GIBSON v. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA et al

Filing 11

GIBSON v. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA et al

Doc. 11

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 1 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

J O S EP H LEE GIBSON 9 6 6 Towlston Road M c L e a n , Virginia 22102, P . DAVID RICHARDSON 7 7 2 8 Georgetown Pike M c L e a n , Virginia 22102 Plain tiff, C a s e Number; 1:04CV00190 J u d g e : Honorable Gladys Kessler De ck Type: Pro se General Civil Da te Stamp: v. B O Y SCOUTS OF AMERICA, J O H N DOE, No. 1-7, N A T I O N A L CAPITAL AREA COUNCIL BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, and R I C H A R D ROE, No. 1-7, Defendants.

R U L E 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS T O PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT

COME NOW the defendants, Boy Scouts of America and the National Capital Area Council Boy Scouts of America, by counsel, and hereby move this Honorable Court to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (6)

Dockets.Justia.com

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 2 of 18

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In support of this Motion a Memorandum of Points and Authorities is attached. Please take further notice that the plaintiffs have the right to state their position in support of or in opposition to said Motion by filing whatever papers deemed appropriate. Failure to file a response within eleven (11) days of the date of service may result in the Court treating the Motion as conceded, or may result in the Court considering the defendants' Motion without hearing the plaintiffs' position.

BO Y SCOUTS OF AMERICA, And NA TIO NA L CAPITAL AREA COUNCIL B O Y SCOUTS OF AMERICA B y Counsel

T R IC H IL O , BANCROFT, McGAVIN, HORVATH & JUDKINS, P.C. 3 9 2 0 University Drive F a i rf a x , Virginia 22030-0022 ( 7 0 3 ) 385-1000 ( 7 0 3 ) 385-1555 (FAX)

_________________________________ John D. McGavin, Esquire D . C . Bar No. 475899 C o u n s e l for Defendants Boys Scouts of America N a t i o n a l Capital Area Council Boy Scouts of America

-2-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 3 of 18

C E R T IF IC A T E OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION T O DISMISS was served by mail, first class, postage prepaid on this 9 th day of June, 2004, to: J o s e p h Lee Gibson P l a i n t if f pro se 9 6 6 Towlston Road M c L e a n , Virginia 22102 P . David Richardson P l a i n t if f pro se 7 7 2 8 Georgetown Pike M c L e a n , Virginia 22102

John D. M cG av in

-3-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 4 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FO R THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA J O S EP H LEE GIBSON 9 6 6 Towlston Road M c L e a n , Virginia 22102, P . DAVID RICHARDSON 7 7 2 8 Georgetown Pike M c L e a n , Virginia 22102 P l a i n t if f s , C a s e Number; 1:04CV00190 J u d g e : Honorable Gladys Kessler De ck Type: Pro se General Civil Da te Stamp: v. B O Y SCOUTS OF AMERICA, J O H N DOE, No. 1-7, N A T I O N A L CAPITAL AREA COUNCIL BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, and R I C H A R D ROE, No. 1-7, Defendants. M E M O R A N D U M OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO THE PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT C O M E NOW, the Defendants, Boy Scouts of America, (hereinafter "Boy Sco uts") and National Capital Area Council Boy Scouts of America (hereinafter "NC AC "), by counsel, and in support of their Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 5 of 18

C o m p l a i n t pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, state a s follows: I. FACTS Th is Motion arises from the Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief and D a m a g e s filed by Plaintiffs, Joseph Lee Gibson (hereinafter "Gibson") and P. David R i c h a r d so n (hereinafter "Richardson") against the Boy Scouts and NCAC. It is u n disp ute d that Gibson was the Scoutmaster for Boy Scout Troop 869 in McLean, Virg inia whose sponsor was and is Trinity United Methodist Church (hereinafter "T rinity"), and that Gibson's adult-volunteer membership in the Boy Scouts ceased o n February 7, 2003. Richardson is the father of a scout member of Troop 869. In his Amended Complaint Gibson alleges that from 1996 until February 7, 2 0 0 3 he was a registered adult-volunteer member of the Boy Scouts of America. He f u rt h e r alleges that, in October 1998, he was selected to serve in the position as Sc outm aste r of Troop 869 by Trinity. Gibson alleges that NCAC and Richard Roes one through seven conducted a "secret meeting" to which he was not privy. Following this "secret meeting", he was n o t if ie d by NCAC that his membership in the Boy Scouts had been revoked. Gibson tim ely appealed the revocation to the Boy Scouts of America at its national hea dqu art e rs in Irving, Texas, and was represented by Richardson, an attorney. A f t e r this appeal process, Gibson alleges that defendants Boy Scouts and NCAC a lo n g with John Does one through seven convened a "secret meeting or review -5-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 6 of 18

