GUEDES et al v. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES et al

Filing 9

AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants filed by FIREARMS POLICY FOUNDATION, DAMIEN GUEDES, MADISON SOCIETY FOUNDATION, INC., SHANE RODEN, FLORIDA CARRY, INC.. (Attachments: #1 Exhibit A Part I, #2 Exhibit A Part II, #3 Declaration of Sean Caranna, #4 Declaration of Jonathan Jensen, #5 Declaration of the Honorable Shane Roden)(Kraut, Adam)

Adam Kraut, Esq.
D.C. Bar No. PA0080
[e-mail]
Joshua Prince, Esq.
D.C. Bar No. PA0081
[e-mail]
Civil Rights Defense Firm, P.C.
646 Lenape Road
Bechtelsville, PA 19505
[phone] (t)
[phone] (f)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DAMIEN GUEDES
Civil Rights Defense Firm, P.C.
646 Lenape Road
Bechtelsville, PA 19505

:
:
:
:
:
SHANE RODEN
:
Civil Rights Defense Firm, P.C.
:
646 Lenape Road
:
Bechtelsville, PA 19505
:
:
FIREARMS POLICY FOUNDATION
:
4212 North Freeway Boulevard
:
Suite 6
:
Sacramento, CA 95834
:
:
MADISON SOCIETY FOUNDATION, INC.
:
210 South Sierra Avenue, Suite 204 :
Oakdale, CA 95361
:
:
and
:
:
FLORIDA CARRY, INC.
:
P.O. Box 1024
:
Lehigh Acres, FL 33970-1024
:
:
:
Plaintiffs
:
v.
:

Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-2988

Complaint – Violations of the
Administrative Procedures Act,
U.S. Constitution and Statutory law

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO,
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, an agency
of the Department of Justice
99 New York Avenue, N.E.,
Washington, DC 20226

:
:
:
:
:
:
MATTHEW WHITAKER, in his official
:
capacity as Acting Attorney General
:
of the United States
:
United States Department of Justice :
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
:
Washington, DC 20530
:
:
THOMAS E. BRANDON, Acting Director
:
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
:
Explosives
:
99 New York Avenue, N.E.,
:
Washington, DC 20226
:
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
:
United States Attorney’s Office
:
555 4th Street, NW
:
Washington, DC 20530
:
:
Defendants
:
AMENDED COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs Damien Guedes, Shane Roden, Firearms Policy Foundation
(“FPF”), Madison Society Foundation, Inc. (“MSF”), and Florida Carry, Inc. (“Florida Carry”)
by and through their attorneys, Adam Kraut, Esq. and Joshua Prince, Esq., of Firearms Industry
Consulting Group, a division of Civil Rights Defense Firm, P.C., and complain of Defendants as
follows:
INTRODUCTION
1.

This is an action challenging the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’
(“ATF”) implementation and enforcement of an agency regulation under Docket No.
ATF-2017R-22 (“Final Rule”), designed to prohibit as criminal the ownership,

2

possession or transportation of “bump-stock-type” devices by redefining them as
“machineguns” for purposes of the criminal proscriptions under the National Firearms
Act (“NFA”) 26 U.S.C. § 5841, et seq., and the Gun Control Act (“GCA”) 18 U.S.C. §
921, et seq. See 83 Fed.Reg. at 13442; https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ATF2018-0002-0001. Indeed, the effect of the Final Rule is that all “current possessors of
these devices would be required to surrender them, destroy them, or otherwise render
them permanently inoperable upon the effective date of the [F]inal [R]ule.” 83 Fed. Reg.
at 13442.
2.

ATF’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking comes after years of public pronouncements and
formal rulings in which the agency declared these very same types of devices are not
“machineguns” and therefore are not subject to the criminal regulation that ATF now
seeks to establish. These were representations of a government agency on which the
public was entitled to do and did reasonably rely in purchasing, possessing, and using
these devices.

3.

ATF’s abrupt about-face on this issue in promulgating and implementing the Final Rule
to criminalize that which it had for years expressly deemed legal under the law of
Congress inherently smacks of agency abuse or dereliction of duty in following the law.
See Center for Science in Public Interest v. Department of Treasury, 573 F. Supp. 1168,
1172 (D.C. 1983) (“sudden and profound alterations in an agency’s policy constitute
‘danger signals’ that the will of Congress is being ignored”).

4.

And, in fact, as Plaintiffs’ complaint demonstrates, ATF’s Final Rule is the product of
serious, multi-dimensional legal violations rendering the process and the rule invalid,
including, inter alia: ATF’s procedural process violated the Administrative Procedure

3

Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 500, et seq., in numerous material ways; ATF’s Final Rule
significantly exceeds its statutory authority to promulgate regulations for purposes of
implementing or enforcing the NFA or the GCA; any implementation or enforcement of
the Final Rule would violate the fundamental constitutional protections against
retroactive imposition of criminal punishment under ex post facto principles; it would
constitute an unconstitutional taking without just compensation; and it would amount to a
violation of the Contracts Clause by destroying the very reasonable investment-backed
expectations that ATF itself established through its previous contrary determinations that
the devices at issue are not “machineguns.”
5.

What is more, in connection with its failure or refusal to provide for the proper form of
public discourse before adopting the Final Rule (as one of the many ways in which ATF
flouted the requirements of the APA), ATF failed or refused to respond to Plaintiff FPF’s
valid request for pertinent information under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),
such that this Court’s intervention is also necessary to compel ATF to produce the
records it was legally required to produce not only during the rulemaking process but also
in response to the FOIA request.

6.

Accordingly, the declaratory, injunctive, and other relief requested herein is necessary to
prevent the implementation or enforcement of this illegal regulation or, at a minimum, to
fairly compensate for the effective destruction of the property rights that any
implementation or enforcement would cause in forcing the dispossession of bump-stocktype devices that ATF itself previously sanctioned as lawful firearm devices.

4

PARTIES
7.

Plaintiff Damien Guedes is a natural person, a citizen of Whitehall, Pennsylvania and the
United States, and a member of institutional Plaintiff FPF. Mr. Guedes purchased an
AR15 BFSystem bump stock on October 30, 2014, from Bump Fire Systems
(“BFSystem”) in reasonable reliance upon one of ATF’s previous letter rulings expressly
determining that “bump-stock” devices of that type do not convert semiautomatic
firearms into “machineguns” under the NFA and GCA. Plaintiff Guedes desires, and
asserts that he would be entitled, to continue lawful possession and/or transportation of
this bump-stock device but for the Final Rule.

8.

Plaintiff Representative Shane Roden is a natural person, who is the duly elected state
representative for District 111 of the Missouri House of Representatives, a citizen of
Cedar Hill, Missouri and the United States, and a member of institutional Plaintiff FPF.
Furthermore, Representative Roden in addition to being a fulltime firefighter/paramedic
since 2003, is a reserve sheriff deputy, and who, since 2004, has worked as a SWAT
operator/medic, initially for the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office and thereafter, since
2010, for the Camden County Sheriff’s Office. In August of 2016, Representative Roden
purchased a Slide Fire SSAR-15 at a cost of $150.00 in reasonable reliance upon ATF’s
previous determinations expressly determining that “bump-stock” devices of that type do
not convert semiautomatic firearms into “machineguns” under the NFA and GCA.
Plaintiff Roden desires, and asserts that he would be entitled, to continue lawful
possession and/or transportation of this bump-stock device but for the Final Rule.

9.

