RAMADAN v. BUSH et al

Filing 1

RAMADAN v. BUSH et al

Doc. 1 Att. 1

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 1 of 16

Advance Questions for General George W. Casey, Jr., U.S. Army Nominee for Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq
Defense Reforms More than 15 years have passed since the enactment of the GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly in your assignments as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Director of the Joint Staff and Commander of the Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command. The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense. Do you agree with these goals? Answer: Yes, the Goldwater-Nichols act has improved our joint operations. The goals of Goldwater-Nichols have been confirmed in the war on terrorism. Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals? Answer: Our fight in the global war against terrorism and our need to work with many agencies outside DoD as well as with coalition partners is creating a different security environment from the one that drove defense reform in 1986. I do believe that its time to update Goldwater-Nichols. The update should take into account the lessons learned since Goldwater-Nichols was implemented, and the current and projected security environments.

1

Dockets.Justia.com

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 2 of 16

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms? Answer: These reforms have significantly clarified operational chains of command and working relations among the military services and combatant commanders to enhance joint operations. Most importantly, they have clearly communicated the intent of Congress and the President that our warfighting efforts must be increasingly joint. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled? Answer: Yes. The general framework established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act is appropriate and existing policies and processes allow that role to be fulfilled. Relationships Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Multi-National Force - Iraq is a new command, established to oversee U.S., coalition, and Iraqi military and security operations in Iraq. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, Multi-National Force Iraq to the following offices: The Under Secretaries of Defense Answer: The Under Secretaries of Defense assist the Secretary of Defense in specific functional areas: Policy, Comptroller, Acquisition and Technology, Intelligence, and Personnel and Readiness. These Under Secretaries provide coordination and the exchange of information with Department of Defense components having collateral or related functions, which include the Combatant Commanders. Since the Multi-National Force - Iraq is a subordinate command to CENTCOM, I anticipate that my interaction with the Under Secretaries would be primarily at the direction of, and subject to the control of, the CENTCOM Commander. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense Answer: The Assistant Secretaries of Defense have functional responsibilities prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. Since the Multi-National Force-Iraq is a subordinate command to CENTCOM, I anticipate that my interaction with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense would be primarily at the direction of, and subject to the control of, the CENTCOM Commander. 2

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 3 of 16

If confirmed, I will fully support and execute all guidance issued by the Assistant Secretaries of Defense with respect to defense functions pursuant to their assigned duties and responsibilities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Answer: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, subject to the authority of the CENTCOM Commander, I will coordinate with and keep the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed in order to execute any assigned missions and accomplish the objectives of the President and the Secretary of Defense. The Secretaries of the Military Departments Answer: The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces they provide to the combatant commands. The responsibilities are outlined in Title 10 USC, Section 165, which notes that the Secretaries are subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, subject to the authority of the CENTCOM Commander, I will coordinate with the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure I have the forces necessary to execute assigned missions. The Service Chiefs Answer: While the Service Chiefs are not in the formal chain of command, they have a significant role. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs provide military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. Individually and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment that every joint commander can call upon; it is a privilege to work with them. If confirmed, subject to the authority of the CENTCOM Commander, I will coordinate with the Service Chiefs to ensure that I have the forces necessary to execute my assigned mission. The Commander, U.S. Central Command Answer: If confirmed as the Commander, Multi-National Force Iraq, my actions will be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Commander, U.S. Central Command, the combatant commander with overall responsible for current military operations in Iraq. I will work closely with the Commander, U.S. Central Command to execute his priorities in successfully accomplishing assigned missions.

