COCKRUM et al v. DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC. et al

Filing 62

MOTION for Discovery by ROY COCKRUM, SCOTT COMER, ERIC SCHOENBERG (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Berwick, Benjamin)

Case 1:17-cv-01370-ESH Document 62 Filed 05/24/18 Page 1 of 24

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROY COCKRUM, SCOTT COMER, and
ERIC SCHOENBERG,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT,
INC., and ROGER STONE,
Defendants.

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) Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-1370-ESH
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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT LIMITED JURISDICTIONAL
DISCOVERY AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Case 1:17-cv-01370-ESH Document 62 Filed 05/24/18 Page 2 of 24

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................................................................................... ii
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................................. 2
I.

The Standard Permitting Discovery Regarding Personal Jurisdiction in this
Circuit is Liberal .................................................................................................. 2

II.

Plaintiffs Should Be Granted Jurisdictional Discovery Regarding Defendants’
Contacts with the District ..................................................................................... 4
A.

The Standards Governing Whether Defendants’ Contacts with the
District of Columbia Give Rise to Personal Jurisdiction............................ 4

B.

Plaintiffs’ Allegations Regarding Defendants’ Contacts State a Prima
Facie Case of Personal Jurisdiction or at a Minimum Warrant
Jurisdictional Discovery ........................................................................... 9

III.

Plaintiffs Should Be Granted Jurisdictional Discovery Regarding CoConspirators’ Contacts with the District ............................................................. 13

IV.

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Discovery ........................................................................... 16

CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................... 18

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc.,
290 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C. 2003) ............................................................................................ 3
Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham,
798 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................................ 11
*Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cty.,
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) ................................................................................................. 7, 8, 14
Cmty. Fin. Services Ass’n of Am., Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
132 F. Supp. 3d 98 (D.D.C. 2015) .......................................................................................... 3
Crane v. Carr,
814 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1987) .......................................................................................... 3, 13
Diversified Mgmt. Solutions v. Control Sys. Research,
No. 15-cv-81062, 2016 WL 4256916 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2016).............................................. 6
*Dooley v. United Techs. Corp,
786 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1992) ............................................................................... 6, 7, 11, 12
*Edmond v. U.S. Postal Service General Counsel,
949 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1991) .................................................................................... 2, 13, 14
Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan,
75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996).................................................................................................. 2
FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd.,
529 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2008) .............................................................................. 3, 6, 13, 14
Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
823 F.3d 759 (2d Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................. 11
GTE New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,
199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000) .............................................................................................. 3

ii

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In re Baan Co. Secs. Litig.,
245 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D.D.C. 2003) ........................................................................................ 2
In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export,
307 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D. Me. 2004) ........................................................................................ 9
In re Sumitomo Copper Litig.,
120 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ..................................................................................... 6
Jacobsen v. Oliver,
201 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D.D.C. 2002) .......................................................................................... 5
Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan,
115 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............................................................................................ 13
Kroger v. Legalbill.com LLC,
No. 04-cv-2189, 2005 WL 4908968 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2005) ................................................ 6, 8
Lans v. Adduci Mastriani & Schaumberg LLP,
786 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D.D.C. 2011) ........................................................................................ 8
Myers v. Casino Queen, Inc.,
689 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................. 7
Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt,
722 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1983) .......................................................................................... 3, 13
*Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,
81 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015) ............................................................................................ 11
Plesha v. Ferguson,
760 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2011) .......................................................................................... 3
Richter v. Analex Corp.,
940 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1996) ............................................................................................. 8
Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC,
884 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2016) ............................................................................................... 8

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Samantar v. Yousuf,
560 U.S. 305 (2010) ............................................................................................................... 2
Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors,
274 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 2001) .......................................................................................... 5, 13
Sharp Corp. v. Hisense USA Corp.,
292 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2017) ........................................................................................ 8
*Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno,
746 A.2d 320 (D.C. 2000) .................................................................................................. 5, 7
Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto,
26 F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 1994) .................................................................................................... 7
TV Azteca v. Ruiz,
490 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2016) .................................................................................................... 8
U.S. v. Menutti,
679 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1982) ............................................................................................... 12
*Walden v. Fiore,
134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) ............................................................................................... 8, 12, 14
Statutory Authorities
42 U.S.C. §1985(3) ..................................................................................................................... 5
D.C. Code §13-423(a)(1) ............................................................................................................ 5
D.C. Code §13-423(a)(4) ............................................................................................................ 5
Rules and Regulations
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) ................................................................................................................. 16
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 ...................................................................................................................... 17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 ...................................................................................................................... 16
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 ...................................................................................................................... 17