Plaintiff FPF is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of
Delaware. FPF’s mission is to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States

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and the People’s rights, privileges and immunities deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition, especially the inalienable, fundamental, and individual right to keep and
bear arms, and any related charitable and educational activities as permissible under law.
On June 19, 2018, by and through counsel, FPF submitted comments in response and
opposition to Defendant ATF’s NPRM concerning the Final Rule. FPF is also the party
who filed the FOIA request regarding the Final Rule, to which ATF never responded.
FPF represents its members and supporters, including those who own and possess, or
would own and possess, “bump-stock” devices that are or would be subject to the
challenged Final Rule, and FPF brings this action on behalf of itself, its members,
supporters who possess all the indicia of membership, and similarly situated members of
the public, including Plaintiff Guedes.
10.

Plaintiff MSF is a (501)(c)(3) non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of
Nevada. MSF’s mission is to promote and preserve the purposes of the Constitution of
the United States, in particular the right to keep and bear arms, for its members and all
citizens. MSF believes that individual constitutional rights should not be infringed to
deny citizens their life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. MSF is headquartered in
Stanislaus County, California. The focus of MSF’s litigation efforts is challenging
violations of the right to keep and bear arms. Defendants’ actions and failures alleged
herein have caused MSF to dedicate resources that would otherwise be available for other
purposes to protect the rights and property of its members, supporters, and the general
public, including by and through this action.

11.

Plaintiff Florida Carry is a Florida not-for-profit corporation existing under the laws of
Florida with its principal office in Lehigh Acres, Florida. Florida Carry has over 30,000

6

registered members and supporters, including members residing in all counties through
the state of Florida and in other states. Florida Carry's purpose is to defend and advance
the fundamental civil right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Florida, Declaration
of Rights. Florida Carry owns a Slide Fire bump stock device, which is currently retained
in Alabama. Florida Carry brings this action on behalf of itself and its members,
including itself and those who own and possess “bump stock” devices that are or would
be subject to the challenged Final Rule, and Florida Carry brings this action on behalf of
itself, its members, supporters who possess all the indicia of membership, and similarly
situated members of the public.
12.

Defendant ATF is the federal government agency responsible for promulgating and
enforcing regulations under the statutory provisions of the GCA and the NFA on which
ATF has relied as the ostensible basis for its authority to issue the Final Rule.

13.

Defendant Matthew Whitaker (“Attorney General” or “Whitaker”), the Acting Attorney
General of the United States, is sued in that official capacity. The Attorney General is
responsible for executing and administering the laws, regulations, customs, practices, and
policies of the United States including the implementation and enforcement of the Final
Rule. The Attorney General is ultimately responsible for supervising the functions and
actions of the United States Department of Justice, including the ATF, which is an arm of
the Department of Justice.

14.

Defendant Thomas E. Brandon (“ATF Director” or “Brandon”) is the Acting Director of
the Bureau of ATF, and he is sued in the that official capacity. ATF is responsible for,
inter alia, regulating and licensing the sale, possession, transfer, and transportation of

7

firearms and ammunition in interstate commerce, including “machineguns” as that term is
defined under the NFA, GCA, and any purported agency regulations of ATF. As Acting
Director of ATF, Defendant Brandon is responsible for the creation, implementation,
execution, and administration of the laws, regulations, customs, practices, and policies of
the United States, including implementation and enforcement of the Final Rule.
15.

Defendant United States of America (“United States”) is a proper party in this action
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

16.

This case concerns certain subject matter under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts of the United States of America.

17.

This action seeks relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 702, 703, 704; 26 U.S.C. § 7805;
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1346, 2201, 2202, and 2412. Therefore, jurisdiction is
founded on 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 704 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this action arises under the
Administrative Procedure Act, as well as the Constitution and laws of the United States.

18.

This Court has authority to award costs and attorney fees pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 2412.

19.

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 703 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2),
(e)(1)(B), as a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims
occurred in the District of Columbia.

8

STATEMENT OF FACTS COMMON TO ALL DEFENDANTS
Publication of the ANPRM
20.

On December 26, 2017, ATF published the ANPRM in the Federal Register and on
federalregister.gov, seeking public input concerning its proposed new treatment of
“bump-stock-type” devices under the Final Rule. 82 Fed. Reg. at 60929;
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/12/26/2017-27898/application-of-thedefinition-of-machinegun-to-bump-fire-stocks-and-other-similar-devices.

21.

In the ANPRM, ATF sought certain information pertaining to bump stocks including, but
not limited to: calendar years produced; economic impact of ATF classifying bump
stocks as machine guns; use(s) for which the device was marketed; number of bump
stocks sold; and purposes bump stocks are used for.
Publication of the NPRM

22.

On March 29, 2018, ATF published its NPRM concerning the Final Rule in the Federal
Register and on federalregister.gov. 83 Fed. Reg. at 13442;
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/03/29/2018-06292/bump-stock-typedevices.

23.

In the NPRM, ATF stated, inter alia, that
When a bump-stock-type device is affixed to a semiautomatic firearm, however,
the device harnesses the recoil energy to slide the firearm back and forth so that
the trigger automatically re-engages by “bumping” the shooter’s stationary trigger
finger without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter. The
bump-stock-type device functions as a self-acting and self-regulating force that
channels the firearm’s recoil energy in a continuous back-and-forth cycle that
allows the shooter to attain continuous firing after a single pull of the trigger so
long as the trigger finger remains stationary on the device's extension ledge (as
designed). No further physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter is
required.
…

9

These bump-stock-type devices are generally designed to operate with the shooter
shouldering the stock of the device (in essentially the same manner a shooter
would use an unmodified semiautomatic shoulder stock), maintaining constant
forward pressure with the non-trigger hand on the barrel-shroud or fore-grip of the
rifle, and maintaining the trigger finger on the device’s extension ledge with
constant rearward pressure. The device itself then harnesses the recoil energy of
the firearm, providing the primary impetus for automatic fire.
83 Fed. Reg. at 13443, 13446.
24.

ATF announced that its intention behind the new rule was “to clarify that ‘bump fire’
stocks, slide-fire devices, and devices with certain similar characteristics (bump-stocktype devices) are ‘machineguns’ as defined by the [NFA] and the [GCA], because such
devices allow a shooter of a semiautomatic firearm to initiate a continuous firing cycle
with a single pull of a trigger.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 13442. Both the NFA and GCA define
“machinegun” to include any “weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can readily
be restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a
single function of the trigger,” as well as the frame or receiver of such a weapon or any
parts or combination of parts that could be converted or assembled into such a weapon.
26 U.S.C. § 5845(b); 18 U.S.C. § 921. At the time of the NPRM, the regulations under 27
C.F.R. §§ 478.11 and 479.11 contained the same general definition of “machinegun.”
ATF’s new rule would amend these to specifically define “single function of the trigger”
to mean “single pull of the trigger,” and to define “automatically” to mean “as the result
of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds
through a single pull of the trigger.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 13442.

25.

ATF acknowledged it had made a series of previous determinations over the last decade
that declared the same kind of “bump-stock-type” devices – operating with the same sort
of functionality that the new rule seeks to prohibit – did not constitute “machineguns”

10

within the meaning of the governing law. Specifically, ATF admitted that between 2008
and 2017, it issued classification decisions and letter rulings concluding that ‘“bumpstock-type’ devices that enable a semiautomatic firearm to shoot more than one shot with
a single function of the trigger by harnessing a combination of the recoil and the
maintenance of pressure by the shooter, do not fire ‘automatically’” within the meaning
of a “machinegun” as that term is defined under the law. 83 Fed. Reg. at 13443, 13445.
26.

Further, although now seeking to prohibit “all bump-stock-type devices” through the
Final Rule on the basis that additional “legal analysis” supports the opposite conclusion
that they convert the firearm into a prohibited “machinegun,” 83 Fed. Reg. at 13443,
ATF’s NPRM at the same time conceded that such devices are neither essential nor
necessary to this functionality of a firearm because individuals can “replicate the effects
of bump-stock-type devices” through myriad other means, such as by “us[ing] rubber
bands, belt loops, or otherwise train[ing] their trigger finger to fire more rapidly,” id. at
13454.

