REPUBLIC OF PERU v. YALE UNIVERSITY

Filing 10

MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Improper Venue by YALE UNIVERSITY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Babbin, Jeffrey)

REPUBLIC OF PERU v. YALE UNIVERSITY

Doc. 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
REPUBLIC OF PERU,
Plaintiff,
v.

) )

)
) ) )

Case No. 1:08-cv-02109 (HHK)

YALE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

)
) )

DEFENDANT YALE UNIVERSITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND IMPROPER VENUE
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b )(2) and (3), for the reasons set forth in

the accompanying statement of points and authorities, Defendant Yale University moves to

dismiss the Complaint in its entirety on the grounds that the Cour lacks personal jurisdiction
over Defendant and that the District of Columbia is not the proper venue for adjudication of
claims between a Peruvian plaintiff and a Connecticut defendant over propert that has been

located in Connecticut for nearly a centuy.

Dockets.Justia.com

Respectfully submitted,

Date: March 4, 2009

Isl Jonathan M. Freiman

Jonathan M. Freiman (pro hac vice)
Isl Jeffrey R. Babbin

Jeffrey R. Babbin (D.C. Bar No. 384557)
WIGGIN AND DANA LLP

One Century Tower P.O. Box 1832 New Haven, CT 06508-1832 [phone] [phone] (fax)

jfreimanêwiggin.com jbabbinêwiggin.com
R. Scott Greathead (pro hac vice)
WIGGIN AND DANA LLP

450 Lexington Avenue Suite 3800 New York, NY 10017 [phone]
[phone] (fax)

sgreathead(fwiggin.com
Attorneys for Yale University

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
REPUBLIC OF PERU,
Plaintiff,
v.

) ) ) ) ) )

Case No. 1:08-cv-02109 (HHK)

YALE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

)
) )

DEFENDANT YALE UNIVERSITY'S STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND IMPROPER VENUE
Nearly a century ago, Hiram Bingham ("Bingham"), a professor at Defendant Yale

University ("Yale"), led scientific expeditions to the Incan ruins at Machu Picchu, Peru. During
his expeditions, Bingham collected samples of old Incan materials, primarily fragments of
ceramic, metal and bone, which were sent to Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, for
further scientific study.
Plaintiff Republic of

Peru ("Peru"), a foreign governent, claims that Yale's possession

of the arifacts in Connecticut is tortious, and that Yale has breached undocumented agreements
with Peru. None of

Peru's claims have any merit, and by waiting nearly a centuy to bring them,
Peru's

Peru has left the parties with no living witness to support or deny them. But even if

claims had any merit, and even if they were not time-bared, the District of Columbia would not
be the right place to resolve them. Neither pary is a resident of

the District, the disputed

property is located in Connecticut - as it has been for more than ninety years - and the
supposedly wrongful acts of the defendant took place in either Connecticut or Peru.

This Cour lacks personal jurisdiction over claims brought by an alien governent
against a Connecticut university seeking the retu of

property held in Connecticut. For much

the same reasons, venue is also improper here. If Peru wishes to pursue its stale and meritless
claims, it must do so in Connecticut.

ARGUMENT
I. There is no personal jurisdiction over Yale.

Personal jurisdiction is an "essential element" of a cour's jurisdiction, "without which
the cour is powerless to proceed to an adjudication." Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526

U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden of establishing personal
jurisdiction lies with the plaintiff, who "must allege specific acts connecting the defendant with
the foru." First Chicago Intl v. United Exch. Co. Ltd., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988);

see also Beusgens v. Brown, 567 F. Supp. 2d 26,31 (D.D.C. 2008). Peru does not, and canot,

meet that burden. This is a case brought by a foreign governent against a Connecticut
university - Peru's own allegations place the residence ofthe parties outside D.C., see CompL.
-i-i 6-7 - involving objects that were excavated in Peru, shipped to Connecticut, and reside in

Connecticut. In short, the District of Columbia has nothing to do with this dispute.
Under D.C. law, specific jurisdiction over a nomesident defendant is governed by the
long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423 (2008). See GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BeUsouth
Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000)~ Under that statute, a plaintiff

must plead "specific

acts connecting the defendant with the forum." First Chicago Intl, 836 F.2d at 1378. The D.C.
long-arm statute requires those acts to fall within one of seven enumerated categories. The only
categories with any conceivable connection to Peru's allegations are the requirement that the

defendant "transact() any business in the District," D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), and the

