FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., et al v. AEREOKILLER LLC, et al

Filing 52

Emergency MOTION to Modify THE SCOPE OF THE INJUNCTION by FILMON X, LLC, FILMON.COM, INC,, FILMON.TV NETWORKS, INC.,, FILMON.TV, INC. (Attachments: # 1 Request for Judicial Notice, # 2 Declaration of Ryan Baker, # 3 Exhibit to Baker Declaration)(Baker, Ryan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_______________________________________
Civil No. 1:13-cv-00758 (RMC)
Hon. Rosemary M. Collyer

FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.

Civil No. 1:13-cv-00758 (RMC)

FILMON X LLC, et al.,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.
_______________________________________

DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF EMERGENCY MOTION AND EMERGENCY
MOTION TO MODIFY THE SCOPE OF THE INJUNCTION
Defendants AereoKiller LLC, FilmOn.TV Networks, Inc., FilmOn.TV, Inc., and
FilmOn.com, Inc. (collectively, “FilmOn X”) respectfully move the Court to modify the scope of
the Preliminary Injunction issued on September 5, 2013 (Dkt. 34) (the “Preliminary Injunction”) to
exclude the geographic boundaries of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
FilmOn X requests expedited consideration of this motion because the Preliminary Injunction
conflicts with a new decision issued on October 8, 2013 by the U.S. District Court of
Massachusetts. Immediate relief is appropriate to vindicate FilmOn X’s legal right to operate
within the territory of the First Circuit and to avoid an unseemly conflict between this Court and
the courts of another circuit.
The basis for FilmOn X’s motion is set forth in the attached Memorandum, the
accompanying Request for Judicial Notice, and the court records in this action. A proposed order
is submitted concurrently herewith.

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Pursuant to Local Rule 7(m), FilmOn X’s counsel provided notice of its intent to seek the
relief requested in this motion to plaintiffs’ counsel on October 10, 2013. (Declaration of Ryan
Baker, ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that plaintiffs would oppose this motion. (Id., ¶ 4 & Ex.
1.) This motion has been brought by defendants at the first available opportunity. (Id., ¶ 5.)

Dated: October 10, 2013

BAKER MARQUART LLP
By:_/s/ _Ryan G. Baker_____________
Ryan G. Baker
BAKER MARQUART LLP
10990 Wilshire Blvd., Fourth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90024
[phone] (telephone)
[phone] (facsimile)
Bar No.: 214036
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs FilmOn X, LLC, FilmOn.TV, Inc.,
FilmOn.TV Networks, Inc., and FilmOn.com, Inc.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND...................................................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................... 4
A.

Modification Of The Preliminary Injunction Is Appropriate In Light Of The Massachusetts
District Court’s Ruling In Hearst v. Aereo, Because FilmOn X’s service is lawful in the
First Circuit .............................................................................................................................. 4

B.

Comity And Respect For The Massachusetts District Court Requires Modification Of The
Preliminary Injunction ............................................................................................................. 7

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 9

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
FEDERAL CASES
Agostini v. Felton
(1997) 521 U.S. 203 ...................................................................................................................6
American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Watt,
694 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .............................................................................................2, 6
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (“Cablevision”),
536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008)...................................................................................................1, 2
Cobell v. Norton
(D.D.C. 2004) 310 F. Supp. 2d 77 .............................................................................................5
Coca-Cola Company v. Standard Bottling Company,
138 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1943) ...................................................................................................6
Common Cause v. Judicial Ethics Committee,
473 F.Supp. 1251 (D. D.C. 1979) ..............................................................................................2
Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa.,
7 F.3d 32 (3d Cir. 1993).............................................................................................................5
Hearst Stations, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,
Civ. No. 13–cv–11649–NMG (D. Mass. filed July 9, 2013) .........................................1, 2, 4, 7
Holland v. National Mining Association,
309 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................8
Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
628 F. Supp. 1438 (D.D.C. 1986) ..............................................................................................5
McGrath v. Potash,
199 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ...............................................................................................2, 6
New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey,
706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983).......................................................................................................4
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,
502 U.S. 367 (1992) ...................................................................................................................5
System Federation No. 91, Ry. Emp. Dept., AFL-CIO v. Wright,
364 U.S. 642 (1961) ...................................................................................................................6
United States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc.,
549 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2008) ......................................................................................................7