27.

Comments were required to be submitted on or before June 27, 2018. Fed. Reg. at 13446.
Plaintiff FPF submitted its comment on June 19, 2018.1 In its Comment, FPF
documented numerous deficiencies regarding ATF’s NPRM, including, but not limited
to, several of the procedural and substantive violations giving rise to the causes of action

1

This comment was posted publicly on Regulations.gov on June 26, 2018. See
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ATF-2018-0002-61777 and
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ATF-2018-0002-61778. The comment was broken
into two separate sections due to the size. Certain media submitted as part of the comment are
unavailable for public viewing because the website is incapable of hosting or displaying the
content. A copy of the comment and its supporting exhibits are attached hereto and incorporated
herein as Exhibit A. Any exhibits that cannot be filed via the Court’s ECF system due to their
electronic nature will be included on a notice as required by Local Rule 49(e)(1) and are referred
to herein by the exhibit number it was assigned in the comment. In any instance where it is
possible to link to another source where the material may be found, the undersigned has done so.
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in this case: 1) ATF’s exceeding its statutory authority in the promulgation of the Final
Rule; 2) the arbitrary and capricious nature of the Final Rule; and 3) ATF’s failure to
provide the necessary supporting documents in the rulemaking process, thereby denying
interested all parties an opportunity to fully consider and respond to the claims made by
ATF in support of the Final Rule.2
Execution of the Final Rule
28.

On December 18, 2018, Defendant Matthew Whitaker executed the Final Rule; thereby,
purportedly making effective the Final Rule, RIN 1140-AA52, Docket No 2018R-22F.

29.

The Final Rule, executed by Defendant Whitaker, was published and otherwise made
available online at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-bumpstock-type-devices-final-rule 3 and www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/bump-stocks 4 5 on

2

According to Regulations.gov, ATF received a total of 193,297 comments about the NPR. It is
unclear whether this number reflects the number of comments actually received and published by
ATF or whether it excludes any comments that ATF may have refused to accept for some reason
(e.g., profane content). See https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/03/29/201806292/bump-stock-type-devices (where ATF declared that it would “not consider, or respond to,
comments that do not meet these requirements or comments containing profanity,” even though
such speech is protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
3

On DOJ’s website, it declares: “Today, Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker announced
that the Department of Justice has amended the regulations of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), clarifying that bump stocks fall within the definition of
“machinegun” under federal law, as such devices allow a shooter of a semiautomatic firearm to
initiate a continuous firing cycle with a single pull of the trigger.”
4

On ATF’s website, it specifies: “On December 18, 2018, Acting Attorney General Matthew
Whitaker announced that the Department of Justice has amended the regulations of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), clarifying that bump stocks fall within the
definition of “machinegun” under federal law, as such devices allow a shooter of a
semiautomatic firearm to initiate a continuous firing cycle with a single pull of the trigger.”
5

The link to download the Final Rule on both DOJ’s and ATF’s websites is
www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1120876/download.
12

December 18, 2018 and all Plaintiffs obtained and reviewed the Final Rule on December
18, 2018.
30.

On December 21, 2018, a link was published on the Federal Register website –
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/12/26/2018-27763/bump-stock-typedevices – to download a copy of the Final Rule.

31.

On December 26, 2018, the Final Rule was published in the Federal Register.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-12-26/pdf/2018-27763.pdf

32.

The Final Rule, spanning 157 pages, implements changes to 27 C.F.R. ¶¶ 447.11, 478.11,
479.11, almost identical to the proposed changes in the NPRM.

33.

Specifically, modifies the definition of “Machinegun” in Section 447.11 such that,
pursuant to the Final Rule, it will provide:
A “machinegun”, “machine pistol”, “submachinegun”, or “automatic rifle” is a
firearm which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot,
automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function
of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such
weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of
parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun,
and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such
parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. For purposes of this
definition, the term “automatically” as it modifies “shoots, is designed to shoot, or
can be readily restored to shoot,” means functioning as the result of a self-acting
or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds through a
single function of the trigger; and “single function of the trigger” means a single
pull of the trigger and analogous motions. The term "machinegun" includes a
bump-stock-type device, i.e., a device that allows a semiautomatic firearm to
shoot more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger by harnessing the recoil
energy of the semi-automatic firearm to which it is affixed so that the trigger
resets and continues firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger
by the shooter.
83 Fed. Reg. at 66553-66554.

34.

Specifically, modifies the definition of “Machine gun” in Section 478.11 such that,
pursuant to the Final Rule, it will provide:

13

For purposes of this definition, the term “automatically” as it modifies “shoots, is
designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot,” means functioning as the
result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of
multiple rounds through a single function of the trigger; and “single function of
the trigger” means a single pull of the trigger and analogous motions. The term
“machine gun” includes a bump-stock-type device, i.e., a device that allows a
semi-automatic firearm to shoot more than one shot with a single pull of the
trigger by harnessing the recoil energy of the semiautomatic firearm to which it is
affixed so that the trigger resets and continues firing without additional physical
manipulation of the trigger by the shooter.
83 Fed. Reg. at 66554.
35.

Specifically, modifies the definition of “Machine gun” in Section 479.11 such that,
pursuant to the Final Rule, it will provide:
For purposes of this definition, the term “automatically” as it modifies “shoots, is
designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot,” means functioning as the
result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of
multiple rounds through a single function of the trigger; and “single function of
the trigger” means a single pull of the trigger and analogous motions. The term
“machine gun” includes a bump-stock-type device, i.e., a device that allows a
semi-automatic firearm to shoot more than one shot with a single pull of the
trigger by harnessing the recoil energy of the semiautomatic firearm to which it is
affixed so that the trigger resets and continues firing without additional physical
manipulation of the trigger by the shooter.
83 Fed. Reg. at 66554.
ATF’s Failure to Respond to FPF’s FOIA and Comply with APA Requirements

36.

In connection with its NPRM, ATF failed to include in the agency docket folder any
supporting documentation for its newly formed determination that its previous, directly
opposite conclusion about bump-stock-type devices “does not reflect the best
interpretation of ‘machinegun’” under the NFA and GCA. 83 Fed. Reg. at 13443.

6

6

Interestingly, in support of the Final Rule, ATF referred to a number of documents, which were
never provided to the public. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 66518 FN 4 “Examples of recent ATF
14

37.

As a result, on March 30, 2018, the day after ATF published the NPRM, Plaintiff FPF
submitted an expedited FOIA Request seeking the following documentation: “all ATF
determinations relative to devices referred to as ‘bump stocks’ and ‘bump-fire stocks’ by
ATF in its proposed rulemaking (ATF 2017R-22, RIN 1140-AA52, Fed. Register No.
2018-06292 - https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ATF-2018-0002-0001), as well
as, all ATF Form 9310.3A ‘Correspondence Approval and Clearance’ forms relative to
each determination, and any versions or drafts of the determinations, which were
different than the final determination.”7 ATF also received “correspondence[s] from
members of the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives, as
well as nongovernmental organizations, requesting that ATF examine its past
classifications and determine whether bump-stock-type devices currently on the market
constitute machineguns under the statutory definition.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 13446.

38.