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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs move for leave to take limited jurisdictional discovery to further establish
Defendants’ contacts with the District of Columbia related to Plaintiffs’ claims, both through
their own direct actions and the actions of their co-conspirators within the District. Under the
standards governing personal jurisdiction discussed at the recent hearing on Defendants’ motions
to dismiss and in the parties’ briefs, Plaintiffs contend that they have sufficiently pleaded a prima
facie case for personal jurisdiction because their claims arise from the Defendants’ own contacts
with the District, as well as the contacts of their co-conspirators. However, should the Court
disagree with Plaintiffs and be inclined to conclude that Plaintiffs have not established
jurisdiction on the face of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs’ allegations are more than
sufficient to qualify them for limited jurisdictional discovery prior to ultimate resolution of
Defendant’s jurisdictional challenge.
Under the D.C. Circuit’s governing law, Plaintiffs should be granted leave to take
discovery unless Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations are so entirely conclusory that discovery
would be futile—which they are not—or it is clear that no discovery could shed any light on
contacts relevant under the governing legal standards—which is also not the case. Plaintiffs
have more than met the governing standard triggering jurisdictional discovery because they have
pleaded facts that if proven true establish: 1) that their claims arise from the existence of a
conspiracy between Defendants and other co-conspirators; 2) that multiple acts in furtherance of
that conspiracy were committed within the District of Columbia by Defendants and their coconspirators; and 3) the plausibility of Defendants’ and the co-conspirators’ additional contacts
with the forum. Plaintiffs therefore make this motion in the alternative to their opposition to the
motions to dismiss, because to resolve those motions in Defendants’ favor without permitting

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jurisdictional discovery would allow “the defendant [to] defeat the jurisdiction of a federal court
by withholding information on its contacts with the forum.” El–Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan,
75 F.3d 668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S.
305 (2010).1
ARGUMENT
I.

The Standard Permitting Discovery Regarding Personal Jurisdiction in this Circuit
is Liberal
When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff can meet

his or her burden with respect to establishing jurisdiction with a prima facie showing based on
allegations. Edmond v. U.S. Postal Service General Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (addressing prima facie burden without discovery or evidentiary hearing). A plaintiff can
also, in the alternative, request jurisdictional discovery, after which this Court will resolve the
jurisdictional question using a “‘factually documented’ prima facie standard” that “obliges
plaintiffs to support their bare allegations, but instructs a court to look favorably upon those
assertions once the required proffer is made.” In re Baan Co. Secs. Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 117,
125 (D.D.C. 2003) (citation omitted).
The D.C. Circuit and this Court generally permit limited jurisdictional discovery before
deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Edmond, 949 F.2d at
425 (“[D]iscovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be freely permitted, and

1

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(m), the undersigned counsel for Plaintiffs has consulted with
Defendants’ counsel, who represent that Defendants oppose this motion.
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this is no less true when discovery is directed to personal jurisdiction.”).2 The D.C. Circuit has
held that it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to deny jurisdictional discovery unless
plaintiffs’ allegations are either so conclusory and superficial or legally invalid that discovery
will shed no light at all on relevant contacts with the forum. See id.; FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX
Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[A] request for jurisdictional discovery
cannot be based on mere conjecture or speculation.”); id. (denying discovery because “no
amount of discovery regarding that one customer’s transactions would support general
jurisdiction”); Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1983). When
requesting jurisdictional discovery, “a plaintiff must make a detailed showing of what discovery
it wishes to conduct or what results it thinks such discovery would produce.” Atlantigas Corp. v.
Nisource, Inc., 290 F.Supp.2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 2003) (citation omitted).3
Under the governing standards, a court has three options when evaluating a pending
motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds and a motion made in the alternative for
jurisdictional discovery: 1) deny the motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs, on the face of the

2

See also GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351-52 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (“[I]f a party demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through
discovery, then jurisdictional discovery is justified.”); El–Fadl, 75 F.3d at 676 (a plaintiff “faced
with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is entitled to reasonable discovery”);
Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[Plaintiff] has pointed to links [defendant]
has with the District, sufficient at least to permit further inquiry regarding personal jurisdiction,
so that the statutory and constitutional questions can be resolved on a fuller record.”); Plesha v.
Ferguson, 760 F. Supp. 2d 90, 93 (D.D.C. 2011) (“The Court cannot dismiss a plaintiff’s claims
against a defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction without affording him an opportunity to
develop facts supporting jurisdiction through appropriate discovery.”).
3

