DOBBINS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Filing 15

ORDER granting 6 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 8 Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson on 9/29/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support) (lcdar1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA DOBBINS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 16-1789
DAR

v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Victoria Dobbins brings this action to recover attorneys’ fees and costs associated
with an administrative proceeding conducted pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilit ies
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Complaint (ECF No. 1) ¶ 4. This case initially
was referred to the undersigned for full case management. 09/13/2016 Docket Entry. Upon the
consent of the parties, the case subsequently was reassigned to the undersigned for all purposes.
See Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge (ECF Nos. 12, 13);
04/07/2017 Docket Entry.
Currently pending for determination are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 6) and Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 8). 1 Upon consideration
of the motions, the memoranda in support thereof, and in opposition thereto, and the entire record
herein, the court will grant Plaintiff’s motion, and deny Defendant’s motion.

1

Although styled as a motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, the traditional summary judgment standard is
not applicable. See Wood v. District of Columbia, 72 F. Supp. 3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Although the plaintiffs seek
attorneys’ fees in a motion for summary judgment, the typical summary judgment standard is inapplicable here[.]”)
(quoting Gardill v. District of Columbia, 930 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 n.1 (D.D.C. 2013)). Indeed, the court directed the
parties to brief the issue consistent with such titles. See 10/19/2016 Minute Order. Accordingly, the court will treat
Plaintiff’s motion as a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, and will treat Defendant’s cross motion as an opposition
to Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.

Dobbins v. District of Columbia

2

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the parent of A.D., a minor student residing in the District of Columbia who is
eligible to receive special education and related services. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points
and Authorities

in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff’s

Memorandum”) (ECF No. 6-2) at 1–2. Plaintiff filed an administrative due process complaint
against the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”), in which she alleged that DCPS had
failed to provide A.D. with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) by not offering A.D. “an
appropriate Individualized Education Plan (IEP) and a full-time residential placement, as well as
by failing to comply with the IDEA’s procedural requirements.” Hearing Officer Determination
(ECF No. 6-4) at 1. The hearing officer found that A.D. “was denied a FAPE by DCPS’ June 18,
2014 IEP, which was not reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits[.]” Id. at 21. As
relief, the hearing officer ordered that DCPS revise A.D.’s IEP in accordance with the prescribed
timetable, and fund a full-time residential program. Id. at 21-28. Additionally, the hearing officer
provided that his order “is without prejudice to Petitioner’s right, if any, to seek compensatory
education relief hereafter for DCPS’ failure to timely evaluate [A.D.] for special education
eligibility following the parent’s November 2013 referral[.]” Id. at 28.
Following the hearing officer’s determination, Plaintiff commenced the instant action,
seeking a total of $93,329.72 in attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during the underlying
administrative proceedings. See Proposed Order (ECF No. 6-3). The total is apportioned between
two attorneys: Alana Hecht., Esq. of D.C. Disability Law Group, PC, who represented Plaintiff
from November 2013 through May 2014, and Elizabeth Jester, Esq. of the firm Jester and
Williams, “which stepped in where Ms. Hecht left off and enforced Plaintiff’s right [to] a FAPE
for her child as guaranteed by IDEA.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 2. Ms. Jester, who filed the

Dobbins v. District of Columbia

3

pending motion for attorneys’ fees, submits that “[e]nforcement of Plaintiff’s IDEA rights [was]
accomplished by means of a successful administrative proceeding brought pursuant to IDEA[,]”
and that “Plaintiff was the prevailing party and found to be entitled to specific special education
services that DCPS had failed or refused to provide.” Id.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiff asserts that she was the prevailing party in a complex administrative proceeding
brought pursuant to IDEA, and therefore is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs in accordance with the applicable authorities. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 3. Plaintiff
contends that both the number of hours claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel, as well as the hourly rates
claimed, are reasonable. Id. at 4-6. More specifically, Plaintiff submits that her attorneys’ billing
practices; skills, experiences, and reputations; and the prevailing market rate in the community all
support her request for an award of fees at counsel’s (and the associated paralegal’s) so-called
Laffey billing rates. Id.; see also id. at 7-16, 17-18. Plaintiff also submits that the costs claimed
are reasonable. Id. at 17.
Defendant does not contest Plaintiff’s status as a prevailing party; nor does Defendant
suggest that the number of hours claimed by Plaintiff is unreasonable. Rather, Defendant opposes
an award in the amount sought on the grounds that (1) the “the proposed hourly rates for both
Plaintiff’s attorneys and Plaintiff’s paralegals are unreasonable and Plaintiff offers an insufficient
factual basis to support these rates; and (2) Plaintiff’s invoices have several entries which are not
reimbursable under the IDEA.” Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Defendant’s Opposition”) (ECF No. 7) at 1. Defendant characterizes Plaintiff’s reliance upon
the so-called Laffey Matrix as “misplaced[,]” id. at 7, and proposes that the court should either