These requests were made several months ago now and yet, to date, ATF has not
responded at all to the FOIA request, and it has not otherwise made available to the
public in the docket folder or elsewhere any of the requested documents or any other
documentation in support of its Final Rule. Most notably, ATF has not disclosed any of

classification letters relying on the ‘single pull of the trigger’ interpretation to classify submitted
devices as machineguns include the following…” (citing to April 13, 2015 ATF determination
letter and an October 7, 2016 ATF determination letter). See also 83 Fed. Reg. at 66519
(referencing rulings from 2008-2017 which were never provided to the public in relation to the
NPRM). By ATF’s failure to even mention these documents in the ANPRM and NPRM, let
alone provide them in the docket, Defendants precluded the public, including Plaintiffs, from
reviewing these determinations and commenting on their applicability; thereby, denying the
public, including Plaintiffs, an opportunity for meaningful review.
7
For purposes of the FOIA Request, “[t]he use of the word ‘determinations’ shall be understood
to mean any correspondence, whether in electronic or paper form, by ATF to any person, which
shall include any individual, Member of Congress, corporation, limited liability company, and
partnership, regarding the lawfulness or unlawfulness of any bump stock or bump-fire stock
device, whether a sample device was submitted or not to ATF.” See Exhibit A at 75-78.

15

the prior classification decision or letter rulings that concluded bump-stock-type devices
do not constitute firearms, let alone “machineguns” under the law.
ATF’s Failure or Refusal to Grant FPF’s Request for Hearing
25.

In their comment, FPF also requested an opportunity to be heard at a hearing
before ATF implemented any rule or regulation in relation to this NPRM, pursuant to
U.S.C. section 926(b). 8 83 Fed. Reg. at 13456. The NPRM stated that “[a]ny interested
person who desires an opportunity to comment orally at a public hearing should submit
his or her request, in writing, to the Director of ATF within the 90-day comment period.”
83 Fed. Reg. at 13456. However, ATF also declared, in violation of Section 926(b), that
the matter of granting such a hearing was left to the discretion of the ATF Director as to
whether it was “necessary.” Id.

26.

Out of an abundance of caution, FPF also sent a separate letter on June 15, 2018 to
Acting Director Brandon, which requested a hearing, and included a copy of the letter as
Exhibit 34 to its Comment. See Exhibit A at 913.

27.

Nevertheless, ATF never granted FPF any such process, and never even responded to the
request for such a hearing, other than to simply refuse to provide FPF with a hearing in
the Final Rule, without even addressing 18 U.S.C. § 926(b)’s mandate that ATF “shall
afford interested parties opportunity for hearing, before prescribing…rules and
regulations.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 66542.

8

This statute provides: “[t]he Attorney General shall give not less than ninety days public notice,
and shall afford interested parties opportunity for hearing, before prescribing such rules and
regulations.”
16

Procedural Irregularities with Comment Period
39.

Not only did ATF fail to provide the material supporting documentation despite the
formal requests for it, the comment period was littered with additional procedural
irregularities and errors.

40.

Immediately upon the publication of the NPR on March 29, 2018, the following advisory
appeared on federalregister.gov:9 “COMMENT PERIOD CLOSED – The comment
period on this document is closed and comments are no longer being accepted on
Regulations.gov. We apologize for any inconvenience.” Exhibit A at 17.

41.

And, in fact, the website was not accepting comments. When people complained to the
Federal Register that they could not submit their comments online, the Federal Register
responded that they could not be of any help. See Exhibit A at 17.

42.

Upon information and belief, it was not until April 2, 2018 (i.e. five days into the
comment period) that the declaration that “COMMENT PERIOD CLOSED” was
removed from federalregister.gov by ATF and that interested individuals were able to
submit comments. Unfortunately, upon information and belief, numerous individuals, due
to the declaration on federalregister.gov “COMMENT PERIOD CLOSED,” were led to
believe that they were unable to submit comments in relation to this rulemaking and were
therefore deprived of an opportunity to be heard, since they were never informed, after
ATF removed the declaration and permitted comments to be filed, that they could then
submit comments.

43.

Further, while the public was directed to federalregister.gov as a resource for all relevant
information and as a vehicle through which to submit comments regarding the Final Rule,

9

The website address where this advisory appeared was
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/03/29/2018-06292/bump-stock-type-devices.
17

the website’s content was confusing and convoluted. The NPRM identified the
rulemaking procedures under “Docket No. 2017R-22,” but the information on the website
related to these proceedings made no mention of this docket number. Instead, it referred
to two different docket numbers (ATF-2018-0002 and ATF-2018-0002-0001), and these
dockets concerned the ANPRM, for which the comment period had closed in January.
44.

The confusing and convoluted display of the information on federalregister.gov was
documented in an article Carl Bussjaeger on April 2, 2018, titled [Update] Bumbling
Machinations on Bump Stocks? Exhibit A at 164-173; see
http://zelmanpartisans.com/?p=5071 and http://zelmanpartisans.com/?p=5055 for copies
of this publication.

45.

When Mr. Bussjaeger inquired of ATF about the issues, an ATF Senior Industry
Operations Investigator responded that he should refer to
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ATF-2018-0002-0001, which contains the
ANPRM and the NPRM, including information on the submission of comments.
However, ATF failed to supply this or any other clarifying information to the public at
large concerning where to locate the relevant material and how to submit their comments.

46.

In the Final Rule, the Government admits to there being procedural issues with the
comment period and declares that (1) “[t]he Department acknowledges that upon
publication of the NPRM on March 29, 2018, there was some confusion within the first
24 to 48 hours about submitting comments through the Federal eRulemaking Portal,” (2)
“that on March 29, 2018, when the comment period opened for the NPRM, the link for
submitting comments to the NPRM had been inadvertently connected to the
Regulations.gov Docket ID number 2018–0001–0001, which had been used by the

18

Regulations.gov website for the ANPRM comment period, December 26, 2017, through
January 25, 2018,” and (3) that ATF “acknowledges that there was some confusion
because there was a brief period on March 29, 2018, during which the ANPRM link
(2018–0001– 0001) was prominently situated on the homepage of the Regulations.gov
website even though that link was no longer able to accept comments for the NPRM.” 83
Fed. Reg. at 66541-42.
47.

On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of these technical
irregularities and errors in ATF’s rulemaking process, numerous people were precluded
from being able to timely submit their comments and ATF ultimately never received or
actually considered all the comments submitted under the different docket numbers.
STATEMENT OF FACTS CONCERNING PLAINTIFF GUEDES

48.

In 2014, Mr. Guedes became interested in a bump stock device. Exhibit A at 274-75.
Before purchasing such a device, Mr. Guedes accessed BFSystems’s website to
determine whether ATF had approved the particular device he sought to purchase.
BFSystems’s website stated that ATF had approved the device in a written determination
letter dated April 2, 2012. Id. at 277-78.

49.

Relying upon this determination from ATF, Mr. Guedes purchased an AR15 BFSystem
for $99.99, which he still possesses today. Id. at 280.
STATEMENT OF FACTS CONCERNING PLAINTIFF RODEN

50.

Representative Roden is the duly elected state representative for District 111 of the
Missouri House of Representatives, having been initially elected, by the citizens of
District 111, in 2014, and since, reelected every two years; whereby, he is currently
serving his third term as state representative.
19

51.

Since 2003, Representative has worked fulltime as a firefighter/paramedic, in addition to
being a reserve deputy Sheriff.

52.

In 2004, Representative Roden attended the Missouri Sheriffs’ Association
Training Academy, where he graduated with a POST class A license, which he has
maintained since issuance; thereby resulting in him being a reserve sheriff deputy.

53.

From 2004 through 2009, Representative Roden worked at the Franklin County Sheriff’s
Office and from 2010 through the present, he works at the Camden County Sheriff’s
Office as a reserve assigned to road patrol and a SWAT operator/medic.

54.

In August of 2016, he purchased a Slide Fire SSAR-15 at a cost of $150.00, only after
becoming aware that ATF issued several determinations that bump-stock-devices do not
constitute machine guns nor firearms, under the GCA or NFA.

55.