Where a court concludes that a complaint’s allegations are sufficient to establish a prima facie
case for personal jurisdiction on their face, it is not required to order further discovery before
resolving the jurisdictional challenge and may dismiss any pending discovery motion for
discovery as moot. E.g., Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am., Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 132 F.
Supp. 3d 98, 116 (D.D.C. 2015).
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complaint, have made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction; 2) withhold judgment on the
jurisdictional question and grant discovery because the plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to
trigger further inquiry, resolving the motion to dismiss later under the factually-documented
prima facie standard; or 3) grant the motion to dismiss without granting discovery, but only if the
plaintiffs’ allegations are legally insufficient and they have pleaded only conclusory facts and
further discovery necessarily would shed no light on jurisdictional issues. Plaintiffs respectfully
submit that the Court should employ the first option, and deny the pending motions to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction on the face of the Amended Complaint. But if the Court is not
inclined to do so, Plaintiffs’ allegations are more than sufficient to warrant the limited discovery
requested in this motion to further establish Defendants’ contacts with this forum that gave rise
to the Plaintiffs’ claims.
Below, Plaintiffs discuss the governing legal standards pertaining to personal jurisdiction
based on Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding how their claims arise from Defendants’ and their coconspirators’ contacts with the District and why, under those standards, Plaintiffs’ existing
factual allegations demonstrate a good-faith basis for determining that discovery will yield
relevant information that will assist the Court in resolving Defendants’ jurisdictional challenge.
II.

Plaintiffs Should Be Granted Jurisdictional Discovery Regarding Defendants’
Contacts with the District
A.

Standards Governing Whether Defendants’ Contacts with the District of
Columbia Give Rise to Personal Jurisdiction

Under the due process clause and the D.C. long-arm statute, a court in D.C. may exercise
jurisdiction over an individual or entity that transacts business in the District, where the

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plaintiff’s claims “aris[e] from” that transaction. D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1).4 When a defendant
has engaged in acts in furtherance of a conspiracy in the forum, he is deemed to have transacted
business in the forum for the purposes of Section 13-423(a)(1). See Second Amendment Found.
v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Persons who enter the forum and
engage in conspiratorial acts are deemed to ‘transact business’ there ‘directly.’”) (quoting D.C.
Code § 13-423(a)(1)).5 And claims that are predicated on conspiracy liability “arise” from the
defendant’s transaction of the business of the conspiracy in the District. That is, where the
underlying tort flows from the conspiracy, other conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy in the
forum can establish jurisdiction under the permissive standard for when claims “arise from”
contacts with the forum.
The “arise from” standard is broad and flexible: a plaintiff’s claims “arise from” the
transaction of business in the forum where they bear a “discernible relationship” to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum. See Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320,
335 (D.C. 2000); see also, e.g., Jacobsen v. Oliver, 201 F. Supp. 2d 93, 105 (D.D.C. 2002)
(“[T]he District of Columbia Court of Appeals interpreted the phrase ‘arise from’ broadly and

4

Plaintiffs focus on Section 13-423(a)(1) here, but jurisdiction is also proper under Section 13423(a)(4) for Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. §1985(3), as well as Plaintiff Comer’s claims in
light of the harm to his professional reputation in the District, see Pls.’ Mem. of Points &
Authorities in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 21-22, ECF No. 25, and under
a theory of general jurisdiction for all of Plaintiffs’ claims, see id. at 22-23. Plaintiffs also focus
here on their underlying claims that rest on the conspiracy theory of liability. But the Court also
has jurisdiction over Defendants for the aiding-and-abetting theory of liability for much the same
reasons discussed here.
5

The court in Second Amendment Foundation declined to exercise jurisdiction because the
plaintiff had alleged no facts from which the court could infer that the defendants had entered
into a conspiracy, and thus had failed to satisfy their prima facie burden. See 274 F.3d at 524.
The court’s decision was not based on the fact that the only basis for jurisdiction was a single
meeting in the forum. Indeed, courts regularly hold that a single in-forum meeting is sufficient
for jurisdiction. See infra at p.8.
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established a ‘flexible’ nexus test to determine when claims can be said to ‘arise from’ contacts
with the forum.”); Kroger v. Legalbill.com LLC, No. 04-cv-2189, 2005 WL 4908968, at *6-*8
(D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2005) (discussing the “arise from” test).
Applying this broad standard, courts in this jurisdiction and elsewhere have held that
conduct in furtherance of a conspiracy in a forum is discernably related to underlying substantive
claims that flow from that conspiracy to give rise to specific jurisdiction. See Dooley v. United
Techs. Corp, 786 F. Supp. 65, 69 (D.D.C. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by FC Inv. Grp.
LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2008); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 120 F.
Supp. 2d 328, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“These business activities are substantially related to
Plaintiffs’ claims, because they were in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, which is the basis
of Plaintiffs’ claims.”); Diversified Mgmt. Solutions v. Control Sys. Research, No. 15-cv-81062,
2016 WL 4256916, at *14-*15 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2016) (holding court has personal jurisdiction
over out-of-state defendant because plaintiffs alleged facts sufficient to show conspiracy and that
co-conspirator “committed acts in Florida in furtherance of the conspiracy,” even assuming that
the contacts between co-conspirator and defendant do not themselves “rise to the level of a
‘tortious act’ committed within Florida”). In Dooley, the plaintiff alleged a conspiracy in which
defendants bribed Saudi officials so that Saudi Arabia would purchase Sikorsky helicopters, and
plaintiff alleged he was demoted for refusing to cooperate. Dooley, 786 F. Supp. at 72-73.
Rather than looking just at the immediate conduct that caused the plaintiff’s demotion, the court
found that it could exercise jurisdiction over the defendants based on conduct in the District in
furtherance of the broader conspiracy:
Plaintiff Dooley’s complaint certainly can be said to arise from the UTC
Corporate Defendants’ activities in the District of Columbia. It is through UTC
Defendants’ contacts with Saudi Arabian Ambassador Bandar in Washington,
D.C. that the conspiracy allegedly came to its inception. Through UTC