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Williams v. Johanns,
555 F.Supp.2d 162 (D.D.C. 2008) .............................................................................................5
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc.
712 F.3d 676 (2d Circ. 2013) .................................................................................................3, 7
FEDERAL STATUTES
17 U.S.C. § 502 ................................................................................................................................3
17 U.S.C. § 502(b) ...........................................................................................................................3
RULES
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 62(c) ............................................................................................................5
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 54(b) ............................................................................................................5

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF FILMON X’S
EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL
INTRODUCTION
FilmOn X offers a service which enables users to remotely control an antenna and DVR to
record and watch television programming. FilmOn X competes with Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo”), which
offers a similar service.1 The action before this Court is only one of several actions filed by the
major television networks in several jurisdictions across the country against FilmOn X and Aereo.
On September 5, 2013, this Court enjoined FilmOn X from “streaming, transmitting,
retransmitting, or otherwise publicly performing, displaying of distributing any Copyrighted
Programming” throughout the United States, “with the exception of the Geographic boundaries of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit” where courts had previously ruled
against the networks. (Dkt. 34 at 2.) In a subsequent Order, this Court recognized that principles
of comity may require modification of the Preliminary Injunction if a court in another circuit
issued a “contrary ruling” that would make it lawful for FilmOn X to operate its service in the
circuit. (Dkt. 41 at 9.) Another such ruling has been issued.
On October 8, 2013, the networks lost another fight. The District Court of Massachusetts
in Hearst Stations, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (“Hearst v. Aereo”) issued a 20-page opinion in which it
denied the networks’ motion for preliminary injunction. It found that a broadcaster had failed “to
make a sufficient showing that it is likely to prevail” on its claim that Aereo’s service (which is
similar to FilmOn X’s in all relevant ways) violates the plaintiff’s exclusive public performance
rights under the Copyright Act. (See Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) filed concurrently
herewith, Ex. A at p. 8.) After surveying the existing case law across the federal circuits, the
District Court of Massachusetts decided that the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Cartoon Network
LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (“Cablevision”), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), was most persuasive. (Id.
1

As this Court has previously ruled, the technological systems used by FilmOn X and Aereo “are essentially
the same, and the parties agree that there are no legally meaningful differences.” (Dkt. 33 at 4.)

