AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, INC. et al v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.

Filing 91

RESPONSE re #67 MOTION to Strike #66 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike the Declaration of Kurt F. Geisinger) filed by AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, INC., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MEASUREMENT IN EDUCATION, INC.. (Attachments: #1 Declaration of Jonathan Hudis, #2 Exhibit 1, #3 Certificate of Service)(Hudis, Jonathan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
ASSOCIATION, INC., AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, INC.,
and NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
MEASUREMENT IN EDUCATION, INC.,
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim-Defendants,
v.
PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.,
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff.

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Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-00857-TSC-DAR
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE
THE DECLARATION OF KURT F.
GEISINGER

[PUBLIC VERSION]

Jonathan Hudis (DC Bar # 418872)
Jonathan P. Labukas (DC Bar # 998662)
Nikia L. Gray (pro hac vice)
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
1700 K Street NW, Suite 825
Washington, DC 20006-3825
Tel. [phone]
Fax [phone]
E-Mail [e-mail]
E-Mail [e-mail]
E-Mail [e-mail]
Counsel for Plaintiffs American Educational Research
Association, Inc., American Psychological Association, Inc.,
and National Council on Measurement in Education, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
LEGAL STANDARD......................................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................5
I.

EACH OF THE SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENTS MADE IN DR. GEISINGER’S
DECLARATION WAS ADEQUATELY PRESAGED IN HIS EXPERT REPORT
AND FULLY EXAMINED IN HIS DEPOSITION ....................................................5
a.

Each Of The Substantive Statements In Dr. Geisinger’s Declaration Is An
Elaboration Of, And Consistent With, An Opinion Previously Asserted By
Dr. Geisinger ...............................................................................................5

b.

Even If The Geisinger Declaration Did Contain Disclosures Not
Contained In The Expert Report, Defendant Fully Examined Dr. Geisinger
At His Deposition On Each Of The Opinions Addressed In The Geisinger
Declaration. Therefore, Any Alleged Failure To Disclose Is Harmless And
Does Not Prejudice Defendant ....................................................................7

II.

DR. GEISINGER IS QUALIFIED TO OFFER EXPERT OPINIONS IN THIS
CASE ............................................................................................................................9

III.

DR. GEISINGER’S OPINIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE ..............................................16
a.

Defendant’s Challenges To The Reliability And Methodology Relating To
Dr. Geisinger’s Opinions Are Merely Objections To The Validity And
Weight Of The Conclusions, Not The Admissibility Of Them ....................16
i.

In Addition To His Personal Observations, Dr. Geisinger May,
And Properly Did, Rely On Information Obtained From
Others.............................................................................................17

ii.

Dr. Geisinger Properly Considered, And Rejected, Alternate
Potential Causes For The Decline In Sales Of The 1999
Standards .......................................................................................18

iii.

Dr. Geisinger’s Opinions Regarding Plaintiffs’ Use Of Sales To
Fund Subsequent Versions Of The Standards Are Admissible ......19

iv.

Public Resource’s Remaining Challenges To Dr. Geisinger’s
Opinions Are Red Herrings Designed To Distract The Court From
i

Public Resource’s Failure To Carry Its Burden On Its Motion To
Strike ..............................................................................................22
b.

Dr. Geisinger Has Substantial Practical Experience With The Subject
Matter Of This Litigation And Is Able To Assist The Court In
Understanding The Evidence And Deciding The Particular Issues In This
Case............................................................................................................23

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................24

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
* Ambrosini v. Labarraque,
101 F. 3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................... 19, 20, 23
Antoine v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,
2009 WL 5842054 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2009) ................................................................................. 5
Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
222 F. Supp. 2d 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ........................................................................................ 19
Clarke v. United States,
915 F. 2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................. 21
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993) ................................................................................................... 4, 16, 17, 23
Evans v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
674 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.D.C. 2009) ............................................................................................. 4
Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd.,
545 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2008) ............................................................................................. 16
Groobert v. President & Directors of Georgetown College,
219 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) ............................................................................................... 23
Halcomb v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
526 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2007) ............................................................................................... 5
* Heller v. D.C.,
952 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2013) ................................................................................... 3, 5, 24
In re Salem,
465 F. 3d 767 (7th Cir. 2006) ....................................................................................................... 5
In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig.,
235 F.R.D. 646 (N.D. Ill. 2006) ............................................................................................... 6, 8

iii

In Re TMI Litigation,
193 F. 3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................................... 18
Interplan Architects, Inc. v. C.L. Thomas, Inc.,
2010 WL 4065465 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2010) .............................................................................. 15
* Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999) ........................................................................................................... 4, 9, 23
Muldrow ex rel. Estate of Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc.,
493 F. 3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................ 5, 7
Sylla–Sawdon v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co.,
47 F. 3d 277 (8th Cir. 1995) ......................................................................................................... 7
Thompson v. Doane Pet Care Co.,
470 F. 3d 1201 (6th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................................... 5
U.S. Information Systems, Inc., v. Inter. Broth. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 3,
313 F. Supp. 2d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ........................................................................................ 19
United States ex rel. K & R Ltd. P’ship v. Mass. Housing Fin. Agency,
456 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2006) ......................................................................................... 3, 22
United States v. Brown,
415 F. 3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................... 5
United States v. H & R Block, Inc.,
831 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2011) ............................................................................................... 4
United States v. Hankey,
203 F. 3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................... 21
United States v. Ramsey,
165 F. 3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................. 23
Window Specialists, Inc. v. Forney Enterprises, Inc.,
47 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2014) ................................................................................................. 4

iv

Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) ....................................................................................................................... 8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1) ............................................................................................................... 7, 8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2) ................................................................................................................... 7
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 .................................................................................................................. 4, 9, 23
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) ....................................................................................................................... 8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) ................................................................................................................... 9
Fed. R. Evid. 702 ........................................................................................................................ 8, 9
Other Authorities
* Joseph, Gregory P., Expert Approaches, 28 LITIGATION 20 (Summer 2002) ......................... 9

