NU IMAGE, INC. v. DOES

Filing 5

MOTION for Order FOR LEAVE TO TAKE DISCOVERY PRIOR TO RULE 26(f) CONFERENCE by NU IMAGE, INC. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Kurtz, Nicholas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NU IMAGE, INC.

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DOES 1 – 6,500
)
)
Defendants.
)
_______________________________________)

CA. 1:11-cv-00301-RLW

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE DISCOVERY
PRIOR TO RULE 26(f) CONFERENCE
Plaintiff, by counsel, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully
moves this Court for leave to take discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) conference for the reasons
stated in its accompanying Memorandum of Points & Authorities filed contemporaneously
herewith. Plaintiff requests a hearing on this matter, if necessary, on an expedited basis.
Respectfully submitted,
NU IMAGE, INC.
DATED: February 17, 2011
By:

/s/
Thomas M. Dunlap (D.C. Bar # 471319)
Nicholas A. Kurtz (D.C. Bar # 980091)
DUNLAP, GRUBB & WEAVER, PLLC
1200 G Street, NW Suite 800
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: 202-318-0242
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NU IMAGE, INC.

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DOES 1 – 6,500
)
)
Defendants.
)
_______________________________________)

CA. 1:11-cv-00301-RLW

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE DISCOVERY
PRIOR TO RULE 26(f) CONFERENCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................1
II. ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................................2
A. PRECEDENTS OF COURTS ALLOWING DISCOVERY TO IDENTIFY DOE
DEFENDANTS ...................................................................................................................2
B. OVERVIEW OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS AND FACTUAL SHOWINGS.....5
1. Overview of the P2P Infringing Activity...................................................................6
2. Preliminary Identification of Defendants...................................................................8
C. PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN GOOD CAUSE FOR THE DISCOVERY AND HAS
MADE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING THAT DEFENDANTS DID INFRINGE
PLAINTIFF’S COPYRIGHTS..........................................................................................12
III. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................16

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ..........................................13
Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH & CO KG v. Does 1- 4,577,
Case No. 10-453 (D.D.C.) ...................................................................................................4
Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2008).........................4, 14
Arista Records, LLC v. Doe No. 1, 254 F.R.D. 480 (E.D.N.C. 2008) ..........................................15
Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-358, Case No. 10-455 (D.D.C.) .......................................4
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ....................4, 12
Cornered, Inc. v. Does 1-2,177, Case No. 10-1476 (D.D.C.)..........................................................4
Couch v. U.S., 409 U.S. 322 (1973) ..............................................................................................15
Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210 (11th Cir. 1992) .............................................................................3
Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Does 1-171, Case No. 10-1520 (D.D.C.) ............................................4
Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003) ..................................14
Entm’t Tech. Corp. v. Walt Disney Imagineering, No. Civ. A. 03-3546, 2003 WL 22519440
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2003).............................................................................................5
Equidyne Corp. v. Does 1-21, 279 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Del. 2003)................................................3
G2 Productions LLC v. Does 1-83, Case No. 10-41 (D.D.C.) ........................................................4
Gary v. United States, No. 3:97-CV-658, 1998 WL 834853 (E.D. Tenn.) ............................. 15-16
Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1980).........................................................................3
Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001) ..................................................................................14
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) .......................................................13
In re Gren, 633 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1980) .......................................................................................16

