and the loss of the enjoyment of sexual

9

relations.

10

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Survival Action--Wrongful Death)
By JANETH. MASINDE Individually And As The Administrator Of The Estate
Of BRENDA DOWNING deceased
Against All Defendants
125.

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
126.

Plaintiff The Estate Of BRENDA DOWNING, By JANETH.

19

MASINDE as Personal Representative brings this “Survival Action”, pursuant

20

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.30.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

127.

DEFENDANTS’ negligent and intentional conduct caused JANETH.

MASINDE to be exposed to excessive radiation during Operation Tomodachi,
causing his injuries, illness, damages and harms, and her death.

BRENDA

DOWNING died on February 23, 2016.
128.

DEFENDANTS’ negligent and intentional conduct are the actual and

proximate cause of the decedent’s damages, injuries, losses and harms, including
the following: ALL loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
78

1

death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent

2

would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and including medical

3

expenses and lost wages, as well as penalties, punitive or exemplary damages.

4

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

5
6
7
8
9

FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Wrongful Death)
By JANETH. MASINDE Individually And As The Administrator Of The Estate
Of BRENDA DOWNING deceased
Against All Defendants
129.

10
11

PLAINTIFFS hereby incorporate the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
130.

12

JANETH. MASINDE individually and as the Administrator Of The

13

ESTATE OF BRENDA DOWNING alleges that BRENDA DOWNING is

14

survived by her mother JANETH. MASINDE.
131.

15

PLAINTIFF has sustained the loss of funeral and burial expenses; and

16

the reasonable value of household services that BRENDA DOWNING would have

17

provided.

18

132.

PLAINTIFF also claims the following noneconomic damages: The

19

loss of BRENDA DOWNING 's love, companionship, comfort, care, assistance,

20

protection, affection, society, moral support;

21

Wherefore, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereinafter provided.

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
1.

For a judgment ordering, requiring and compelling the DEFENDANTS to
establish a fund in an amount not less than FIVE BILLION
($5,000,000,000.00) DOLLARS as to each DEFENDANT available to
advance and pay all costs and expenses for each of the PLAINTIFFS for
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
79

1

medical examination, medical monitoring, and treatment by physicians of

2

PLAINTIFFS’ choice; And for the payment of costs and expenses for each

3

of the PLAINTIFFS for medical examination, medical monitoring, and

4

treatment by physicians of PLAINTIFFS’ choice for their offspring who are

5

at risk for birth defects caused by genetic gene mutation.

6

2.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

For special and economic damages, including lost wages, for all Causes of
Action;

3.

For general and non-economic damages for all Causes of Action;

4.

For punitive damages for all Causes of Action;

5.

For prejudgment interest at the prevailing legal rate;

6.

For costs of the suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees; and

7.

For such other and further relief, including injunctive relief, as the Court
may deem proper.

Dated: August 18, 2017
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

17

By: /S/ PAUL C. GARNER
PAUL C. GARNER, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

18
19
20
21
22
23

Dated: August 18, 2017
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
LAW OFFICES OF BONNER & BONNER

24
25
26

By: /S/CHARLES A. BONNER
CHARLES A. BONNER
Attorney for Plaintiffs

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
80

1

Dated: August 18, 2017
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
EDWARDS KIRBY

2
3
4

By: /S/JOHN EDWARDS
JOHN EDWARDS
Attorney for Plaintiffs

5
6
7

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

8
9
10
11
12

The PLAINTIFFS hereby demand a jury trial of all issues as provided by
Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated: August 18, 2017
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

13

By: /S/ PAUL C. GARNER
PAUL C. GARNER, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

14
15
16

Dated: August 18, 2017

17

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
LAW OFFICES OF BONNER & BONNER
By: /S/CHARLES A. BONNER
CHARLES A. BONNER
Attorney for Plaintiffs

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Dated: August 18, 2017
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
EDWARDS KIRBY
By: /S/JOHN EDWARDS
JOHN EDWARDS
Attorney for Plaintiffs

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
81