v

Plaintiffs, American Educational Research Association, Inc., American Psychological
Association, Inc., and National Council on Measurement in Education, Inc. (collectively,
“Plaintiffs” or the “Sponsoring Organizations”), submit this Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Strike ECF No. 60-88, the Declaration of Kurt F. Geisinger in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction (“Motion to Strike”).
INTRODUCTION
Defendant, Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Public Resource”), lacks any
legitimate basis for striking the Declaration of Kurt F. Geisinger filed in support of Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction (the “Geisinger Declaration”).
Defendant’s Motion is a meritless attempt to sequester from the Court’s consideration any expert
opinions Public Resource does not like.1
Despite Defendant’s assertions to the contrary, Dr. Geisinger’s Declaration simply
reaffirms the conclusions originally espoused in his Expert’s Report2 and further promoted in his
deposition testimony--which remain unchanged--and are thus properly within the scope of the
Expert Report. The Geisinger Declaration does not contain any “new” or “untimely” disclosures
as Defendant would have the Court believe. Rather, the Geisinger Declaration elaborates upon
and advances the opinions set forth in Dr. Geisinger’s Expert Report and that were further
elicited by defense counsel during Dr. Geisinger’s deposition. Indeed, defense counsel deposed
Dr. Geisinger, at length, regarding each and every opinion expressed in the Geisinger
Declaration and in other areas.

Public Resource cannot now claim to have been unfairly

1

In fact, it appears that Defendant’s attacks on Dr. Geisinger’s opinions stem from its failure to
designate a rebuttal expert to refute Dr. Geisinger’s well-reasoned opinions. Defendant’s failure
to secure its own expert--despite ample opportunity to do so--was a tactical mistake on its part
and should not be entertained through a meritless Motion to Strike.
2

Dr. Geisinger’s expert’s report is attached to the Declaration of Matthew Becker submitted in
support of Defendant’s Motion to Strike at Exhibit 3 (ECF 67-5) (the “Expert Report”).
1

surprised, harmed, or otherwise prejudiced by the opinions in the Geisinger Declaration that
would warrant the harsh remedy of exclusion.
Similarly, Defendant’s attacks on Dr. Geisinger’s qualifications to render his opinions are
meritless. Dr. Geisinger is unquestionably qualified to render opinions relevant to this case. He
has over 40 years of experience in the field of psychometric testing; holds and has held numerous
director, chair, and/or co-chair-level positions for various colleges, universities, and professional
associations, including with each of the three Sponsoring Organizations in this action; has
authored, edited, or co-edited over 130 books, book chapters, and/or journal articles in the field
and is familiar with the tracking and monitoring of sales of such publications; and is currently
serving as the Director of the Buros Center for Testing, a position which he has held for nearly
ten years. To say that Dr. Geisinger’s experience qualifies him to render his opinions in this case
may be an understatement.
Moreover, Public Resource distorts the bases upon which Dr. Geisinger was offered as an
expert. Defendant focuses significantly on Dr. Geisinger’s consideration of the sales revenues
for the 1999 edition of the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (the
“Standards”) and the opinions he draws therefrom, concluding that Dr. Geisinger is not qualified
to testify as an economist. 3 However, Dr. Geisinger was never offered as an expert economist;
rather he has been offered as an expert in the standards of the kind at issue in this lawsuit to
render opinions based on his specialized knowledge and skill – born of many years of experience
in psychometrics, including his familiarity with and understanding of each of the Plaintiffs’
3

Curiously, Defendant also moved to strike Plaintiffs’ expert in ASTM, et al. v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (Case No. 1:13-cv-01215) (D.D.C.), in part, on the basis that the
expert, an economist with decades of experience, was not qualified to opine on issues relating to
standards development organizations. See Case No. 1:13-cv-01215, ECF No. 124. Thus, it
appears Public Resource will move to strike any type of expert, short of a mythically-omniscient,
unicorn-like figure, offered to opine on issues that are adverse to its cause.
2

organizations as well as the authoring, editing, and publishing of books and other reference
materials on testing and assessment issues.
Dr. Geisinger is intimately familiar with the “lifespan” of psychometrics, testing, and
assessment publications, including reviewing, interpreting, and monitoring sales trends related
thereto. Public Resource’s challenge to Dr. Geisinger’s qualifications stems from Defendant’s
self-serving and overly restrictive view on what Public Resource deems necessary for this case,
leading it to conclude, among other things, that Dr. Geisinger is unqualified to render such
opinions because he is not an economist.
Further, all of Public Resource’s objections to the “reliability” of Dr. Geisinger’s
opinions are objections to the validity of his conclusions. In essence, Defendant distorts Dr.
Geisinger’s Declaration and associated opinions to assert evidentiary objections because Public
Resource disagrees with the underlying facts upon which Dr. Geisinger relies. However, the
factual bases underlying an expert’s opinion go to the credibility of his testimony, not to the
admissibility of the testimony.

Likewise, Defendant’s disagreements with Dr. Geisinger’s

methodology used to render his opinions goes to the weight of the proffered evidence, not its
admissibility.
Public Resource fails to carry its burden requiring the harsh sanction of striking the
Geisinger Declaration.

Dr. Geisinger’s specialized experience, knowledge, and skill will,

undoubtedly, assist the trier of fact.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Rejection of an expert’s testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” Heller v. D.C.,
952 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140 (D.D.C. 2013); see also United States ex rel. K & R Ltd. P’ship v.
Mass. Housing Fin. Agency, 456 F. Supp. 2d 46, 53 (D.D.C. 2006) (citations and quotations
omitted) (denying motions to strike expert affidavit and demonstrative chart noting that “a
3

motion to strike is an exceptional remedy that is generally disfavored..., and that the proponent of
such a motion must shoulder a formidable burden.”). Significantly, “[t]he presumption under the
Federal Rules is that expert testimony is admissible.” Evans v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 674 F. Supp. 2d 175, 178 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993)); see also Window Specialists, Inc. v. Forney Enterprises, Inc., 47
F. Supp. 3d 53, 59 (D.D.C. 2014).
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert opinion testimony:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (noting that
where the traditional Daubert factors do not apply, reliability concerns may focus on personal
knowledge or experience).
A District Court is granted broad latitude is deciding how to determine reliability and
rendering the ultimate determination of reliability. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141-42. “Courts take a
flexible approach to deciding Rule 702 motions and have broad discretion in determining
whether to admit or exclude expert testimony.” United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 831 F. Supp.
2d 27, 30 (D.D.C. 2011) (quotations omitted).
Importantly, where (as here) the judge and not a jury is the trier of fact, “[t]he Court’s
gatekeeper role is ‘significantly diminished’” Window Specialists, Inc., 47 F. Supp. at 59-60
(quoting H & R Block, Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 30). This is because “[w]here the gatekeeper and the
factfinder are one and the same—that is, the judge—the need to make such decisions prior to

4

hearing the testimony is lessened.” In re Salem, 465 F.3d 767, 777 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing United
States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2005)).
ARGUMENT
I.