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Interscope Records v. Does 1-14, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D. Kan. 2008)......................................14
Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir 1987) .....................................................................15
Lions Gate Films, Inc., et al. v. Does 1-5, Case No. 05-386 (EGS) (D.D.C.) .................................4
Lynn v. Radford, No. 99-71007, 2001 WL 514360 (E.D. Mich. 2001) ........................................15
Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1980) ..............................................................................3
Maverick Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Does 1-1,000, Case No. 10-569 (D.D.C.).........................4
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Inc., et al. v. Does 1-10, Case No. 04-2005 (JR) (D.D.C.) .........4
Munz v. Parr, 758 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1985) ..................................................................................3
Murphy v. Goord, 445 F.Supp.2d 261 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)................................................................2
Pleasants v. Allbaugh, 208 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 2002)......................................................................15
Pod-Ners, LLC v. Northern Feed & Bean of Lucerne LLC, 204 F.R.D. 675 (D. Colo. 2002) .....13
Qwest Comm. Int’l, Inc. v. WorldQuest Networks, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 418 (D. Colo. 2003) ............5
Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John Does, No. 03-MC-33 2003 WL 22149380 (N.D. Cal. 2003).............4
Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ........................5, 14
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).......................................................................................15
Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)...................... 14-15
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, et al. v. Does 1-9, Case No. 04-2006 (EGS) (D.D.C.).4
UMG Recordings v. Does 1-4, 64 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 305 (N.D. Cal. March 6, 2006) ..3
UMG Recordings, et al. v. Does 1-199, Case No. 04-093 (CKK) (D.D.C.) ...................................4
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Doe, 2008 WL 4104214 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ..................................... 13-14
U.S. v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504 (W.D. Va. 1999) ...............................................................15
U.S. v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Kan. 2000) .................................................................15
U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)...............................................................................................15

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Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997) ......................................................................... 2-3
Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5,000, Case No. 10-00873 (D.D.C.)...........................................4
Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1999).................................................................2
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Does 1-6, 527 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007)..................................3, 5
West Bay One, Inc. v. Does 1- 2,000, Case No. 10-481 (D.D.C.) ..................................................4
Worldwide Film Entertainment LLC v. Does 1-749, Case No. 10-38 (D.D.C.) .............................4
Yokohama Tire Corp. v. Dealers Tire Supply, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 612 (D. Ariz. 2001).....................5

Statutes
17 U.S.C. §106...............................................................................................................................13

Miscellaneous
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 14.06[A] (2003) .....................14

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, a film producer and motion picture copyright holder, filed a Complaint to stop
Defendants from copying and distributing to others over the Internet unauthorized copies (files)
of the motion pictures for which it holds the exclusive licensing and copyrights, specifically “The
Expendables” (the “Motion Picture”). Using so-called “peer-to-peer” (“P2P”) file “swapping”
networks, Defendants’ infringements allow them and untold others unlawfully to obtain and
distribute for free the copyrighted Motion Picture that Plaintiff invested substantial sums of
money to make. Plaintiff sued Defendants as “Doe” Defendants because Defendants committed
their infringements using on-line pseudonyms (“user names” or “network names”), not their true
names. At this point, Plaintiff has only been able to identify the Doe Defendants by their
Internet Protocol (“IP”) address and the date and time of alleged infringement.
The only way that Plaintiff can determine Defendants’ actual names is from the non-party
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to which Defendants subscribe and from which Defendants
obtain Internet access, as this information is readily available to the ISPs from documents they
keep in the regular course of business. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks leave of Court to serve
limited discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference on several of the non-party ISPs solely to
determine the true identities of the Doe Defendants, as well as any other infringers that Plaintiff
identifies during the course of this litigation, as Plaintiff’s infringement monitoring efforts are
on-going and continuing. Therein, Plaintiff request that the Court enter an order allowing

1

Plaintiff to serve Rule 45 subpoenas on the ISPs immediately and that the ISPs shall comply with
the subpoenas.1
If the Court grants this Motion, Plaintiff will serve subpoenas on the ISPs requesting the
identifying information. If the ISPs cannot themselves identify one or more of the Doe
Defendants but can identify an intermediary ISP as the entity providing online services and/or
network access to such Defendants, Plaintiff will then serve a subpoena on that ISP requesting
the identifying information for the relevant Doe Defendants. In either case, these ISPs will be
able to notify their subscribers that this information is being sought, and, if so notified, each
Defendant will have the opportunity to raise any objections before this Court. Thus, to the extent
that any Defendant wishes to object, he or she will be able to do so.

