Soto et al v. Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC et al

Filing 1

NOTICE OF REMOVAL by Remington Outdoor Company, Inc., Remington Arms Company, LLC from Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield, at Bridgeport Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0205-3478818, filed by Remington Outdoor Company, Inc., Remington Arms Company, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Whitcomb, Jonathan) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/15/2015: # 5 REPLACEMENT PDF) (Lynch, K.).

Case 3:15-cv-00068-RNC Document 1 Filed 01/14/15 Page 1 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
DONNA L. SOTO, ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF VICTORIA L. SOTO, et al.

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Plaintiffs,
VS.
BUSHMASTER FIREARMS
INTERNATIONAL, LLC a/k/a FREEDOM
GROUP, INC. a/k/a REMINGTON OUTDOOR
GROUP, INC, et al.
Defendants.

Civil Action No.

DEFENDANTS REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, LLC AND REMINGTON
OUTDOOR COMPANY, INC.’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL
Defendants Remington Arms Company, LLC and Remington Outdoor Company, Inc.
(collectively, the “Remington Defendants”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 and 1446,
notify this Court that they are removing the above captioned action currently pending in the
Superior Court of the Judicial District of Fairfield County (at Bridgeport) to the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut. In support, the Remington Defendants state as
follows:
INTRODUCTION
1.

On December 13, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against (1) the Remington

Defendants,1 (2) Camfour, Inc. and Camfour Holding, Inc. (collectively, the “Camfour

1

This Notice of Removal is filed on behalf of Defendants “Remington Arms Company, LLC”
and “Remington Outdoor Company, Inc.” For clarification, Defendant “Remington Arms
Company, LLC” was formerly known as “Remington Arms Company, Inc.” Thus,
“Remington Arms Company, Inc.” does not exist. Defendant “Remington Outdoor Company,
Inc.” was formerly known as “Freedom Group, Inc.” Thus, “Freedom Group, Inc.” does not
exist. “Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC” is also a named defendant but does not
exist as it was merged into and is only an unincorporated brand of Remington Arms
Company, LLC. Plaintiffs have also named or listed as “a/k/a” several other entities that do
1

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Defendants”),2 and (3) Riverview Sales, Inc. and David LaGuercia (collectively, the “Riverview
Defendants”), in the Superior Court of the Judicial District of Fairfield County (at Bridgeport).
2.
2014.

The Remington Defendants were served with the Complaint on December 15,

This notice of removal is timely filed within thirty (30) days after the Remington

Defendants were served.
3.

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut is the federal

judicial district encompassing Fairfield County, Connecticut. Therefore, venue lies in this Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
4.

Copies of all papers, pleadings, process, and orders, if any, served on the

Remington Defendants are attached as Exhibit A, including the Summonses and Plaintiffs’
Complaint (“Compl.”) and exhibits thereto.
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
5.

The basis for removal to federal court is diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1332, because: (1) Riverview Sales, Inc. is improperly joined, (2) there is complete
diversity of citizenship between Plaintiffs, on the one hand, and the diverse defendants, that is,
the Remington Defendants, the Camfour Defendants and David LaGuercia, on the other hand,
and (3) the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds seventy-five thousand
dollars ($75,000.00).

not exist: (1) “Remington Arms Co., LLC”; (2) “Remington Outdoor Group, Inc.”; (3)
“Remington Outdoor Company”; (4) “Remington Outdoor Co.”; (5) “Freedom Group, LLC”;
(6) “Freedom Group”; (7) “Bushmaster Firearms”; (8) “Bushmaster Holdings, LLC”; (9)
“Bushmaster Firearms, Inc.”; and (10) “Bushmaster Firearms Int., Inc.” These non-existent
entities have not been “properly joined and served as defendants[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
For diversity purposes, “the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be
disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1).
2

Plaintiffs have also named “Camfour Holding, LLP” as a defendant, but that entity does not
exist.
2

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6.

Remington Outdoor Company, Inc. (hereinafter, “ROCI”) is a corporation

organized under the laws of the state of Delaware with its principal place of business in North
Carolina. Thus, for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, ROCI is a citizen of Delaware and
North Carolina.
7.

Remington Arms Company, LLC (hereinafter “Remington”), is a limited liability

company organized under the laws of the state of Delaware with its principal place of business in
North Carolina.

Remington’s sole member is a Delaware limited liability company with its

principal place of business in North Carolina.3 Thus, for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
Remington is a citizen of Delaware and North Carolina.
8.