EACH OF THE SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENTS MADE IN DR. GEISINGER’S
DECLARATION WAS ADEQUATELY PRESAGED IN HIS EXPERT REPORT
AND FULLY EXAMINED IN HIS DEPOSITION
a. Each Of The Substantive Statements In Dr. Geisinger’s Declaration Is An
Elaboration Of, And Consistent With, An Opinion Previously Asserted By Dr.
Geisinger
“The purpose of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] … 26(a)(2) is to prevent unfair surprise at trial and to

permit the opposing party to prepare rebuttal reports, to depose the expert, and to prepare for
depositions and cross-examination at trial.” Antoine v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 2009 WL
5842054, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2009) (quoting Halcomb v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
526 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 2007)). The Rule “‘does not limit an expert’s testimony simply
to reading his report . . . . The rule contemplates that the expert will supplement, elaborate upon,
[and] explain . . . his report’ in his oral testimony.” Muldrow ex rel. Estate of Muldrow v. ReDirect, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Thompson v. Doane Pet Care Co., 470
F.3d 1201, 1203 (6th Cir. 2006)). “The expert report, then, is not the end of the road, but a means
of providing adequate notice to the other side to enable it to challenge the expert’s opinions and
prepare to put on expert testimony of its own.” Heller, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 139.
Dr. Geisinger’s Expert Report is not as limited as Defendant would have the Court
believe. Despite Public Resource’s mischaracterizations, each of the substantive opinions in the
Geisinger Declaration was adequately presaged in his Expert Report. While the precise language
may differ, the initial opinions remain the same.
Principally, Dr. Geisinger opined in his Expert Report that:

5

•

Defendant’s posting of the 1999 Standards on the Internet resulted in a drop in sales
volume, and corresponding drop in sales revenues, of the 1999 Standards (Expert Report
at ¶¶ 50 and 55; Reply Declaration of Jonathan Hudis (“Hudis Reply Decl.”), dated
February 18, 2016, at ¶3, Exhibit 1 (September 10, 2015 Deposition of Dr. Kurt
Geisinger (“Geisinger Dep.”)) at 131:4-23; 151:4-24; 170:3-9);

•

Plaintiffs derive revenues from the sale of the prior versions of the Standards, which are
then applied to production of subsequent versions of the Standards (Expert Report at ¶
60-61; Geisinger Dep. 169:21-170:11; 172:21-173:2);

•

If the sales revenues stream is lost or otherwise insufficient to permit the publication of
subsequent versions of the Standards, it is likely that the production of subsequent
versions may cease (Expert Report at ¶¶ 52, 55,-56, 59-61 and 63; Geisinger Dep. at
86:17-25; 172:21-173:2);

•

If the Standards are no longer published, there will be significant harm to the testing and
assessment professions, as well as to members of the general public who rely on the
outcomes of tests and assessments. (Expert Report at ¶¶ 57-58, 60, 62; Geisinger Dep.
249:1-14, 289:23-290:2); and

•

If the 1999 Standards is made freely available on the Internet without notice that they are
now outdated, psychometrics students, test developers and the general public might be
harmed or otherwise subject to liability for reliance on obsolete testing recommendations
(Expert Report at ¶ 62; Geisinger Dep. at 103:10-106:9, 110:5-21, 249:1-14, 250:7-16).
Moreover, Defendant deposed Dr. Geisinger and thoroughly examined him on each of the

substantive statements in the Geisinger Declaration. See, e.g., In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig.,
235 F.R.D. 646, n. 13 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citations omitted) (“Indeed, the very fact that the

6

defendants elicited such testimony at the deposition has been found, in other instances, to amount
to all the disclosure necessary under Rules 26(a)(2) and 37(c)(1)”). The Geisinger Declaration
merely summarizes, contextualizes, and reaffirms Dr. Geisinger’s initial positions as set forth in
his Expert Report and elicited during his deposition testimony. Additionally, there has been no
change in Dr. Geisinger’s opinions; the Geisinger Declaration addresses opinions previously
detailed by him in his Expert Report and that were elicited during his deposition testimony.
Thus, the opinions in the Geisinger Declaration are properly within the scope of his Expert
Report.
b. Even If The Geisinger Declaration Did Contain Disclosures Not Contained In
The Expert Report, Defendant Fully Examined Dr. Geisinger At His Deposition
On Each Of The Opinions Addressed In The Geisinger Declaration. Therefore,
Any Alleged Failure To Disclose Is Harmless And Does Not Prejudice
Defendant
Public Resource failed to claim or otherwise demonstrate how it has been prejudiced,
harmed, or surprised, much less unfairly surprised, as a result of any alleged “untimely
disclosure” that would warrant the extreme sanction of exclusion. See Muldrow ex rel. Estate of
Muldrow, 493 F.3d at 167 (“The purpose of the rule is to eliminate ‘unfair surprise to the
opposing party.’”) (quoting Sylla–Sawdon v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 47 F.3d 277, 284 (8th
Cir.1995)). Instead, Defendant rests on its erroneous conclusion that “[o]pinions, facts, and data
not included in the [expert] report are automatically excluded under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37.” See Motion to Strike at 2. However, “automatic exclusion” is not the law and,
indeed, not what Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 explicitly states. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) (“If a party fails to
provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not
allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a
trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”) (emphasis added).