II. ARGUMENT
A. PRECEDENTS OF COURTS ALLOWING DISCOVERY TO IDENTIFY DOE
DEFENDANTS
Courts routinely allow discovery to identify “Doe” defendants. See, e.g., Murphy v.
Goord, 445 F.Supp.2d 261, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (in situations where the identity of alleged
defendants may not be known prior to the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff should have an
opportunity to pursue discovery to identify the unknown defendants); Wakefield v. Thompson,
177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (error to dismiss unnamed defendants given possibility that
identity could be ascertained through discovery); Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 75-76 (2d
Cir. 1997) (plaintiff should have been permitted to conduct discovery to reveal identity of

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Because Plaintiff does not currently know the identity of any of the Defendants, Plaintiff cannot
ascertain any of the Defendants’ position on this Motion or serve any of the Defendants with this
Motion.
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defendant); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1992) (error to deny plaintiff’s
motion to join John Doe defendant where identity of John Doe could have been determined
through discovery); Munz v. Parr, 758 F.2d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 1985) (error to dismiss claim
merely because defendant was unnamed; “Rather than dismissing the claim, the court should
have ordered disclosure of Officer Doe’s identity”); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th
Cir. 1980) (“where the identity of alleged defendants [are not] known prior to the filing of a
complaint . . . the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the
unknown defendants”); Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83, 87 (7th Cir. 1980) (where “party is
ignorant of defendants’ true identity . . . plaintiff should have been permitted to obtain their
identity through limited discovery”); Equidyne Corp. v. Does 1-21, 279 F. Supp. 2d 481, 483 (D.
Del. 2003) (allowing pre-Rule 26 conference discovery from ISPs to obtain identities of users
anonymously posting messages on message boards).
In similar copyright infringement cases brought by motion picture studios and record
companies against Doe defendants, courts have consistently granted plaintiffs’ motions for leave
to take expedited discovery to serve subpoenas on ISPs to obtain the identities of Doe
Defendants prior to a Rule 26 conference. See Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Does 1-6, 527
F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007) (allowing plaintiffs to serve a Rule 45 subpoena upon Georgetown
University to obtain the true identity of each Doe defendant, including each defendant's true
name, current and permanent addresses and telephone numbers, email address, and Media
Access Control (“MAC”) address) (citing Memorandum Opinion and Order, UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. Does 1-199, No. 04-093(CKK) (D.D.C. March 10, 2004); Order, UMG Recordings v.
Does 1-4, 64 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 305 (N.D. Cal. March 6, 2006)).

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In fact, for the past few years, federal district courts throughout the country, including
this Court, have granted expedited discovery in Doe Defendant lawsuits that are factually similar
to the instant lawsuit.2 In these cited cases and others like them, copyright holder plaintiffs have
obtained the identities of P2P network users from ISPs through expedited discovery using
information similar to that gathered by Plaintiff in the instant case, and they have used that
information as the basis for their proposed subpoenas to these ISPs.
Courts consider the following factors when granting motions for expedited discovery to
identify anonymous Internet users: (1) whether the plaintiff can identify the missing party with
sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity
who could be sued in federal court; (2) all previous steps taken by the plaintiff to identify the
Doe Defendant; and (3) whether the plaintiff’s suit could withstand a motion to dismiss.
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also Rocker
Mgmt. LLC v. John Does, No. 03-MC-33 2003 WL 22149380, *1-2, (N.D. Cal. 2003) (applying
Seescandy.com standard to identify persons who posted libelous statements on Yahoo! message
board; denying request for expedited discovery where the postings in question were not libelous).
Plaintiff here is able to demonstrate each one of these factors.

