Gainor v. Sidley, Austin, Brow

Filing 66

MOTION to Dismiss 40 Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support by P. Anthony Nissley. Responses due by 6/6/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Austin, Michael)

Gainor v. Sidley, Austin, Brow

Doc. 66

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Miami Division
Case No. 06-21748 CIV-MARTINEZ/BANDSTRA

MARK J. GAINOR and ELYSE GAINOR,
Plaintiffs,
v.

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, et aI.,
Defendants.

/

DEFENDANT P. ANTHONY NISSLEY'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
Michael G. Austin (FBN 0457205) E-mail: maustin(gmwe.com 201 South Biscayne Blvd., Ste. 2200
Miami, Florida 33131

Tel: [phone] Fax: [phone]
Of Counsel: Douglas E. Whitney Jocelyn D. Francoeur
E-Mail: dwhitney(gmwe.com

jfrancoeur(gmwe. com 227 West Monroe Street

Chicago, Ilinois 60606
[phone] [phone] FAX
Counsel for P. Anthony Nissley

Dockets.Justia.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

I. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................1
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND .............................................................................................2
III. ARGUMENT......................................................................................................................5

A. The Amended Complaint Does Not Identify A Basis For Specific
Jurisdiction Under Florida's Long-Arm Statute .....................................................5
B. Exercising Jurisdiction Over Nissley Would Not Comport With The Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...................................................... 7
1. Nissley Did Not Have Sufficient Contacts With Florida ...........................8
2. Exercising Jurisdiction Over Nissley Would Offend Traditional
Notions of

Fair Play and Substantial Justice ............................................11

IV. CONCLUSION........................................ ....................................................................... .12

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

Cases
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Therm-O-Disc., Inc.,
511 So.2d 992 (Fla. 1987) ........................................................................................................... 7

Alternate Energy Corp. v. Redstone,
328 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2004) ....................................................................................5, 6

Fleming & Weiss, P. C. v. First Am. Title Co., 580 So.2d 646 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991)...........................................................................................1 0 Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247 (11 th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................6 Green v. USF & G Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1991).... ......... ............ ................................ .................. .............. .... 7
Groome v. Feyh,

651 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1986).........................................................................................9, 12 Kim v. Keenan, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (M.D. Fla. 1999)................................................................................... 7, 11 Nichols v. Paulucci, 652 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995)............................................................................................5 Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Madure & Curiel's Bank, N. V,
70 1 F. 2d 889 (11 th C ir. 1 983) ..................................................................................................... 6 Posner v. Essex Ins. Co.,

178 F.3d 1209 (11 th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................................8 Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bil, P. C. , 74 F.3d 253 (11 th Cir. 1996) ...............................................................................................1 0, 11
Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd.,

94 F.3d 623 (11 th Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................................5, 7 Steinhilber v. Lamoree, 825 F. Supp. 1 003 (S.D. Fla. 1992)................ ...................... ........... ................ .................. ........10 Sun Bank, N.A. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 926 F.2d 1030 (1Ith Cir. 1991) ........................................................................................... 7,8,9 Wallack v. Worldwide Mach. Sales, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2003)..................................................................................... 11 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) ..................................................................................................................11

Statutes
§ 48.193 ................................................................................................................................... 5, 6, 7

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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant P. Anthony Nissley is an Arizona resident and accountant licensed to practice

accounting and law in the state of Ilinois. From 1994 through approximately June 2002, Nissley

worked in the Chicago, IL offce of Arthur Andersen LLP ("Andersen"). In 1999, Andersen was
engaged to assist in the structuring and implementation of a tax strategy involving the sale of two

Georgia entities owned or controlled by Plaintiff Mark to two Georgia entities owned or

controlled by co-defendant Mark Klopfenstein (the "Gainor Strategy"). At the request of others
in Andersen's Atlanta offce, Nissley provided advice regarding the implementation of

the

Gainor Strategy, which Gainor utilized to avoid paying taxes on approximately $70 milion of
capital gains that otherwise would have been subject to federal and Georgia state income tax. At
the time Gainor hired Andersen's Atlanta office to assist in implementing the Strategy, Gainor

was a Georgia resident and Nissley was an Ilinois resident.
The Gainor Strategy was designed for a Georgia resident, involved the sale of Georgia
entities, was governed by agreements under Georgia law, affected Gainor's Georgia state income tax obligations, and was reviewed and approved by several different Georgia professionals.

