Securities and Exchange Commission v. Nadel et al
Filing
1355
Unopposed MOTION for miscellaneous relief, specifically FOR APPROVAL TO SELL OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF UNDEVELOPED LAND LOCATED IN THOMAS COUNTY, GEORGIA by Burton W. Wiand. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Perez, Jared)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARTHUR NADEL,
SCOOP CAPITAL, LLC,
SCOOP MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendants.
CASE NO.: 8:09-cv-0087-T-26TBM
SCOOP REAL ESTATE, L.P.,
VALHALLA INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P.,
VALHALLA MANAGEMENT, INC.,
VICTORY IRA FUND, LTD,
VICTORY FUND, LTD,
VIKING IRA FUND, LLC,
VIKING FUND, LLC, AND
VIKING MANAGEMENT, LLC.
Relief Defendants.
/
RECEIVER’S UNOPPOSED, VERIFIED MOTION FOR APPROVAL
TO SELL OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF UNDEVELOPED LAND
LOCATED IN THOMAS COUNTY, GEORGIA
Burton W. Wiand, as Receiver (the “Receiver”), respectfully moves the Court for an
order, in substantially the form attached as Exhibit 1, (a) authorizing him to sell or otherwise
dispose of two parcels of undeveloped land in Thomas County, Georgia (the “Properties”),
free and clear of all claims, liens, and encumbrances and (b) relieving him from complying
with certain provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2001 (“Section 2001”).
BACKGROUND
On January 21, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”)
filed this case to prevent the defendants from further defrauding investors in hedge funds
operated by them. That same day, the Court entered an order appointing Mr. Wiand as
Receiver for Defendants Scoop Capital, LLC, and Scoop Management, Inc., and Relief
Defendants Scoop Real Estate, L.P.; Valhalla Investment Partners, L.P.; Valhalla
Management, Inc.; Victory Fund, Ltd.; Victory IRA Fund, Ltd.; Viking IRA Fund, LLC;
Viking Fund, LLC; and Viking Management, LLC (Doc. 8) (the “Order Appointing
Receiver”). The Court subsequently granted several motions to expand the scope of the
Receivership to include other entities owned or controlled by Arthur Nadel (“Nadel”). (See
generally Docs. 17, 44, 68, 81, 153, 172, 454, 911, 916, 1024.) All of the entities in
receivership are collectively referred to as the “Receivership Entities.” Pursuant to the
Order Appointing Receiver, the Receiver was directed to, inter alia, administer and manage
the business affairs, funds, assets, choses in action, and any other property of the
Receivership Entities.
THE PROPERTIES
The Receivership’s Interests In The Properties
Shortly after his appointment, the Receiver learned that proceeds of Nadel’s fraud had
been diverted to entities other than the defendant entities. One of those entities was the GuyNadel Foundation, Inc. (the “Foundation”), a Florida non-profit corporation formed in
December 2003 by Nadel for “charitable, educational and scientific purposes.” Nadel served
as one of the Foundation’s directors, along with Mrs. Nadel, and Mrs. Nadel’s son and
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daughter, Geoff Quisenberry and Alexandra Quisenberry. The Receiver’s investigation
revealed that the Foundation was funded with nearly $3 million in proceeds from Nadel’s
scheme that were either transferred directly from Receivership Entity Scoop Capital or
indirectly through transfers from Nadel’s personal accounts.
Those proceeds were
subsequently used for various purposes, including the purchase of the Properties at or near
the height of the real estate boom. Upon this discovery, the Receiver successfully sought to
expand the scope of the Receivership Entities to include the Foundation. (Doc. 68).
The Properties consist of two undeveloped lots in Thomasville, Thomas County,
Georgia. The first lot is a 0.12-acre parcel located at 211 Church Street (the “Church Street
Lot”) that was purchased by the Foundation in December 2006 for $4,000. The Thomas
County Board of Tax Assessors currently appraises the Church Street Lot at $2,224 (Parcel
Number 001-0008018). See Exhibit 2.
