FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., et al v. AEREOKILLER LLC, et al

Filing 39

Memorandum in opposition to re 36 Emergency MOTION to Stay Preliminary Injunction, 38 Emergency MOTION Judicial Notice re 37 Emergency MOTION for Reconsideration re 33 Memorandum & Opinion, 34 Preliminary Injunction, , 36 Emergency MOTION to Stay Preliminary Injunction filed by ALLBRITTON COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., CBS BROADCASTING, INC.,, CBS STUDIOS, DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC., FOX BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC., FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., GANNETT CO., INC., NBC STUDIOS LLC, NBC SUBSIDIARY (WRC-TV), LLC, OPEN 4 BUSINESS PRODUCTIONS LLC, TELEMUNDO NETWORK GROUP LLC,, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL NETWORK TELEVISION LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Julie A. Shepard, # 2 Objections to Defendants' Supplemental Evidence, # 3 Objections to Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Smith, Paul)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., et al.

Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00758-RMC
Hon. Rosemary M. Collyer

Plaintiffs,
v.
FILMON X, LLC, et al.
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY
THE INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL AND TO MODIFY THE GEOGRAPHIC
SCOPE OF THE INJUNCTION

2228470.4

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 2
I. FILMONX IS NOT ENTITLED TO A STAY OF THE INJUNCTION
PENDING APPEAL ..................................................................................................... 2
A. FILMONX HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED ANY LIKELIHOOD OF
SUCCESS ......................................................................................................... 2
B. FILMONX CANNOT SHOW THAT IT WILL SUFFER
IRREPARABLE INJURY ABSENT A STAY ................................................ 5
C. PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IF
FILMONX IS NOT ENJOINED AS THIS COURT ALREADY
FOUND ............................................................................................................. 8
D. THE PUBLIC INTEREST SUPPORTS A REFUSAL TO STAY THE
COURT’S INJUNCTION ORDER PENDING APPEAL ............................... 9
II. FILMONX’S REQUEST FOR THE COURT TO RECONSIDER THE
GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE INJUNCTION SHOULD BE DENIED .............. 10
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Apple Computer, Inc., v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)...................................................................................................10
Bailey v. Callaghan,
No. 12-11504, 2012 WL 3134338 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2012) ..................................................3
Barnstead Broad. Corp. v. Offshore Broad. Corp.,
869 F. Supp. 35 (D.D.C. 1994) ..................................................................................................2
Blankenship v. Boyle,
447 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1971) .................................................................................................2
CytoSport, Inc. v. Vital Pharms., Inc.,
617 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2009)......................................................................................3
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC,
915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012) .....................................................................................6
Hilton v. Braunskill,
481 U.S. 770 (1987) ...................................................................................................................2
James v. England,
226 F.R.D. 2 (D.D.C. 2004).......................................................................................................8
Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Nebara,
264 F. Supp. 2d 484 (S.D. Tex. 2002) .......................................................................................3
Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009) ...................................................................................................................2
Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co.,
No. 00-5361, 2001 WL 493266 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2001) .............................................................3
Olson v. Clinton,
630 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.D.C. 2009) .............................................................................................8
Salinger v. Colting,
607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).......................................................................................................10
Schoenbohm v. F.C.C.,
204 F.3d 243 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................8
Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Corp.,
64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995) .....................................................................................................6

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WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2012) ................................................................9
WPIX, Inc., v. ivi, Inc., No. 10-7415, 2011 WL 1533175 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2011) ....................10
STATUTES
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) ...........................................................................................................................3
17 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................................................................................................3
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) ........................................................................................................................2

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INTRODUCTION
The Court should deny FilmOnX’s motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending
appeal (the “Stay Motion”), with its accompanying request to modify the geographic scope of the
injunction, which is nothing more than an attempt to seek reconsideration of this Court’s prior
determination that the injunction should apply nationwide except in the Second Circuit.
In the Stay Motion, FilmOnX asks the Court for a free pass to continue its infringement
while it challenges this Court’s thorough and well-reasoned preliminary injunction order. But
FilmOnX has not come close to demonstrating that any of the relevant factors weigh in favor of a
stay. FilmOnX has not established a strong likelihood of success on appeal – to the contrary,
FilmOnX has simply recycled the same arguments that this Court rejected when it held that
based on the clear language of the Copyright Act, FilmOnX is violating Plaintiffs’ exclusive
right of public performance by retransmitting their copyrighted broadcast programming to the
public without permission.
FilmOnX claims that it will be irreparably harmed by an injunction because Aereo will
steal its customers. But even if this were true, the notion that FilmOnX should be allowed to
continue infringing because a competing company not before this Court is also infringing is
unsupportable. Moreover, FilmOnX’s claim that it will be driven out of business by the
injunction fails because, among other reasons, it is not supported by any evidence. Alki David
has publicly admitted it is not true, and it is undisputed that FilmOnX’s legal transmission of
non-broadcast programming and international business will not be impacted by the injunction.
In contrast, this Court has already found that the injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable
harm to the Plaintiffs, and FilmOnX has provided no colorable basis for the Court to reverse that