7

Public Resource’s apparent contention that Plaintiffs are engaging in trial-by-ambush is
far from accurate. Dr. Geisinger’s Expert Report was provided to defense counsel on June 15,
2015. On September 10, 2015, Defendant took Dr. Geisinger’s deposition. See Exhibit A to
Hudis Reply Decl. During that deposition, defense counsel questioned Dr. Geisinger at length
regarding his various opinions, effectively leaving no stone unturned. During his deposition, Dr.
Geisinger provided context and explained the opinions set forth in his Expert Report.
Thus, despite its blustering, Public Resource has not shown, and cannot establish, that it
has been unfairly surprised, harmed, or otherwise prejudiced, in any way, by what Defendant
deems an “untimely disclosure.” Public Resource fails to provide a single fact, a single example,
or a single specific reason to conclude otherwise. Instead, Defendant calls upon the Court to
reach that conclusion for it, without providing any support, in law or in fact, by which to do so.
In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 646, 657 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“It is not for a court to
do the work the lawyers have chosen not to do.”).
However, even if the Court were to determine that the Dr. Geisinger’s Declaration
somehow includes “new” or “undisclosed” information not contained in his Expert Report so as
to be “untimely” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2) or 37(c), the fact that the challenged opinions
were elicited during Dr. Geisinger’s deposition in response to pointed questions from defense
counsel may well be perceived as expanding the scope of Dr. Geisinger’s testimony. As noted
commenter Gregory P. Joseph has said:
If you really intend to try your case, you ought to think long and hard about
whether you want to take that expert deposition. Why? Not only because the 26(a)
report freezes experts’ testimony to their reported opinions and sources—and thus
eliminates the need for a deposition to accomplish that—but also because taking a
deposition can actually liberate experts to expound far beyond the bounds of their
reports. If an expert volunteers new or different opinions, data, or exhibits in a
deposition, that cures their omission from the expert’s Rule 26(a) report. The
automatic preclusion remedy of Rule 37(c)(1) will no longer apply because there
8

is a carve-out from the preclusion remedy in Rule 37(c)(1) if the omitted expert
testimony has “otherwise been made known to the other parties during the
discovery process or in writing,” under Rule 26(e)(1). An expert deposition is a
prime example of “ma[king] known” the expert’s opinion “during the discovery
process.”
***
If you decide to take an expert deposition, you must be careful what you ask.
You may open the door to testimony that would otherwise be precluded under
Rule 37(c)(1). There is, to be specific, considerable downside in asking common
deposition questions designed to ensure that no unexplored opinions exist—like
the traditional catch-all question, “Do you have any other opinions as to this case
that we haven’t discussed?” You generally don’t want to know the answer to that
question. If you don’t ask it and the opinions are not provided either in the report,
in the deposition, or otherwise “in writing” (under Rule 26(e)(1)), the undisclosed
opinions are presumptively excluded under Rule 37(c)(1)”
See Joseph, Gregory P., “Expert Approaches”, 28 LITIGATION 20, 21 (Summer 2002)
(emphasis added). Here, defense counsel, indeed, asked pointed questions that elicited the very
testimony and opinions Public Resource now complains are untimely. See, e.g., Geisinger Dep.
at 99:8-18; 130:8-12; 131:4-23; 151:4-24; 170:3-9 (discussing review of sales records and
causation). Thus, Defendant cannot credibly claim unfair surprise, harm, or prejudice from any
of the opinions detailed in the Gesiginer Declaration that would warrant exclusion.
II.

DR. GEISINGER IS QUALIFIED TO OFFER EXPERT OPINIONS IN THIS
CASE
An expert may be qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”

Fed. R. Evid. 702. “[T]he text of Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be
qualified on the basis of experience. In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole,
basis for a great deal of reliable expert testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee notes,
2000 amendments. In light of these qualifications, courts assess whether a proffered expert has
“sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the particular issues in this
case.” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Dr. Geisinger
9

unquestionably possesses “sufficient specialized knowledge” to assist the Court in deciding the
particular issues in this case.
Defendant’s challenges to Dr. Geisinger’s qualifications stem from its overly restrictive
view on what Public Resource deems required for this case. While Dr. Geisinger, admittedly, is
not an economist, as Defendant contends is required in this case, he:
•

is a 40-year veteran in the field of psychometrics, having researched, studied, and
taught in the field of testing and assessment during that period of time (Expert
Report, ¶6; Geisinger Declaration, ¶5);

•

is a fellow, diplomat, and member of numerous professional societies, including
the APA, AERA, and NCME (Expert Report, ¶6; Geisinger Declaration, ¶5);

•

represented APA by serving on and chairing the Joint Committee on Testing
Practices (Expert Report, ¶6; Geisinger Declaration, ¶5);

•

served on APA’s Committee on Psychological Tests and Assessment (Expert
Report, ¶6; Geisinger Declaration, ¶5);

•

was elected to serve two terms as the representative on the Council of
Representatives for the APA’s Division of Evaluation, Measurement and
Statistics (Expert Report, ¶6; Geisinger Declaration, ¶5);

•

was elected to serve as a member-at-large on the APA’s Board of Directors
(Expert Report, ¶6; Geisinger Declaration, ¶5);

•

co-chaired a sub-committee of the APA’s Joint Committee on Testing Practices
(Expert Report, ¶11; Geisinger Declaration, ¶10);

•

jointly represented AERA, APA, and NCME in developing the International
Organization for Standardizations (Expert Report, ¶15; Geisinger Declaration,
¶14);

•

is currently serving as the Director of the Buros Center for Testing, a position
which he has held for the past nearly ten years (Expert Report, ¶1; Geisinger
Declaration, ¶¶1, 18);

•

has had past and ongoing relationships, as a member or fellow, with AERA, APA,
and NCME (Expert Report, ¶23);

•

currently serves as a committee chair on one of AERA’s divisions’ International
Committee (Expert Report, ¶23);

•

has presented at AERA’s annual conferences regularly (Expert Report, ¶23);

•

has served on and chaired NCME’s professional development committee, served
as a program co-chair for its annual meeting, represented NCME on the
committee that developed its code of professional conduct, and was a
10

representative and advisory board member of a doctoral program in
psychometrics that was being developed at Morgan State University (Expert
Report, ¶24);
•

was elected and served as a member of APA’s Committee on Psychological Tests
and Assessments, Committee on International Relations in Psychology, Joint
Committee on Testing Practices, Council of Representatives representing the
Division of Measurement, Evaluation and Statistics, and on APA’s Board of
Directors (Expert Report, ¶25);

•

served as a member of APA’s editorial board for its journal, Psychological
Assessment (Expert Report, ¶25);

•

served the APA, AERA, and NCME by representing them on an American
National Standards Institute/International Organization for Standardization
committee that developed an international standard for industrial testing (Expert
Report, ¶25);

•

is the Treasurer of the International Test Commission (Geisinger Dep. at 158:1-2);

•

published in several of NCME’s journals and has served on the editorial
committee for the journal (Expert Report, ¶24);

•

knows every member of the joint committee that prepared the 1999 Standards
(Geisinger Dep. at 146:16-19);

•

is intimately familiar with the standards at issue in this case as well as previous
and subsequent versions thereof (Geisinger Dep. 101:6-13);

•

has authored, edited, or co-edited over 130 books, book chapters, and/or journal
articles in the field of testing (Expert Report, ¶10; Geisinger Declaration, ¶9); and

•

is familiar with the tracking and monitoring of sales of such publications
(Geisinger Dep. at 134:6-21, 136:20-137:5).