2

Such cases include Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. Apr. 28,
2008) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Inc., et al. v. Does 1-10, Case No.
04-2005 (D.D.C.) (Robertson, J.); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, et al. v. Does 1-9,
Case No. 04-2006 (D.D.C.) (Sullivan, J.); Lions Gate Films, Inc., et al. v. Does 1-5, Case No. 05386 (D.D.C.) (Sullivan, J.); UMG Recordings, et al. v. Does 1-199, Case No. 04-093 (D.D.C.)
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); Worldwide Film Entertainment LLC v. Does 1-749, Case No. 10-38
(D.D.C.) (Kennedy, Jr., J.); G2 Productions LLC v. Does 1-83, Case No. 10-41 (D.D.C.) (KollarKotelly, J.); Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH & CO KG v. Does 1- 4,577, Case No.
10-453 (D.D.C.) (Collyer, J.); West Bay One, Inc. v. Does 1- 2,000, Case No. 10-481 (D.D.C.)
(Bates, J.); Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-358, Case No. 10-455 (D.D.C.) (Urbina, J.);
Maverick Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Does 1-1,000, Case No. 10-569 (D.D.C.) (Leon, J.);
Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5,000, Case No. 10-00873 (D.D.C.) (Urbina, J.); Cornered, Inc.
v. Does 1-2,177, Case No. 10-1476 (D.D.C.) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); Donkeyball Movie, LLC v.
Does 1-171, Case No. 10-1520 (D.D.C.) (Sullivan, J.).
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Overall, courts have wide discretion in discovery matters and have also allowed
expedited discovery when “good cause” is shown. See Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Does 1-6,
527 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007); Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273,
275-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Qwest Comm. Int’l, Inc. v. WorldQuest Networks, Inc., 213 F.R.D.
418, 419 (D. Colo. 2003); Entm’t Tech. Corp. v. Walt Disney Imagineering, No. Civ. A. 033546, 2003 WL 22519440, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2003) (applying a reasonableness standard: “a
district court should decide a motion for expedited discovery on the entirety of the record to date
and the reasonableness of the request in light of all of the surrounding circumstances”)
(quotations omitted); Yokohama Tire Corp. v. Dealers Tire Supply, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 612, 613-14
(D. Ariz. 2001) (applying a good cause standard).

B. OVERVIEW OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS AND FACTUAL SHOWINGS
As alleged in the complaint, the Doe Defendants, without authorization, used an online
media distribution system to download the copyrighted Motion Picture and distribute it to other
users on the P2P network, including by making the copyrighted Motion Picture for which
Plaintiff holds the exclusive sale and distribution rights available for distribution to others. See
Complaint at ¶12. In the instant case, Plaintiff has engaged Guardaley, Limited (“Guardaley”), a
provider of online anti-piracy services for the motion picture industry, to monitor this infringing
activity. See Declaration of Ben Perino (“Perino Decl.”), ¶¶ 1-2, 10 [attached to this Motion as
Exhibit A]; see also Declaration of Daniel Arheidt (“Arheidt Decl.”) ¶ 1, 6-7 [attached to this
Motion as Exhibit B].

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1. Overview of the P2P Infringing Activity
The Internet is a vast collection of interconnected computers and computer networks that
communicate with each other. Perino Decl., ¶ 4. It allows hundreds of millions of people
around the world to freely and easily exchange ideas and information, including academic
research, literary works, financial data, music, audiovisual works, graphics, and an unending and
ever-changing array of other data. Id. Unfortunately, the Internet also has afforded opportunities
for the wide-scale infringement of copyrighted motion pictures. Id. Once a motion picture has
been transformed into an unsecured digital format, it can be copied further and distributed an
unlimited number of times over the Internet, without significant degradation in picture or sound
quality. Id.
To copy and distribute copyrighted motion pictures over the Internet, many individuals
use online media distribution systems or so-called P2P networks. Id. at ¶ 5. P2P networks, at
least in their most common form, are computer systems that enable Internet users to (1) make
files (including motion pictures) stored on each user’s computer available for copying by other
users; (2) search for files stored on other users’ computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of files
from one computer to another via the Internet. Id.
At any given moment and depending on the particular P2P network involved, anywhere
from thousands to millions of people, either across the country or around the world, unlawfully
use the P2P network to connect to one another’s computers to upload (distribute) or download
(copy) copyrighted material. Id. at ¶ 6. The P2P systems represent a “viral” distribution of
digital files: each user of the system who copies a digital file from another user can then
distribute the file to still other users and so on, so that copies of an infringing file can be
distributed to millions of people worldwide with breathtaking speed. Id.