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Defendants’ visits to the District, the conspiracy allegedly came to fruition. And it
is the defendants’ connections to Frank E. Basil, Inc., in Washington, D.C., which
established allegedly the mechanism for the bribes at the heart of the conspiracy.
Plaintiff Dooley’s alleged refusal to cooperate with this Washington-centered
conspiracy gave rise to his demotion and thus, this action.
Id. at 72-73.
Significantly, under the “arise from” standard, a plaintiff’s injury need not be caused by a
defendant’s contacts with the forum. Shoppers Food Warehouse, 746 A.2d at 333-35 (discussing
and rejecting tests based on proximate causation or but for causation). The D.C. Court of
Appeals has emphasized that “if the claim either arises out of or relates to the nonresident
defendant’s business activity, specific jurisdiction may be exercised,” id. at 332 (emphasis in
original). This construction of “arise from” is consistent with the federal due process standard,
which likewise allows jurisdiction over claims that arise from or relate to a defendant’s contacts
with a forum. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct.
1773, 1780 (2017) (“[T]he suit must aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the
forum.”); Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[W]e think it
significant that the constitutional catchphrase is disjunctive in nature, referring to suits ‘aris[ing]
out of, or relat[ing] to,’ in-forum activities. . . . We believe that this added language portends
added flexibility and signals a relaxation of the applicable standard. A number of other courts
share this belief.” (internal citations omitted)); Myers v. Casino Queen, Inc., 689 F.3d 904, 91213 (8th Cir. 2012).
Recent Supreme Court precedent likewise does not impose a causation requirement or
some other heightened nexus between a plaintiff’s claim and a defendant’s contacts with the
forum to satisfy due process requirements. The Court’s most recent specific jurisdiction cases
merely hold that a court lacks personal jurisdiction if the defendant itself lacks any minimum

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contacts with the forum (Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121-22 (2014)), or if there is no
relationship at all between the forum and the plaintiff’s claims (Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at
1780). Neither Walden nor Bristol-Myers suggests that a tighter nexus between the Defendants’
actual contacts with the forum and the underlying claims is required—a “discernible
relationship” remains sufficient. See, e.g., Sharp Corp. v. Hisense USA Corp., 292 F. Supp. 3d
157, 170 (D.D.C. 2017) (applying the “arise from” test after Walden and Bristol-Myers); Rilley v.
MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 329 (Minn. 2016) (“Walden does not disturb numerous,
long-established precedents allowing courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants
based in part on commercial contacts with businesses or residents that are located inside the
forum.”); TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 52-53 (Tex. 2016) (holding, post-Walden, that the
“standard does not require proof that the plaintiff would have no claim ‘but for’ the contacts, or
that the contacts were a ‘proximate cause’ of the liability”).6
Under the “arise from” standard, and consistent with due process, courts have recognized
that even a single significant act related to a claim by a defendant in the forum can create
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kroger, 2005 WL 4908968, at *9 (stating that “the long-arm
statute does not require that the claim arise solely from D.C. activities” and that “it is certainly
the case that a ‘single event’ or a ‘single meeting’ can suffice” to establish personal jurisdiction);
Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.D.C. 1996) (basing personal jurisdiction on
one meeting in D.C. at which conduct giving rise to the claim might have been discussed); Lans
v. Adduci Mastriani & Schaumberg LLP, 786 F. Supp. 2d 240, 277 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that

6

This case would be more like Walden or Bristol-Myers had Plaintiffs brought it in a forum
where the Campaign had no contact at all or its only contact was to try to win voters, and it had
engaged in no conduct related to the conspiracy. Not so here, where the Campaign and its coconspirators engaged in specific acts in the forum in furtherance of the conspiracy.
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“even if the July 1997 meeting was Delphi’s only contact with the District, this contact alone is
sufficient to constitute minimum contacts” and citing cases); In re New Motor Vehicles
Canadian Export, 307 F. Supp. 2d 145, 152-53 (D. Me. 2004) (finding prima facie case of
jurisdiction based on a single meeting in the forum in furtherance of the conspiracy).
B.