Representative Roden still possess his Slide Fire SSAR-15, today.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATED TO MATTHEW THOMPSON

56.

In 2017, Matthew Thompson (“Mr. Thompson”) became interested in a bump stock
device. Exhibit A 282-83.

57.

Before purchasing such a device, Mr. Thompson accessed Slide Fire’s website to
determine whether ATF had approved the particular device he sought to purchase. Slide
Fire’s website stated that ATF had approved the device in a written determination letter
dated June 7, 2010. Id.

58.

Relying upon this determination from ATF, Mr. Thompson purchased a Slide Fire bump
stock for $134.00, which he still possesses today. Id.

20

COUNT I: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT VIOLATIONS
59.

The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

60.

A reviewing court may “hold unlawful and set aside agency action … found to be –
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Failure to Provide the Underlying Documents
(Plaintiff FPF Against All Defendants)

61.

The APA imposed upon ATF the affirmative duty to respond to “any request for records
which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published
rules” by “mak[ing] the records promptly available” to the requester. 5 U.S.C. §
522(a)(3)(A). An agency’s failure to properly discharge this duty gives rise to a cause of
action in the nature of the claim Plaintiffs have brought here, through which the district
court is empowered to compel disclosure of the records improperly withheld, 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(B), and to assess “reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially
prevailed,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i).10

62.

Here, despite proper requests by FPF “made in accordance with published rules” several
months ago now concerning the NPRM, and even a separate formal FOIA request by
FPF, Exhibit A at 75-77, ATF has failed or refused to provide any of the requested
records, or any other supporting documents, to FPF or the public. Moreover, in support of

10

In such situations, if “the court additionally issues a written finding that the circumstances
surrounding the withholding raise questions whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or
capriciously with respect to the withholding, the Special Counsel shall promptly initiate a
proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or employee
who was primarily responsible for the withholding.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F)(i).
21

the Final Rule, ATF referred to a number of documents, which it admits were never
provided to the public nor were they even mentioned in the ANPRM or NPRM. See 83
Fed. Reg. at 66518 FN 4 “Examples of recent ATF classification letters relying on the
‘single pull of the trigger’ interpretation to classify submitted devices as machineguns
include the following…” (citing to April 13, 2015 ATF determination letter and an
October 7, 2016 ATF determination letter). See also 83 Fed. Reg. at 66519 (referencing
rulings from 2008-2017 which were never provided to the public in relation to the
NPRM). By ATF’s failure to even mention these documents in the ANPRM and NPRM,
let alone provide them in the docket, Defendants precluded the public, including
Plaintiffs, from reviewing these determinations and commenting on their applicability;
thereby, denying the public, including Plaintiffs, an opportunity for meaningful review.
As such, the agency has failed or refused to justify or supply any basis for the ostensibly
“extensive legal analysis” motivating its decision to criminalize all “bump-stock-type
devices” as prohibited “machineguns” under its Final Rule. Fed. Reg. at 13443.
63.

ATF’s failure to discharge its statutorily-imposed duty to make the requested record
“promptly available” in response to the request of FPF improperly deprived them, and
ultimately the rest of the public, of their important statutorily-created opportunity to fully
consider and participate in the APA’s public comment process, which is designed to
ensure government transparency and a properly informed citizenry in the establishment
of agency regulations.

64.

Wherefore, Plaintiff FPF is entitled to the relief prayed for herein.

22

Failure to Provide 90-Day Comment Period
(All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)
65.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 926(b), ATF was statutorily obligated to provide at least a 90-day
public comment period to facilitate the public discourse intended under the APA.

66.

Nevertheless, in addition to failing to provide any supporting documents to the public at
large – or even to FPF in response to its properly presented formal record requests – ATF
failed or refused to provide for this crucial public comment process.

67.

As described above, immediately upon the publication of the NPR, the portal through
which concerned citizens were directed to submit online comments, was shut down and
the website specifically declared that the comment period was “closed.”

68.

As a result, for a minimum of five days of the statutorily required ninety-day comment
period, interested individuals were deprived of their ability to submit comments.

69.

Even ATF admits “that upon publication of the NPRM on March 29, 2018, there was
some confusion within the first 24 to 48 hours about submitting comments through the
Federal eRulemaking Portal,” and that “there was some confusion because there was a
brief period on March 29, 2018, during which the ANPRM link (2018–0001– 0001) was
prominently situated on the homepage of the Regulations.gov website even though that
link was no longer able to accept comments for the NPRM.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 66541-42.

70.

Furthermore, numerous individuals, due to the declaration on federalregister.gov, were
led to believe that they were unable to submit comments in relation to this rulemaking
and were therefore deprived of an opportunity to be heard, since they were never
informed, after ATF removed the declaration and permitted comments to be filed, that
they could now submit comments.

23

71.

Wherefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for herein.
Failure to Consider Cost-Impact and Erroneous Cost Estimate
(All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)

72.

ATF flat out ignored any analysis in relation to a cost impact, as the proposed rule fails to
provide information on how the Government will fulfill its obligation to compensate
affected individuals for the taking.

73.

As reflected in the NPRM, ATF assumes “an average sale price for bump-stock-devices
from 2012-2017 [of] $200.00,” while acknowledging that the prices ranged from $179.95
to $425.95. 83 Fed. Reg. 13451. The proposal then declares the primary estimated cost to
be $96,242,750.00 based on ATF’s primary estimate of 520,000 bump-stock-devices
having been produced. Id.

74.

However, multiplying ATF’s stated average price of $200.00 by the primary estimate
yields a value of $104,000,000.00, not $96,242,750.00 as stated in Table 3 of NPRM.

75.

Moreover, by averaging the acknowledged prices for bump-stock-devices, a proper
average sale price should be $302.95, which would result in a primary estimated cost of
$157,534,000.00 in just compensation being due.
Failure to Provide Plaintiff FPF a Hearing
(Plaintiff FPF Against All Defendants)

76.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 926(b), ATF was also expressly required to “afford interested parties
opportunity for hearing, before prescribing such rules and regulations.”

77.

In contravention of the clear mandate that the agency “shall afford” such hearings, ATF
purported to transform this mandatory obligation into a discretionary option for itself, by
declaring in the NPRM that such hearings ultimately would be granted only if the
24

Director found it “necessary” to do so. 83 Fed. Reg. at 13456. The NPRM included no
objective standards or criteria controlling or limiting the Director’s determination here
and therefore essentially vested the Director with unbridled discretion to deny hearings.
78.

Moreover, in an apparent exercise of this unchecked discretion that the agency
purportedly created for itself in violation of section 926(b), ATF failed and refused to
provide FPF any opportunity for a hearing before implementing the Final Rule despite
the organizations’ formal requests for such a hearing.

79.

Wherefore, Plaintiff FPF is entitled to the relief prayed for herein.
The Final Rule is Arbitrary and Capricious

80.

“On February 20, 2018, the President issued a memorandum to the Attorney General
concerning ‘bump fire’ stocks and similar devices...The President then directed the
Department of Justice, working within established legal protocols, ‘to dedicate all
available resources to complete the review of the comments received [in response to the
ANPRM], and, as expeditiously as possible, to propose for notice and comment a rule
banning all devices that turn legal weapons into machineguns.’” 83 Fed. Reg. at 6651666517.

81.

Let there be no mistake, President Trump directed the ATF, through the Attorney
General, to ban bump-stock devices, before the notice and comment period was even
initiated and without consideration for the legal authority of ATF to regulate bump-stock
devices or the public, including Plaintiffs, being afforded an unbiased review of their
comments. See, https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/20/politics/donald-trump-bumpstocks/index.html.

25

82.