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requirement that the defendant "caus(e) tortious injury in the District," D.C. Code § 13423(a)(3)-(4). Moreover, specific jurisdiction is proper only if

the plaintiffs claims "aris(e)

from" the acts conferring jurisdiction over the defendant. D.C. Code § 13-423(b ).1 None of
Peru's claims arise from Yale transacting any business in the District or from Yale causing

tortious injur in the District. See Gonzalez v. Internacional de Elevadores, SA., 891 A.2d 227,
236 (D.C. 2006) (finding that tort allegedly occuring in Mexico did not arise from defendant's
contacts in D.C.); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia SA. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984) (Texas court canot exercise personal

jurisdiction over foreign corporation whose

helicopter, provided to joint venture between Peruvian governent instruentality and Texas

company, crashed in Peru).

Replevin, "wrongful retention," and conversion: The specific acts alleged to give rise
to Peru's claims for replevin and "wrongful retention" are that "Yale has wrongfully exercised
custody of

arifacts exported from Peru by Bingham," and that "(d)espite Peru's demand for

return ofthese arifacts. . . Yale has refused." CompL. -i 88. Similarly, the acts alleged to give
rise to Peru's conversion claim are that "Yale has refused Peru's demand that the arifacts. . . be
retured," has "failed to conduct research and studies to the extent agreed," and "has wilfully

exercised dominion and custody" over Peru's property. CompL. -i 100. None ofthese acts
"connect() the defendant with the (District of

Columbia)." First Chicago Intl, 836 F.2d at 1378.

1 Yale is not subject to general jurisdiction in D.C. for two separate and independent reasons.

First, Peru served Yale with the complaint in Connecticut - not the District of Columbia - which alone negates the possibilty of general jurisdiction. See Gonzalez v. Internacional De Elevadores, SA., 891 A.2d 227,233 (D.C. 2006). Second, the Complaint alleges no facts relevant to general jurisdiction, which may be exercised only where a non-resident corporate
defendant has "continuous and systematic" contacts with the foru, Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at

416, and is carying on a "consistent pattern of regular business activity" in the District of Columbia. Gonzalez, 891 A.2d at 233; see D.C. Code § 13-334(a) (2008).

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To the contrary, Plaintiff Peru alleges that Bingham excavated the arifacts in Peru, CompL. -i 20,

that Yale took possession of the arifacts in Connecticut, and that Yale kept them in Connecticut

after Peru demanded their retur. CompL. -i-i 22,23,28,34,39,57, 74, 75, 99, 118. Accordingly,
the Cour lacks personal jurisdiction over Yale with respect to the claims for replevin, wrongful

retention or conversion - Counts II, III, and iv. 2

Breach of contract: For its fifth cause of action, Peru alleges that it "allowed Yale to
conduct the Bingham expeditions and to export arifacts from Peru on the condition that the
arifacts and related materials be retured to Peru when Peru demanded." CompL. -i 104. It
fuher alleges that "Yale agreed to these terms," id., but "has breached its agreement with Peru

by failing to return the artifacts and related materials, despite Yale's (sic) demand for their

return." CompL. -i 106. Personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for a contract claim is possible only where the "prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with
the terms of

the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing" create a "substantial

connection" with the forum state. Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Peru's allegations do not satisfy this standard. The paries to
the alleged agreement are Yale and Peru, neither of

which is a D.C. resident. CompL. -i-i 6, 7,

106. Peru does not allege that either Yale or Peru traveled to D.C. to negotiate or execute the
supposed agreement. To the contrary, the alleged sources of

Yale's supposed promises appear to

include a "draft() memorandum of a working agreement" written by Bingham when he lived and
worked in New Haven, CompL. -i-i 14,41, and two executive decrees of

the Peruvian governent

2 Counts iX and X allege that Yale conspired with Bingham to commit "wrongful retention" and
conversion. See CompL. -i-i 133-160. Like the underlying torts that were the object of

the alleged

conspiracy, the civil conspiracy claims have no connection with D.C., and the Cour therefore lacks jurisdiction over Yale with respect to them.