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Further, a person who uses a P2P network is free to use any alias (or “network name”)
whatsoever, without revealing his or her true identity to other users. Perino Decl., ¶ 6. Thus,
while Plaintiff has observed the infringement occurring on the Internet, it does not know the true
identities of those individuals who are committing the infringement. Id.
Additionally, the P2P methodologies for which Guardaley monitored for Plaintiff’s
Motion Picture make even small computers with low bandwidth capable of participating in large
data transfers across a P2P network. Perino Decl., ¶ 7; Arheidt Decl., ¶ 4. The initial fileprovider intentionally elects to share a file using a P2P network. Id. This is called “seeding.”
Id. Other users (“peers”) on the network connect to the seeder to download. Id. As additional
peers request the same file, each additional user becomes a part of the network (or “swarm”)
from where the file can be downloaded. See id. However, unlike a traditional peer-to-peer
network, each new file downloader is receiving a different piece of the data from each user who
has already downloaded that piece of data, all of which pieces together comprise the whole. Id.
This means that every “node” or peer user who has a copy of the infringing copyrighted material
on a P2P network—or even a portion of a copy—can also be a source of download for that
infringing file, potentially both copying and distributing the infringing work simultaneously. Id.
This distributed nature of P2P leads to a rapid viral spreading of a file throughout peer
users. Perino Decl., ¶ 8; Arheidt Decl., ¶ 5. As more peers join the swarm, the likelihood of a
successful download increases. Id. Because of the nature of a P2P protocol, any seed peer who
has downloaded a file prior to the time a subsequent peer downloads the same file is
automatically a possible source for the subsequent peer so long as that first seed peer is online at
the time the subsequent peer downloads a file. Id.

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2. Preliminary Identification of Defendants
On behalf of Plaintiff, Guardaley engaged in a specific process utilizing its specially
designed software technology to identify direct infringers of Plaintiff’s copyrights using
protocols investigated by Guardley’s software on P2P networks. Arheidt Decl., ¶ 7; see Perino
Decl., ¶ 10. All of the infringers named as Doe Defendants were identified in the following way:
Guardaley software is connected to files of illegal versions of the Motion Picture. Arheidt Decl.,
¶ 8; see Perino Decl., ¶ 10. All infringers connected to those files are investigated through
downloading a part of the file placed on their computer. Id. This evidence is then saved on
Guardaley’s service. Id.
Once Guardaley’s searching software program identifies an infringer in the way
described herein for the Motion Picture for which Plaintiff owns the exclusive licensing and
distribution rights, Guardaley obtains the IP address of a user offering the file for download.
Arheidt, ¶ 9; see Perino Decl., ¶ 10. When available, Guardaley also obtains the user’s
pseudonym or network name and examines the user’s publicly available directory on his or her
computer for other files that lexically match Plaintiff’s Motion Picture. Id. In addition to the file
of the motion picture itself, Guardaley downloads or otherwise collects publicly available
information about the network user that is designed to help Plaintiff identify the infringer. Id.
Among other things, Guardaley downloads or records for each file downloaded: (a) the time and
date at which the file or a part of the file was distributed by the user; (b) the IP address assigned
to each user at the time of infringement; and, in some cases, (c) the video file’s metadata (digital
data about the file), such as title and file size, that is not part of the actual video content, but that
is attached to or contained within the digital file and helps identify the content of the file. Id.

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Guardaley then creates evidence logs for each user that store all this information in a database.
Id.
An IP address is, in combination with the date, a unique numerical identifier that is
automatically assigned to a user by its ISP each time a user logs on to or accesses the network.
Arheidt Decl., ¶ 10. Each time a subscriber logs on, he or she may be assigned a different (or
“dynamic”) IP address unless the user obtains from his/her ISP a static IP address. Id. ISPs are
assigned certain blocks or ranges of IP addresses by the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (“IANA”) or a regional internet registry such as the American Registry for Internet
Numbers (“ARIN”). See id. ISPs keep track of the IP addresses assigned to their subscribers at
any given moment and retain such “user logs” for a very limited amount of time, sometimes as
little as weeks or even days, before erasing the data they contain. Arheidt Decl., ¶ 10; Perino
Decl., ¶ 12. These user logs provide the most accurate—and often the only—means to connect
an infringer’s identity to its infringing activity. Arheidt Decl., ¶ 10.
Although users’ IP addresses are not automatically displayed on the P2P networks, any
user’s IP address is readily identifiable from the packets of publicly available data being
exchanged. Arheidt Decl., ¶ 11. The exact manner in which Guardaley determines a user’s IP
address varies by P2P network. Id.
An infringer’s IP address is significant because it is becomes a unique identifier that,
along with the date and time of infringement, specifically identifies a particular computer using
the Internet. Arheidt, ¶ 12. However, the IP address does not enable Guardaley to ascertain with
certainty the exact physical location of the computer or to determine the infringer’s identity. Id.
It only enables Guardaley to trace the infringer’s access to the Internet to a particular ISP. Id.
Subscribing to and setting up an account with an ISP is the most common and legitimate way for