The second lot is a 1.17-acre parcel located on
North Stevens Street (the “North Stevens Street Lot”) that was purchased by the
Foundation sometime in January 2008 for $24,000. The Thomas County Board of Tax
Assessors currently appraises the North Stevens Street Lot at $10,342 (Parcel Number 001029009). See Exhibit 3. The purchase price and subsequent closing costs for the Properties
were paid entirely by the Foundation with proceeds of Nadel’s fraud. The Receiver seeks to
donate the Church Street Lot. The Receiver has a buyer for the North Stevens Street Lot.
The Properties were maintained (but not improved) since their purchase, and they are
not subject to any known liens or encumbrances. Further, no claims have been filed in the
Receivership that are connected in any way to the Properties. In light of (1) the current state
of the real estate market in Thomas County, Georgia, (2) the fact that the Properties have
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been marketed for sale since 2009 with minimal interest, and (3) the fact that prior efforts by
the Receiver to sell the Properties via public action 1 were unsuccessful, the Receiver believes
donating the Church Street Lot to Habitat for Humanity or a similar humanitarian
organization to avoid additional maintenance expenses is in the best interest of the
Receivership estate and that the current $5,500 offer for the North Stevens Street Lot
represents a fair and reasonable price.
The Receiver also believes that it is in the
Receivership estate’s best interests to proceed with the sale without the expense of obtaining
any appraisals or advertising the terms of the sale as contemplated by Section 2001(b). Thus,
the Receiver requests that the Court waive, or find that the Receiver has substantially
complied with, the procedures in Section 2001(b) governing the private sale of real property
by a receiver. The Receiver also requests the Court grant this motion and allow him to
transfer title to the Properties free and clear of all claims, liens, and encumbrances.
The Receiver’s Marketing Efforts
After taking possession of the Properties, the Receiver marketed the Properties
through his website, www.nadelreceivership, in a specific “Assets for Sale” section. The
Receiver also engaged the services of Tallahassee Land Company in September 2009 to list
and market the Properties for sale. The Properties were listed for sale for the price of $5,000.
and $34,745, respectively. After the Receiver’s listing agreement with Tallahassee Land
Company expired, the Receiver continued to market the Properties on his own through
posted advertisements in the local newspaper.
1
See Docs. 1011 and 1106 and the Receiver’s Twenty-First Interim Report at Doc. 1289.
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Since the Receiver began marketing the Properties in 2009, he has received one offer
to purchase each property. After considering each offer, the Receiver determined that neither
offer adequately represented the value of the Properties and declined to accept either offer.
Given the lack of interest in the properties, as well as the continuing need to pay
maintenance, tax, and insurance obligations, the Receiver determined that a public sale by
online auction through Iron Horse Auction Company (“Iron Horse”) could provide the best
opportunity to sell the Properties. The Receiver filed and the Court granted the Receiver’s
motion to auction the Properties. See Doc. 1106. Unfortunately, neither property was sold at
the 2013 online auction, and Iron Horse was not paid for is advertising expenses or any
commission. Since that time, the Receiver has continued to market the Properties through
various cost-appropriate means, but interest has remained low.
Offer to Purchase North Stevens Street Lot
The Receiver recently entered into the Purchase and Sale Agreement attached as
Exhibit 4 with Gregory Lance Mitchell (the “Mitchell” or the “Purchaser”) for the North
Stevens Street Lot for $5,500. Mitchell was the highest bidder at the 2013 online action, but
his offer then was less than half of what he has agreed to pay now. The Receiver seeks to
convey title, free and clear of all claims, liens, and encumbrances, by Receiver’s Deed. The
Receiver believes the Purchaser’s offer is reasonable considering the current real estate
market conditions in the area and the length of time the Property has been listed for sale.
Since Purchaser was associated with the online auction, the Receiver believes it is
appropriate to compensate Iron Horse for its services. The Receiver has agreed to pay Iron
Horse $500 following the sale of the North Stevens Street Lot, and Iron Horse has agreed to
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accept that amount in exchange for the release of any claims it might have due to its prior
services. The Receivership estate will net approximately $5,000 from the sale after paying
standard closing costs.