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issued in Peru. CompL. -i-i 30,31,35,36. The terms of

the alleged agreements are similarly

devoid of connection to the District of Columbia, providing only that Bingham would excavate

the arifacts in Peru and send them to Connecticut, where they would be studied, and (according

to Peru) then retured to Peru. CompL. -i-i 30,31,33,36,38,41,43, 104. Finally, Yale's
putative failure to study the arifacts, or to retur some of them to Peru, also took place in
Connecticut. CompL. -i-i 32,34,39,57, 74, 75, 118. Accordingly, even if

there were an

agreement between Yale and Peru, it would not have a "substantial connection" with D.C., and
personal jurisdiction over Yale with respect to the claim for breach of contract (Count V) is
therefore lacking.
Unjust Enrichment: Count XIII asserts a violation of

the quasi-contractual doctrine of

unjust emichment. As with the breach of contract claim, the unjust emichment claim provides
no basis for personal jurisdiction over Yale in D. C. It alleges that Peru "conferred a benefit on

Yale by allowing Yale to export Peru's arifacts," that "Yale accepted and retained the benefit
under inequitable circumstances by its refusal to retu the arifacts," and that "Yale has been

unjustly emiched" by these actions. CompL. -i-i 162, 164, 165. These allegations describe neither

a tortious injury occuring in the District of Columbia nor an injury arising from business
transactions carried out there.

Breach of fiduciary duty: Peru alleges that its agreement to permit Yale to export the
artifacts to Connecticut established a fiduciary relationship between Yale and Peru, which Yale

breached by "fail(ing) to return the artifacts when Peru demanded. . . (and failing) to conduct
scientific research and studies ofthe arifacts as (it) had agreed." CompL. -i-i ILL, 113. The
paries to the alleged fiduciary relationship are Yale and Peru, neither of

which is a D.C. resident,

and Yale's alleged failure to study or retur the arifacts took place in Connecticut, where the

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arifacts have been for almost 100 years, and where they remain. CompL. -i-i 32, 34, 39, 57, 74,
75,99, l18. The acts giving rise to the fiduciary breach claims have no connection with the

District. The Cour therefore lacks jurisdiction over Yale for Peru's claim of breach of fiduciary
duty - Count VI.

Fraud and Fraudulent Misrepresentation: In support of these claims, Peru merely
repeats its breach of contract allegations that Yale "promised that it would conduct scientific

research and examinations of the arifacts and that it would retur the arifacts. . . when Peru
demanded," and that Peru "relied on Yale's representation, as evidenced by Peru allowing the. . . temporary exportation of arifacts." Peru then tries to paint these claims as torts by additionally
alleging that Yale "knew that (its) representation was false" and intended to deceive Peru.
CompL. -i-i 118, 121, 122, 127-130; cf. CompL. -i-i 104, 106. But Peru has not alleged (and could
not) that Yale made its supposed false representations in the District of

Columbia, or that Peru's

actions in reliance on those representations occurred anywhere but Peru. While Peru has failed

to plead the precise nature of those representations, when they occured, or where they were
made, any allegedly false representations made by Yale to Peru would have had to have occured

in either Connecticut or Peru. And Peru seems to think that its reliance was manifested in what it
calls the Third Decree - an "executive order" of

the Peruvian governent, issued (natually) in

Peru. CompL. -i-i 30, 42. As with the other claims, the acts giving rise to these claims fail to

connect Yale with the District of Columbia, and this Cour therefore lacks personal jurisdiction
over Yale with respect to Counts VII and Viii.3

3 Peru also claims that Yale conspired with Bingham to commit fraud and fraudulent
misrepresentation. CompL. -i-i 147-160. Like the underlying claims, the civil conspiracy claims have no connection with D.C. and the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction with respect to Counts XI and XII.

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***

For the reasons above, Peru's claims do not arise out of

the transaction of

business or

tortious injur within the District of Columbia, and the allegations thus fail to meet the

requirements for personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation set forth in the D.C. longar statute.4 For the same reasons, it is also clear that the exercise of

jurisdiction would not

comport with due process. The District of Columbia has no special interest in adjudicating a

dispute between a foreign governent plaintiff and a Connecticut university over property that
has been in Connecticut for almost a century. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286,292 (1980). The Governent of Peru is not a resident of the District of

Columbia,

and consequently the District has little or no interest in providing a forum for its claims.
Gonzalez, 891 A.2d at 235 n.l1. Accordingly, the exercise of

jurisdiction over Yale would

violate the constitutional minimum of "fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945); Gonzalez, 891 A.2d at 234-35 (finding no personal

jurisdiction over non-resident defendant where alleged tort was not "purposefully directed" at
anyone in D.C.). Peru's claims against Yale must therefore be dismissed for lack of