boa rd at a location unknown to Plaintiff", and that this review board based their ratificatio n of his revocation upon a file, the contents of which he has never seen. Gibson and Richardson allege that the actions of Boy Scouts of America and N C A C , along with other defendants, have caused him substantial harm, and they asse rt five claims: Count I­Violation of Right of Fair Procedure by both plaintiffs, C o u n t II­Violation of Due Process and Right to Association by plaintiff Gibson, Count III ­ Breach of Implied Contract by plaintiff Gibson, Count IV - Breach of Implied C o n t r a c t by plaintiff Richardson, and Count IV­ Defamation by plaintiff Gibson. The plain tiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages as a result of the alleged v i o la t io n s against them. The plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action for any count, a n d the defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6 ). II. P R IN C IP L E S OF LAW AND ARGUMENT A. S t a n d a rd for Motion

F e d e r a l Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a pending a c t io n if the plaintiff's pleadings fail to state a cause of action for which relief may be g r a n te d . A court will dismiss a plaintiff's case under this Rule if "it appears beyond d o u b t that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would en title him to relief." Williams v. Holiday Inn Washington D.C. on the Hill , 295 F.Supp 2 d 27, 28 (D.D.C. 2003). This Rule is used to eliminate legally deficient pleadings from the court system. Id. at 29, n.1. -6-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 7 of 18

B.

C o u n t I Fails to State a Cause of Action on Behalf of Either Plaintiff f o r a Violation of the Right of Fair Procedure

Bo th plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated internal rules and regulations, a n d therefore a com m on law action lies in favor of the plaintiffs for a violation of their rights of "fair procedure." T h e Boy Scouts of Am e ric a is a completely private entity. Boy Scouts of A m e r i c a and Monmouth Council v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S.Ct. 1226 (2000). The entity has its own internal procedures and regulations regarding the registration of you th and adult members. A plaintiff who simply believes he has been wronged by this private organization is not entitled to seek redress through the court systems, b e c a u s e "when the constitution and bylaws of an unincorporated, voluntary ass ocia tion... are reasonable and valid and provide a mode for determining when r e li e f shall be given or denied to its own members by tribunals provided for therein, r e d r e s s therefore may not be sought in the courts." Allen v. Southern Pacific Co., et al. , 166 Or. 290, 306, 110 P.2d 933, 939 (1941). S om e jurisdictions have recognized a common law right to fair procedure in s i tu a t io n s where the plaintiff establishes "arbitrary exclusion or expulsion from m em be rsh ip in a `private entity affecting the public interest' where the exclusion or e x p u l s io n has substantial adverse econom ic ramifications." Kim v. Southern Sierra Co un cil Boy Scouts of America, 117 Ca. App. 4 th 743, 746 (2004). The plaintiffs do n o t allege, however, that the Boy Scouts is the type of quasi-public organization that

-7-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 8 of 18

wo uld fall within this doctrine. The Boy Scouts is a purely private entity, and without s u f fi c ie n t pleadings establishing its effect on public interest, the plaintiffs do not state a claim. Further, the plaintiffs have not alleged that the decision regarding revocation o f Gibson's membership adversely affected "an important, substantial economic intere st." Id. at 747. The plaintiffs allege only that Gibson was deprived of the many hou rs he spent voluntarily working for the organization, and there is no allegation that R i c h a r d so n was deprived of any assets as a result of this decision. As the Boys Sc outs is a social organization, Gibson's membership and leadership position did not con stitute an economic, contract, or property interest. Lee v. Snyder, 285 Ill. App.3d 5 5 5 , 559 (1996). There is no allegation that state that either plaintiff is unable to wo rk or to obtain financial benefits through other means. The plaintiffs therefore h a v e failed to state a cause of action for breach of the common law right of "fair proc edu re." Plain tiff Richardson has not stated any harm that he has suffered as a result o f this decision, and thus does not have standing to assert a claim for violation of fair p r o c e d u re . A plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" to have standing, which is "(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or h y p o t h e t i c al ." Friends of Tilden Park, Inc., v. District of Columbia, 806 A.2d 1201, 1 2 0 7 (D.C. App. 2002). Richardson was not affected adversely in any way by the d e c i s io n to revoke membership to Gibson; therefore he has no standing to sue. -8-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 9 of 18

C.