3

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 4 of 16

The other combatant commanders Answer: As directed by the Commander, U.S. Central Command, I will coordinate with the other combatant commanders to accomplish missions assigned to the Multi-National Force Iraq. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Answer: The Commander, MNF-I, and the U.S. Ambassador will work closely in formulating strategic direction and ensuring unity of effort in support of the Interim Government of Iraq. Creating a secure and stable Iraq requires careful coordination of military operations and objectives with other elements of U.S. national power, including economic, political, diplomatic, and informational objectives. Establishing a close and effective working relationship with the new Ambassador and the government agencies working out of the Embassy is a priority goal for me. I will also serve as his principal military advisor. Qualifications If confirmed, you will be entering this important position at a critical time for United States interests in Iraq and the Middle East. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position? Answer: My military experience and education have prepared me to assume this position. I have over thirty years of military service, and have commanded soldiers from platoon to Division. My joint experience includes service as the Deputy Director for Politico-military Affairs (Europe), J5, Director of the J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, and most recently as the Director of the Joint Staff. My tour as a UN Military Observer in Cairo, Egypt, my assignment as the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia, and my oversight of 1st Armored Division forces in Kosovo afforded me an understanding of the challenges and complexities of multinational operations. My present assignment as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army gives me direct and daily involvement with the critical issues facing our military in meeting the challenges in Iraq and in fighting the Global War on Terrorism. My educational background includes a Bachelor of Science Foreign Service degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, a Masters degree in International Relations from Denver University, and service as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, all of which will be extremely valuable in discharging the duties as Commander of the Multi-National Force Iraq. If confirmed, I am confident that I possess the experience and knowledge to successfully address the difficult challenges of this position.

4

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 5 of 16

Major Challenges In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the first Commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I)? Answer: I see these major challenges facing MNF-I: 1. Implementing an effective transition from occupation to partnership with the Interim Iraqi government (IIG). 2. With the IIG and the Iraqi security forces, defeating the anti-Iraqi and antiCoalition forces. 3. Assisting the IIG in efficiently rebuilding the Iraqi security forces. 4. With the Iraqi security forces (ISF), provide an environment secure enough to permit elections in December/January. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? Answer: MNF-I is already developing plans to address these challenges. Broadly, I will focus on: leading the MNF counterinsurgency effort and establishing a strong relationship with the U.S. ambassador and IIG to bring all the elements of national power to bear in defeating the insurgency; building links to the IIG to rebuild the ISF and ensure close cooperation and coordination of military operations; and, in coordination with the IIG, the UN, and the U.S. Embassy, work to provide a secure environment for the yearend elections. Relationship to Commander, Multi-National Corps Iraq In addition to MNF-I, there is also a new organization designated MultiNational Corps-Iraq. What will the relationship of Commander, MNF-I be to the Commander, MNC-I? Will there be a division of responsibilities between the two commanders and, if so, please describe the responsibilities of each commander? Answer: The Commander of the MNF-I has a national strategic focus, with responsibilities for consulting and coordinating with the IIG, training Iraqi security forces, and political-military relations with the new U.S. Embassy Team and Coalition. The Commander, MNF-I maintains overall responsibility for military operations in Iraq.

5

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 6 of 16

A three-star general commands the Multi-National Corps. MNC-I is one of the major subordinate commands of MNF-I. The focus of the MNC-I Commander is the battle command (C2) of five subordinate commanders: two U.S. Divisions, two Multi-National Divisions (Poland and the UK), and one Multi-National Brigade (US). He will focus on full spectrum operations at the operational and tactical levels. Operation Iraqi Freedom From your perspective as the Director of the Joint Staff and then as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, preparing soldiers for deployment, and now as the prospective Commander of MNF-I, what are the top lessons learned with regard to Operation Iraqi Freedom? Answer: The U.S. Army has learned several important lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom. The major ones are the value of truly joint operations and the integration of coalition and Special Operations Forces. The Joint culture forged through continuous operations and aided by improved command and control networks enabled CENTCOM to operate as a cohesive Joint force. The merger of Special Operations Forces and conventional forces increased the range of coalition capabilities and enabled key victories. There are several areas, however, that we want to improve. Our information operations have provided mixed results and need significant improvement. The deployment of more than 40,000 reservists was hampered by cumbersome mobilization policies and by a force mix that put too many early deploying support units and high demand low-intensity units in the reserves. The Army is addressing these issues in its transformation efforts. What role do you foresee for forces from additional coalition nations in Iraq in the future? Answer: Joint Staff has the lead to work within the Inter-Agency process to coordinate contributions from current and potential coalition partners. There are 35 coalition countries with 22,000 personnel conducting stability operations and humanitarian relief in Iraq. In the near term, we are focusing our efforts on obtaining contributions for security forces for UN personnel and facilities in Iraq. United Nations Security Council Resolution On June 8, 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1546, recognizing the Interim Government of Iraq as the legal authority of a sovereign Iraq on June 30, 2004, and extending the UN mandate for one year for the presence of a multi-national force under the unified command of a U.S. military commander.