Thus, Dr. Geisinger’s considerable knowledge and experience gained from his participation and
association with each of the activities listed above has assisted in informing his opinions in this
case. Indeed, for example, Dr. Geisinger properly explained during his deposition that his
conclusions were based on, among other things:
Journals, books, conference -- conferences that I go to. I go to six or seven
conferences a year, and I have seen nothing else, that, in my mind, could have
possibly caused the decline in sales.
***

11

I can’t point to a specific document. My field is -- is -- is testing, and I basically
live and breathe that. And I can’t tell you any one thing that said, okay, it was
PublicResource.org that caused the decline. But there was a buzz for a long time
that the new standards were coming out. I -- when I was on the board, I actually
often met with the standards committee at social occasions and -- and talked to
them about their progress, I knew what was happening to that committee, and I
saw no other reason why they would have gone down. I can’t tell you that I’ve
looked at any one thing, because it’s a multitude of things.
***
I think when you have a lifetime of experience, it’s very hard to separate what
you’re bringing to bear when you look at a situation. I think primarily in this case
I’m bringing my knowledge of testing, but I think my knowledge of higher
education, my knowledge of the education of people in psychology and of
marketing and budgeting is all part of this.
Geisinger Dep. 152:5 - 153:2; 265:5-13.
As evidenced above, Dr. Geisinger has extensive knowledge and experience with each of
the three Sponsoring Organizations in this action. Nevertheless, Public Resource contends that
“[Dr. Geisinger] is not an organizational consultant or historian, which could possibly qualify
him to render opinions on the internal politics of Plaintiffs’ organizations” (Motion to Strike at
4), that “[Dr. Geisinger’s] qualifications . . . are not relevant to evaluating the business
justification for Plaintiffs’ use of sales revenue to pay for development costs and generate
investment returns” (Motion to Strike at 12), and that “[Dr.] Geisinger is not qualified to render
an opinion whether Plaintiffs will continue to update the Standards” (Motion to Strike at 14.).
However, as demonstrated above, Dr. Geisinger’s membership and professional association with
each of the Sponsoring Organizations, including several director and chair-level positions, his
past and ongoing relationships with members of each them, as well as his extensive experience
with standards of the kind involved in this lawsuit, provide the requisite knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education to render his opinions on these issues.

12

For example, when questioned during his deposition regarding the use of sales revenues
for development of future updates to the Joint Standards, Dr. Geisinger stated:
Dr. Levine shared with me that AERA did not have the funding to support this. I
know the APA budget very well. They don’t have funding to serve -- to -- to take
this on, and NCME certainly doesn't have the budget to take this on. So if those
funds [from sales of the Standards] don’t accrue, it simply can’t happen, any more
than your legal practice would continue if all your clients dried up. I mean, it’s the
same issue, basically. You can’t continue.
***
The American Psychological Association would -- which has the primary number
of members, would never approve [a membership increase to fund revisions to the
Standards] as something that they would take on given their current budget
constraints.
***
The goals of APA are actually to reduce the membership fee right now. APA is
experiencing a membership decline, and the percentage of members who are
actually interested in testing that are members of APA is actually quite small,
probably 3,000 or so. And so the overall governance would never approve the
idea that a membership fee would go up to cover something that a small portion
of people need, and they have higher priorities right now that they're trying to deal
with.
***
With regard to confirmation, I talked to Dr. Levine, and she assured me that
AERA would not move in that direction. There’s actually a strong anti-testing
movement in education right now, and so they would never get [a membership fee
increase] through their governance. As I’ve said before, I know APA governance
really well. Eight years of my life spent in APA governance. I know that they’re
not going to do it. NCME is the only group that probably really cares a lot about
the standards, but they only have 3,000 members. So would just not be a
possibility.
***
I was part of the strategic planning effort for APA. I know where they’ve decided
to put their funds. It is not for test standards, so they’re not going to come up with
the money. The only person at APA who knows a lot about testing, and she does,
is Marianne Ernesto, and she has a bachelor’s degree. AERA has no extra money,
and NCME has no extra money. The monies are just not there in the budget. So
13

the studies I’ve done are -- are knowing those three budgets, to the extent that I
do, and knowing that there are not funds for it, and that they do not have expertise
to write a proposal to get somebody to fund this, and they don’t have the free time
for somebody to write the proposal either.
Geisinger Dep. at 173:15-25; 184:21-25; 187:22-188:7; 190:16-191:4; 280:8-24. See also Expert
Report at ¶¶ 59-61, 63; Geisinger Declaration at ¶¶ 22-23. Moreover, Dr. Geisinger is well
familiar with the “lifespan” of books and publications of the kind in this litigation and has the
“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to opine on the tracking and monitoring of
sales relating to such publications. As Dr. Geisinger explained in his deposition:
My organization, the Buros Center for Testing, survives on the basis of book sales
and electronic sales. I have been tracking that for the last years very carefully.
I’ve watched books decline. I’ve never seen a precipitous drop in the sales of
books or of our electronic access of -- of individual tests, and it’s an un -- unheard
of kind of thing. We come out with new books, and the old books continue to
sell. There’s a gradual decline. To see a precipitous drop like that is -- is very
unexpected, and so one looks for a cause. And in this case the cause is most
likely, in fact, the posting of these standards online.
***
As I said, I have tracked book purchases, I have tracked my own book sales
records for books I’ve published. Even as they’re getting older, there’s usually a
very gradual decline. Even when a second edition is coming out, there’s a very
gradual decline. In this particular case, to see a precipitous drop and to know that
the book was posted online at -- during that time period, I think that's a very
strong indication that that is the -- the culprit.
Geisinger Dep. 134:6-21, 136:20-137:5.