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at 10-13.) It agreed with Aereo’s contention that “it cannot be liable for infringing [the plaintiff’s]
exclusive right to reproduce [plaintiff’s] copyrighted works because its users provide the volitional
conduct that creates the copy of the program they select.” (Id. at 14.) It thus refused to issue a
preliminary injunction on the ground that Aereo was “transmitting private rather than public
performances per Cablevision.” (Id. at 12, 20.)
Hearst v. Aereo is the law of the First Circuit. Pursuant to that law, FilmOn X’s service is
legal; the performances rendered by FilmOn X users are private; and they do not infringe on any
copyright. Accordingly, this Court should immediately modify the Preliminary Injunction in this
case to recognize that FilmOn X has the legal right to operate its service in the First Circuit in
accordance with Hearst v. Aereo.
It is well established that a preliminary injunction should be modified where a new decision
is issued that would render the continuance of the injunction in its original form inequitable. In
fact, “[w]hen a change in the law authorizes what had previously been forbidden it is abuse of
discretion for a court to refuse to modify an injunction founded on the superseded law.” American
Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also McGrath v.
Potash, 199 F.2d 166, 167–68 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (ordering district court to vacate an earlier
injunction where Congress had passed a law that removed the statutory basis for the injunction).
This Court must, in the interest of comity, defer to the judgment of its sister court. To do
otherwise, would be tantamount to having this Court sit as an appellate court, reviewing the
decision of another trial court.” Common Cause v. Judicial Ethics Committee, 473 F.Supp. 1251,
1254 (D. D.C. 1979). Further, emergency relief is appropriate to vindicate FilmOn X’s legal rights
to operate within the territory of the First Circuit.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 5, 2013, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. The
Preliminary Injunction bars FilmOn X from “streaming, transmitting, retransmitting, or otherwise
publicly performing, displaying or distributing any Copyrighted Programming over the Internet
(through websites such as filmon.com or filmonx.com).” (Dkt. 34 at 2.) Although FilmOn X had
argued that any injunction should be limited to the D.C. Circuit, this Court found that 17 U.S.C. §
502(b) required the Preliminary Injunction to have nationwide effect. (Id. at 32-33.) But in order
to avoid conflict with the Second Circuit’s decision in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo II”),
712 F.3d 676 (2d Circ. 2013), this Court omitted the geographic area of the Second Circuit from
the coverage of the Injunction. (Dkt. 34 at 2 (ruling that the injunction “applies throughout the
United States pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502, with the exception of the Geographic boundaries of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.”).)
Subsequently, on September 12, 2013, this Court’s denied FilmOn X’s motions for a stay
and reconsideration. (Dkt. 41.) While the Court declined to modify the geographic scope of the
injunction at that time, it suggested that it would do so in the future if a court in another circuit
disagreed with this Court’s conclusion and ruled that the technology used by FilmOn X or Aereo is
lawful. (See Dkt. 41 at 9 (“If other courts issue contrary rulings, FilmOn X may file a motion to
modify this Court’s injunction.”).)
Subsequently, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, proceedings before this Court were
stayed pending appeal, although the Court expressly reserved the power to modify the Injunction
based on “any changes in the pertinent law.” (Dkt. 51 at 1-2 (ordering that “[t]he stay does not
preclude any party from bringing to this Court’s attention any changes in the pertinent law” and
that “[t]he stay does not preclude the Court from modifying the scope of the injunctive relief
granted pursuant to the Preliminary Injunction”).)

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Two days ago, on October 8, 2013, the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts in the First
Circuit issued a 20-page opinion that denied a motion for a preliminary injunction filed by a local
television station against Aereo. (RJN, Ex. A.) The Court adopted the law of the Second, Third,
and Fourth Circuits in holding that a plaintiff claiming infringement must show volitional conduct
on the part of the defendant. (Id. at 14.) It wrote: “Those courts reason that holding a media
company liable just because it provides technology that enables users to make copies of
programming would be the rough equivalent of holding the owner of a copy machine liable
because people use the machine to illegally reproduce copyrighted materials.” (Id. at 15.)
Because “it is likely that the [Aereo] user supplies the necessary volitional conduct to make the
copy”, the Massachusetts district court denied the request for a preliminary injunction. (Id.)
Immediately after the Massachusetts district court’s opinion was entered on the docket, on
October 10, 2013, FilmOn X provided plaintiffs’ counsel with notice of its intent to seek the relief
requested in this motion. (Declaration of Ryan Baker, ¶ 3.) Specifically, FilmOn X asks that this
Court modify the geographic scope of the injunction to exclude the jurisdiction of the First Circuit
on an expedited basis. Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that they opposed this motion. (Id., ¶ 4.)
ARGUMENT
A.