6

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 7 of 16

What will be the relationship of MNF-I to the United Nations? Answer: The UN will be interacting with the MNF-I in their efforts to establish democratic election processes and humanitarian reconstruction assistance. MNF-I will, with the ISF, provide security for these efforts. I envision the relationship between the MNF-I and the UN as a partnership pursuing the common goal of building a democratic Iraq. What will be the relationship of MNF-I to the Government of Iraq? Answer: The MNF-I and the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) will form a partnership to build a free and democratic Iraq. National, regional, and local coordinating bodies comprised of Iraqi Security Force and MNF-I leaders will be established. These bodies will be responsible for ensuring that there is coordination between Iraqi Security Forces and the MNF-I on all security policy and operations issues. This will promote unity of command in military operations in which Iraqi Forces are engaged with MNF-I. At the invitation of the Prime Minister of Iraq, I, or my designee, will attend and participate in the sessions of the Iraqi Ministerial Committee on National Security. What will be your chain of command? Answer: Commander, CENTCOM; Secretary of Defense; President. What will be your responsibilities with regard to providing security for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq? What coalition forces will be used for such a mission? Answer: The MNF will work to facilitate the protection of the UN Assistance Mission. The MNF-I will establish a separate brigade sized force under its command dedicated to providing security for UN personnel and facilities in Iraq. We strongly desire that this come from additional international contributions. Status of Forces Agreement There is no specific status of forces agreement (SOFA) between the United States and the Interim Government of Iraq. How will U.S. and coalition forces be protected from unwarranted prosecution under Iraqi law? What will be the status of contractors supporting U.S. and coalition military efforts after the transfer of sovereignty to the interim Government of Iraq?

7

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 8 of 16

Answer: Currently, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 17 provides immunity from Iraqi legal process for all U.S. and coalition forces. Order 17 also provides that coalition personnel are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their Parent States, and that they are immune from local criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction and detention. The current version of CPA Order 17 relies heavily on occupation law and this must be modified to extend protection beyond June 30, 2004, when the occupation ends. CENTCOM officials are currently consulting with the interagency and other members of the coalition on an amendment to CPA Order 17 that extends and expands protections for coalition military forces beyond June 30, 2004. In the draft amendment to CPA Order 17 currently under consideration, non-Iraqi contractors supporting U.S. and coalition military efforts shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract with a Sending State. When called into question, the Sending State is responsible for determining and certifying whether the contractor acted pursuant to the terms and conditions of the contract. Iraqi and Foreign National Detainees After the transfer of sovereignty, what will be the role of MNF-I in the detention and interrogation of Iraqi and foreign nationals detained during the course of authorized military operations? Answer: After the transfer of sovereignty, multinational forces will continue to have a role in detention and interrogation operations in support of the maintenance of security in Iraq. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, the Security Council specifically decided that multinational forces shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. Among those tasks is detention and internment where necessary for imperative reasons of security. What will be the role of Iraqi security forces in the detention and intelligence exploitation of persons detained during the course of authorized coalition military operations? Answer: MNF is currently working procedures to be able to integrate the selected Interim Iraqi Government Intelligence and related ministry elements in the Screening and Debriefing/Interrogation process. There are currently a number of procedural issues to be worked out to enable that to happen. Memorandums of Agreement must be drafted between Multi-National Force-Iraq and the respective Interim Iraqi Governmental organization to ensure that all parties understand and agree to areas of mutual concern.