C o u n t II Fails to State a Claim for Violation of Due Process and R i g h t of Association for Plaintiff Gibson

G i b s o n alleges that the Boy Scouts and NCAC have violated his First A m e n d m e n t right to freedom of association, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to d u e process, when it terminated him as Scoutmaster of Troop 869. The law is clear t h a t a claim for a violation of a Fourteenth Amendment right can only be brought a g a i n s t a government or quasi-government entity that acts under color of state or f e d e ra l law. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830; 102 S.Ct. 2764 (1982). A claim f o r violation of the right to free association under the First Amendment can only be m a d e against a governmental entity, as the "guarantees under the First Amendment ... embrace only abridgments by federal or state governments." Havas v.

C o m m u n i c a t io n s Workers of America, 509 F.Supp. 144, 147 (N.D. NY 1981). In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640; 120 S.Ct. 2446 (2000), the S up re m e Court held that the Boy Scouts is "a private, not-for-profit organization" not s u b j e c t to public accommodation laws of the State of New Jersey. The Court held t h a t an application of New Jersey's public accommodation laws would have intruded into the group's internal affairs because it was not a government entity and not s u b j e c t to substantial governmental involvement. Id. at 659, 2457. Further, the Co urt stated that "the forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the gro up 's freedom of expressive association in the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints." Id. at

-9-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 10 of 18

6 4 8 , 2451. Since the Boy Scouts is a private organization and is not subject to s u b s t a n ti a l governmental involvement, Gibson's allegation that Boy Scouts and N C A C violated his First Amendment right to free association fails to state a claim upo n which relief can be granted. In Kohn, supra, the plaintiffs made claims for violation of their Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t rights of due process against a privately run high school, but the Court f o u n d that the employer was a private entity and not acting under color of state law w h e n it discharged the employees. In so holding, the Court stated that "the relevant q u e s t io n is not simply whether a private group is serving a `public function.' We have h e l d that the question is whether the function performed has been `traditionally the e x c l u s i v e prerogative of the state.'" Id. at 842, 2772. The ruling in Kohn was

c o n s i st e n t with the law when it held that the Fourteenth Amendment "applies to acts o f the states not to acts of private persons or entities." Id. at 837, 2769. In this case, G i b s o n alleges a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Am end m ent, against private, non-governmental entities, and therefore his pleading f a il s to state a claim for which relief can be granted. D. C o u n t III Fails to State a Claim for Breach of Implied Contract on B e h a l f of Gibson

Plain tiff Gibson alleges that an implied contract to allow him to associate with T r o o p 869 and to act as Scoutmaster was created between himself and defendants b a s e d on the consideration of his expenditure of time and money. He alleges that

-10-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 11 of 18

defe nda nts breached this contract when he was removed from his position, and s e e k s a return of the "fair value of the labor he devoted" in compensation. (Amended Co mp laint, 36 at p. 15). In determining the substantive law to apply in a diversity case, a "federal court m u s t follow the choice of law rules of the forum state." Felch v. Air Florida, Inc., et al. , 866 F.2d 1521, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The District of Columbia uses the

" g o v e rn m e n t a l interests" tests, which requires that a court identify the governmental p o l ic i e s at issue and determine which state's policies would be most advanced by h a v i n g its law applied. Raflo v. United States of America, et al., 157 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 ( D .D . C. 2001). In this case, to evaluate whether the District of Columbia or Virginia has a stronger interest, the court must consider: 1 ) the place where the injury occurred; 2) the place where the conduct c a u s i n g the injury occurred; 3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place o f incorporation and place of business of the parties; and 4) the place wh ere the relationship is centered. Id. at 5-6. W ith the respect to the alleged breach of an implied contract, the contract was alle ge dly created and entered into in Virginia, and the breach complained of occurred in Virginia. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants reside or do business in Virginia, a n d the relationship amongst the members of Troop 869 is centered in Virginia. T h e r e f o r e , Virginia substantive law applies. A s a matter of law, an implied legal obligation cannot arise from the rendering o f services which are gratuitous. Mullins v. Mingo Lime & Lumber Co., 176 Va. 44; 1 0 S.E. 2d 492 (1940); Nedrich v. Jones, 245 Va. 465; 429 S.E. 2d 201 (1993). A -11-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 12 of 18