Plaintiffs’ Allegations Regarding Defendants’ Contacts State a Prima Facie
Case of Personal Jurisdiction or, at a Minimum, Warrant Jurisdictional
Discovery

Under the standards discussed above, Defendants’ own contacts with the District in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy are relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims and are sufficient—
particularly at this early stage of the proceedings—to establish personal jurisdiction over
Defendants. In the alternative, the same allegations, identifying Defendants’ specific contacts
with the District related to Plaintiffs’ claims, are more than sufficient to support Plaintiffs’
request for jurisdictional discovery.
Plaintiffs have specifically alleged the conspiracy at issue: that over the course of the
spring of 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators entered into a single conspiracy, pursuant to
which Russia agreed that it would help the Trump Campaign, including by releasing thousands
of emails stolen from the Democratic National Committee (DNC), which included Plaintiffs’
private information, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 139; that Defendants advised their co-conspirators
on the specific material to be released and the timing of such release, see id. ¶¶ 10-11, 16, 119120, 161; and that Defendants offered policy concessions to Russia in exchange for their
assistance, see id. ¶¶ 14-15, 139-159. Plaintiffs have alleged that they were injured as a direct

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and foreseeable result of this conspiracy. See id. ¶¶ 16-22, 61-77, 161, 226-227, 234-235, 244245.7
Plaintiffs have further alleged several specific acts in furtherance of this conspiracy that
involved Defendants and occurred in the District, including:
1. Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants’ foreign policy team was based in D.C., was led
by someone who lived and worked in D.C., that the team’s defining attribute was its
inexplicable collaboration with Russia as part of the conspiracy, and that this
collaboration was conducted and directed in the District. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-37.
2. Plaintiffs have alleged that then-candidate Trump met with the Campaign’s foreign
policy team in D.C. on March 31, 2016. Id. ¶ 95. Plaintiffs also have alleged specific
facts suggesting strongly that this March 31 meeting was important to the inception of the
conspiracy—specifically, it was attended by George Papadopoulos, who had recently
made contact with agents of the Russian regime and had declared himself to be an
intermediary for the Kremlin; those contacts were discussed at the meeting; and J.D.
Gordon later identified the meeting as the source of the adoption of language favorable to
Russia in the Republican Party platform. See id. ¶¶ 95, 149; Statement of the Offense

7

Plaintiffs have alleged that the conspiracy explicitly included dissemination of the emails, and
they have provided ample facts to support that allegation. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11, 13,
16, 97, 101, 119-127, 129-134, 139, 160-165; Statement of the Offense ¶ 14, United States v.
Papadopoulos, 1:17-cr-182, ECF No. 19 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017) (“Papadopoulos SOO”). But,
even if the co-conspirators entered into a more general agreement for Russia to help the Trump
Campaign in exchange for policy benefits, and that agreement did not explicitly include
dissemination of the emails, Defendants would be liable for that dissemination as an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. See Pls’ Mem. at 27 n.10; Pls.’ Surreply in Opp’n to Defs’ Mot.
to Dismiss at 3, ECF No. 50. And because Plaintiffs’ injuries would still flow from the
conspiracy, acts in furtherance of the conspiracy in the forum would still bear a “discernible
relationship” to Plaintiffs’ claims, thus providing the Court with jurisdiction, or at the very least
with a specific basis for jurisdictional discovery.
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¶ 9, United States v. Papadopoulos, 1:17-cr-182, ECF No. 19 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017)
(“Papadopoulos SOO”); see also Dooley, 786 F. Supp. at 72 (identifying conduct by
which “the conspiracy allegedly came to its inception” as relevant to conduct in the
forum for personal jurisdiction).
3. Similarly, on April 27, 2016, just one day after Mr. Papadopoulos was offered “dirt” on
Mr. Trump’s opponent in the form of “thousands of emails,” Papadopoulos SOO ¶ 14,
Mr. Trump and other high-ranking Campaign officials met with Russian Ambassador
Kislyak in D.C. Am. Compl. ¶ 96. These meetings were kept secret and wrongfully not
disclosed as required on official government documents (filed in the District), further
enhancing the plausibility of the allegation that they were in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Id. ¶¶ 194-198.
4. And on July 7, 2016, while in D.C., then-Campaign Chairman Paul Manafort emailed a
Russian oligarch with close ties to the Kremlin to offer private briefings. Id. ¶ 99.8
Plaintiffs have pleaded, and it is at the least plausible—indeed, likely—that all of these
furthered the conspiracy that is the basis for their claims. Plaintiffs have also pleaded additional
facts supporting the plausibility of additional acts in furtherance of the conspiracy in the