8

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 9 of 16

What role will MNF-I have in the supervision and oversight of detainee operations conducted by the Iraqi security forces? Answer: Multi-National Force-Iraq is developing a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Justice for individuals held in pre-trial confinement. This MOA will address the support to be provided pending the development of the capacity by the Ministry of Justice to securely house these detainees. Transformation As a result of your previous positions, you are familiar with the requirements for the military services to support CENTCOM and MNF-I. Do current transformation initiatives support MNF-I's future requirements? Answer: I believe that Department of Defense and Army transformation initiatives support MNF-I's current and future requirements. In particular, actions directed by the Army Transformation Strategy and the Army Campaign Plan are enhancing Current Force capabilities and building toward the Future Force, now. Currently, the Army is focusing its efforts and institutional energies to enhance the effectiveness of and reduce risk to our frontline Soldiers at MNF-I and other global operations. The Army's focus and sense of urgency pervade all of the Army's transformation efforts. Based on a comprehensive analysis of lessons learned, operational experience, requirements for the GWOT, combatant commanders' needs, and a focused look at key areas, the Army has initiated numerous transformational initiatives. It has accelerated select Future Force capabilities where they could benefit the warfighter, now. The focus of Army transformation is reconfiguring Army maneuver formations to fight as smaller, more modular, more versatile, and joint interdependent units will enable the MFN-I to sustain operations over protracted campaigns and confer substantial benefits to Army forces in Iraq. How will the Army's transformation impact MNF-I's current operations? Answer: In Iraq, the benefits of Army transformation are clear, now. Today, the Army's first networked maneuver formation, a Stryker Brigade Combat Team, is demonstrating Future Force capabilities in Iraq. The Army converted the 3rd Infantry Division to a modular design while retaining its readiness for redeployment and return to Iraq. Army forces in Iraq fight with Good Enough Battle Command that provides enhanced situational awareness. The Rapid Fielding Initiative provides Soldiers coming to Iraq with 50 essential items to improve the effectiveness and protection. The Rapid Equipping Force has fielded a variety of commercial-off-the-shelf or near-term developmental items in response to warfighter requests -- from webcams to aid in weapons searches to Packbots that remotely search dangerous areas. These efforts reflect 9

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 10 of 16

the pace and scope of Army transformation efforts and demonstrate how Army transformation provides an immediate impact on MNF-I's current operations. Transformation efforts that will provide the most significant impacts to current MNF-I operations will be modular conversion of maneuver and support formations that retain the capabilities previously found at higher echelons. Over the next 3 years, the Army will build up to 15 additional brigades and select High Demand/Low Density capabilities required for global commitments. The Army will also convert all maneuver brigades and divisions within the Active and Reserve Components into standardized designs by 2010, with modularly converted units fighting in Iraq this year. To provide ready forces, the Army is also developing a force management process that leverages standard unit designs and rotational deployment cycles. This process pools available forces in the Active and Reserve Components into modular deployment packages for specific periods. Each unit within the force pool will undergo a structured progression of increased readiness over time, culminating in full readiness and availability to deploy. When this process is coupled with the balancing of AC and RC force structure, the Army will improve its capability to sustain combat operations over the mid-term. Army transformation efforts are synchronized with the planning, preparation, and execution of Army operations within the context of ongoing strategic commitments. The Army Campaign Plan framework has two complementary parts -- strategic posture and transformation. This framework enables a detailed, by fiscal year view of Army capabilities to build the Army program. This allows the Army to align resources and manage its budget against the plan and emerging needs. Further, this planning framework provides flexibility to adjust plan execution as required. What impact will the Army's transformation have on the large prepositioned stocks in the CENTCOM area of responsibility that are critical to force rotations for MNF-I? Answer: Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) and Army Regional Flotillas are and will continue to be integral components to the strategic responsiveness and reshaping of Army forces. Modernization of APS has always been affected by resource prioritization required by the entire Army. APS equipment has been older and less capable than equipment found in the Active Component. Currently, Army prepositioned stocks in USCENTCOM are serving their intended function -- providing an equipment base for rotational Army forces in Iraq. In 2003, as the VCSA, I approved the concept that supports some modernization of APS equipment as part of the Army reset initiative. The prepositioned stocks in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility will benefit from this program. At the same time, rotational "Stay Behind Equipment" packages at MNF-I are also benefiting from some 10