Thus, Dr. Geisinger brings to the Court his vast

experience related to the specific Sponsoring Organizations who are the Plaintiffs in this case
and the tracking and monitoring of sales relating to publications relating to psychometrics,
testing and assessment. This includes the general function of tracking and monitoring book sales
over time.4

4

Defendant also contends that Dr. Geisinger lacks qualifications to opine on the effect of online
availability of versions of the Standards on Plaintiffs’ revenues. See Motion to Strike at 14.
14

Nevertheless, Defendant contends that “[c]ourts, however, routinely reject claims that a
person’s personal, anecdotal experiences qualify them as expert witnesses.” Motion to Strike at
5. However, the cases cited by Defendant in support of this assertion do not stand for that
proposition. For example, in Interplan Architects, the Court explained that a witness may not
base its opinions solely on attenuated relationships with two architects to opine on industry
custom, however, virtually in the same breadth and with respect to the same witness, the Court
held that:
With respect to his opinions on convenience store design, Mr. Mitchell’s
experience has provided him with a detailed knowledge regarding the various
ways in which convenience stores may be designed, the interior arrangement of
elements, and how some design choices are chosen over others. With respect to
his opinions regarding the factors for success of a convenience store, Mr. Mitchell
may not be an economist or econometrist who can quantify the exact impact of
certain variables, such as store location, price of goods, cleanliness of bathrooms,
upon a convenience store’s success. However, he may offer general, nonquantitative opinions regarding the factors that impact a store’s performance
based upon his years of practical experience in the industry.
Interplan Architects, Inc. v. C.L. Thomas, Inc., No. 4:08-CV-03181, 2010 WL 4065465, at *13
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2010) (footnotes omitted). That is exactly what Dr. Geisinger has done here.
His years of practical experience in tracking and monitoring books sales for the Buros Center for
Testing, as well as the tracking and monitoring of sales of his own publications over the years,
provided him with a detailed knowledge regarding the “lifespan” of books of the kind to opine
that one would expect a general decline in sales over time, not a precipitous drop in sales as was
experienced in this case.5

Defendant is incorrect. As Dr. Gesinger testified in his deposition, “[a]s a journal editor . . . as
faculty members around the country have received online access to journals through their
libraries, the publication -- the sales rates on those journals has gone way down nationally. So it
does seem as though, as things are made available online, they sell less.” Geisinger Dep. 301:2-8.
5

Public Resource also contends that Dr. Geisinger’s “opinion” that “Plaintiffs cannot calculate
their lost revenues with ‘any degree of certainty’” (citing Paragraph 24 of the Geisinger
15

Given his specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education, Dr. Geisinger
certainly is qualified to opine on each of the matters Defendant challenges.
III.

DR. GEISINGER’S OPINIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE
a. Defendant’s Challenges To The Reliability And Methodology Relating To Dr.
Geisinger’s Opinions Are Merely Objections To The Validity And Weight Of
The Conclusions, Not The Admissibility Of Them
Public Resource distorts the Geisinger Declaration to assert evidentiary objections

because it disagrees with the underlying facts upon which Dr. Geisinger relies. However, the
factual basis of an expert opinion goes to the credibility of the testimony, not its admissibility.
Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 88 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Motorola
may cross-examine Saunders about the factual basis of his opinions, but its disagreements with
that factual basis does not affect the testimony’s admissibility.”). Similarly, Defendant’s
disagreement with Dr. Geisinger’s methodology goes to the weight of the proffered evidence, not
its admissibility. Id.
As Daubert instructs, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky, but admissible, evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Public Resource fails to

Declaration) should be struck because he “has not demonstrated any familiarity with, or expertise
in, calculating lost revenue.” Motion to Strike at 11. However, that is not what Dr. Geisinger
opines on and was not retained to do. Indeed, nowhere in Paragraph 24 does Dr. Geisinger
discuss lost revenues. Paragraph 24 merely discusses Plaintiffs’ inability to calculate “with any
degree of certainty the number of university/college professors, students, testing companies and
others who would have purchased Plaintiffs’ Standards but for their wholesale posting on
Defendant’s https://law.resource.org website and the Internet Archive http://archive.org
website.” This is because it is virtually impossible to determine how many people, after
accessing and downloading the Standards from Defendant’s website, thereafter distributed it to
friends or colleagues, who thereafter may have done the same--a veritable snowball effect.
Defendant’s misapprehension, again, is a result of their overly restrictive view on what they
perceive Dr. Geisinger’s opinions concern and deem required for this case, as well as their
failure to read carefully and contextualize the actual opinions of Dr. Geisinger.
16

provide any evidence to rebut Dr. Geisinger’s opinions. Despite ample opportunity to do so,
Defendant failed to engage any expert of its own. Accordingly, Dr. Geisinger’s opinions stand
unrebutted. Thus, Public Resource is left in the unenviable position of conjuring up meritless
reliability and methodology objections, rife with red herrings, to challenge Dr. Geisinger’s
opinions.
i. In Addition To His Personal Observations, Dr. Geisinger May, And
Properly Did, Rely On Information Obtained From Others
Defendant asserts that Dr. Geisinger’s reliance on, and “uncritical” acceptance of,
statements from Plaintiffs’ executives requires the exclusion of his opinions formed from those
conversations as being unreliable. Specifically, Defendant states “[Dr. Geisinger’s] opinion
[regarding Plaintiffs’ use of sales proceeds] is based on talking with a handful of Plaintiffs’
senior executive and that he did nothing to verify the information he received” (Motion to Strike
at 13) and “[a]s to opinions concerning why Plaintiffs would not fund future development of the
Standards from other sources . . . [i]t appear he once again relied, uncritically, on information
from Plaintiff’s [sic] senior executives.” (Motion to Strike at 16).
However, Fed. R. Evid. § 703 provides that “the facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.” See also Daubert, 509 U.S. at
595. Dr. Geisinger’s consideration of facts provided by Plaintiffs’ executives is well within the
scope of materials an expert is allowed to rely on under Fed. R. Evid. § 703. Thus, it is not
unreasonable to rely on an executive’s description of the use of sales proceeds for his or her own
organization. Even if that were the case, however, Dr. Geisinger is familiar with each of the
17