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someone to gain access to the Internet. Id. An ISP can be a telecommunications service
provider such as Verizon, an Internet service provider such as America Online, a cable Internet
service provider such as Comcast, or even an entity such as a university that is large enough to
establish its own network and link directly to the Internet. Id.
Here, the IP addresses Guardaley identified for Plaintiff enable Guardaley to determine
which ISP was used by each infringer to gain access to the Internet. Arheidt Decl., ¶ 13.
Publicly available databases located on the Internet list the IP address ranges assigned to various
ISPs. Id. However, some ISPs lease or otherwise allocate certain of their IP addresses to other
unrelated, intermediary ISPs. Id. Since these ISPs consequently have no direct relationship—
customer, contractual, or otherwise—with the end-user, they are unable to identify the Doe
Defendants through reference to their user logs, but they can identify the intermediary ISP to
which that IP address has been allocated. Id. The intermediary ISPs’ own user logs, therefore,
should permit identification of the Doe Defendants. Id.
Guardaley determined that the Doe Defendants here were using ISPs listed in Exhibit C
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Take Discovery Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference, together with
various other ISPs operating both within and outside the District of Columbia, to gain access to
the Internet and distribute and make available for distribution and copying Plaintiff’s copyrighted
motion picture. Arheidt Decl., ¶ 13. A sample of the IP addresses for the Doe Defendants
Plaintiff has identified as of the date of this Motion are also attached to this Motion as Exhibit
C.3 Plaintiff specifically requests leave to conduct discovery on all of the Doe Defendants it has
been able to identify to date, as well as any other infringers that Plaintiff identifies during the

3

Exhibit C provides the Court with a random sampling of ten (10) IP addresses identified for
Doe Defendants for each Internet Service Provider Plaintiff has identified as providing services
to Doe Defendants that have infringed Plaintiff’s Motion Pictures.
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course of this litigation, as Plaintiff’s infringement monitoring efforts are on-going and
continuing. Perino Decl., ¶ 13; Arheidt Decl., ¶ 18.
Guardaley then downloaded the motion picture file, or a substantial part of it, and other
identifying information described above and created evidence logs for each Doe Defendant.
Arheidt Decl., ¶ 14; see Perino Decl., ¶ 10. Once Guardaley identified the ISP used by the Doe
Defendants to gain access to the Internet from the IP address, an e-mail was sent to the relevant
contact at each ISP informing them of the Doe Defendant’s IP address and the date and time of
the infringing activity. Arheidt Decl., ¶ 14. That e-mail message requested that each ISP retain
the records necessary to identify its subscriber who was assigned that IP address at that date and
time. Id. Once provided with the IP address, plus the date and time of the infringing activity, the
Doe Defendant’s ISPs quickly and easily can use their respective subscriber logs to identify the
name and address of the ISP subscriber who was assigned that IP address at that date and time.
Id.
Lastly, Guardaley confirms that the digital audiovisual files it downloaded are actual
copies of Plaintiff’s Motion Picture. Arheidt Decl., ¶ 16. It is possible for digital files to be
mislabeled or corrupted; therefore, Guardaley (and accordingly, Plaintiff) does not rely solely on
the labels and metadata attached to the files themselves to determine which motion picture is
copied in the downloaded file, but also to confirm through a visual comparison between the
downloaded file and the Motion Picture themselves. Id.
As to Plaintiff’s copyrighted Motion Picture, as identified in the Complaint, a member of
Guardaley watches a DVD copy of the Motion Picture provided by Plaintiff. Arheidt Decl., ¶ 17.
After Guardaley identified the Doe Defendants and downloaded the motion pictures they were

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distributing, Guardaley opened the downloaded files, watched them and confirmed that they
contain a substantial portion of the motion picture identified in the Complaint. Id.

C. PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN GOOD CAUSE FOR THE DISCOVERY AND HAS
MADE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING THAT DEFENDANTS DID INFRINGE
PLAINTIFF’S COPYRIGHTS.
First, Plaintiff has sufficiently identified the Doe Defendants through the unique IP
address each Doe Defendant was assigned at the time of the unauthorized distribution of the
copyrighted Motion Picture. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578-80.
These Defendants gained access to the Internet through their respective ISPs (under cover of an
IP address) only by setting up an account with the various ISPs. The ISPs can identify each
Defendant by name through the IP address by reviewing its subscriber activity logs. Thus,
Plaintiff can show that all Defendants are “real persons” whose names are known to the ISP and
who can be sued in federal court.
Second, Plaintiff has specifically identified the steps taken to identify Defendants’ true
identities. Plaintiff has obtained each Defendant’s IP address and the date and time of the
Defendant’s infringing activities, has traced each IP address to specific ISPs, and has made
copies of the Motion Picture each Defendant unlawfully distributed or made available for
distribution. Therefore, Plaintiff has obtained all the information it possibly can about the
Defendants without discovery from the ISPs.
Third, Plaintiff has asserted a prima facie claim for direct copyright infringement in its
Complaint that can withstand a motion to dismiss. Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that: (a) it
owns the exclusive rights under the registered copyright for the Motion Picture, and (b) the Doe

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Defendants copied or distributed the copyrighted Motion Picture without Plaintiff’s
authorization. See Complaint, ¶¶ 9-15. These allegations state a claim for copyright
infringement. See 17 U.S.C. §106(1)(3); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004) (“Teenagers and young adults who have access
to the Internet like to swap computer files containing popular music. If the music is copyrighted,
such swapping, which involves making and transmitting a digital copy of the music, infringes
copyright.”); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to copy violate plaintiffs’
distribution rights. Napster users who download files containing copyrighted music violate
plaintiffs’ reproduction rights”).
Here, good cause exists because ISPs typically retain user activity logs containing the
information sought for only a limited period of time before erasing the data. If that information
is erased, Plaintiff will have no ability to identify the Defendants, and thus will be unable to
pursue its lawsuit to protect its copyrighted work. Where “physical evidence may be consumed
or destroyed with the passage of time, thereby disadvantaging one or more parties to the
litigation,” good cause for discovery before the Rule 26 conference exists. Qwest Comm., 213
F.R.D. at 419; see also Pod-Ners, LLC v. Northern Feed & Bean of Lucerne LLC, 204 F.R.D.
675, 676 (D. Colo. 2002) (allowing discovery prior to Rule 26 conference to inspect items in
defendant’s possession because items might no longer be available for inspection if discovery
proceeded in the normal course).
Good cause exists here for the additional reason that a claim for copyright infringement
presumes irreparable harm to the copyright owner. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Doe, 2008 WL
4104214 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding good cause for expedited discovery exists in Internet