v o l u n te e r renders his services without expectation of compensation. The position o f Scoutmaster of Troop 869, the subject of this litigation, is and was a purely volunta ry position. There is no basis in law for granting plaintiff a return of the "fair v a l u e " of the services that he freely and voluntarily donated. T he re is no allegation of any express or tacit agreement from which an implied c o n t r a c t arose; plaintiff simply stated that mutual promises existed, and that he gave c o n s i d e ra t io n for the promises. The Virginia courts, however, have consistently f o u n d that individuals who provide services voluntarily to one another, without p r o m i s e of payment, cannot recover on a claim of breach of implied contract. See M u l l in s, supra, Nedrich, supra. The plaintiff's bare legal conclusions that an implied c o n t ra c t existed is not sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted. G i b s o n alleges an implied contract between Boys Scouts, NCAC and himself, des pite his own admission that he was a volunteer to the "Scouting Movement" from 1 9 9 6 through February 7, 2003. Plaintiff alleges no agreement to pay him for his s e r v i c e s , nor any mutual promise that he would retain his membership and position a s Scoutmaster for any specified period of time. The pleadings are insufficient to e s t a b l is h an implied contract existed based on voluntary services, and the plaintiff fa ils to state a claim. E. C o u n t IV Fails to State a Cause of Action for Breach of an Implied C o n t r ac t on Behalf of Plaintiff Richardson

P lain ti ff Richardson alleges an implied contract between himself and the

-12-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 13 of 18

defe nda nts to allow Richardson the "expectation of continuing to enjoy his own and his sons' association with Plaintiff Gibson as Scoutmaster of Troop 869" and pa rticip atio n in selection of the Scoutmaster. (Amended Com p l a in t , ¶ 39 at p. 15). In consideration of these promises, Richardson alleges that he paid dues and made f in a n c i a l contributions to the Boy Scouts. As a result of Gibson's removal from his p o s i ti o n as Scoutmaster, Richardson claims he has been damaged. A s in Gibson's claim, Richardson voluntarily paid dues and made financial c o n t ri b u ti o n s to the Boy Scouts. An implied contract does not arise when the serv ices provided by one party were voluntary. Mullins, supra. Further, Richardson does not allege any direct negative action taken against h im personally, but instead argues he was damaged based on the actions taken a g a i n s t Gibson. Richardson has no standing to challenge the actions taken by defe nda nts that reflect only upon Gibson. Richardson alleges no "injury in fact" that is imminent as a result of Gibson's removal. Friends of Tilden Park, supra. No im pli e d contract existed because any donations made by Richardson were voluntary, a n d no agreement was reached between Richardson and the defendants which wo uld have justified the existence of a mutual promise. Richardson has not pled s u f fi c ie n t facts to establish the existence of an implied contract, and he has no s t a n d in g to assert a claim for damages based on actions taken by the defendants t h a t relate solely to Gibson. Therefore, Count IV fails to state a claim for which relief c a n be granted. -13-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 14 of 18

F.

C o u n t V Fails to State a Cause of Action for Defamation

G i b s o n alleges that Boy Scouts and NCAC made defamatory statements a b o u t him, and that "NCAC by or through one or more of the officials, employees or age nts named as Richard Roes" made statements to others that he (Gibson) was "un fit for Scouting mem b e r s h i p and unfit to be Scoutmaster of Troop 869." ( A m e n d e d Complaint, ¶ 44 at p. 16) The plaintiff further states that "upon information and belief" similar comments were made to parents of troop members. Id. Virginia law will apply under the District of Columbia choice of law provisions. U n d e r the governmental interests test, the alleged defamatory statements were m a d e and published in Virginia. The parties, as well as the persons to whom the state m ents were made, all reside or do business in Virginia. Therefore, Virginia has a greater interest in having its laws applied to the defamation action. See Raflo, supra. It is well established in Virginia that in issues of defam at i o n "[g]ood pleading r e q u ir e s that the exact word spoken or written must be set out in the declaration in h a e c verba...it must purport to give the exact words." Federal Land Bank v. Birchfield, 1 7 3 Va. 200, 210; 3 S.E.2d 405, 410(1939); Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Ass'n., 2 6 5 Va. 127; 575 S.E. 2d 858(2003). The plaintiff simply alleges that he was referred to as "unfit," and does not plead any specific statements or comments made by a defe nda nt. There is no detail given regarding any statements made to troop parents, a n d in fact it is simply alleged that the plaintiff believes such statements were made.