Nissley's consultation and advice on the Gainor Transaction occurred almost exclusively from
his Chicago offce, where Nissley spoke by phone to Andersen personnel and/or Gainor in

Georgia. Any contact Nissley may have had with Gainor regarding the Gainor Strategy took
place in Georgia. It was not until the year following the implementation of the Gainor Strategy
that Gainor (presumably for tax reasons) established residency in Florida, which may have necessitated some contact between Nissley and Florida to allow for Gainor's affairs to be
transitioned from Andersen's Atlanta office to a local Florida accounting firm.

Gainor and his wife fied the amended complaint in March 2007 seeking, for the first

time, to drag Nissley into this Florida litigation that Gainor had first fied nearly three years

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earlier. Gainor's belated claims against Nissley are deficient for several reasons. As a threshold
matter, Gainor's claims against Nissley cannot support a finding that Nissley is subject to the

jurisdiction of the courts of this State. i Gainor contends that Nissley conspired with various

other defendants to induce Gainor to enter into the Gainor Strategy. As Gainor's own allegations
make clear, however, any contacts Nissley had with Gainor prior to the implementation of

that

strategy occurred in Georgia, not Florida. Any fleeting contacts Nissley may have had with
Gainor after Gainor chose to establish residency in Florida fall far short of establishing the

puroseful availment necessary to support the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. As a result,
Plaintiffs' amended complaint against Nissley should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Nissley is a resident of the state of Arizona. (Declaration of P. Anthony Nissley
("Nissley Decl."), ir 2.) Nissley has been licensed to practice as an accountant and lawyer in the
state of Ilinois since 1994. (Nissley DecI., ir 4.) He presently is a Partner of

PricewaterhouseCoopers, with his principal offices in Chicago, Ilinois. (Nissley Decl., ir 6.)
Nissley has never lived or worked in the state of

Florida. (Id., ir 3.) He is not licensed as

an accountant or lawyer in Florida, and he has never maintained an office in Florida. (Id., ir 7.)
He has never held any professional licenses in the State of Florida or advertised his services in
the State of

Florida. (Id., ir 8.)

Since approximately 2003, Nissley has jointly owned, with other family members, a

house in Jacksonvile, Florida. Nissley does not reside in that home or earn any income from

the Court, Gainor's claims against Nissley should be dismissed for the same reasons that wil be set forth in the subsequently fied motions of coi Should the Court determine that Nissley is in fact subject to the jurisdiction of

defendant Andersen.

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that property in Florida, and he does not maintain any ban accounts in the State of Florida. (Id.,
irir 9-10.)

On March 7, 2007, Plaintiffs fied the First Amended Complaint ("F AC" or

"Complaint"). The Complaint alleges only one claim against Nissley - namely, that Nissley
conspired with Andersen, Sidley Austin, Merril Lynch, and a number of associated
professionals to induce Gainor to engage in the Gainor Strategy and pay defendants other than
Nissley fees associated with the implementation of

that strategy. (FAC, irir 51-97.) Gainor does

not allege that Nissley received any of

these fees. (F AC, ir 86.) In fact, he did not. (Nissley

DecI., ir 17.)

The Complaint alleges that in late February of 1999 Nissley and another defendant,

Michael Marx, "advised Gainor that it had a legitimate tax strategy" that would "substantially
reduce the taxes payable" from the sale of

Gainor's lucrative medical services business. (FAC, ir

95(a).) Gainor contends that between January and August of 1999, Nissley communicated with
various other defendants regarding the Gainor Strategy. (FAC, irir 62-66.) Gainor contends that

on August 20, 1999, either Nissley or Mar sent to Gainor "a schedule confirming the
anticipated professional fees and transaction costs that would be incurred in implementing" the

Strategy. (F AC, ir 68.) This schedule was faxed to Gainor's home in Georgia. (Declaration of
Michael Marx at ir 14.2) Gainor alleges that between September and December, 1999, Andersen

"coordinated" the activities among the defendants, and he contends that Marx and/or Nissley
made a number of

factual representations to Gainor regarding the Strategy on Andersen's behalf.