Dobbins v. District of Columbia

4

deny Plaintiff’s motion, see id. at 12, or alternatively, award fees at rates of no more than 75% of
the applicable Laffey Matrix rates, see id. at 10-13, 15-17. Additionally, Defendant claims that
any time related to attorney travel should be awarded at 50% of the appropriate hourly rate, and
that any travel expenses from counsel’s office in Great Falls, Virginia should be excluded from
the fee award. Id. at 13–14. Applying this formula. Defendant submits that the award of attorneys’
fees should not exceed $7,664.41 for the services of Ms. Hecht, and $64,109.95 for the services of
Ms. Jester. Id. at 17.
Finally, Defendant argues that the costs claimed by Plaintiff for photocopying and faxing
should be reduced to “customary” rates. Id. at 15.
Plaintiff, in her reply, states that her counsel “is willing to accept as reasonable in this case
Defendant’s proposal that compensation for travel time be at 50% of her hourly rate.” Plaintiff’s
Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff’s
Reply”) (ECF No. 10) at 4. Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s contention that the costs requested are
unreasonable. Id. at 5-6.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
In actions for attorneys’ fees that are brought pursuant to the IDEA, “the court, in its
discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to the prevailing party. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). In evaluating such a request, the court must first determine “whether
the party seeking attorney’s fees is the prevailing party,” and if so, must then evaluate whether the
requested fees are reasonable. Wood v. District of Columbia, 72 F. Supp. 3d 13, 18 (D.D.C.
2014) (citing Staton v. District of Columbia, No. 13-773, 2014 WL 2700894, at *3 (D.D.C. June
11, 2014), adopted by 2014 WL 2959017 (D.D.C. July 2, 2014); Douglas v. District of Columbia,
67 F. Supp. 3d 36, 39–41 (D.D.C. 2014)).

5

Dobbins v. District of Columbia

As this Circuit has recently observed, “[t]he IDEA provides no further guidance for
determining an appropriate fee award.” Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir.
2015). Thus, the common mechanism for the determination of a reasonable award is generally
“the number of hours reasonably expended” multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Wood, 72 F.
Supp. 3d at 18 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The party requesting fees
bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the hours expended, and “may satisfy this
burden by submitting an invoice that is sufficiently detailed to permit the District Court to make
an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are justified.” Id. (citing Hensley,
461 U.S. at 433).
The party requesting fees “also bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the
hourly rate sought,” and in doing so, “must submit evidence on at least three fronts: the attorneys’
billing practices; the attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates
in the relevant community.” Id. at 18–19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re North,
59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). If the party requesting fees satisfies its burden, “there is a
presumption that the number of hours billed and the hourly rates are reasonable,” and “the burden
then shifts to the [opposing party] to rebut” this presumption. Id. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
In this jurisdiction, the Laffey Matrix serves as the commonly accepted benchmark for
determining the prevailing market rates for attorneys’ fees in complex federal court litigation. See
Eley, 793 F.3d at 100. “The prevailing market rate provides merely a starting point for determining
the reasonableness of a billing rate . . . . The fee applicant should also submit evidence, including
affidavits,

regarding

her

counsel’s

general billing

practices,

skill,

experience

and

reputation.” Wood, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 21 (quoting Baker v. District of Columbia Pub. Sch., 815 F.

6

Dobbins v. District of Columbia

Supp. 2d 102, 114 (D.D.C. 2011)) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
Another judge of this Court has also noted that IDEA cases “take a variety of litigation
paths” and cannot be dismissed as “categorically routine or simple.”