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finding. Finally, FilmOnX has offered no valid reason for this Court to reconsider its prior
determination that the public interest favors enjoining FilmOnX’s infringement.
ARGUMENT
I.

FILMONX IS NOT ENTITLED TO A STAY OF THE INJUNCTION PENDING
APPEAL
In deciding whether to stay an order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), a court

considers: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed
on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4)
where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); see also Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
“The first two factors . . . are the most critical. It is not enough that the chance of success
on the merits be better than negligible. . . . [M]ore than a mere possibility of relief is required.
By the same token, simply showing some possibility of irreparable injury fails to satisfy the
second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Even should Respondent show that irreparable harm would result without the imposition of a
stay, if Respondent has not provided a sufficient showing of likelihood of success on the merits
of the appeal, the stay will not be granted.” Barnstead Broad. Corp. v. Offshore Broad. Corp.,
869 F. Supp. 35, 39 (D.D.C. 1994) (citing Blankenship v. Boyle, 447 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1971)).
A.

FILMONX HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED ANY LIKELIHOOD OF
SUCCESS

FilmOnX’s contention that it is likely to succeed on appeal is merely a rehash of the same
arguments that the Court considered and rejected when it granted Plaintiffs’ preliminary
injunction motion. Courts have recognized that where, as here, the defendant seeking a stay

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“raises essentially the same arguments made in its original opposition to [the] motion for
preliminary injunction,” the standard for a stay pending appeal cannot be met. CytoSport, Inc. v.
Vital Pharms., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1084-85 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Bailey v. Callaghan, No.
12-11504, 2012 WL 3134338, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2012) (“Defendants’ rehashing of their
previous arguments does not establish more than a mere possibility of success on the merits.
This factor does not weigh in favor of granting a stay.”); see also Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Nebara, 264 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (S.D. Tex.
2002) (denying motion to stay where motion relied on the same arguments the court rejected
when it granted the preliminary injunction); Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson &
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., No. 00-5361, 2001 WL 493266, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 17,
2001) (denying motion to stay and noting that where the defendant “offers no new circumstances
to support its application for a stay [of a preliminary injunction] pending appeal,” granting the
motion would “effectively be a reconsideration and reversal” of the preliminary injunction).
This was not a close case on the merits. The Court found that “the provisions of the 1976
Act that protect Plaintiffs’ work are clear: FilmOn X’s service violates Plaintiffs’ ‘exclusive
right . . . to perform the copyrighted works publicly.’” Dkt. No. 33, at 25 (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
106(4)). It was not a “mistake,” as FilmOnX claims, for the Court to conclude that “the
particular technological system used by FilmOnX . . . is legally irrelevant.” See FilmOnX Stay
Mot. at 4. To the contrary, the Court’s conclusion that the inner workings of FilmOnX’s
technology is irrelevant was commanded by the statute, which states that it is a public
performance “to transmit . . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public, by means of any
device or process[.]” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). As the Court correctly found,
FilmOnX’s “convoluted process for relaying television signals” is a device or process used to