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 11 of 16

improvements in battle command and protection. The APS strategy continues to evolve to meet both changing threats and simultaneous implementation of Army Transformation concepts. The Army faces significant funding and resourcing challenges as it resets and converts to modular units, but it recognizes that APS must also be reset, repositioned, and modularized. End Strength You have a unique perspective as the current Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the prospective Commander of MNF-I. In your view, is the current end strength of the Army sufficient to meet the requirements to support the needs of MNF-I, as well as the Army's other global commitments? Answer: The Army is currently meeting the needs of MNF-I and our other global commitments. To continue to meet these commitments, we need more combat units and a better balance in low density/high demand capabilities between our active and reserve component forces. We are executing a plan to build ten new brigades by the end of FY 07 (with a potential for five more this decade). One has already been activated, and by this time next year, we will have four new brigades available for commitment. These new formations, along with force stabilization and a new unit rotational readiness cycle will begin to ease the stress on the force to a more sustainable OPTEMPO. NATO Peacekeepers Military forces from 17 NATO member nations are currently participating in peacekeeping operations in Iraq. What additional opportunities, if any, do you foresee for NATO forces to conduct operations in the MNF-I area of responsibility? Answer: MNF-I would welcome NATO involvement. A specific way NATO forces can contribute to operations in Iraq is to provide military training for the Iraqi army and to build the capacity of Iraqi military and defense civil servants and institutions. If confirmed, I will carefully examine this and other possibilities to enhance our peacekeeping operations in Iraq.

11

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 12 of 16

Force Protection If confirmed, what would be your top priorities in terms of force protection? Answer: My first priority in force protection will be to review the measures we take to prevent hostile actions against Department of Defense and Coalition personnel. This includes both offensive and defensive measures that allow us to preserve the lives of our soldiers while degrading opportunities for enemy forces. We will do our utmost to protect all Coalition personnel on our bases and while they are conducting operations and movements. If confirmed, I will insist that requirements for force protection equipment are met as quickly as possible, with tested and proven gear. This includes monitoring the aggressive programs we have already put in place to provide armoring for vehicles, fielding of items like unmanned aerial vehicles, counter mortar radars, and IED countermeasures. I will also work to take advantage of innovative new equipment begin developed by industry and incorporate new tactics and procedures. Finally, I will aggressively seek and employ solutions that defeat and prevent enemy combatants from attacking our soldiers. What additional steps, if any, need to be taken to ensure that personnel being assigned to Iraq are fully prepared and equipped for potential threats? Answer: Service members arrive in theater with an impressive amount of training that is specifically focused on the threats they will encounter in Iraq. For example, our Army Combat Training Centers have adapted to include these threats in training and challenge all units with realistic scenarios. This training continues all the way until their arrival in Iraq, under the most realistic challenges possible. I will continue to work with the services to ensure that the training and the preparation received by Service members fully prepare them for operations in Iraq. Additionally, as you know, with the great support of the Congress, billions of dollars have been applied to ensure that Service members have the most capable equipment available for their use. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the commanders on the ground to obtain their input and ensure they have the best equipment to accomplish the mission and protect our Service members. What steps are being taken to ensure that foreign nations that contribute forces to MNF-I have sufficient force protection capabilities? Answer: If confirmed, one of my first areas of interest will be to closely examine the capabilities of the other nations that make up the coalition. I will also ensure that we are sharing the lessons learned in force protection techniques and equipment.

12

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 13 of 16

Bandwidth on the Battlefield Unmanned assets, such as persistent unmanned aerial vehicles, require tremendous bandwidth capacity. Command and control, blue force tracking and movement of intelligence products also use significant amounts of bandwidth. What challenges do you anticipate in fully utilizing these important assets with the bandwidth currently available to you in Iraq? Answer: The full utilization of all radio emitting assets (Command and Control (C2), Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA), and Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR)) in the constrained area requires a constant effort to efficiently and effectively use the available bandwidth. Bandwidth requirements for deployed forces have increased ten fold with over 3.2 Gbps of SATCOM service alone supporting Central Region. By comparison, the available SATCOM bandwidth for Operation Desert Storm was 99 Mbps vs. the 3.2 Gbps as of April 2003 (source DISA Bandwidth report). The bandwidth challenges are most pronounced below the division level. Sexual Assaults in the Army You testified before the Personnel Subcommittee on February 25, 2004, along with the other service chiefs, about policies and programs for preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault in the armed services. At that time you testified that the Army Criminal Investigation Command was actively investigating, or had completed investigating, 86 sexual assault crimes reported in the CENTCOM area of operations. How many of the foregoing cases have been closed since you testified? Answer: The 86 sexual assault crimes that I referenced in my prior testimony consisted of 38 allegations of rape, 5 allegations of forcible sodomy, and 43 allegations of indecent assault. As of June 21, 2004, 5 cases remain open and under investigation (3 allegations of rape, 1 allegation of sodomy, and 1 allegation of indecent assault). Of the remaining cases, 52 were investigated and determined founded, 15 were determined as unfounded, and 14 were determined to have insufficient evidence to proceed. What measures have been implemented in the CENTCOM AOR to ensure prevention of sexual assaults and to respond appropriately to victims of assaults? Answer: If confirmed as the MNF-I Commander, I will support the recommendations from the Task Force on Sexual Assault Policies that establish a policy and program structure to provide support to sexual assault victims through Victim Advocates (VA) and Victim Advocate Coordinators (VAC). The Army is currently staffing a draft policy that 13