Camfour, Inc. and Camfour Holding, Inc. are corporations organized under the

laws of the state of Massachusetts with principal places of business in Massachusetts. Thus, for
the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the Camfour Defendants are citizens of Massachusetts.
The Camfour Defendants consent to removal. (Removal Consent, attached as Exhibit B.)4
9.

Riverview Sales, Inc. is a Connecticut corporation with its principal place of

business in Connecticut, and is therefore a citizen of Connecticut.5
10.

David LaGuercia “is or was” the federal firearms licensee of the Riverview Sales,

3

Remington’s sole member is FGI Operating Company, LLC (“Operating”), a Delaware
limited liability company with its principal place of business in North Carolina. Operating’s
sole member is FGI Holding Company, LLC (“Holding”), a Delaware limited liability
company with its principal place of business in North Carolina. Holding’s sole member is
ROCI.

4

Camfour, Inc. is owned by Camfour Holding, Inc., which is also a corporation organized
under the laws of Massachusetts with its principal place of business in Massachusetts.

5

When removal is based on improper joinder of defendants, it is unnecessary for the removing
defendants to obtain consent from the improperly joined defendants. In re Rezulin Prods.
Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Kaplan, J.); see Jernigan v. Ashland
Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[A]s a general rule, removal requires the
consent of all co-defendants. In cases involving alleged improper or fraudulent parties,
however, application of this requirement to improperly or fraudulently joined parties would
be nonsensical. . . .”).
3

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Inc. business. (See Compl. at ¶ 33.) LaGuercia is a Massachusetts citizen, and consents to this
removal. (Removal Consent, attached as Exhibit C.)
11.

All Plaintiffs are citizens of Connecticut. The Soto, Hockley, Sherlach, Pozner,

Rousseau, Wheeler, Lewis, Barden and D’Avino Plaintiffs are estates created under Connecticut
probate law. And Plaintiff Natalie Hammond, suing in “her individual capacity[,]” is a citizen of
Connecticut. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 35-44, Exhs. A through I, Fiduciary’s Probate Certificates of
each estate; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2); Civil Summons at p. 3.)
12.

As explained below, Riverview Sales, Inc. is improperly joined in this action. As

a result, Riverview Sales, Inc.’s citizenship should not be considered in determining whether
complete diversity exists among the remaining parties. Complete diversity exists between the
Plaintiffs, on the one hand, and the Remington Defendants, the Camfour Defendants and David
LaGuercia, on the other.
BACKGROUND
13.

Plaintiffs’ action arises from the tragic December 14, 2012 shooting at Sandy

Hook Elementary School by Adam Lanza. Plaintiffs allege that a Bushmaster XM15-E2S rifle
(the “firearm”) manufactured by the Remington Defendants was among the firearms used by
Adam Lanza to commit his heinous crimes. Plaintiffs allege that the Camfour Defendants
purchased the firearm from the Remington Defendants “prior to March of 2010[.]” (Id. at ¶ 152.)
14.

Plaintiffs allege that the Riverview Defendants purchased the firearm from the

Camfour Defendants “prior to March of 2010[.]” (Id. at ¶ 153.)
15.

Plaintiffs allege that Nancy Lanza, the mother of Adam Lanza, purchased the

firearm from the Riverview Defendants in March 2010. (Id. at ¶ 153.)

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16.

Plaintiffs allege that Adam Lanza took the firearm from a gun closet in the house

he shared with his mother on the morning of December 14, 2012. (Compl. at ¶ 154.)
17.

Plaintiffs assert thirty-three (33) Wrongful Death claims against the Remington

Defendants, the Camfour Defendants and the Riverview Defendants.6
IMPROPER JOINDER
18.

Under the doctrine of improper or “fraudulent joinder,” a defendant can remove to

federal court by invoking diversity jurisdiction when there is no reasonable basis for a cause of
action against the improperly joined, non-diverse defendant. Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998).

The doctrine is satisfied when the defendant demonstrates

“by clear and convincing evidence” that there is “no possibility” that the plaintiff “can state a
cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in state court.” Id. at 461. In other words,
“[j]oinder will be considered fraudulent when it is established that there can be no recovery
against the defendant under the law of the state on the cause alleged.” Whitaker v. Am.
Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citation and original brackets
omitted).
19.

This Court has stated that “the language ‘no possibility’ has been interpreted as

meaning no ‘reasonable possibility’ or ‘no reasonable basis.’” Doe v. Fed. Express Corp., No.
3:05-cv-1968, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31825, *4 (D. Conn. May 22, 2006) (Eginton, J.) (citing In
re Rezulin Prods. Liability Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d at n.4).
20.