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make Plaintiffs’ copyrighted performances available to the public, and therefore falls within the
Copyright Act’s intentionally broad definitions of “transmit,” “device,” and “process.” Dkt. No.
33, at 25. FilmOnX’s belated attempts to introduce new evidence about the copies and
directories its system uses in the course of retransmitting live broadcast television programs over
the Internet is unavailing, since under the statute’s plain language FilmOnX’s system is
nonetheless a “device or process” that transmits copyrighted broadcast programming to the
public, infringing the Plaintiffs’ exclusive public performance right. See id. at 25-28.
FilmOnX claims that it has submitted new evidence because this Court supposedly did
not understand its technology and use of unique copies. FilmOnX Stay Mot. at 4-5. That
argument amounts to no more than saying FilmOnX’s technology is identical to Aereo’s, which
Plaintiffs accepted for purposes of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Court knew and
acknowledged this. Dkt. No. 33, at 4 n.4 (“There are some differences between FilmOn X’s
system and the system in Aereo, most notably minor distinctions in the sequence in which signals
are processed. . . . Nonetheless, the systems are essentially the same, and the parties agree that
there are no legally meaningful differences.”). Nonetheless, the Court decided that Cablevision
and Aereo should not be applied. Id. at 25. There was no misunderstanding of the technology.
Although FilmOnX insists that the D.C. Circuit could choose to follow Aereo and
Cablevision, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this is unlikely given that these cases are not
controlling and both commentators and judges — including this Court — have recognized that
their analysis is based on a misreading of the statute. See id. at 20. The mere existence of two
non-controlling, widely-criticized cases supporting FilmOnX does not create a strong likelihood
that the D.C. Circuit will reverse the injunction. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily —
perhaps dispositively — against a stay.

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B.

FILMONX CANNOT SHOW THAT IT WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE
INJURY ABSENT A STAY

This Court fully considered the parties’ arguments regarding irreparable harm and
concluded that Plaintiffs showed they will likely suffer irreparable harm if the FilmOnX service
is not enjoined and the balance of hardships tips in Plaintiffs’ favor. Id. at 29-32. Nothing in
FilmOnX’s Stay Motion warrants this Court drawing different conclusions now.
In its Motion, FilmOnX essentially repeats its same arguments it made earlier about the
harm to its business that it will supposedly suffer if enjoined from retransmitting Plaintiffs’
copyrighted programming. Compare Dkt. No. 31, at 25 (“Granting of an injunction now could
very well cripple FilmOn X’s business.”) with FilmOnX Stay Mot. at 8-9 (claiming loss of
market share to Aereo and revenues because FilmOnX cannot transmit Plaintiffs’ copyrighted
content if enjoined). This Court already rejected that argument, finding that “FilmOnX has no
cognizable interest in continuing to infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights and thus cannot complain of
the harm it will suffer if ordered to cease doing so.” Dkt. No. 33, at 32.
The only arguable nuance FilmOnX has added to its prior business-harm argument is its
claim that it will suffer harm specifically because it will not be able to continue to infringe while
Aereo’s infringing activities are still being challenged in other courts. FilmOnX Stay Mot. at 8.
FilmOnX’s argument boils down to the plea that it should be allowed to continue to infringe
because there is another infringing service in operation (Aereo) with which FilmOnX competes.
Id. In the height of irony, FilmOnX complains that Aereo will “steal” FilmOnX’s customers if
FilmOnX is enjoined. Id. FilmOnX’s arguments based on Aereo’s ongoing business should be
rejected.
First, it could not have escaped this Court’s notice that Aereo is currently in operation
given that FilmOnX relied extensively on Aereo’s existence in its Opposition to Plaintiffs’

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Preliminary Injunction Motion. See generally Dkt. No. 31. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that
the litigation against Aereo involves Transmit Clause challenges to a service that operates
technology that is purportedly identical to FilmOnX. Dkt. No. 33, at 4, n. 4 and 10-15.
Second, FilmOnX’s argument turns the principles of equity on their head and violates the
well-established tenet that an infringer cannot complain of the harm it will suffer if required to
cease infringing. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 33, at 32; Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller
Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express
Corp., 64 F.3d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1995). If FilmOnX’s logic were to apply, copyright holders
would never be able to obtain an injunction to stop an infringing service where there were
multiple infringers because the defendant could always claim it was competitively disadvantaged
in the market for pirated works. The fact that Aereo’s infringement is not stopped by this
Court’s Injunction Order provides no basis for this Court to stay its Injunction Order stopping
FilmOnX’s ongoing infringement, which as this Court and others — including Judge Nathan in
Aereo I — have found will cause irreparable injury. Dkt. No. 33, at 31-32 (citing cases).
Moreover, despite FilmOnX’s assertion that the Injunction Order will somehow put
FilmOnX out of business, the historical evidence shows otherwise. First, as this Court noted,
FilmOnX has other content partners and is “free to continue legal retransmission.” Dkt. No. 33,
at 32. Second, building on the non-infringing aspects of FilmOnX’s Internet television service,
FilmOnX expanded its operation within the Ninth Circuit based on its legal, non-infringing
content to include Seattle in August 2013. Shepard Decl., Ex. A. FilmOnX engaged in this
expansion even though it clearly could not (and to Plaintiffs’ knowledge does not) retransmit
Plaintiffs’ local copyrighted broadcast programming in Seattle as part of its Internet television
service due to the injunction in the Ninth Circuit, which was entered in December 2012.