-14-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 15 of 18

Sta tem ents which might be defamatory, or which leave a listener to speculate as to the ir meaning, cannot be defam atory . Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 659, 665, 47 S.E.2 d 329, 332 (1948). T he Virginia Supreme Court has stated that it is "firmly established that pure e x p r e s s io n s of opinion are protected by both the First Amendment of the Federal C o n s t it u ti o n and Article I, §12 of the Constitution of Virginia and, therefore, cannot form the basis of a defamation action." Williams v. Garraghty, 249 Va. 224, 233; 455 S . E . 2 d 683(2002). The plaintiff does not allege any statements of fact that were m a d e against him, but only that he was referred to as "unfit," and that the defendant s t a te d Gibson "had not fully disclosed to Richardson, to the troop or to the affected com m unity the reasons for the revocation of his Scouting membership." (Amended Co m plain t, ¶ 45 at p. 17). There are no actual statements quoted in the amended com plain t, and no negative facts published against Gibson are recited. The Virginia S u p r e m e Court has stated that "speech which does not contain a provably false f a c tu a l connotation, or statements which cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating a c t u a l facts about a person cannot form the basis of a common law defamation actio n." Yeagle v. Collegiate Times, 255 Va. 293, 295, 497 S.E.2d 136, 137 (1998). G i b s o n alleges defamation based on statements expressed as opinions. F urthe r, Gibson fails to plead any particular statements or false factual allegations m a d e against him. Therefore, the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for which r e li e f may be granted based on a claim of defamation.

-15-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 16 of 18

III.

C O N C L U S IO N A s to all Counts pled by Gibson and Richardson in their Amended Complaint

f o r Injunctive Relief and Damages, the Defendants Boy Scouts and NCAC have s ho w n herein that as matter of law, these claims fail to state claims for which relief c a n be granted. W H E R E F O R E , the Defendants, Boy Scouts and NCAC move this Honorable Co urt to dismiss this Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Federal Civil P r o c e d u r e and such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

P o i n t s of Law and Authorities 1. 2. Alle n v. Southern Pacific Co., et al., 166 Or. 290, 110 P.2d 933 (1941) B o y Scouts of America and Monmouth Council v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S . C t . 1226 (2000) 3. 4. 5. 6. Fe de ral Land Bank v. Birchfield, 173 Va. 200, 3 S.E.2d 405 (1939) Fe lch v. Air Florida, Inc., et al., 866 F.2d 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1989) F lem i n g v. Moore, 221 Va. 659, 47 S.E.2d 329 (1948) F r i en d s of Tilden Park, Inc., v. District of Columbia, 806 A.2d 1201 (D.C. App. 2002) F u s t e v. Riverside Healthcare Ass'n., 265 Va. 127, 575 S.E. 2d 858 (2003) H a v a s v. Communications Workers of America, 509 F.Supp. 144 (N.D. NY 1981) Kim v. Southern Sierra Council Boy Scouts of America, 117 Ca. App. 4 th 743 -16-

7. 8.

9.

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 17 of 18

(2004) 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. L e e v. Snyder, 285 Ill. App.3d 555 (1996) M u l l in s v. Mingo Lime & Lumber Co., 176 Va. 44, 10 S.E. 2d 492 (1940) N e d r i c h v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 429 S.E. 2d 201 (1993) Ra flo v. United States of America, et al., 157 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001) R e n d e l l- B a k e r v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S.Ct. 2764 (1982) W illiams v. Garraghty, 249 Va. 224, 455 S.E.2d 683 (2002) W illiam s v. Holiday Inn Washington D.C. on the Hill, 295 F.Supp 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2003) Y e a g l e v. Collegiate Times, 255 Va. 293, 497 S.E.2d 136 (1998)

17.

B O Y SCOUTS OF AMERICA And NA TIO NA L CAPITAL AREA COUNCIL B O Y SCOUTS OF AMERICA B y Counsel

T R IC H IL O , BANCROFT, McGAVIN, HORVATH & JUDKINS, P.C. 3 9 2 0 University Drive F a i rf a x , Virginia 22030 ( 7 0 3 ) 385-1000 ( 7 0 3 ) 385-1555 Fax

_____________________________ John D. McGavin, Esquire D C B Number 475899 C o u n s e l for Defendants Boys Scouts of America and National Capital Area Council B o y Scouts of America

-17-

Case 1:04-cv-00190-GK

Document 11

Filed 06/09/2004

Page 18 of 18

C E R T IF IC A T E OF MAILING I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF P O I N T S AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF RULE 12 (b)(6) MOTION TO D I S M IS S was mailed, postage pre-paid on this 9th day of June, 2004 to: J o s e p h Lee Gibson P l a i n t if f pro se 9 6 6 Towlston Road M c L e a n , Virginia 22102 P . David Richardson P l a i n t if f pro se 7 7 2 8 Georgetown Pike M c L e a n , Virginia 22102

________________________ Jo hn D. M cG av in

-18-