There is no reasonable basis for a cause of action against Riverview Sales, Inc.

under the allegations of Plaintiffs’ Complaint because Riverview Sales, Inc. is immune from
Plaintiffs’ claims under federal law.
6

Plaintiff Natalie Hammond also asserts claims for Wrongful Death, see Counts 31-33, even
though she is not alleged to have died in the incident.
5

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21.

The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7901 et seq.

(hereafter, “PLCAA”), immunizes firearms sellers such as Riverview Sales, Inc. from claims for
damages and other forms of relief arising from the criminal misuse of firearms by third parties.
15 U.S.C. §§ 7902, 7903(5)(a).7

Congress declared that “[t]he manufacture, importation,

possession, sale, and use of firearms and ammunition in the United States are heavily regulated
by Federal, State and local laws” and those engaged in firearms sales “are not, and should not, be
liable for the harm caused by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse” firearms. 15 U.S.C. §§
7901(a)(4) & (a)(5).
22.

The operative language of the PLCAA states that “[a] qualified civil liability

action may not be brought in any Federal or State court” and “shall be immediately dismissed[.]”
15 U.S.C. § 7902. Congress defined a “qualified civil liability action” as:
[A] civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding
brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a
qualified product, or a trade association, for damages, punitive
damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution,
fines, penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or
unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or by a third
party ….”

7

Every federal and state appellate court to address the constitutionality of the PLCAA has
found it constitutional. See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 392-98
(2d Cir. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 3320 (2009); Ileto v. Glock, 565 F.3d 1126, 1138-42
(9th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S.Ct. 3320 (2010); District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 940 A.2d 163, 172-82 (D.C. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009); Estate of Kim
ex rel v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 388-92 (Alaska 2013); Adames v. Sheehan, 909 N.E.2d 742,
764-65 (Ill. 2009), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 1014 (2009). In addition, at least two trial courts
have issued opinions affirming the PLCAA’s constitutionality. See Estate of Charlot v.
Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 174, 182-86 (D.D.C. 2009); Gilland v.
Sportsmen’s Outpost, Inc., 2011 WL 2479693, *16-23 (Conn. Super. May 26, 2011). And
numerous courts have applied the PLCAA to dismiss lawsuits without confronting challenges
to its constitutionality. See, e.g., Al-Salihi v. Gander Mountain, Inc., 2013 WL 5310214
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2013); Jeffries v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. Jan.
8, 2013); Bannerman v. Mountain State Pawn, Inc., 2010 WL 9103469 (N.D.W.Va. Nov. 5,
2011); Ryan v. Hughes-Ortiz, 81 Mass.App.Ct. 90 (Mass. App. 2012).
6

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15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A). A “qualified product” includes a firearm as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§
921(a)(3)(A) & (B). 15 U.S.C. § 7903(4).
23.

Congress’ intent was to “preempt common-law claims, such as general tort

theories of liability.” Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). Congress created
six narrow exceptions to the definition of a “qualified civil liability action” and immunity under
the PLCAA:
(i)
an action brought against a transferor convicted
under section 924(h) of title 18, [United States Code,] or a
comparable or identical State felony law, by a party directly
harmed by the conduct of which the transferee is so convicted;
(ii)
an action brought against a seller for negligent
entrustment or negligence per se;
(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a
qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute
applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation
was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought,
including -(I)

any case in which the manufacturer or seller
knowingly made any false entry in, or failed to
make an appropriate entry in, any record required to
be kept under Federal or State law with respect to
the qualified product, or aided, abetted or conspired
with any person in making any false entry or
fictitious oral or written statement with respect to
any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or
other disposition of a qualified product; or

(II)

any case in which the manufacturer or seller aided,
abetted, or conspired with any person to sell or
otherwise dispose of a qualified product, knowing
or having reasonable cause to believe, that the
actual buyer of the qualified product was prohibited
from possessing or receiving a firearm under
subsection (g) or (n) of section 922 of title 18;

(iv)
an action for breach of contract or warranty in
connection with the purchase of the product;

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(v)
an action for death, physical injuries or property
damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture
of the product, when used as intended or in a reasonably
foreseeable manner, except that when the discharge of the product
was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense,
then such act shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any
resulting death, personal injuries or property damage; or
(vi)
an action or proceeding commenced by the
Attorney General to enforce the provisions of chapter 44 of title 18
[18 U.S.C. §§ 921 et seq.] or chapter 53 of title 26 [26 U.S.C. §§
5801 et seq.].
15 U.S.C. §§ 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi). Congress expressly provided that no provision of the PLCAA
is to be “construed to create a public or private cause of action or remedy.” 15 U.S.C. §
7903(5)(C).
24.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint appears to allege that Riverview Sales, Inc. created a

common law public nuisance, knowingly violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
(“CUTPA”) and negligently entrusted the firearm to Nancy Lanza. (See Compl. at Count Three,
¶¶ 174-194.) Plaintiffs’ claims do not fit within any of the six exceptions to PLCAA immunity.8
25.