As noted by Josh Blackman, Ilya Shapiro, and Matthew Larosiere of the Cato Institute in
their comment, Comments to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
In the Matter of The Language of the National Firearms Act and Definition of
“Machinegun” submitted by Josh Blackman, Ilya Shapiro, and Matthew Larosiere of the
Cato Institute, available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ATF-2018-000265898, the rulemaking process, before its inception, “was a fait accompli” and that
President Trump admitted that he would write out bump-stock devices through executive
action and even stated, “I’ll do that myself because I’m able to.” Directly on point, the
Cato Comment recounts that moments before the rulemaking was announced, “President
Trump tweeted: … As I promised, today the Department of Justice will issue the rule
banning BUMP STOCKS with a mandated comment period. We will BAN all devices
that turn legal weapons into illegal machine guns.”

83.

The Cato Comment then continues on, citing to Josh Blackman, Presidential
Maladministration, 2018 Il. L. Rev. 397 at 405, 11 that:
To be clear, there is no problem when the president exercises his constitutional
authority to direct the actions of his principal officers. There can be a problem,
however, when those actions reverse past executive actions by discovering new
authority in old statutes. One of us has referred to the former phenomenon as
presidential reversals and the latter as presidential discovery. When interpreting
an unambiguous statute, courts should hesitate before deferring to exercises of
reversal coupled with discovery.

84.

As previously noted, a reviewing court may “hold unlawful and set aside agency action
… found to be – arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “Agency action is arbitrary and

11

“The first species of presidential maladministration is by far the most commonplace: when the
incumbent administration abandons a previous administration’s interpretation of a statute. Every
four to eight years, to comply with the new President’s regulatory philosophy, political
appointees in agencies alter certain interpretations of the law.”
26

capricious ‘if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, [or] offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency.’” Animal
Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Perdue, 872 F.3d 602, 611 (2017 D.C. Cir.) (quoting Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43).
85.

Here, given its failure or refusal to produce any records in support of the Final Rule, ATF
has presented no evidence in support of its “legal analysis” leading to the unprecedented
conclusion that bump-stock-type devices are “machineguns” because “they convert a
semiautomatic firearm into a firearm that shoots automatically more than one shot,
without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 13443.
And all the known evidence runs directly counter to this conclusion.

86.

Experts opining on behalf of ATF have consistently concluded that commonly used
bump-stock-type devices manufactured by Slide Fire and Bump Fire Systems do not
function so as to convert the associated firearm into a “machinegun” because, in fact, the
shooter must still separately pull the trigger to fire each successive shot. See Exhibit A at
901 and 908 (expert report of Rick Vasquez, former Acting Chief of Firearms
Technology Branch); id. at 708 (expert testimony of Thomas E. Brandon, ATF Deputy
Director, in Freedom Ordnance Mfg. v. Thomas E. Brandon).

87.

Additionally, FPF placed before the agency, as part of its comment, compelling video
evidence in which an AR-15 type of firearm fitted with a Slide Fire bump stock device
was fired in multiple ways,12 Exhibit 28 to Exhibit A,13 including in precisely the same

12

The video depicts the firearm being shot in three different manners: first with the stock in a
“locked” position (meaning that the stock does not move); second with the stock unlocked (so
that the stock may move freely); and finally, again with the stock unlocked but in the manner
27

manner that the NPRM emphasizes as creating “machinegun” functionality – i.e., where
the shooter maintains “constant forward pressure with the non-trigger hand on the barrelshroud or fore-grip of the rifle, and constant rearward pressure on the device’s extension
ledge with the shooter’s trigger finger,” 83 Fed. Reg. at 13444. As this evidence clearly
demonstrates, in all methods of firing, the bump stock device does not, as ATF claims in
the NPRM, function as “a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing
of multiple rounds through a single pull of the trigger.” 83 Fed.Reg. at 1344. Rather, the
video shows that each shot requires a separate pull of the trigger. Exhibit 28 to Exhibit A.
This most notably includes the form of firing on which ATF relies to make its claim, as
the video plainly and indisputably illustrates that, even when fired in this manner, the
trigger must be released, reset, and pulled completely rearward before the next shot can
be fired. Id. 14 Thus, at no point does the firearm fire more than one round, by a single
function of the trigger. Id. Moreover and consistently, the close-ups reveal, contrary to
ATF’s contention (83 Fed. Reg. 13447), that “additional physical manipulation of the
trigger by the shooter” is necessary for subsequent rounds to be discharged. Id.
88.

Indeed, Mr. Vasquez, the former Acting Chief of FTB, viewed the Bump Stock Analytical
video and attested it “fully, explicitly, and accurately depicts the function of bump-stockdevices, including, but not limited to, the function and operation of the firearm’s trigger,

described in the NPR itself (maintaining constant forward pressure with the non-trigger hand on
the barrel-shroud or fore-grip of the rifle, and maintaining the trigger finger on the device’s
extension ledge with constant rearward pressure”).

13
This video can also be viewed online at the following link: https://youtu.be/1OyK2RdO63U
(Adam Kraut, Esq. and Patton Media and Consulting, Bump Stock Analytical Video).
14
See 83 Fed. Reg. at 66534 declaring that “[w]hile semiautomatic firearms may shoot one
round when the trigger is pulled, the shooter must release the trigger before another round is
fired.” The operation of a bump-stock-type device is no different than another other
semiautomatic firearm as depicted in the video exhibit, Exhibit 28 to Exhibit A.
28

which is exactingly consistent with my evaluation and review of the Slide Fire stock
during my tenure with ATF and my Slide Fire Analysis.” Exhibit A at 901.
89.

As Mr. Vasquez further explained (Exhibit A at 903):
The bump-stock-device does not permit automatic fire by harnessing the recoil
energy of the firearm. Harnessing the energy would require the addition of a
device such as a spring or hydraulics that could automatically absorb the recoil
and use this energy to activate itself. If it did harness the recoil energy, the bumpstock equipped firearm in the video would have continued to fire, while the
shooter’s finger remained on the trigger, after pulling it rearwards without
requiring the shooter to release and reset the trigger and then pull the trigger
completely reward for a subsequent round to be fired.

90.

Moreover, even assuming bump-stock-type devices do or could produce such
machinegun-like effects (something Plaintiffs do not concede given the evidence clearly
demonstrating otherwise), ATF’s own analysis in the NPRM tellingly undermines the
validity of the conclusion on which its new rule is based, because it reveals the
underlying rationale is capricious, absurd, and invites total arbitrariness.

91.

As noted, because bump-firing is produced by a technique and not a particular device,
ATF admits that this method of firing can be produced by myriad means totally unrelated
to any bump-stock-style device, such as through certain fashioning of rubber bands or
belt loops, or by simply training one’s trigger finger to fire more rapidly. 83 Fed. Reg. at
13454. This acknowledgement can lead to one of only two untenable conclusions: First,
ATF is explicitly approving the use of such techniques to produce machinegun-like
effects, which cannot reasonably be squared with its claim that regulation of bump-stocktype devices is urgently necessary prevent mass-shooting mayhem.15 Second, ATF is

15

One could draw this inference from ATF’s statement that, for those individuals who seek to do
so, these manual manipulations of semiautomatic firearms “would be their alternatives to using
bump-stock-type devices,” 83 Fed. Reg. at 13454, which arguably implies that while attempting
29

declaring that any such manipulations of a semiautomatic firearm to produce this
shooting capability is subject to regulation under the Final Rule just the same as if the
firearm were a “machinegun.” This does square logically with the thesis of ATF’s NPRM
that this functionality of firearms, in general, must be stamped out to prevent mass
shootings, but such a rationale leads to the absurd result that people could be arrested,
prosecuted, and convicted of illegal “machinegun” possession, and additionally lose not
only their firearms but their Second Amendment rights pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
simply because they employed a technique on some occasion that happened to produce a
“bump-fire” effect.
92.