Sponsoring Organizations, having held numerous director and chair-level positions within each
of them, and, moreover, supported his opinions based on his own personal observations. See,
e.g., Geisinger Dep. at 152:5-153:2 and 190:16-191:4.6
ii. Dr. Geisinger Properly Considered, And Rejected, Alternate Potential
Causes For The Decline In Sales Of The 1999 Standards
Public Resource erroneously asserts that Dr. Geisinger “did not consider any other
alternative causes for the decline in sales, despite numerous possibilities.” Motion to Strike at 10.
First, that is patently false. Dr. Geisinger testified during his deposition that he considered the
announcement of the 2014 Standards publication as one possible explanation for the decline in
sales of the 1999 Standards. See Geisinger Dep. 93:7. However, Dr. Geisinger ruled out that
possibility based on his experience in tracking and monitoring book sales throughout his career,
including relevant experience developed in the last ten years. See Geisinger Dep. at 137:13138:18.7

6

Defendant’s reliance on In Re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999) is misplaced. In that
case, the Court found that “[t]here is nothing improper about a medical report prepared solely for
litigation” however, “[a doctor] cannot rely on medical summaries prepared from interviews
conducted by nonprofessionals as [the expert] did here.” 193 F.3d at 698. Here, Dr. Geisinger
personally interviewed several of Plaintiffs’ executives and also relied on his own experience
and knowledge with the Sponsoring Organizations to render his opinions. This is a far cry
relying on “summaries prepared from interviews conducted by” others.

7

Public Resource’s argument that sales did not continue to “precipitously” decline in 2013 is
puzzling. See Motion to Strike at 9. As the records indicate, sales of the 1999 Standards
dropped by nearly $35,000 year over year from 2011 to 2012, the year Public Resource posted
the 1999 Standards on the Internet. Thereafter, in 2013, sales remained at the already low level.
Defendant appears to suggest that every year after the posting of the 1999 Standards on the
Internet must result in subsequent “precipitous” drops for Plaintiffs to demonstrate causation.
That is illogical. While 2011 sales of the 1999 Standards may have decreased in anticipation of
the release of the revised standards (ultimately published in 2014), the vast majority of annual
purchasers are students taking courses in which the 1999 Standards is required reading and thus
who cannot delay in purchasing the book. Geisinger Dep. at 244:4-13. Sales to these students
should have remained constant year-after-year until at least the release of the 2014 Standards.
18

Second, Public Resource’s apparent requirement that an expert consider and eliminate
every possible explanation in rendering an opinion is incorrect under the law. Even so, such
purported requirements go to the “accuracy of the conclusion, not the soundness of the
methodology.” Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The fact that
several possible causes might remain ‘uneliminated,’ the court explained, only goes to the
accuracy of the conclusion, not the soundness of the methodology.”); U.S. Information Systems,
Inc. v. Inter. Broth. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 3, 313 F.Supp.2d 213, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (quoting Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 222 F.Supp.2d 423, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)) (“While an expert should address evidence that contradicts his conclusions,
‘[i]t is not required ... that an expert categorically exclude each and every possible alternative
cause in order to render the proffered testimony admissible.’”).
Nonetheless, as noted above, Dr. Geisinger carefully explained why he rejected
alternative explanations and settled on the conclusions he presented in this case. See, e.g.,
Geisinger Dep. 99:5-100:13 (discussing elimination of reasonable alternative explanations
generally); Geisinger Dep. 301:2-8 (explaining that “[a]s a journal editor . . . as faculty members
around the country have received online access to journals through their libraries, the publication
-- the sales rates on those journals has gone way down nationally. So it does seem as though, as
things are made available online, they sell less.”).
iii. Dr. Geisinger’s Opinions Regarding Plaintiffs’ Use Of Sales To Fund
Subsequent Versions Of The Standards Are Admissible
Public Resource’s challenges to the reliability of and methodology used by Dr. Geisinger
in rendering his opinions relating to Plaintiffs’ use of revenues generated from the 1999
Standards to fund subsequent versions of the standards are, equally, unavailing. For example,
Public Resource contends that Dr. Geisinger’s opinion regarding the future viability of the
19

standards is inadmissible because he testified in his deposition that he estimated there to be “60
percent, plus or minus 20 percent” chance that Plaintiffs would cease updating the standards if
Defendant prevailed. Public Resource states “[g]iven the wide margin of error, [Dr.] Geisinger
cannot reliably state that Plaintiffs are more likely than not to cease developing the standards.”
Motion to Strike at 14. Putting aside for the moment that there is no requirement that an expert
quantify the likelihood of an outcome to establish that it is probable (see Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at
135 (“Dr. Strom’s evidence does not warrant exclusion simply because it fails to establish the
causal link to a specified degree of probability.”)), Public Resource’s self-serving, overly
restrictive view on this case has caused them to be unable “to see the forest for the trees.”
Public Resource’s focus on this one statement (procured after endlessly repetitive
questions on this point) has caused them to lose sight of Dr. Geisinger’s overwhelming,
unequivocal, and unrebutted testimony, based on his experience and knowledge relating to each
of the Sponsoring Organizations as well as his interviews of several of Plaintiffs’ executives, that
should Defendant prevail, the Sponsoring Organizations will cease developing the standards:
I was part of the strategic planning effort for APA. I know where they’ve decided
to put their funds. It is not for test standards, so they’re not going to come up with
the money. The only person at APA who knows a lot about testing, and she does,
is Marianne Ernesto, and she has a bachelor’s degree. AERA has no extra money,
and NCME has no extra money. The monies are just not there in the budget. So
the studies I’ve done are -- are knowing those three budgets, to the extent that I
do, and knowing that there are not funds for it, and that they do not have expertise
to write a proposal to get somebody to fund this, and they don’t have the free time
for somebody to write the proposal either.
Geisinger Dep. 280:8-24.8

8

Public Resource also contends that Dr. Geisinger “has no basis to assume that, if Public
Resource prevails in this litigation, it will post the 2014 Standards, which are not incorporated by
reference into law.” Motion to Strike at 15. However, it was confirmed by Carl Malamud in his
deposition that if the 2014 Standards are incorporated by reference into law, he will post them on
the Internet. See Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts In Support Of Their Motion For
20

Likewise, Defendant suggests that Dr. Geisinger lacks specialized knowledge about
“optimal or necessary methods for financing projects generally, or standards specifically.”
Motion to Strike at 13. Public Resource appears to be suggesting merely that Dr. Geisinger did
not use a methodology they perceive as being fit for their purposes. As explained throughout,
Dr. Geisinger based his opinions on his specialized knowledge, skill, training, and experience,
his interviews with several of Plaintiffs’ executives, his personal knowledge and observations of
the Sponsoring Organizations’ businesses obtained through his involvement with each of them,
as well as his review of the relevant facts of this case. The factors, taken as a whole, comprise a
solid foundation for the admissibility of Dr. Geisinger’s opinions concerning the Plaintiffs’
development of future versions of the standards. United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1169
(9th Cir.2000) (noting that with non-scientific experts, as Dr. Geisinger is in this case, “the
Daubert factors (peer review, publication, potential error rate, etc.) simply are not applicable”
and “reliability depends heavily on the knowledge and experience of the expert rather than the
methodology or theory behind it.”).