personal

jurisdiction. S

4 Peru also asserts causes of action for "Violation of Peruvian Law" and "Request for

Declaratory Judgment." These counts (Count I and Count XiV) make no allegations that are not made in the conversion, wrongful detention, replevin, contract, unjust emichment, fraud and fiduciary breach claims. They fail to establish personal jurisdiction over Yale for the same reasons that the counts they mimic fail to establish personal jurisdiction. S The Complaint alleges that Yale entered into agreements with the National Geographic Society Bingham's expeditions. See, e.g., CompL. -i-i 13, 18,61. ("NGS") regarding fuding for two of the NGS agreements, making the agreements irrelevant to But Peru's claims do not arise out of jurisdiction. Peru canot argue that Yale's agreements with NGS somehow subject Yale broadly to jurisdiction in D.C., as it is well established that "the mere existence of a contract between a foreign corporation and a local resident is not enough to establish minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy due process." Gonzalez, 891 A.2d at 236. That is especially true where, as here, the plaintiff "was not even a pary to the contract." Id.

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II. The District of Columbia is not the proper venue for this action.

The Complaint asserts that venue in the District of

Columbia is proper under 28 U.S.C.
judicial district in which a substantial par of

§ 1391

(a)(2), which authorizes venue in "a

the

events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." Peru has the burden of showing that

venue is proper in this Cour '''with respect to each cause of action.'" Elemary v. Philpp
Holzmann A.G., 533 F. Supp. 2d 144, 149 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d

1124, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) (emphasis added). The preceding section makes plain that Yale
does not have sufficient "minimum contacts" with D.C. to support personal jurisdiction for any
of Peru's claims. But even if

it were otherwise, it would be incontrovertible that "a substantial

par of

the events or omissions giving rise to the claim" did not occur in D.C. 28 U.S.c.

§ 1391(a)(2) (2008). In short, nothing in Peru's complaint suggests that any par, let alone "a
substantial par" of any of its stale, meritless claims arose from events or omissions in the
District of Columbia. Accordingly, venue is improper, and the suit should be dismissed.
III. This civil action must be dismissed or transferred.

Where a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, dismissal is proper. Ruhrgas,

526 U.S. at 584 (without personal jurisdiction, "the cour is powerless to proceed to an

adjudication"). Likewise, a cour may dismiss a suit where venue is improper. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a) (2008) ("The district cour of a district in which is fied a case laying venue in the

wrong division or district shall dismiss. . . such case. . ."). Here, where there is neither personal
jurisdiction over the defendant nor proper venue, this Court has two independent bases for

dismissal available. Following dismissal, Plaintiff could re-fie its suit in a district where
jurisdiction and venue are proper, if and when it sees fit to do so.

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Defendant acknowledges that dismissal is not the only remedy for a complaint filed

where personal jurisdiction is lacking or venue is improper. "(I)f it be in the interest of justice,"
the Court may cure such defects by transferring a case to a district court where venue is proper
and personal

jurisdiction exists. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see also Sinclair v. Kleindienst, 711 F.2d
venue or

291,293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Section 1406(a) can be used to remedy defects of

personal

jurisdiction); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465 (1962) ("Nothing in (the)
the section was intended to be limited to

language (of 1406(a)) indicates that the operation of

actions in which the transferring cour has personal

jurisdiction over the defendants.,,).6 The

District of Connecticut - where the Defendant resides and where the objects at issue have been

preserved for nearly a century - is the only such cour.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this civil action should be DISMISSED for lack of
personal jurisdiction and improper venue, or, if

this Court finds that it is in the interests of
Connecticut pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

justice, TRANSFERRD to the District of

628 U.S.C. § 1631 provides another mechanism for the transfer of an action fied where personal

jurisdiction is lacking. See Trujilo v. Willams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006) jurisdiction and venue were lacking); (transferring case under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 where personal Kieffer v. United States Parole Comm 'n, 1991 WL 251862, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1991) personal
(unpublished opinion) (transferring case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 for lack of

jurisdiction).
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Respectfully submitted,
Date: March 4,2009
Isl Jonathan M. Freiman

Jonathan M. Freiman (pro hac vice)
Isl Jeffey R. Babbin

Jeffrey R. Babbin (D.C. Bar No. 384557)
WIGGIN AND DANA LLP

One Century Tower P.O. Box 1832 New Haven, CT 06508-1832 [phone] [phone] (fax)

jfreimanêwiggin.com
j babbinêwiggin.

com

R. Scott Greathead (pro hac vice)
WIGGIN AND DANA LLP

450 Lexington Avenue Suite 3800 New York, NY 10017 [phone] [phone] (fax) sgreatheadêwiggin.com

Attorneys for Yale University

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