Sweatt v. District of

Columbia, 82 F. Supp. 3d 454, 459 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2 3 Some
judges in this District “ha[ve] rejected the suggestion that IDEA administrative litigation is
categorically less complex than other forms of litigation, and reaffirm[ed] that IDEA cases are
sufficiently complex to allow application of the Laffey Matrix.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Moreover, “[s]ince an attorney’s total fee award is determined by multiplying the

number of hours expended by the hourly rate, reducing the Laffey rates to reflect the brevity of the
case improperly accounts for the length of the proceedings twice.” Id. Thus, “[t]he complexity of
the case is accounted for by the number of hours expended and should not be accounted for by a
blunt reduction of rates before applying the rates to the number of hours expended.” Id.
While the Circuit thus far has declined to categorically decide “whether IDEA litigation is
in fact sufficiently ‘complex’ to use [some version of the Laffey Matrix][,]” it has criticized the
mechanical application of the proposition “that IDEA cases, as a subset of civil rights litigation,
fail to qualify as ‘complex’ federal litigation.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 105. In a concurring opinion, a
member of the Eley panel wrote that “I would simply add that, in my view, the United States

3

By way of illustration, the court has observed that “IDEA cases require ‘testimony from education experts regarding
whether a student has been denied a free and public education,’. . . and plaintiffs’ counsel must ‘understand the
bureaucratic workings of [DCPS] . . . and . . . become conversant with a wide range of disabling cognitive, emotional,
and language-based disorders and the corresponding therapeutic and educational approaches.’” Sweatt, 82 F. Supp.
3d at 460 (citations omitted).

Dobbins v. District of Columbia

7

Attorney’s Office Laffey matrix is appropriate for IDEA cases.” Id. at 105 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring). 4
DISCUSSION
Reasonable Rates
As Defendant does not dispute the number of hours claimed, the sole issue to be determined
is a reasonable billing rate. This court has held, as recently as six months ago, has awarded fees
at the applicable Laffey rates, and, incorporating herein the rationale previously articulated, does
so here. See Daniels v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 14-665, 2017 WL 1154948, at *5
(D.D.C. March 27, 2017). 5 This court knows of no reason warranting reconsideration of this
determination.
The burden thus “shifts to the District to ‘provide specific contrary evidence tending to
show that a lower rate would be appropriate.” Wimbish v. District of Columbia, Civil Action Nos.
15-1429, 15-2182, 2017 WL 1743497, at *4 (D.D.C. May 3, 2017) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The court finds that Defendant has failed to carry such burden, as the court has
found the bare claim that 75% of the Laffey rate is warranted to be insufficient. Daniels, 2017 WL
1154948, at *6 (“[T]he undersigned has rejected the proposition that an award of fees to a
prevailing party in an IDEA action must be confined to a rate of no more than three-quarters of the
applicable Laffey Matrix rates[.]”); see also Wimbish, 2017 WL 1154948, at *4 (The District’s

4

In December, 2016, a different panel of the Circuit affirmed a District Court judge’s exercise of discretion to award
fees to an IDEA prevailing party at three-quarters of counsel’s Laffey rates. See Reed v. District of Columbia, 843
F.3d 517, 522, 524–25 (D.C. Cir. 2016). However, as that panel of the Circuit neither overturned Eley, nor held that
IDEA litigation, categorically, is not complex federal litigation, the court concludes that Reed is limited to its facts.

5

The court has no occasion to address Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s delay in making any payment warrants
an award of fees at her Laffey rates.

8

Dobbins v. District of Columbia

citation [exclusively]to . . . cases fails to meet its rebuttal burden of putting on ‘equally specific
countervailing evidence.’”) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the court finds that the reasonable billing rates are the claimed Laffey Matrix
rates. 6
Allowable Costs
Upon consideration of the arguments of the parties in the context of the applicable
authorities, the undersigned will, for the reasons offered by Defendant, see Defendant’s Opposition
at 14-15, award costs in an amount calculated in accordance with the formulas proposed by
Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and award fees at the
Laffey rates of counsel and the paralegal, except with respect to entries as to which counsel has
agreed to accept one-half of her Laffey rate. The court will award costs calculated in accordance
with the formula proposed by Defendant.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Deborah A.
Robinson
September 29, 2017

6

Digitally signed by Deborah A. Robinson
DN: c=US, st=District of Columbia,
l=Washington, o=United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, ou=U.S.
Magistrate Judge, cn=Deborah A. Robinson,
email=[e-mail].
gov
Date: 2017.09.29 17:23:19 -04'00'

DEBORAH A. ROBINSON
United States Magistrate Judge

Defendant does not suggest that the Laffey rates for either lawyer, or for the paralegal, has been miscalculated.