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Third, Mr. David’s statements to this Court about the supposed harm FilmOnX will
suffer if it cannot retransmit Plaintiffs’ broadcast programming over the Internet (David Decl. ¶¶
7-10) are belied by his own public statements that FilmOnX does not need Plaintiffs’
programming in order to succeed. Declaration of Julie Shepard in Support of Plaintiffs’ Joint
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. No. 27-3 (“Shepard PI Decl.”), Ex. M (“Although
David talked tough after the Fox suit, he said today that his company ‘is temporarily ceasing to
retransmit the Network content’ — he says because consumers would prefer to receive
alternative programming such as BikiniTV. He adds: ‘We have better things to do than screw
around with ageing [sic], irrelevant free to air TV[.]’”).
Fourth, and correspondingly, the Southern District of New York issued an injunction
against FilmOnX’s predecessor (FilmOn), prohibiting them from streaming Plaintiffs’
programming over the Internet without a license, using purportedly different technology.
Notwithstanding the injunction, FilmOn continued to operate and developed relationships with
content providers whose programming it streamed over its website. See Shepard PI Decl. Ex. N
(stipulation by FilmOn acknowledging 2010 injunction); Declaration of Alkiviades David, Dkt.
No. 31-1, ¶ 16 (discussing other content providers on FilmOnX platform).
Fifth, a substantial amount of FilmOn’s business is international, none of which will be
affected by compliance with this Court’s order. See Shepard Decl. Ex. B ¶ 36 (Alki David CD
Cal Decl.) (“To date, the FilmOn mobile application has been downloaded about nine million
times worldwide. About 20,000 to 30,000 of those downloads were in the United States.”). In
light of this it is particularly telling that, while Mr. David claims that FilmOnX has invested, and
will lose, millions of dollars by stopping its illegal retransmission (David Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 9-10),
FilmOnX has not introduced a scintilla of the actual evidence that would support such a

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statement (e.g., FilmOnX’s actual books and records), if it were true. In fact, it would appear
that FilmOnX’s predominantly foreign business would be unaffected by an injunction that affects
only what programming may be retransmitted in the United States.
Sixth, and perhaps most glaring, FilmOnX does not provide a shred of evidence that it
suffered any harm — let alone irreparable harm — by being enjoined from infringing Plaintiffs’
copyrighted works in the Ninth Circuit for over eight months.
Finally, none of the “evidence” as to FilmOnX’s supposed irreparable harm is new or of
the nature that FilmOnX could not have brought it to this Court’s attention before. Hence, this
Court should not consider Mr. David’s declaration since FilmOnX has not provided any reason
why it could not have been presented along with its Opposition to the Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction. See Schoenbohm v. F.C.C., 204 F.3d 243, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(evidence that was “previously available” is not “new evidence” supporting reconsideration);
Olson v. Clinton, 630 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Even if evidence is newly raised, it is
not considered new evidence if it was previously available.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also James v. England, 226 F.R.D. 2, 7 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[A]rguments that should have been
previously raised, but are only raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration, will not be
entertained by this Court.”).
C.

PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IF FILMONX IS
NOT ENJOINED AS THIS COURT ALREADY FOUND

After fully considering the evidence submitted and the relevant legal authorities, this
Court determined that Plaintiffs had established that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in
at least four respects absent an injunction: “harm to their ability to negotiate with advertisers;
damage to their contractual relationships and ability to negotiate with authorized retransmitters;
interference with their propriety and licensed online distribution avenues, such as their own