(F AC ir 95.)

2 The declaration of Michael Marx is submitted in support of

Marx's Motion To Dismiss For Lack of

Personal

Jurisdiction, which is being fied simultaneously with this motion.

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Gainor makes no specific allegation regarding any action taken by Nissley after October

5, 1999 nor does he allege that Nissley committed any specific act in - or directed towardFlorida. (See F AC, ir 95( c).) Gainor does not allege that any specific conversations described

above occurred in the state of Florida, nor does Gainor allege any specific actions that Nissley
directed to Gainor after Gainor became a resident of Florida.
In fact, Nissley's communications with Gainor regarding the structue and

implementation of the Strategy were directed to Gainor in Georgia, not Florida. On September
1, 1999, Andersen's

job arrangement letters were addressed from Andersen's Atlanta office to

Gainor's Georgia entities, both of which had their principal place of business in Atlanta (Nissley
DecL., ir 14, Exs. A, B.) Because Gainor was residing in Georgia at the time, any communication

that Nissley had with Gainor regarding implementation of the Strategy occurred in that state.
(Nissley DecL., ir 16.) The last specific contact that Gainor alleges he had with Nissley was on
October 5, 1999 (FAC, ir 95(c)), when Gainor was stil a resident of the state of

Georgia.

(Nissley Decl., ir 24.)
The Gainor Strategy was completed by the end of

December, 1999, and Gainor sought to

establish residency the following year in Florida. (FAC, irir 77-78; Nissley DecL., irir 22,24-25.)

After Gainor relocated to Florida, Gainor decided that he wanted to replace Andersen, which
had been serviung as the tax preparer for Gainor and his entities, with a local Florida accounting

firm, and Gainor eventually retained Rachlin Cohen & Holtz for that purose. (Nissley Decl., ir
25.)

Prior to completing this transition, Gainor decided to have Andersen prepare his 2000

federal and Georgia state income tax returns. Nissley did not participate in the preparation of
any of Gainor's tax returns, nor was he ever consulted by Gainor or any of Gainor's advisors

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regarding any Florida tax issues. (Nissley DecL., ir 27.) Nissley does not recall ever

communicating with Gainor in Florida regarding the Gainor Strategy or his corresponding taxes.

(Id., ir 26.) Although Nissley may have subsequently visited Gainor in Florida, these visits were

unrelated to the Gainor Strategy or Gainor's Florida taxes. (Id.)

III. ARGUMENT
In order to establish personal jurisdiction over Nissley, Gainor must meet both prongs of

a two-part test set forth by the Eleventh Circuit. First, Gainor's complaint must identify a
specific basis for jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute. Alternate Energy Corp. v.

Redstone, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts,

Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (lIth Cir. 1996)). Second, Gainor must establish that "the defendant has
established sufficient minimum contacts with the state, such that the exercise of jurisdiction wil
satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement by comporting with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial

justice." Alternate Energy, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1381-82. As

demonstrated more fully below, Gainor canot fulfill either of these requirements.

A. The Amended Complaint Does Not Identify A Basis For Specific Jurisdiction Under Florida's Long-Arm Statute.
Gainor makes no allegation that Nissley is subject to the general jurisdiction of Florida
courts.3 Rather, he contends that

jurisdiction over Nissley is appropriate under Florida's long-

arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193, because the instant action arises from "one or more" of a series of acts allegedly made by Nissley acting individually or "collectively with the other Defendants."
(F AC, ir 20.)

3 The mere fact that Nissley, together with other family members, owns propert in Florida is insuffcient to confer
jurisdiction. "By itself, ownership of propert is insuffcient to subject a nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state, unless the cause of action arose out of

such ownership." Nichols v. Paulucci, 652 So. 2d 389,

392-93 n.5 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).

5
"

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As an initial matter, even Gainor's general description of

the acts purportedly giving rise

to jurisdiction are inaccurate, and thus insufficient, under Florida's long-arm statute. Gainor

alleges, for example, that Nissley and/or other defendants "caus(ed) injury to persons or propert
within the State of Florida arising out of an act or omission outside of Florida." (F AC, ir 20( c).)

