Mares v. Pueblo County Detention Center et al

Filing 54

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE that the 34 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Fran Lepage be GRANTED. By Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang on 8/31/2017. (Attachments: unpublished case law) (nywlc1)

Robinson v. Roper, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010)
2010 WL 1407851

2010 WL 1407851
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
C.D. California.
Samuel ROBINSON, Plaintiff,
v.
Melissa ROPER, Defendants.
No. CV 06-3817-TJH (PJW).
|
Feb. 17, 2010.
West KeySummary
1

Constitutional Law
Mental Health
Mental Health
Disposition; Commitment
A civil detainee's First Amendment right to
freely practice religion was not violated when
staff members handled religious materials
kept in detainee's locker during an authorized
search for contraband. The civil detainee
failed to establish that it interfered with his
ability to practice his religion when the staff
removed a prayer rug, a Koran, and a Bible
from the detainee's locker and placed the times
on the floor. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
Cases that cite this headnote

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
PATRICK J. WALSH, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to
the Hon. Terry J. Hatter, Jr., United States District
Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order
05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. For the reasons discussed below, it
is recommended that Defendants' unopposed motion for
summary judgment be granted.

I.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
In 2006, Plaintiff Samuel Robinson was being housed
at Atascadero State Hospital (“ASH”) for care and
treatment under California's Sexually Violent Predator
Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code §§ 6600-6609.3. (Joslin Decl.
¶ 9.) Plaintiff had a reputation for making “pruno,” an
alcoholic beverage made with sugar, fruit, juice, and pieces
of bread. (Roper Decl. ¶ 5.) Alcohol is not allowed at ASH.
(Roper Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was placed on a treatment
plan aimed at preventing him from making pruno. (Roper
Decl. ¶ 6.) As part of that plan, Plaintiff was monitored
during meals to ensure that he did not take pruno-making
ingredients from the cafeteria and his room was searched
daily. (Roper Decl. ¶ 6.) Despite these efforts, Plaintiff
continued to make pruno, as evinced by the fact that
pruno and pruno-making materials were found in his
room and on his person on numerous occasions after the
plan was implemented. (Roper Decl. ¶ 7.)
On March 3, 2006, at lunchtime, Plaintiff approached
Defendant Gabriel Perez (nee Saldana), a psychiatric
technician, with a partially clenched hand and threatened
her, saying “The fun is just about to start around here.
You just wait and see because you all ain't seen nothing
yet!” (Perez Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Defendant Perez reported the
incident to Defendant Roper, a unit supervisor. (Perez
Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff became very argumentative and
shouted profanities at Roper when she confronted him
about the incident. (Roper Decl. ¶ 10.) Roper believed that
she smelled a “fruity prunolike odor” on Plaintiff's breath.
(Roper Decl. ¶ 13.) Roper directed Plaintiff to leave the
dining room, but he refused. Roper then summoned the
hospital police because she believed that it was possible
that Plaintiff would become violent. (Roper Decl. ¶ 11.)
Roper ordered a search of Plaintiff's room, which she
is authorized to do where, as here, she believes that a
patient is hiding contraband in his room. (Roper Decl.
¶¶ 12, 13.) The search was carried out in accordance
with the hospital's policies and procedures. (Roper Decl.
¶ 14.) Plaintiff was not allowed to be present during the
search because he was agitated and acting in a threatening
manner. (Roper Decl. ¶ 14.) Another patient designated
as a “ward government member” was present during the

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Robinson v. Roper, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010)
2010 WL 1407851

search, instead. (Roper Decl. ¶ 14.) Numerous prunomaking materials were found in Plaintiff's room and
confiscated. (Roper Decl. ¶ 15.) All of Plaintiff's remaining
property was left in his room in a “reasonably neat
and orderly fashion,” in accordance with hospital policy.
(Roper Decl. ¶ 16.)
*2 Plaintiff kept various religious items, including a
Bible, Koran, and prayer rug, in a locker in his room.
(Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) at 7. 1 ) A note on
the side of the locker warned that no one should touch his
Koran. (TAC at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that during the search
of his room all of his religious materials were taken out of
his locker and left in a pile on the floor, which greatly upset
and angered him. (TAC at 7.) Plaintiff refused to pick
them until two days later when Defendant Roper went to
Plaintiff's room and apologized to him for the items being
left on the floor after the search. (TAC at 7.)

II.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff filed this civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that Defendants Roper and Saldana violated his
First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion by
desecrating his Bible, Koran, and prayer rug. He also
sought injunctive relief.
Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that
Plaintiff failed to show that their conduct burdened his
ability to freely exercise his religion, and, in the alternative,
that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants
also argue that the claim for injunctive relief is moot
because Plaintiff has been transferred to another facility.
Plaintiff has not opposed the motion. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court concludes that Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment.

A. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. A “genuine issue” exists
only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The moving party in a summary judgment motion is
tasked with presenting the Court with admissible evidence
that establishes that there is no genuine, material factual
dispute and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A factual dispute is
“material” only if it might affect the outcome of the suit
under governing law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The
Court views the inferences it draws from the underlying
facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986).
Under Rule 56, the non-moving party also has a burden in
opposing a summary judgment motion. He must make a
“showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to [his] case, and on which [he] will bear the
burden of proof at trial ... since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of [his] case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322-23. However, the non-moving party's failure to
oppose a summary judgment motion does not relieve the
moving party of his burden to establish that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that he is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See Martinez v. Stanford,
323 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir.2003) (“[A] nonmoving
party's failure to comply with local rules does not excuse
the moving party's affirmative duty under Rule 56 to
demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law.”).

B. First Amendment: Free Exercise of Religion
*3 Plaintiff complains that Defendants violated his right
to freely exercise his religion by desecrating his religious
materials. This claim is without merit.
Civil detainees retain the protections afforded by the
First Amendment, including the right to freely practice
their religion. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 347, 348 (1987) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974)); see also Youngberg v. Romero, 457
U.S. 307, 322, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982)
(holding civilly detained persons must be afforded “more
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than
criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed

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Robinson v. Roper, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010)
2010 WL 1407851

to punish”). In order to establish a cause of action under
the Free Exercise Clause, a civil detainee must show that a
restriction that impeded his ability to practice his religion
was not “ ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.’ “ Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th
Cir.2008) (quoting Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107
S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)). 2
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary
judgment because Plaintiff has failed to establish, as he
must, that the alleged desecration of his religious materials
burdened his ability to practice his religion. See Sanders
v. Ennis-Bullock, 316 Fed. Appx. 610, 611 (9th Cir.2009)
(noting that, following Shakur, prisoners must still show
that a regulation substantially burdened the practice of
his religion). The Court agrees. Absent some evidence that
Defendants' conduct interfered with his ability to practice
his religion, summary judgment is warranted.
Plaintiff completely fails to show how having his religious
items placed on the floor constituted a substantial burden
on his ability to practice his religion. See Shakur, 514 F.3d
at 885 (holding proper focus of the free exercise inquiry is
whether the prison regulation substantially interfered with
a tenet the prisoner “sincerely believes ... is consistent with
his faith”); Hensley v. Kampshaefer, 2009 WL 69074, at *3
(W.D.Ky.2009) (concluding that prisoner did not allege
that officials' conduct prevented him from practicing his
religion where he only alleged that officials disrespected or

dishonored his religious materials). This was his burden.
See Sanders, 316 Fed. Appx. at 611. Plaintiff's failure
to present admissible evidence on this element of his
case mandates summary judgment for Defendants. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. 3

C. Qualified Immunity
Because the Court concludes that Defendants' conduct did
not violate the First Amendment, the Court need not and
does not reach Defendants' qualified immunity defense.
See Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.2002).

III.
RECOMMENDATION
For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS
RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order
(1) approving and adopting this Report and
Recommendation, and (2) granting Defendants' motion
for summary judgment.

All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2010 WL 1407851

Footnotes

1
2
3

Because the TAC is not verified, the Court is relying on allegations of fact contained therein only if they are not contradicted
by Defendants' declarations. See Shroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir.1995) (“A verified complaint may be
used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56.”).
Defendants argue that the proper inquiry is whether they “burdened the practice of [Plaintiff's] religion by preventing him
from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests .” (Motion at 12.) That is no longer the test. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir.2008).
Though Plaintiff does not explicitly allege that Defendants violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the Court has considered RLUIPA in granting Defendants' motion, as it must.
See Alvarez, 518 F.3d at 1157 (holding that a prisoner need not specifically allege that his rights were violated under a
specific statute, i.e. RLUIPA, where he alleged a violation of his free exercise rights). Like his First Amendment claims,
however, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Defendants violated his rights under RLUIPA, which is his burden,
and, therefore, Plaintiff does not have a cause of action under RLUIPA, either. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; see also
Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that plaintiff bears initial burden under RLUIPA of
showing the prison regulation constituted a substantial burden on the exercise of religious beliefs). Plaintiff's claims
for injunctive relief also fail because he has not raised any viable substantive claims and, even if he did, he has been
transferred to a new facility and, therefore, injunctive relief is no longer available.

End of Document

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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