One of the exceptions to PLCAA immunity is an action for negligent entrustment.

15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(ii). Congress defined negligent entrustment as follows:
As used in subpargraph (A)(ii), the term “negligent entrustment”
means the supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by
another person when the seller knows, or reasonably should know,
the person to whom the product is supplied is likely to, and does,
use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of
physical injury to the person or others.
15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, a negligent entrustment action against a

8

Plaintiffs allege an additional claim against the Remington Defendants, which appears to be a
product liability action based on a failure to design the firearm “with safety mechanisms that
prevent the weapon from being fired by someone other than the purchaser.” (Compl. at Count
One, ¶ 183.)
8

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firearm seller must involve a sale of a firearm by a seller to the same person who thereafter
“use[s]” the firearm to cause harm to himself or herself, or others. Here, Plaintiffs allege that
Riverview Sales, Inc. sold the firearm to Nancy Lanza. (Compl. at ¶ 153.) They allege that nearly
three years later Adam Lanza “used” the firearm to cause physical injuries to others. (See id. at
¶¶ 155, 166, 169, 170.) Plaintiffs cannot plead a negligent entrustment action against Riverview
Sales, Inc. under the definition provided by Congress.
26.

A second exception to PLCAA immunity is a claim against a seller for

“knowingly violat[ing] a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing” of firearms.
15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). Plaintiffs have not alleged that Riverview Sales, Inc. violated a
statute applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms in selling the firearm to Nancy Lanza.
Moreover, there is no reasonable basis on which such an allegation can be made because the sale
was not made in violation of an applicable firearms statute. See Report of the State’s Attorney for
the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36
Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012 at 36 (“All of the firearms . . .
involved in these cases were legally purchased by the shooter’s mother.”) (available at
http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/Sandy_Hook_Final_Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2014)).9
27.

The exception for “knowingly violat[ing] a State or Federal statute applicable to

the sale or marketing” of firearms does not encompass statutes of general application, but only
those statutes that “expressly regulate firearms” or “that clearly can be said to implicate the
purchase and sale of firearms.” City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 403 (2d

9

In analyzing improper joinder, “courts can look beyond the pleadings to determine if the
pleadings can state a cause of action.” Pampillonia, 138 F.3d at 461-62 (considering affidavit
to decide whether defendant was improperly joined); see Oliva v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
No. 3:05-cv-486, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35881, *4-5 (D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2005); In re
Rezulin Prods. Liability Litig., 133 F. Supp. at 281-82.

9

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Cir. 2008) (holding that New York criminal nuisance statute not “applicable to the sale or
marketing of firearms”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 3320 (2009); Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1135-36 (finding
it “likely that Congress had in mind only ... statutes that regulate manufacturing, importing,
selling, marketing, and using firearms or that regulate the firearms industry – rather than general
tort theories that happened to have been codified by a given jurisdiction.”); Estate of Charlot v.
Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 2d 174, 180-81 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that alleged
violation of District of Columbia Assault Weapons Manufacturing Strict Liability Act not within
the § 7903(5)(A)(iii) exception). The only statute referenced in Plaintiffs’ Complaint is CUTPA,
a statute that does not expressly regulate or clearly implicate the regulation of firearms. CUTPA
is a statute of general application that creates an action to recover an “ascertainable amount of
money or property” resulting from unfair or deceptive business practices. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42110g. CUTPA is not the type of statute “Congress had in mind” as a predicate statute for
immunity under § 7903(5)(A)(iii). See Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1135-36.10
28.

Plaintiffs’ allegation that Riverview Sales, Inc.’s “conduct” in selling the firearm

to Nancy Lanza “constituted a public nuisance” also does not fit within any of the six exceptions
to firearm seller immunity. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi); City of New York, 524 F.3d at
403 (ordering dismissal of nuisance claim as barred by the PLCAA); Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1126
(general tort theories of liability preempted by the PLCAA, including public nuisance claim).
Congress did not provide an exception to immunity under the PLCAA based on common law
public nuisance.
29.
10

Nor did Congress create an exception to immunity based on ordinary negligence.