This allegation canot provide jurisdiction under § 48.193, which specifically provides that

causing an injury to persons or property in the State of Florida only gives rise to personal
jurisdiction if, "at or about the time of

the injury, either: (I) The defendant was engaged in

solicitation or service activities within this state; or (2) Products, materials, or things processed,
serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in

the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use." Fla. Stat. § 48.193(f). Similarly, Gainor's
allegation that Nissley and/or other defendants "breach(ed) a contract in the State of

Florida"

(F AC, ir 20(d)) does not give rise to jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, which provides

jurisdiction only when a defendant breaches a contract in Florida "by failng to perform acts
required by the contract to be performed in (Florida)." Fla. Stat. § 48.193(g).
Even if Gainor had accurately identified potential bases for jurisdiction under the long-

arm statute, his complaint would fare no better. Gainor bears the burden of justifying use of the
long-arm statute (Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Madure & Curiel's Bank, N. V, 701 F.2d
889,890-91 (lIth Cir. 1983)), and he canot meet this burden by simply parroting the language

of

Florida's long-ar statute. Rather, Gainor must "pleadfacts that establish the basis for

jurisdiction." Alternate Energy, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (citing Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF

Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (lIth Cir. 2000) (emphasis added)). Gainor plainly has
not done so.

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Gainor has pled no facts supporting a conclusion that Nissley engaged in business in

Florida, committed a tortious act in Florida, caused injur to persons or propert within the State
of Florida while soliciting services or sellng products in the State,4 breached a contract in Florida by failing to perform certain acts in Florida, or actively engaged in the solicitation of

Florida residents for the provision of professional services. Absent such specific factual
allegations, Gainor's invocation of

Florida's long-arm statute must faiL. Green v. USF & G

Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1258,1261 (S.D. Fla. 1991) ("The Florida long-arm statute is to be strictly

construed to guarantee compliance with due process requirements.")
Gainor has accordingly failed to identify any proper basis for specific jurisdiction under
5
Florida's long-ar statute.

B. Exercising Jurisdiction Over Nisslev Would Not Comport With The Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even if Gainor could successfully plead a basis for jurisdiction under Florida's long-ar
statute, the constitutional guarantee of due process would stil prevent the exercise of jurisdiction
over Nissley. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause necessitates a two-part inquiry.
See Kim v. Keenan, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 1999). First, a court must determine
whether a defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the relevant foru. Id. Second, a

court must assess whether the exercise of jurisdiction in that forum would offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial

justice." Id. (citing Sculptchair, 94 F.3d 623). Here, neither

standard is (or can be) met.
4 Notably, the Florida Supreme Cour has held that purely economic injuries are insuffcient to confer jurisdiction
over a defendant under § 48. 193(t). Sun Bank, 926 F.2d at 1033 (citing Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Therm-ODisc., Inc., 511 So.2d 992 (Fla. 1987).)

Florida's long-arm jurisdiction would be appropriate under any other provisions of statute, including Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2). Such an allegation could not succeed because Nissley's contacts with Florida - as demonstrated above - have been sporadic at best. Compare Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2) (authorizing jurisdiction if defendant engaged in "substantial and not isolated activity within this state").
5 Gainor does not allege that

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1. Nissley Did Not Have Suffcient Contacts With Florida.

The Eleventh Circuit utilzes a three-part test for determining whether a defendant has
sufficient contacts with a forum to support the exercise of jurisdiction:

First, the contacts must be related to the plaintiffs cause of action. . . Second, the contacts must involve some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the foru( ). Third, the defendant's contacts with the foru must be such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into cour
there.

Keenan, 71 F. Supp. at 1235 (citing Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1220 (lIth Cir.
1999)). Ultimately, "(t)he key to any constitutional inquiry into personal

jurisdiction is

forseeabilty." Sun Bank, NA. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 926 F.2d 1030 (lIth Cir. 1991).
In the present case, each of

the contacts related to Gainor's claim against Nissley
the

occurred in Georgia, not Florida. Nissley discussed the structure and implementation of

Strategy with Gainor in Georgia; the job arrangement letters with Gainor's Georgia entities were
sent from Andersen's Atlanta office to those entities in Georgia; and all of

the steps necessary to
residency in

implement the Gainor Strategy were completed prior to Gainor's establishment of

Florida. (Nissley Decl., irir 13-16,22-24.) Although Nissley may have communicated with
Gainor once Gainor relocated to Florida, Gainor's conspiracy claim - which specifically alleges
that Nissley and the other defendants induced Gainor "to believe that Defendants had crafted a
legal 'tax strategy'" (F AC, ir 85) - arose, if at all, from contacts that Nissley had with Gainor in

Georgia.