Either way, all the known evidence (as well as logic and common sense) before ATF and
elsewhere concerning the actual functionality and utility of bump-stock-type devices,
runs diametrically counter to the conclusion on which ATF’s Final Rule rests. Therefore,
the Final Rule cannot be sustained and instead must be stricken as invalid. Stand Up for
California! v. United States DOI, 204 F. Supp. 3d 212, 245 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Cty. of
L.A. v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1021, 338 U.S. App. D.C. 168 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (When an
agency ‘“fail[s] to provide a reasoned explanation, or where the record belies the
agency’s conclusion, [the court] must undo its action.’”).

93.

Wherefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for herein.

to use bump-stock devices to produce such effects is not acceptable, these “alternatives” are
acceptable.
30

COUNT II: VIOLATION OF ATF’S RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
94.

The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

95.

The “core administrative-law principle” is that “an agency may not rewrite clear statutory
terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.” Util. Air Regulatory Group
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).

96.

Congress has clearly defined “machinegun” to include only a firearm “which shoots, is
designed to shoot, or can readily be restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot,
without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger,” and the frame or receiver
of such a weapon, or parts or combination of parts that could be converted or assembled
into such a weapon. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b); 18 U.S.C. § 921. The express purpose behind
the Final Rule’s alteration and expansion of this definition is to capture “all bump-stocktype devices” with the law’s prohibitive sweep based upon ATF’s conclusion – directly
countered by all the available evidence and logic – that such devices enable shooters to
shoot automatically through a “self-acting or self-regulating” firing mechanism.

97.

Because there is no support for ATF’s conclusion about the functionality of these
devices, it has necessarily exceeded its statutory authority by purporting to expand the
law of Congress for the specific purpose of regulating firearms such devices as prohibited
“machineguns.” Indeed, through its previous formal determinations that bump stock
devices are not “machineguns,” ATF itself has conceded that it lacks the authority to
regulate these devices at all. In fact, in a 2013 letter to Congressman Ed Perlmutter, ATF

31

stated it “does not have authority to restrict [bump-stock devices’] lawful possession, use
or transfer.” Id. at 268. And members of Congress have said the same: ranking Judiciary
Committee Member, Senator Diane Feinstein, has declared that “ATF lacks authority
under the law to ban bump-fire stocks. Period.” Exhibit A at 267.
98.

Moreover, in its Final Rule, ATF admits that it has exceeded the authority granted to it.

99.

“The Department agrees that regulatory agencies may not promulgate rules that conflict
with statutes.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 66527.

100.

“The NFA is a statute, which only Congress may repeal or alter.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 66540.

101.

Perhaps most importantly, “the statutory definition alone determines whether a firearm is
a machinegun.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 66533-34 (emphasis added).

102.

The Final Rule then goes on to declare that the “Department believes that this rule’s
interpretations of ‘automatically’ and ‘single function of the trigger’ in the statutory
definition of ‘machinegun’ accord with the plain meaning of those terms. Moreover, even
if those terms are ambiguous, this rule rests on a reasonable construction of
them…Congress thus implicitly left it to the Department to define “automatically’ and
‘single function of the trigger’ in the event those terms are ambiguous.” Id. (emphasis
added).

103.

Here, even setting aside ATF’s admission that that “the statutory definition alone
determines whether a firearm is a machinegun,” it takes the untenable position that the
statutory language is so clear that the agency is merely “defining those terms in
accordance with the plain meaning;” yet, it concedes that it only has the authority to do
such when terms are ambiguous and admits that the terms are not ambiguous; thereby,

32

precluding it from implementing the Final Rule, since it admits that it lacks the legal
authority to define terms that are not ambiguous.
104.

Accordingly, ATF’s attempt to redefine the term “machinegun” is in violation of its
regulatory authority and Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for herein.

COUNT III: INTERNAL REVENUE CODE VIOLATIONS
105.

The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

106.

ATF’s Final Rule is not only procedurally and substantively invalid as set forth above,
but any implementation or enforcement of the rule against such devices manufactured or
assembled before the date of the NPRM publication would violate 26 U.S.C. § 7805(b).
26 U.S.C. § 7805(b) provides that “no temporary, proposed, or final regulation relating to
the internal revenue laws shall apply to any taxable period ending before … [¶ … ¶] [t]he
date on which any notice substantially describing the expected contents of any temporary,
proposed, or final regulation is issued to the public.” ATF has previously acknowledged
the limiting effect of this law on the retroactivity of its firearms regulations, in that it
cannot properly apply a legal reclassification of items produced before this date. See e.g.,
ATF Rule 82-8 (in reclassifying SM10 and SM11A1 pistols and SAC carbines as
“machineguns” under the National Firearms Act, ATF acknowledged that the
reclassification was not applicable to those firearms manufactured or assembled before
June 21, 1982, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7805(b)); ATF-41F (81 Fed. Reg. 2658 through
2723) (where ATF cited Section 7805(b) in declining to retroactively apply the final rule
related to the transfer of regulated firearms and acknowledging that the old law would
apply to all transfer applications submitted prior to the effective date of the new rule).

33

107.

Accordingly, to whatever extent the Final Rule may otherwise legitimately be
implemented or enforced, it cannot be properly be applied to bump stock devices
manufactured before March 29, 2018 – the date of publication of this NPR in the Federal
Register – if not, the date of issuance of the Final Rule.
COUNT IV: TAKINGS WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION

108.

The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

109.

Generally, under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
when government laws or regulations result in the taking or destruction of private
property, the government must provide just compensation for the value of that property.
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425-28 (2015); Pumpelly v. Green Bay &
Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177 (1871). More specifically, an agency regulation
amounts to such a taking when “denies all economically beneficial or productive use” of
the property or when it “impedes the use of property without depriving the owner of all
economically beneficial use,” based upon “a complex of factors, including (1) the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the
governmental action.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).

110.

ATF has made no bones about the property-destroying effect of its Final Rule. It has
boldly declared that, upon implementation of the rule, all “manufacturers, current owners,
and persons wishing to purchase [bump-stock-type] devices would be subject to the
restrictions imposed by the GCA and NFA.” Reg. Red. At 13448. Thus, all “bump-stocktype devices currently possessed by individuals would have to be destroyed or turned in
upon implementation of the regulation.” Id. at 13450.” Indeed, given the teeth built into

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the criminal statutes that ATF seeks to invoke through this application of the Final Rule,
the forced dispossession comes on pain of criminal prosecution for failure to comply.
111.

Unquestionably, the effect of this regulation is to destroy “all economically beneficial or
productive use” and to destroy all the “investment-backed expectations” that ATF itself
set up through its previous public pronouncements consistently declaring these very same
types of devices lawful as not constituting “machineguns.” And the loss of private
interests here is substantial. ATF itself assumes “an average sale price for bump-stockdevices from 2012-2017 [of] $200.00,” while acknowledging that the prices ranged from
$179.95 to $425.95. 83 Fed. Reg. at 13451. It then declares that the primary estimated
cost to be $96,242,750.00 based on an estimate of 520,000 affected bump-stock-devices.
However, multiplying ATF’s stated average price of $200.00 by the primary estimate
yields a value of $104,000,000.00, not $96,242,750.00 as stated in Table 3 of the NPRM.
Moreover, by averaging the acknowledged prices for bump-stock-devices, a proper
average sale price should be $302.95, which would result in a primary estimated cost of
$157,534,000.00 in just compensation being due.

112.

At a minimum, for those like Plaintiffs Guedes and Mr. Thompson with concretely
established damages based on the verified purchase price of their bump-stock-type
devices, the government should be compelled as a matter of law under the Takings
Clause to provide just compensation in the amount of the purchase price.

113.