8

During the May 17 hearing, the Court raised the possibility that Mr. Manafort may have been
motivated by his own self-interest rather than by his participation in a broader conspiracy. While
that may be a plausible explanation if this allegation were taken in isolation, it becomes far less
plausible when viewed in the context of the other contacts between Russian agents and agents of
the Trump Campaign. In any event, it is at least equally plausible that Mr. Manafort’s actions
were a part of the conspiracy (including because his participation in the conspiracy was in his
self-interest). And at this stage, Plaintiffs need not rule out the possibility of independent action
or other plausible (even more plausible) explanations. See, e.g., Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC
v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 81 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Because Oxbow’s allegations
are plausible, Oxbow need not eliminate the possibility of independent action to survive
defendants’ motions to dismiss, even if defendants’ allegations are also plausible.” (internal
citations omitted)); Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015);
Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 781 (2d Cir. 2016).
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District.9 Together, the alleged acts in D.C. by Defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy to
work together to harm Mr. Trump’s opponent and help the Trump Campaign, which led to the
release of the stolen DNC emails, have far more than a “discernible relationship” to Plaintiffs’
underlying claims.
But even if the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs about the “arising from” standard and
concludes that conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy is only a basis for jurisdiction if it has a
closer nexus to the underlying tort, Plaintiffs still should be granted jurisdictional discovery.
Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts regarding activity by the Defendant Trump Campaign and
its co-conspirators in the District to raise at the least a very serious question as to whether the
Campaign discussed, at meetings that took place in the District, the very activities that harmed
plaintiffs and constituted the underlying torts and violations of law—namely, publication and
dissemination of the stolen emails on WikiLeaks and elsewhere, and using that publication to
decrease support for their political opponents. These allegations—predicated on now-public

9

Plaintiffs have also alleged that the Campaign had a significant D.C. presence and that the bulk
of the Campaign’s foreign policy activity was conducted from D.C. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-37,
196. The hack of the DNC servers in D.C. was also a critical overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and thus is also a basis for personal jurisdiction. See Pls.’ Mem. at 20-21; see also
infra at Section III. And in-forum conduct that post-dates the dissemination of the emails—such
as Mr. Flynn’s conversations with Mr. Kislyak, which were a part of the “payoff” pursuant to the
conspiracy, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 152-154; the Campaign’s amplification of the leaked emails, id. ¶¶
168; and acts of concealment, id. ¶¶ 188, 192, 194-198—are sufficiently related to Plaintiffs’
claims that they provide a further basis for jurisdiction, particularly given that the specific
jurisdiction inquiry turns on the contacts that the defendant creates with the forum. See Walden,
134 S. Ct. at 1122; see also, e.g., U.S. v. Menutti, 679 F.2d 1032, 1035 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding
that “a conspiracy continues until the conspirators receive their payoffs”); Dooley, 786 F. Supp.
at 75-76 (“The UTC Individual Defendants also argue that several of the defendants’ visits to
Washington, D.C. took place after Dooley’s demotion in October 1988, and therefore, cannot
give rise to the plaintiff’s complaint. This argument is unavailing. Plaintiff Dooley alleges that
the harm he has suffered only initiated with his demotion. He claims that the illegal conspiracy
to bribe Saudi Arabian officials continues; consequently, the harm he suffers, from opposing the
ongoing conspiracy, continues. Thus, business trips to Washington, D.C. taken by UTC
Individual Defendants after October 1988 are very relevant to plaintiff Dooley’s claims.”).
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information regarding specific contacts between the Trump Campaign and Russian agents
regarding the DNC e-mails, and the discussion of those contacts with Russian agents at meetings
in the District in the spring of 2016—are far more substantial than the type of conclusory or
entirely hypothetical allegations that courts deem insufficient to support a request for
jurisdictional discovery. Compare Edmond, 949 F.2d at 424, with FC Inv. Grp. LC, 529 F.3d at
1094; and Naartex, 722 F.2d at 788. Here, as in prior cases, at the very least, the jurisdictional
question should not be resolved without a fuller record. Crane, 814 F.2d at 760 (“[Plaintiff] has
pointed to links [defendant] has with the District, sufficient at least to permit further inquiry
regarding personal jurisdiction, so that the statutory and constitutional questions can be resolved
on a fuller record.”). Plaintiffs describe the proposed discovery below, in Section IV.
III.

Plaintiffs Should Be Granted Jurisdictional Discovery Regarding Co-Conspirators’
Contacts with the District
Besides establishing personal jurisdiction based on the Defendant’s own direct contacts

with the forum (or any of the other bases asserted by Plaintiffs here), Plaintiffs can establish that
Defendants “transacted business” in the District from which their claims arose through the
actions that their co-conspirators took in the District in furtherance of the conspiracy. The D.C.
Circuit permits conspiracy jurisdiction resulting from the in-forum actions of co-conspirators on
an agency theory, where plaintiffs have pleaded: 1) the existence of a conspiracy; 2) the nonresident defendant’s participation in or agreement to the join the conspiracy; and 3) an overt act
by a co-conspirator in furtherance of this conspiracy within the forum, sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction over that co-conspirator. Edmond, 949 F.2d at 425; Second Amendment Foundation,
274 F.3d at 524; Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1030–31
(D.C. Cir. 1997). Thus, “[s]o long as any one co-conspirator commits at least one overt act in
the forum jurisdiction sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction over that person and the act