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infringement cases, where a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of infringement, there is no
other way to identify the Doe defendant, and there is a risk an ISP will destroy its logs prior to
the conference); Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 14.06[A], at
14-03 (2003); Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2003).
The first and necessary step that Plaintiff must take to stop the infringement of its valuable
copyrights and exclusive licensing and distribution rights is to identify the Doe Defendants who
are copying and distributing the Motion Picture. This lawsuit cannot proceed without the limited
discovery Plaintiff seeks because the ISPs are the only entities that can identify the otherwise
anonymous Defendants. Courts regularly permit early discovery where such discovery will
“substantially contribute to moving th[e] case forward.” Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 277.
Finally, Defendants have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the subscriber
information they provided to the ISPs much less in downloading and distributing the copyrighted
Motion Picture without permission. See Interscope Records v. Does 1-14, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1176,
1178 (D. Kan. 2008) (a person using the Internet to distribute or download copyrighted music
without authorization is not entitled to have their identity protected from disclosure under the
First Amendment); see also Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C.
Apr. 28, 2008) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding that the “speech” at issue was that doe defendant’s
alleged infringement of copyrights and that “courts have routinely held that a defendant’s First
Amendment privacy interests are exceedingly small where the ‘speech’ is the alleged
infringement of copyrights”); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (“computer users
do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their subscriber information because they have
conveyed it to another person—the system operator”); Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1–40,
326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“defendants have little expectation of privacy in

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downloading and distributing copyrighted songs without permission”); Arista Records, LLC v.
Doe No. 1, 254 F.R.D. 480, 481 (E.D.N.C. 2008); U.S. v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508
(W.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000). This is because a person can have no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he or she voluntarily communicates to third
parties. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
442-43 (1976); Couch v. U.S., 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d at 335; U.S.
v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000); U.S. v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
Although Defendants copied and distributed the Motion Picture without authorization
using fictitious user names, their conduct was not thus anonymous. Using publicly available
technology, the unique IP address assigned to each Defendant at the time of infringement can be
readily identified. When Defendants entered into a service agreement with the ISPs, they
knowingly and voluntarily disclosed personal identification information to it. As set forth above,
this identification information is linked to the Defendant’s IP address at the time of infringement,
and recorded in the ISP’s respective subscriber activity logs. Because Defendants can, as a
consequence, have no legitimate expectation of privacy in this information, this Court should
grant Plaintiff leave to seek expedited discovery of it. Absent such leave, Plaintiff will be unable
to protect its copyrighted Motion Picture from continued infringement.
Where federal privacy statutes authorize disclosure pursuant to a court order, courts have
held that a plaintiff must make no more than a showing of relevance under the traditional
standards of Rule 26. See Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885, 888 (D.C. Cir 1987) (court found
“no basis for inferring that the statute replaces the usual discovery standards of the FRCP . . .
with a different and higher standard”); Pleasants v. Allbaugh, 208 F.R.D. 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2002);
accord Lynn v. Radford, No. 99-71007, 2001 WL 514360, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Gary v.

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United States, No. 3:97-CV-658, 1998 WL 834853, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.); see also In re Gren, 633
F.2d 825, 828 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980) (“court order” provision of Fair Credit Reporting Act requires
only “good faith showing that the consumer records sought are relevant”) (internal quotation
omitted). Plaintiff clearly has met that standard, as the identity of Defendants is essential to
Plaintiff’s continued prosecution of this action.

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court should grant the
Motion for Leave to Take Discovery Prior to Rule 26 Conference and enter an Order
substantially in the form of the attached Proposed Order. Plaintiff requests permission to serve a
Rule 45 subpoena on the ISPs it has identified as of this date, and those it identifies in the future,
so that the ISPs can divulge the true name, address, telephone number, e-mail address, and MAC
address of each Doe Defendant that Plaintiff has identified to date, and those it identifies in the
future during the course of this litigation and an order that the ISPs shall comply with the
subpoenas. To the extent that any ISP, in turn, identifies a different entity as the ISP providing
network access and online services to the Doe Defendants, Plaintiff also seeks leave to serve, on
any such later identified ISP, limited discovery sufficient to identify the Doe Defendant prior to
the Rule 26 conference.
Plaintiff will only use this information to prosecute its claims. Without this information,
Plaintiff cannot pursue its lawsuit to protect its Motion Picture from past and ongoing, repeated
infringement.

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Respectfully submitted,
NU IMAGE, INC.
DATED: February 17, 2011
By:

/s/
Thomas M. Dunlap (D.C. Bar # 471319)
Nicholas A. Kurtz (D.C. Bar # 980091)
DUNLAP, GRUBB & WEAVER, PLLC
1200 G Street, NW Suite 800
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: 202-318-0242
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

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