Moreover, the requirement of just compensation for this destruction of valuable private
interests cannot be set aside as a valid exercise of police power, for the simple yet
fundamental reason that ATF has not and evidently cannot put forth legitimate support
for the core conclusion underlying the Final Rule that these devices constitute

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“machineguns.” Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 429, n. 11 (1989). (“[T]o be a valid exercise of the police power in the first
instance a government regulation must be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.”).
114.

Accordingly, implementation of this regulation would violate the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for herein.
COUNT V: EX POST FACTO VIOLATION

115.

The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

116.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the U.S Constitution declares that “No Bill of Attainder
or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” It is well established that this prohibition includes
“[e]very law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action,” Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386
(1798), and any law that, “in relation to the offence or its consequences, alters the
situation of a party to his disadvantage,” Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 47 (1990).
The specific focus of this proscription is to prevent the retroactive application of laws and
regulations whose primary purpose is to impose punishment on the affected citizens or
whose impact would be so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate any claim of a
mere intent to effect a civil and nonpunitive regulatory purpose. See Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 500-501 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

117.

Much like the unabashed manner in which ATF attempts to destroy all value and
beneficial use of bump-stock-type devices without providing any just compensation, ATF
openly admits the harsh criminal consequences flowing from its unsupported about-face
on the classification of bump-stock-type devices. As the NPRM states (italics added):

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The proposed rule would replace prior classifications of bump-stock-type
devices, including those that ATF previously determined were not machineguns.
This rule would thus supplant any prior letter rulings with which it is inconsistent
so that any bump-stock device described above qualifies as a machinegun.
83 Fed. Reg. at 13448.
118.

And, as already seen, because all “manufacturers, current owners, and persons wishing to
purchase such devices would be subject to the restrictions imposed by the GCA and
NFA,” 83 Fed. Reg. at 13448, everyone is subject criminally punitive sanctions for
failing to comply with this new world order of ATF – without exception (except for the
small class of individuals exempted from the rule). Indeed, ATF has expressly declared
that “there is no means by which a possessor may register a firearm retroactively,
including a firearm that has been reclassified.” Id. (italics added). So ATF has effectively
shackled everyone affected by this new rule, transforming them into criminals based
upon their mere possession of any bump-stock-type device regardless of whether that
device had theretofore been lawfully possessed and regardless of whether ATF itself
previously determined the device does not to have the capability of converting a firearm
into a prohibited “machinegun.” This is a prohibited ex post facto in the purest sense.

119.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for herein.
COUNT VI: VIOLATION OF THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE

120.

The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

121.

“The Contracts Clause restricts the power of States to disrupt contractual arrangements. It
provides that ‘[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.’ U. S. Const., Art. I, §10, cl. 1.” Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1821 (2018).
“To determine when such a law crosses the constitutional line, … [t]he threshold issue is

whether the state law has “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual
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relationship.” Id. at 1821-22. “In answering that question,” the primary factors of
concerns are “the extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain, interferes
with a party’s reasonable expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or
reinstating his rights.” Id. at 1822. “If such factors show a substantial impairment, the
inquiry turns to the means and ends of the legislation.” Id. And the focus there is
“whether the state law is drawn in an ‘appropriate’ and ‘reasonable’ way to advance ‘a
significant and legitimate public purpose.” Id.
122.

Here, as ATF unabashedly admits throughout its NPRM, the government undeniably
created reasonable, investment-backed expectations in the eyes of the affected public
about the legality of their acquisition, purchase, possession, and use of the untold number
of specifically identified bump-stock-type devices, and all their substantially similar or
reasonable equivalents, that ATF deemed lawful in its prior rulings and determinations.
And, beyond substantial impairment, the Final Rule would completely eviscerate those
investment backed expectations on which the affected individuals relied to their serious
detriment – a detriment so significant that it exposes them to criminal liability.

123.

Moreover, for all the reasons already discussed revealing the illegality of the process and
substance behind ATF’s scheme here, and especially the lack of any demonstrated or
even logical basis in support of the Final Rule, the regulation certainly has not been
“drawn in an ‘appropriate’ and ‘reasonable’ way to advance ‘a significant and legitimate
public purpose.” Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. at p. 1822.

124.

Accordingly, this amounts to a violation of the Contracts Clause, and on this basis too
Plaintiffs have demonstrated entitled to the relief prayed-for herein.

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COUNT VII: VIOLATION OF FOIA
(Plaintiff FPF Against All Defendants)
125.

The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

126.

As described above, ATF failed and refused to respond to the properly presented, formal
request for production of records submitted several months ago by FPF. The agency
neglected to even assign a docketing number to the FOIA request and, to this date, has
made no effort to communicate even an intention of complying with the request.

127.

Accordingly, Plaintiff FPF has been improperly and illegally denied access to the
requested records, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), this Court has the power to compel the
agency to produce the records in accordance with the law, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), and it
should do so in addition to assessing ATF with reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs
incurred on account of the need to bring this action, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i).

128.

Wherefore, Plaintiff FPF is entitled to the relief prayed for herein.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Damien Guedes, Representative Shane Roden, Firearms

Policy Foundation, Madison Society Foundation, and Florida Carry, Inc. respectfully requests
that this Honorable Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendants, as follows:
a)

Preliminarily enjoin Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees and all
persons in active concert or participation with them from enforcing the Final Rule and all
related laws, policies, and procedures that would impede or criminalize an individual’s
exercise of their use, possession, sale, transfer, or other disposition of a bump-stock-type
device, as the result of this new regulation;

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b)

Declare that Defendants are prohibited from implementing a new regulation, wherein
they expand or purport to expand the definition of a “machine gun” as enacted by
Congress, on the basis that the Final Rule violates the APA;

c)

Declare that Defendants are prohibited from implementing a new regulation, wherein
they expand or purport to expand the definition of a “machine gun” as enacted by
Congress, on the basis that the Final Rule violates ATF’s statutory authority;

d)

Declare pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7805, Defendants are unable to enforce a ban on the
possession or use of bump-stock-type devices;

e)

Declare that the Final Rule’s enforcement constitutes a violation of Article I, Section 9,
Clause 3 of the U.S Constitution (Ex Post Facto Clause);

f)

Declare that the Final Rule’s enforcement constitutes a violation of Article I, Section 10,
Clause 1 of the U.S Constitution (Contracts Clause);

g)

Declare that Defendant ATF violated 5 U.S.C. § 522(a)(3)(A) by failing to provide a
response to Firearm Policy Foundation’s FOIA request;

h)

Declare that the circumstances surrounding the withholding of the information raise
questions as to whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to
the withholding;

i)

Order that Defendant ATF disclose the documents requested by Firearm Policy
Foundation’s FOIA request, as well as those it was required to produce during the
rulemaking process;

j)

Permanently enjoin Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees and all
persons in active concert or participation with them from enforcing the Final Rule and all
related laws, policies, and procedures that would impede or criminalize an individual’s

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exercise of their use, possession, sale, transfer, or other disposition of a bump-stock-type
device, as the result of this new regulation;
k)

In the alternative, declare that the Final Rule constitutes a taking under the Fifth
Amendment and order that the Defendants pay just compensation to those affected;

l)

Award Plaintiff costs and attorney fees and expenses to the extent permitted under 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i), 18 U.S.C. § 924, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 2412; and

m)

Grant any and all other equitable and/or legal remedies this Court may see fit.
Respectfully Submitted,

________________________
Adam Kraut, Esq.
D.C. Bar No. PA0080
[e-mail]
Joshua Prince, Esq.
D.C. Bar No. PA0081
[e-mail]
Civil Rights Defense Firm, P.C.
646 Lenape Road
Bechtelsville, PA 19505
(888) 202-92973 (t)
[phone] (f)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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