CUTPA is also not the type of statute that can serve as the basis for a negligence per se claim
under Connecticut law, and thus cannot be the basis for a negligence per se claim within the
§ 7903(5)(A)(ii) exception to immunity. See generally Gore v. Peoples Savings Bank, 235
Conn. 360 (1995).
10

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Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1135-36 (“Congress clearly intended to preempt common law claims, such as
general tort theories of liability[,]” including “classic negligence” claims); Gilliand v.
Sportsmen’s Outpost, Inc., 2011 WL 2479693, *16 (Conn. Super. May 26, 2011) (“[I]t is clear
that … a ‘qualified civil liability action’ … includes cases where it is alleged that gun sellers
negligently cause harm.”); Estate of Kim ex rel. Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.2d 3d 380, 386
(Alaska 2013) (“The statutory exceptions [under the PLCAA] do not include general negligence,
and reading a general negligence exception into the statute would make the negligence per se and
negligent entrustment exceptions a surplussage.”).
30.

In sum, there is no reasonable basis for a cause of action against Riverview Sales,

Inc. Under the facts pleaded by Plaintiffs, Riverview Sales, Inc. is immune from liability under
the PLCAA and has been improperly joined as a defendant in this case.
AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
31.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the amount in

controversy is greater than $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
32.

Removing defendants must show that it appears “to a reasonable probability” that

the claimed amount in controversy exceeds the statutory jurisdictional threshold. Mehlenbacher
v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 2000).

If it is facially apparent from the

plaintiffs’ complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds the removal threshold, the amount
in controversy requirement is satisfied.
33.

Nine Plaintiffs assert thirty (30) wrongful death claims and one plaintiff asserts a

personal injury claim. Together, they seek (1) monetary damages (for e.g., “Terror”; “antemortem pain and suffering”; “destruction of the ability to enjoy life’s activities”; “destruction of
earning capacity”; “pain and suffering”; “severe, permanent and painful injuries”; “medical

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expenses”; and “death”), (2) punitive damages, (3) attorneys’ fees, (4) costs, and (5) injunctive
relief. (See Compl. at “WHEREFORE” clause; and e.g., Count One, ¶¶ 192-193 and Count
Thirty-three, ¶¶ 193-194.) Given the multiplicity of Plaintiffs and their multiple claims against
multiple defendants, the Complaint, on its face, seeks compensation far in excess of the
jurisdictional threshold of $75,000. (See Declaration of Counsel, attached as Exhibit D.)
34.

Because both of the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C

§ 1332 are satisfied, i.e., complete diversity of citizenship exists between the Plaintiffs, on the
one hand, and the Remington Defendants, the Camfour Defendants and David LaGuercia, on the
other hand, and the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum, this action is properly
removed.
35.

Prompt written notice of this Notice of Removal is being sent to Plaintiffs through

their counsel, and a copy of this Notice of Removal is being filed with the Clerk of the Superior
Court of the Judicial District of Fairfield County (at Bridgeport), as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1446(d).
WHEREFORE, Defendants, Remington Arms Company, LLC and Remington Outdoor
Company, Inc., hereby give notice that this action is removed from the Superior Court of the
Judicial District of Fairfield County (at Bridgeport) to the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut.
Dated: January 14, 2015.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jonathan P. Whitcomb
One of the Attorneys for Defendants,
Remington Arms Company, LLC, and
Remington Outdoor Company, Inc.

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Jonathan P. Whitcomb (CT15014) ([e-mail])
Richard Castiglioni (CT07280) ([e-mail])
Matthew C. Wagner (CT25926) ([e-mail])
Jonathan J. Kelson (CT26755) ([e-mail])
Diserio Martin O’Connor & Castiglioni LLP
One Atlantic Street
Stamford, Connecticut 06901
[phone]
[phone] fax

James B. Vogts (pro hac vice application forthcoming) [e-mail]
Andrew A. Lothson (pro hac vice application forthcoming) [e-mail]
Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP
330 North Wabash, Suite 3300
Chicago, IL 60611
[phone]
Attorneys for Defendants,
Remington Arms Company, LLC, and
Remington Outdoor Company, Inc.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of January, 2015, I caused to be served a copy of the
foregoing document on all counsel of record listed below, via the Court’s ECF system and
Federal Express.
Joshua D. Koskoff
Alinor C. Sterling
Katie Mesner-Hage
Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, P.C.
350 Fairfield Avenue
Bridgeport, CT 06604
Tel: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
/s/ Jonathan P. Whitcomb
One of the Attorneys for Defendants,
Remington Arms Company, LLC, and
Remington Outdoor Company, Inc.

14