8

websites, Hulu.com, and Apple’s iTunes; and the loss of control over the distribution and quality
of their copyrighted programs.” Dkt. No. 33, at 31.
FilmOnX asks this Court to reverse this finding. Notably, FilmOnX does not, and
cannot, argue that Plaintiffs are not likely to suffer these irreparable harms that the Court found.
To the contrary, FilmOnX argues that because Plaintiffs are already being irreparably harmed by
Aereo in these same ways, FilmOnX should not be enjoined. FilmOnX Stay Mot. at 9. Under
FilmOnX’s theory, increased, expanded and further infringement by FilmOnX causes no
cognizable irreparable harm to Plaintiffs. That is clearly wrong. One of the fundamental reasons
that injunctions are granted is to deter others from deciding to jump on the infringement
bandwagon by commencing to free ride on Plaintiffs’ copyrights:
The absence of a preliminary injunction would encourage current and prospective
retransmission rights holders, as well as other Internet services, to follow ivi’s
lead in retransmitting plaintiffs’ copyrighted programming without their consent.
The strength of plaintiffs’ negotiating platform and business model would decline.
The quantity and quality of efforts put into creating television programming,
retransmission and advertising revenues, distribution models and schedules — all
would be adversely affected. These harms would extend to other copyright
holders of television programming.
Continued live retransmissions of
copyrighted television programming over the Internet without consent would thus
threaten to destabilize the entire industry.
WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2012).
As this Court has found, Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm if FilmOnX is not
enjoined. The Injunction Order should remain in place.
D.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST SUPPORTS A REFUSAL TO STAY THE
COURT’S INJUNCTION ORDER PENDING APPEAL

The public interest does not support a stay of the Injunction Order. FilmOnX’s Stay
Motion merely rehashes the same technology and consumer demand arguments that FilmOnX
made in its Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion. Compare FilmOnX PI
Opp., Dkt. No. 31, at 26 (“FilmOnX merely provides the public with a service it increasingly

9

desires and demands: Internet access to media through a remote DVR.”); with FilmOnX Stay
Mot. at 10-11 (“there is a strong public demand for the technology services offered by
FilmOnX”). FilmOnX proffers no reason for this Court to reconsider its prior determination that
the public interest favors enjoining FilmOnX’s infringement. Indeed, none exists. As this Court
and others have found, “the public interest can only be served by upholding copyright
protections and correspondingly preventing the misappropriation of skill, creative energies, and
resources which are invested in the protected work.” Dkt. No. 33, at 32-33 (quoting Apple
Computer, Inc., v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1255 (3d Cir. 1983)); accord
WPIX, Inc., v. ivi, Inc., No. 10-7415, 2011 WL 1533175, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2011)
(denying motion to stay injunction of similar Internet infringing service; “Defendants offer no
theory as to why this Court, having found that they are in violation of Plaintiffs’ copyrights,
should discount the object of copyright law to ‘promote the store of knowledge available to the
public’ by ‘providing individuals a financial incentive to contribute to the store of knowledge’”)
(quoting Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2010)).
II.

FILMONX’S REQUEST FOR THE COURT TO RECONSIDER THE
GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE INJUNCTION SHOULD BE DENIED
FilmOnX’s request for a modification of the injunction to limit the scope of the

injunction to the D.C. Circuit is nothing more than a request for reconsideration of another issue
that was fully briefed and argued in Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Motion. As set forth more
fully in Plaintiffs’ Opposition to FilmOnX’s Emergency Motion for Reconsideration, this Court
should deny FilmOnX’s request to limit the scope of the injunction to the D.C. Circuit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny
FilmOnX’s request to stay the Injunction Order anywhere.

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Dated: September 12, 2013
/s/ Paul Smith
Paul Smith (D.C. Bar No. 358870)
[e-mail]
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001-4412
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Richard L. Stone (admitted pro hac)
[e-mail]
Julie A. Shepard (admitted pro hac)
[e-mail]
Amy Gallegos (admitted pro hac)
[e-mail]
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
633 West 5th Street, Suite 3600
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Fox Television
Stations, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation, and Fox Broadcasting Company
/s/ Robert Garrett
Robert Alan Garrett (D.C. Bar No. 239681)
Hadrian R. Katz (D.C. Bar No. 931162)
Christopher Scott Morrow
(D.C. Bar No. 491925)
Murad Hussain (D.C. Bar No. 999278)
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP
555 12th St., NW
Washington, DC 20004
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
James S. Blackburn (admitted pro hac)
[e-mail]
John C. Ulin (admitted pro hac)
[e-mail]
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP

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777 South Figueroa Street, 44th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs NBC Subsidiary
(WRC-TV) LLC, NBC Studios LLC,
Universal Network Television LLC, Open 4
Business Productions LLC, Telemundo
Network Group LLC, American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., Disney
Enterprises, Inc., Allbritton
Communications Company, CBS
Broadcasting Inc., CBS Studios Inc., and
Gannett Co., Inc.

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