13

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committed is in furtherance of the conspiracy, there is personal jurisdiction over all members of
the conspiracy.” FC Inv. Grp. LC., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 41–42.
The D.C. Circuit has specifically allowed jurisdictional discovery into allegations
pertaining to conspiracy jurisdiction where plaintiffs have pleaded non-conclusory allegations
that would establish a conspiracy, and have identified at least one specific overt act in the forum
by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy:
[I]t is an abuse of discretion to deny jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiff
has specifically alleged: (1) the existence of a conspiracy, (2) the nonresident’s
participation, and (3) an injury-causing act of the conspiracy within the forum’s
boundaries.
Edmond, 949 F.2d at 424–25.
Plaintiffs recognize that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding specific
jurisdiction have renewed focus on due process limits, raising concerns that could apply to the
outer limits of this type of conspiracy jurisdiction—particularly if, unlike here, the non-resident
defendant has had no personal contacts with a forum at all. But neither Walden nor BristolMyers addressed conspiracy jurisdiction or reversed the D.C. Circuit’s governing standards for
obtaining discovery in this context. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121-22; Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.
Ct. at 1780. In Walden, the Court specifically noted that a Defendant’s contacts for due process
purposes could be either personal or through others: “physical entry into the State—either by the
defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some other means—is certainly a
relevant contact.” 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (emphasis added); see Second Amendment Foundation, 274
F.3d at 523 (describing co-conspirators acting as agents for nonresident defendants in the forum).
Moreover, this case also does not approach the outer limits of conspiracy jurisdiction
where a defendant who has never had any contact at all with a forum is only brought into that
forum only via the actions of a co-conspirator. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs have alleged

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Case 1:17-cv-01370-ESH Document 62 Filed 05/24/18 Page 20 of 24

extensive direct contacts with this District by Defendants, including the Campaign’s own
repeated contacts with this forum in furtherance of the very conspiracy at issue and other actual
direct contact by Defendant Stone. Jurisdictional discovery may well reveal further direct
contact.
Under the controlling standard for conspiracy jurisdiction, Plaintiffs’ allegations
regarding co-conspirators’ contacts with the District establish that both the Campaign and Roger
Stone are subject to this Court’s jurisdiction, or at the very least should be subject to
jurisdictional discovery. First, as set forth above, supra at Section II.B., Plaintiffs have pleaded
more than conclusory allegations of a conspiracy, sufficient to meet the requirement of nonconclusory allegations to obtain discovery. Second, Plaintiffs have pleaded specific actions
taken within the District by Defendants’ co-conspirators in furtherance of this conspiracy and
directly relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims: the extraction of large volumes of data from the DNC
servers located in D.C. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 86-87.10 This conduct within the District by the coconspirators (the hackers acting on behalf of the Russian government) who perpetrated the
targeted and ongoing theft of the DNC e-mails for political gain constitutes a series of overt acts
in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy within the forum, actions that would give rise to personal
jurisdiction in this Court over the hackers, and therefore, over their co-conspirators, the
Defendants.
These very significant overt acts (or, as discovery may show, series of acts related to the
hack and its dissemination) within the District by co-conspirators are sufficient to establish a
prima facie case for jurisdiction over the other members of the conspiracy that resulted in the

10

The unauthorized access and exfiltration of data from the DNC servers continued until at least
mid-June 2016, Am. Compl. ¶ 86-87, when the conspiracy was already well underway.
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Case 1:17-cv-01370-ESH Document 62 Filed 05/24/18 Page 21 of 24

publication of material from this hack. At a minimum, this allegation supports allowing
jurisdictional discovery to further develop the record of the contacts by those working together
with Defendants in this common scheme.
IV.

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Discovery
If this motion is granted, Plaintiffs will serve on Defendants the following discovery

requests for material relevant to establishing Defendants’ relevant contacts with the District. As
used below, the term “Relevant Forum Contact” refers to “any in-person meeting, telephone
conversation, or other communication, including electronic communications, conducted in the
District of Columbia involving any Defendant, or between any Defendant and any Russian or
Russian agent or any agent of WikiLeaks, in which any form of assistance by Russia or Russian
agents to the Trump Campaign was discussed or facilitated, including but not limited to any
discussions of the DNC emails, publication of the DNC emails by WikiLeaks, or the resulting
impact on the Clinton campaign.”
1.

All initial disclosure required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a),

but limited to the subject of Relevant Forum Contacts; and in addition, to the extent not
duplicative of Rule 26(a) disclosures:
2.