Nor can it be said that Nissley purposefully conducted activities within Florida such that

he could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Florida. Nissley did not reach out
to Gainor, solicit Gainor, or initiate an accountant-client relationship when Gainor was a Florida

resident. Rather, Nissley's extremely limited involvement in the Gainor Strategy all took place

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in Ilinois or Georgia. (Nissley Decl., ir 16.) The fact that Nissley may have had some incidental
communications with Gainor after Gainor relocated his residence to Florida canot be construed

as activity purposefully directed to the state of Florida; rather, it constitutes incidental activity

that fortuitously landed in the state after a Georgia resident unilaterally decided to establish
residence in Florida.

This interpretation is consistent with binding precedent. For example, in Sun Bank, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected efforts to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose contacts

with the forum "occurred not because (defendant) purosefully availed himself of the privilege
of conducting activities within Florida, nor even because (he) 'purposefully directed' his

activities at Florida residents. . . but because (defendant's) Massachusetts customer moved to

Florida, sought a loan from a Florida bank, and told that ban to call (defendant) in
Massachusetts." 926 F.2d at 1034. Here, as in Sun Bank, Gainor's unilateral decision to seek

residency in Florida (and the corresponding tax benefits) canot be imputed to Nissley or used as
a basis to support jurisdiction over him.

Should Nissley's contacts with Gainor after he moved to Florida be construed as

constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts, every accountant and lawyer who eases the

transition for a relocating client must fear the possibility of defending a lawsuit in a foreign

jurisdiction. This result, which would arise solely from a client's unilateral decision to relocate,

canot be reconciled with the constitutional requirement that a defendant direct substantial and
purposeful acts toward the forum state. See Groome v. Feyh, 651 F. Supp. 249,254 (S.D. Fla.
1986) ("(it) is the defendant's contacts and not the 'unilateral activity' of

the plaintiffthat bear

significance") (citation omitted).

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Courts have rejected jurisdiction over out-of-state professional service providers in
circumstances similar to these. See, e.g., Steinhilber v. Lamoree, 825 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (S.D.

Fla. 1992) (court-ordered appearance at a mediation in Florida insuffcient to constitute
minimum contacts for an out-of-state lawyer); Fleming & Weiss, P. C. v. First Am. Title Co., 580

So.2d 646 (Fl. Ct. App. 1991) (insufficient minimum contacts when defendant "was a New York law firm retained by a New York client to render a legal opinion pursuant to New York law" and
subsequently sent that opinion to a Florida resident).

It would be a different matter if Gainor had asked, and Nissley had agreed, to advise him
regarding Florida tax issues. Such post-relocation transformation of

the accountant-client

relationship and purposeful availment of Florida laws and standards would alter the jurisdictional

analysis. See Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bil, P. c., 74 F.3d 253 (lIth Cir. 1996) (where client
relocated to Florida and requested that defendant out-of-state attorneys prepare a wil and
amended trust under Florida law, "(t)he nature of

the professional services rendered was such

that the defendants were fully aware that their actions or omissions would have a substantial

effect in Florida" and should have "reasonably anticipated the possibilty of a suit arising from
conduct directed" toward the client); Keenan, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (minimum contacts

established where out-of-state attorneys "secured a co-counsel relationship" with a Florida
attorney and entered into a contingent fee contract written "in accordance with Florida law").

But absent any allegations - or facts - to indicate that Nissley ever prepared Gainor's Florida
returns or otherwise provided any advice to Gainor regarding his Florida tax obligations, there is
no basis to conclude that Nissley purposefully availed himself of the benefits of

Florida law.

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2. Exercising Jurisdiction Over Nissley Would Offend Traditional

Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice.
When determining fair play and substantial justice, a cour should consider the "burden
on the Defendant, the interests of

the forum State, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief."