Disposition of the 211 Church Street Lot
As indicated above, considering the current real estate market conditions in the area
and the length of time the Church Street Lot has been listed for sale, the Receiver believes
donating it is in the best interest of the Receivership Estate.
The lot is simply not
commercially viable. The Receiver reached out to various charities, including Habitat for
Humanity, to determine if any would be interested in taking title to the Church Street Lot.
Habitat for Humanity has agreed to do so, and as such, the Receiver seeks authority to
convey title to that organization, free and clear of all claims, liens, and encumbrances, by
Receiver’s Deed without further order of this Court.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT HAS BROAD POWERS OVER THIS RECEIVERSHIP’S
ADMINISTRATION, INCLUDING TO CONVEY REAL PROPERTY FREE
AND CLEAR OF CLAIMS, LIENS, AND ENCUMBRANCES
The Court’s power to supervise an equity receivership and to determine the
appropriate actions to be taken in its administration is extremely broad. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953
F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1992); S.E.C. v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1986). The
Court’s wide discretion derives from the inherent powers of an equity court to fashion relief.
Elliott, 953 F.2d at 1566; S.E.C. v. Safety Finance Service, Inc., 674 F.2d 368, 372 (5th Cir.
1982). A court imposing a receivership assumes custody and control of all assets and
property of the receivership, and it has broad equitable authority to issue all orders necessary
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for the proper administration of the receivership estate. See S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp Ltd.,
290 F.3d 80, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2002); S.E.C. v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1980).
The court may enter such orders as may be appropriate and necessary for a receiver to fulfill
the duty to preserve and maintain the property and funds within the receivership estate. See,
e.g., Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors of Worldcom, Inc. v. S.E.C., 467 F.3d 73, 81
(2d Cir. 2006). The goal of a receiver charged with liquidating assets is to obtain the best
value available under the circumstances. Fleet Nat’l Bank v. H & D Entertainment, Inc., 926
F. Supp. 226, 239-40 (D. Mass. 1996) (citations omitted). Further, the paramount goal in any
proposed sale of property of the estate is to maximize the sale proceeds. See, e.g., Four B.
Corp. v. Food Barn Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 558, 564-65 (8th Cir. 1997).
The relief sought in this motion falls squarely within the Court’s powers and is in the
best interest of defrauded investors and the Receivership estate. That relief is also consistent
with precedent, which establishes that a court of equity – like this one in these proceedings –
may authorize the sale of property free and clear of all claims, liens, and encumbrances. See,
e.g., Miners’ Bank of Wilkes-Barre v. Acker, 66 F.2d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 1933); People’sPittsburgh Trust Co. v. Hirsch, 65 F.2d 972, 973 (3d Cir. 1933). In part, a court has this
authority because when a court of competent jurisdiction takes possession of property
through its officers – like this Court has done with the Properties through the Receiver – it
has jurisdiction and authority to determine all questions about title, possession, and control of
the property. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1931). Indeed, in
this Receivership, the Court has previously entered at least six orders approving sales that
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convey title free and clear of all claims, liens, and encumbrances. (See Docs. 1043, 1044,
1075, 1110, 1151, 1177.)
III.
THE COURT HAS THE POWER TO DEVIATE FROM THE
REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 2001, AND THAT IS WARRANTED
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE
Pursuant to Section 2001, property in the possession of a receiver may be sold by private
or public sale. As noted above, the Receiver has already attempted a public sale via auction
of these Properties, but the auction was unsuccessful.
Subsection (b) establishes the
following procedures for a private sale of real property:
(b) After a hearing, of which notice to all interested parties shall be given by
publication or otherwise as the court directs, the court may order the sale of
such realty or interest or any part thereof at private sale for cash or other
consideration and upon such terms and conditions as the court approves, if it
finds that the best interests of the estate will be conserved thereby. Before
confirmation of any private sale, the court shall appoint three disinterested
persons to appraise such property or different groups of three appraisers each
to appraise properties of different classes or situated in different localities. No
private sale shall be confirmed at a price less than two-thirds of the appraised
value. Before confirmation of any private sale, the terms thereof shall be
published in such newspaper or newspapers of general circulation as the court
directs at least ten days before confirmation. The private sale shall not be
confirmed if a bona fide offer is made, under conditions prescribed by the
court, which guarantees at least a 10 per centum increase over the price
offered in the private sale.