Interrogatories pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 requiring the

Defendants to identify:
•

all persons with knowledge of any Relevant Forum Contact;

•

all persons in possession of or with responsibility for maintaining documents,
electronically stored information, or tangible things (hereinafter “materials”)
relating to Relevant Forum Contacts;

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Case 1:17-cv-01370-ESH Document 62 Filed 05/24/18 Page 22 of 24

•

all persons with knowledge of who may possess or have responsibility for
maintaining materials relating to Relevant Forum Contacts;

•

whether any materials relating to Relevant Forum Contacts have been destroyed,
defaced, deleted, or spoliated in any way; and if so, the nature and content of
those materials and all facts relating to their destruction, defacement, deletion, or
spoliation, including, without limitation, the identity of all persons involved in
ordering or carrying out that destruction, defacement, deletion, or spoliation.

3.

Requests pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 for all materials

relating to the date, time, location, participants and subject matter of any Relevant Forum
Contacts, including, without limitation:
•

All materials relating to the March 31, 2016 meeting in the District of Columbia
between then-candidate Trump and the Trump Campaign’s foreign-policy team;

•

All materials relating to the April 27, 2016 meeting in the District of Columbia
between then-candidate Trump, other high-ranking Trump Campaign officials,
and Russian Ambassador Kislyak in the District of Columbia.

•

All materials relating to any other meetings, discussions or other actions by agents
of the Trump Campaign in the District of Columbia in which any form of
assistance by Russia or Russian agents to the Trump Campaign was discussed or
facilitated.

•
4.

All materials relating to other Relevant Forum Contacts.
Depositions Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 of persons

identified by initial disclosure, interrogatory responses, and disclosed materials as having

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Case 1:17-cv-01370-ESH Document 62 Filed 05/24/18 Page 23 of 24

knowledge relating to any Relevant Forum Contacts or relating to the location and condition of
evidence pertaining to Relevant Forum Contacts.
As relevant to the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction based on actions of co-conspirators in
the District, Plaintiffs also will serve on the Defendants all the discovery previously described,
but with the following adjustment: The term “Relevant Forum Contacts” will be expanded to
refer to “all contacts in the District of Columbia (1) between the Defendants, (2) between the
Defendants and Russians or Russian agents or agents of WikiLeaks, or (3) attended by Russians,
Russian agents, agents of WikiLeaks, or others acting in concert with them, in which any form of
assistance by Russians or Russian agents to the Trump Campaign was discussed or facilitated
including but not limited to any discussions of the DNC emails, publication of the DNC emails
by WikiLeaks, or the resulting impact on the Clinton campaign.”
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, in the alternative to denying Defendants’ pending Motions to
Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court grant this
motion for jurisdictional discovery.

Date: May 24, 2018

By: /s/ Benjamin L. Berwick
Counsel for Plaintiffs
BENJAMIN L. BERWICK (D.D.C. Bar No. MA0004)
United to Protect Democracy
10 Ware St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
[phone]
[e-mail]

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Case 1:17-cv-01370-ESH Document 62 Filed 05/24/18 Page 24 of 24

Additional Counsel for Plaintiffs
IAN BASSIN
(NY Attorney Reg. No. 4683439)
United to Protect Democracy
222 Broadway
19th Floor
New York, NY 10038
[phone]
[e-mail]

RICHARD PRIMUS
(D.C. Bar No. 472223)
The University of Michigan Law School*
625 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
[phone]
[e-mail]
* For identification purposes

JUSTIN FLORENCE
(D.C. Bar No. 988953)
ANNE TINDALL
(D.C. Bar. No. 494607)
United to Protect Democracy
2020 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, #163
Washington, DC 20006
[phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]

STEVEN A. HIRSCH
(CA Bar No. 171825)
Keker, Van Nest & Peters LLP
633 Battery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111-1809
[phone]
[e-mail]
STEPHEN P. BERZON
(CA Bar No. 46540)*
BARBARA J. CHISHOLM
(CA Bar No. 224656)*
DANIELLE LEONARD
(CA Bar No. 218201)*
Altshuler Berzon LLP
177 Post Street Suite 300
San Francisco, CA
[phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
*pro hac vice forthcoming

NANCY GERTNER
(MA Bar No. 190140)
Fick & Marx
100 Franklin Street, 7th floor
Boston, MA 02110
[phone]
[e-mail]

19

Case 1:17-cv-01370-ESH Document 62-1 Filed 05/24/18 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROY COCKRUM, SCOTT COMER, and
ERIC SCHOENBERG,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT,
INC., and ROGER STONE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
) Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-1370-ESH
)
)
)
)
)
)

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
CONDUCT LIMITED JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited
Jurisdictional Discovery.

It is SO ORDERED this _______ day of _______________, 2018

____________________________________
The Honorable Ellen S. Huvelle
U.S. District Judge