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 60-2) at ¶ 104. Dr. Geisinger read and properly relied upon the
deposition of Carl Malamud. See, e.g., Geising Dep. at 266:23-267:1. Further, Public Resource
contends that Dr. Geisinger’s opinion that if Public Resource prevails, the public will be harmed
by uncontrolled publication of the 1999 Standards without any notice that those guidelines have
been replaced by the 2014 Standards lacks any reliable foundation because, among other things,
he is “not aware of any instance where a member of the public encountered the 1999 Standards
after the 2014 Standards were published and believed the 1999 Standards were the current
standards.” Motion to Strike at 17. While Dr. Geisinger was not able to address the specific
scenario Public Resource sets forth in its challenge, Dr. Geisinger was able to point to an
instance where someone believed the 1985 Standards were the then-current Standards, despite
the 1999 Standards having already been issued. See Geisinger Dep. at 251:5-252:5; see also
Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (the mootness doctrine
includes an exception when the harm is “capable of repetition yet evading review”).
21

iv. Public Resource’s Remaining Challenges To Dr. Geisinger’s Opinions
Are Red Herrings Designed To Distract The Court From Public
Resource’s Failure To Carry Its Burden On Its Motion To Strike
Having unsuccessfully failed to conjure up sufficient bases to render Dr. Geisinger’s
opinions inadmissible, Public Resource next turns to constructing various “red herrings” to draw
the Court’s attention away from its failure to “shoulder [its] formidable burden.” United States
ex rel. K & R Ltd. P’ship, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
For example, Public Resource asserts that Dr. Geisinger’s opinions regarding Plaintiffs’
use of sales proceeds to fund subsequent versions are inadmissible because: (1) he has not
offered any opinion on whether expenses incurred in developing the standards were necessary
(i.e., that Dr. Geisinger has failed to “render[] any opinion on whether Plaintiffs’ could find
cheaper travel and lodging alternatives (e.g. teleconferencing) or whether doing so would affect
the quality of the Standards”) (Motion to Strike at 15); (2) he “offers no opinion whether
Plaintiffs would continue to develop the Standards following a decline in sales revenue, as
opposed to the complete elimination of all sales revenues” (i.e., that “[h]e has not identified any
threshold beyond which a decline in sales would prevent the development of standards or
materially affect their quality”) (Motion to Strike at 15); (3) “[Dr.] Geisinger ignores that
Plaintiffs currently have sufficient funding to update the standards for decades” (Motion to Strike
at 16); and (4) he has not evaluated “probable” responses to online availability to the standards,
including “decreasing the price of the Standards, including explanatory material that is not
incorporated by reference into law, issuing updates more frequently, or seeking alternative
sources of funding” (Motion to Strike at 16), to name a few.
Public Resource appears to suggest that in order for Dr. Geisinger’s opinions to be
admissible, he must “travel down the rabbit hole” to consider a hypothetical, Wonderland

22

scenario where Plaintiffs are required to completely restructure their organizations and business
models so as to permit Defendant’s unlawful conduct. That is preposterous. Each of these “red
herrings” does nothing to dispel, or otherwise call into question, the reliability of Dr. Geisinger’s
conclusions and the methodology used to render his opinions; at most, they go to the validity or
weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. Accordingly, Defendant’s challenges to Dr.
Geisinger’s expert opinions are without merit.
b. Dr. Geisinger Has Substantial Practical Experience With The Subject Matter
Of This Litigation And Is Able To Assist The Court In Understanding The
Evidence And Deciding The Particular Issues In This Case
In its Motion to Strike, Public Resource ignores almost completely that personal
experience is a reliable and valid basis for the admission of expert testimony. See Kumho Tire,
526 U.S. at 156 (“[N]o one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of
observations based on extensive and specialized experience.”). Dr. Geisinger’s opinions are
based, properly, on the wealth of knowledge and experience he holds, rather than any formalistic
methodology or theory. See, e.g. United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(upholding admission of Drug Enforcement Administration agent’s testimony regarding
defendant’s past criminal history because expert was testifying based on specialized knowledge);
Groobert v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2002)
(admitting expert’s testimony based on his 12 years of experience in the field of stock
photography, various speaking engagements and his continuous study of industry trends).
Indeed, as explained above, the presumption under the Federal Rules of Evidence is that
expert testimony is admissible. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588; Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 134; Fed. R.
Evid. 702 Advisory Committee Note (2000) (“A review of the case law after Daubert shows that
the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.”). Under this body of law,

23

Dr. Geisinger’s extensive knowledge and experience in the standards of the kind involved in this
lawsuit, his review of the relevant facts in this case, and the application of his knowledge to the
facts to generate his opinions, sufficiently satisfy the requirements of Daubert, Kumho, and Fed.
R. Evid. 702--i.e. Dr. Geisinger’s “professional judgment obtained through long experience in
the field” (Heller, 952 F. Supp. at 142)--and will assist the Court in understanding the evidence
and deciding the particular issues in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Strike ECF No. 60-88, the Declaration
of Kurt F. Geisinger in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent
Injunction should be denied in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
Dated: February 18, 2016
By:

/s/ Jonathan Hudis
Jonathan Hudis (DC Bar # 418872)
Jonathan P. Labukas (DC Bar # 998662)
Nikia L. Gray (pro hac vice)
1700 K Street NW, Suite 825
Washington, DC 20006-3825
Tel. [phone]
Fax [phone]
E-Mail [e-mail]
E-Mail [e-mail]
E-Mail [e-mail]
Counsel for Plaintiffs American Educational
Research Association, Inc., American
Psychological Association, Inc., and
National Council on Measurement in
Education, Inc.

24