Modification Of The Preliminary Injunction Is Appropriate In Light Of The
Massachusetts District Court’s Ruling In Hearst v. Aereo, Because FilmOn X’s service
is lawful in the First Circuit
This Court should modify the scope of the injunction issued in this case to exclude the First

Circuit, which has determined that a service similar to FilmOn X’s does not infringe copyright.
The Court has the power to make that modification. New York State Assn. for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 967 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The power of a court of equity to modify a
decree of injunctive relief is long-established, broad, and flexible.”). The federal rules explicitly
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codify the court’s inherent authority to modify an injunction in several places.2 When a party
appeals the court’s interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction,
the court, in its discretion, “may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the
pendency of the appeal.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 62(c). Further, a party may obtain relief from a
preliminary injunction if, among other things, “applying [the judgment or order] prospectively is
no longer equitable.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 62(c).
In its September 12, 2013 Memorandum Opinion, this Court explained that modification of
an injunction is proper “when there has been a change of circumstances between entry of the
injunction and the filing of the motion that would render the continuance of the injunction in its
original form inequitable.’” (Dkt. 41 at 6 (quoting Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 32, 337 (3d
Cir. 1993)).) Indeed, a motion to modify a preliminary injunction is meant “to relieve inequities
that arise after the original order,” and its “primary justification” is “to avoid the injustice of
requiring a defendant to continue complying with an injunctive order under circumstances that
would have prevented its entry in the first place.” Favia, 7 F.3d at 337-38.3
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that it is appropriate to modify an injunction when the
party seeking relief from an injunction or consent decree can show “a significant change either in
factual conditions or in law.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384. “A court
2

Additionally, this Court has the power to hear a motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) where “a
controlling or significant change in the law has occurred.” Williams v. Johanns, 555 F.Supp.2d 162, 164 (D.D.C.
2008).
3

While the normal rule is that a party’s filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction
over the matters being appealed, “a district court is not deprived of jurisdiction to modify a preliminary injunction
while that injunction is on appeal.” Cobell v. Norton (D.D.C. 2004) 310 F. Supp. 2d 77, 83; see also Indus. Ass'n v.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 628 F. Supp. 1438, 1440 n. 1 (D.D.C. 1986) (noting that pending appeal
district courts continue to “retain jurisdiction to ... modify, restore, or grant injunctions”). That is especially true in a
case where modification is necessary to preserve the original intent of the preliminary injunction and the status quo
created by controlling decisional law. Indeed, this Court’s September 15, 2013 order, which excluded the Second
Circuit from the scope of the Preliminary Injunction, contemplated that the injunction was never intended to apply to
jurisdictions where courts have ruled that FilmOn X’s service lawful. (See dkt. 34 at 32-33; dkt. 41 at 9.) Moreover,
modification of the Preliminary Injunction to exclude the First Circuit would not impair the D.C. Circuit’s review of
the appeal in this matter.

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may recognize subsequent changes in either statutory or decisional law.” Agostini v. Felton (1997)
521 U.S. 203, 215. “When a change in the law authorizes what had previously been forbidden it is
abuse of discretion for a court to refuse to modify an injunction founded on the superseded law.”
American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also
McGrath v. Potash, 199 F.2d 166, 167–68 (D.C. Cir.1952).
Indeed, “[t]here are many cases where a mere change in decisional law has been held to
justify modification of an outstanding injunction.” System Federation No. 91, Ry. Emp. Dept.,
AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650 (1961) (collecting cases). The decision in Coca-Cola
Company v. Standard Bottling Company, 138 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1943), demonstrates that an
injunction should be modified or vacated where subsequent case law establishes that the conduct
enjoined is lawful. In that case, the trial court was asked to modify a consent decree that
prohibited the defendant from “selling any product under the names Cherry and Cola, Ayer’s Cola,
Standard Cola, or any like word, name, or names.” Id. at 789. In affirming a modification to the
injunction that ended the prohibition against the use of the term “cola,” the court noted that after
the issuance of the injunction numerous courts had held that the plaintiff has no exclusive right to
the term “cola.” Id. at 790. Therefore, except for the earlier injunction, the use of the prior trade
names recited in the order would have been entirely legal. Id.
Here, since the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction, there has been a substantial change
in the decisional law regarding the legality of FilmOn X’s service. As this Court noted in its
September 5, 2013 Preliminary Injunction order, the Second Circuit was – at that time – the only
jurisdiction in the country where courts had found a system like that of FilmOn X legal. (Dkt. 33
at 34.) Thus, in order to avoid a “conflict” with the law of the Second Circuit, the Court expressly
excluded the Second Circuit from the geographic scope of the injunction but otherwise applied the
injunction throughout the rest of the United States. (Id.)