28 U.S.C. § 2001(b).
Notwithstanding the language of Section 2001, district courts are afforded wide
discretion in overseeing the sale of real and personal property in equity receiverships. Any
action taken by district courts in the exercise of this discretion is subject to great deference by
appellate courts. See United States v. Branch Coal, 390 F. 2d 7, 10 (3d Cir. 1969). Such
discretion is especially important considering that one of the ultimate purposes of a receiver’s
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appointment is to provide a method of gathering, preserving, and ultimately liquidating assets
to return funds to defrauded investors. See S.E.C. v. Safety Fin. Serv., Inc., 674 F.2d 368,
372 (5th Cir. 1982) (court overseeing equity receivership enjoys “wide discretionary power”
related to its “concern for orderly administration”) (citations omitted).
A.
The Statutory Appraisal Requirements Under Section 2001(b)
Pursuant to Section 2001(b), a court may order the sale of real estate after (i) the
completion of three appraisals, of which the proposed sale price may not be less than twothirds of the average appraised value, and (ii) the advertisement of the terms of the proposed
sale in such newspaper(s) of general circulation as directed by the court.
28 U.S.C.
§ 2001(b). Here, given the values of the Properties as set forth by the Thomas County Board
of Tax Assessors, the Receiver determined it was unnecessary to incur the cost of having
formal appraisals prepared as it would only deplete the funds available to the Receivership
Estate.
This is especially true given that the Properties have already been auctioned
unsuccessfully.
B.
Waiver Of The Statutory Notice Provisions Under Section 2001(b) Is
Warranted
Section 2001(b) also contemplates that the terms of a proposed sale will be advertised
in a newspaper of general circulation. However, the Receiver believes that full compliance
with the statutory notice procedure set forth in Section 2001(b) would create an unnecessary
expense and could derail the sale or disposition of the Properties. Given the existence of a
ready and willing buyer for the North Stevens Street Lot and a likely donee for the Church
Street Lot, the lack of any actual or potential claims to the Properties, and efforts to sell the
Properties the Receiver for almost eight years, the Receiver requests that the Court either
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waive Section 2001(b)’s notice provision, or in the alternative, find that the Receiver’s
efforts in marketing and listing the Properties are in compliance with Section 2001(b). See
Billion Coupons, Inc., 2009 WL 2143531 at *3 (relieving receiver of compliance with
statutory provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2001 where sufficient safeguards existed and proposed
procedure would maximize net sales proceeds). The Receiver will post a copy of this motion
on his website, www.nadelreceivership.com, immediately after filing, which will be publicly
available.
CONCLUSION
The Receiver moves the Court for entry of an order in substantially the form of the
proposed Order attached as Exhibit 1 to (1) sell the North Stevens Street Lot by private sale
in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Purchase and Sale Agreement
attached hereto as Exhibit 4, such sale being free and clear of all claims, liens, and
encumbrances; (2) donate the Church Street Lot to Habitat for Humanity or a charity or
similar organization at the Receiver’s discretion without further order of this Court; and
(3) waive the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2001(b).
CERTIFICATE UNDER LOCAL RULE 3.01(g)
Undersigned counsel for the Receiver has conferred with counsel for the SEC and is
authorized to represent to the Court that the SEC does not oppose the relief requested in this
motion.
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VERIFICATION OF RECEIVER
I, Burton W. Wiand, Court-Appointed Receiver in the above-styled matter, hereby
certify that the information contained in this Motion is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
_____________________________________
Burton W. Wiand, Court-Appointed Receiver
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 30, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system.
s/Jared J. Perez
Jared J. Perez, FBN 0085192
jperez@wiandlaw.com
WIAND GUERRA KING P.A.
5505 W. Gray Street
Tampa, FL 33609
Tel: 813-347-5100
Fax: 813-347-5198
Attorneys for the Receiver
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