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 14 of 16

will place VACs at the Installation level while assigning as a collateral duty a minimum of two soldiers at battalion or equivalent level for all deployments. The installation VAC will have the responsibility of integrating and coordinating victim services at the installation while VA's will serve to assist victims of sexual assault in securing basic needs and serve as a companion throughout the medical, investigative and judicial process. Since this is considered a collateral duty, VA's must undergo training to deal with victims of sexual assault. The Army is aggressively pursuing implementing VAC's and VA's throughout the Army, to include deployments, by the end of the CY 04. CID will also provide investigative support and victim and witness protection as required. What steps will you take as Commander, MNF-I to prevent sexual assaults and to respond to victims of assaults? Answer: Commanders will ensure that all soldiers receive instructions on sexual assault prevention techniques and training. If confirmed, I will ensure that all MNF-I personnel will understand that sexual assault is a crime that is not tolerated and those who commit these crimes will be held accountable. I will also undertake efforts to improve awareness and education programs designed to prevent sexual assault, provide sensitive care for sexual assault victims, and conduct aggressive and thorough investigation of all reported sexual assaults. If confirmed, I will ensure a positive command climate in which victims of any crimes have complete confidence in their Chain of Command, and will report these crimes immediately. Iraqi Security Forces Lieutenant General David Petraeus, USA, has returned to Iraq as the Chief of Security Transition in Iraq, responsible for the recruiting, training, equipping and mentoring of Iraqi security forces. What will be your relationship with the Chief of Security Transition in Iraq? Answer: The Chief of Security Transition will work for the Commander, MNF-I. What relationship will General Petraeus' office have with the interim Government of Iraq? Answer: LTG Petraeus will work closely with the Minister of Defense for military issues along with the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), one of his subordinate commands. Likewise, he will work closely with the Minister of Interior for police issues with his other subordinate command, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team.

14

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 15 of 16

What are your views concerning the pace at which Iraqi security forces can assume responsibility for the internal and external defense of Iraq? Answer: This is a priority and the goal is to have the Iraqis increase their responsibility for internal and external defense of Iraq as soon as possible. We must ensure that the conditions are set for their success, and that we proceed at a pace that yields quality as well as quantity. Assistance to Contractor Security Personnel Private security companies in Iraq are performing some extremely important missions, including protecting military supply convoys and guarding critical facilities and personnel, and, in some cases, coming under hostile fire. What responsibilities, if any, should MNF-I assume in assisting contract security personnel, or other contractors, to include providing threat information, intelligence, military assistance, or appropriate medical assistance? Answer: Private security companies have proven instrumental in the reconstruction efforts within Iraq. Events over the past several months have clearly demonstrated their individual professionalism and courage under hostile action. Moreover, these companies have assisted not only in providing security to the Coalition Provisional Authority, but to a host of individuals, contractors, and Iraqi government officials. The Combatant Commander is responsible for the security and force protection for contractors accompanying the force. Integration and oversight of contractor-provided security services is a key task to be executed by the MNF-I. I am committed to this relationship and, if confirmed, will take measures to provide for their safety and wellbeing. Congressional Oversight In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress? Answer: Yes.

15

Case 1:07-cv-00297-PLF

Document 1-2

Filed 02/09/2007

Page 16 of 16

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power? Answer: Yes. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, MNF-I? Answer: Yes. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? Answer: Yes.

16