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The Massachusetts District Court has now joined the Second Circuit in finding a service
based on uniquely assigned antennas and DVRs does not publicly perform copyrighted works and,
accordingly, does not infringe plaintiffs’ copyright. On October 8, 2013, the District of
Massachusetts denied a motion for preliminary injunction brought by a local television station
against Aereo. The motion in that case was similar to the motion brought by plaintiffs here.
Whereas this Court found the reasoning of the district court in Fox Television Systems, Inc. v.
BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC “more persuasive” than the Second Circuit’s decision in Aereo
II (Dkt. 33 at 2), Judge Gorton in the District of Massachusetts reached the contrary decision. He
concluded that the Second Circuit’s “interpretation [of the Transmit Clause] is a better reading of
the statute because the ‘canon against surplusage’ requires this Court to give meaning to every
statutory term if possible.” (RJN, Ex. A at 13.)
In light of the conflict between this Court’s decision and Hearst v. Aereo, this Court should
modify the scope of the injunction to exclude the geographic boundaries of the First Circuit just as
it did with the Second Circuit.
B.

Comity And Respect For The Massachusetts District Court Requires Modification Of
The Preliminary Injunction
This Court has “recognized that in some cases comity may require courts to limit the scope

of injunctions.” (Dkt. 33 at 34.) Indeed, the district court in BarryDriller correctly limited its
injunction to the Ninth Circuit in light of the very possible circuit split and held that “[c]ourts
should not issue nationwide injunctions where the injunction would not issue under the law of
another circuit.” BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. at 1142-43 (quoting United States v. AMC Entm’t,
Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 773 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing grant of nationwide injunction)).
Here, the same principles of comity that lead this Court to exclude the Second Circuit from
the geographic scope of the Preliminary Injunction dictate that the Court modify the Injunction to

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also exclude the First Circuit. It would be improper for this Court to ignore Judge Gorton’s
decision and force its own contrary interpretation of the Transmit Clause within the jurisdiction of
the First Circuit.
Subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court, each federal circuit has the authority to set
the law of the land in its territory. In performing their responsibilities, circuits have the authority
“to rule on statutory meaning independently of each other” and therefore “[c]ircuits may have
differing interpretations of the same statutes.” Holland v. National Mining Association, 309 F.3d
808, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Moreover, it is improper to “squelch the circuit disagreements that can
lead to Supreme Court review” by allowing “one circuit’s statutory interpretation to foreclose . . .
review of the question in another circuit.” See id. The First Circuit has done that and determined
that FilmOn X’s service does not infringe copyright. Accordingly, the Court’s injunction should
be modified to exclude the First Circuit.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, FilmOn X respectfully requests that the Court modify the
preliminary injunction to exclude the geographic boundaries of the First Circuit.

Dated: October 10, 2013

BAKER MARQUART LLP
By:_/s/ _Ryan G. Baker_______________
Ryan G. Baker
BAKER MARQUART LLP
10990 Wilshire Blvd., Fourth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90024
[phone] (telephone)
[phone] (facsimile)
Bar No.: 200344
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs FilmOn X, LLC, FilmOn.TV, Inc.,
FilmOn.TV Networks, Inc., and FilmOn.com, Inc.
By: /s/ Kerry J. Davidson
LAW OFFICE OF KERRY J. DAVIDSON
1738 Elton Road, Suite 113
Silver Spring, Maryland 20903
[phone] (telephone)
[phone](facsimile)
Bar No.: 456431
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs FilmOn X, LLC, FilmOn.TV, Inc.,
FilmOn.TV Networks, Inc., and FilmOn.com, Inc.

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