Keenan, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1236. A court must also consider "the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the

several States in furthering fudamental substantive social policies." Id. (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (l980)).

Here, neither Gainor nor the state of Florida has a compellng interest in litigating this
case in Florida. Gainor was a Georgia resident at the time the Gainor Strategy was designed and

implemented, and Gainor implemented the Strategy by sellng two Georgia entities. Gainor used

the strategy to shield roughly $70 milion of income eared in Georgia from federal and Georgia
state income tax. Although Nissley may have had some minimal contact with Gainor after he
relocated to Florida, he did not provide professional services to a Florida resident concerning

assets located in Florida or income earned or to be reported in Florida. Compare Robinson, 74

F.3d at 259. Nor wil Florida law apply to a dispute in which the alleged causes of action arose
in Georgia. Cf Wallack v. Worldwide Mach. Sales, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1371 (M.D. Fla.

2003) (granting motion to dismiss and noting "Florida has little interest in this dispute insofar as

. . . the laws of Louisiana and/or Mississippi may control other legal issues such as statute of

limitations"). The only apparent interest that Gainor has in adjudicating this dispute in Florida is
one of

his own personal convenience, which arises from his tax-advantaged decision to establish

his residency in Florida.

Of course, Gainor's convenience is Nissley's burden. Nissley now faces the prospect of
extensive travel to defend a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction. This is significant for an individual

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who neither resides nor conducts business in the state of Florida, and it has the potential to

impose undue burden on Nissley, his family, and his accounting practice. (See Nissley Decl., ir
28.) In light of the limited interest of

both Gainor and Florida in pursuing this action in the

cours of Florida, the concepts of fair play and substantial justice further support the dismissal of
this action against Nissley. The burdens on Nissley surely "outweigh the convenience to the
plaintiff of suing in Florida merely because his residence is here." See Groome, 651 F. Supp. at
256.

iv. CONCLUSION
For all of

the foregoing reasons, Nissley respectfully requests that this Cour dismiss

Gainor's complaint against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(2).

McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
By: sl: Michael G. Austin
Michael G. Austin (FBN 0457205) E-mail: maustin(gmwe.com 201 South Biscayne Blvd., Ste. 2200
Miami, Florida 33131

Tel: [phone] Fax: [phone]
Of Counsel:

Douglas E. Whitney Jocelyn D. Francoeur

McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
227 West Monroe Street

Chicago, Ilinois 60606
Tel: [phone] Fax: [phone]
E-Mail: dwhitney(gmwe.com

jfrancoeur(gmwe. com
Counsel for P. Anthony Nissley

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 22, 2007, I electronically fied the forgoing with the

Clerk of Court using the CM/CF system, which automatically sends an electronic notification

to CM/CF paricipants. The foregoing document was also served on those counselor paries
who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing identified on the
attached Service List via first-class U.S. maiL.

sl Michael G. Austin

Michael G. Austin

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Mark J. Gainor v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, LLP and Arthur Andersen LLP

SERVICE LIST
Richard Benjamin Wilkes
Attorneys at Law

600 S. Magnolia Ave, Suite 200
Tampa, Florida 33606

813-254-6060
Fax: [phone]
Attorney for Plaintif

Johathan E. Altman Aaron M. May MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 355 S. Grand Avenue, 35th Floor Los Angeles, California 90071 613-683-9100
Fax: [phone]

and
Katherine Warthen Ezell

PODHURST ORSECK JOSEFSBERG, ET AL. 25 W. Flagler Street, Suite 800 City National Ban Bldg. Miami, Florida 33130-1780 305-358-2800
Fax: [phone]

Counsel for Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, LLP

Stephen J. Anderson ANDERSON DAILEY LLP The Prominence Building
3475 Piedmont Road N.E.,

Suite 1820 Atlanta, Georgia 30305
404442 1800
Fax: [phone]

Attorney for Marc C. Klopfenstein
Bennett F alk

Bressler, Amery & Ross P.C.
2801 S.W. 149th Ave.

Miramar, Florida 33027 954-499-7979 Attorney for Merril Lynch & Co., R.J Ruble
MIA 322379- i .065784.0026