Levens v. National Football League et al

Filing 1

COMPLAINT with Jury Demand filed by Dorsey Levens. Consent form to proceed before U.S. Magistrate and pretrial instructions provided. ( Filing fee $ 350.00 receipt number 113E-3682011.) (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(eop) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov to obtain Pretrial Instructions.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
DORSEY LEVENS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE;
And NFL PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No.:

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
Plaintiffs Dorsey Levens (“Plaintiff”) hereby file this Complaint for
Damages and Jury Trial Demand against the above named Defendants, respectfully
showing the Court the following:
INTRODUCTION
1.

The National Football League (“NFL” or “the League”) is America’s

most successful and popular sports league. With 32 member teams, the League is a
multi-billion dollar business. The NFL is and has always been eager to avoid
negative publicity and protect the product on the field. As a result, the NFL
regulates just about everything as it pertains to their teams, including League
policies, player appearances, marketing, and safety, among other items.

2.

As recognized by the League, professional football is unquestionably

a tough, aggressive, and physically demanding sport. Injuries are common. As
such, it is vital to the safety of the players that the NFL act reasonably, through
research studies and other means, to identify the risks of serious injury associated
with playing professional football, to keep the teams and players informed of the
risks that they identify, and to take reasonable steps based upon their findings from
appropriate and adequate studies to protect players. Aware of this responsibility,
the NFL, through its own initiative, created the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury
(“MTBI”) Committee in 1994 to research, and presumably look to ameliorate,
what was already a tremendous problem in the League – concussions.
3.

The rash of head injuries has been noted in a wide variety of news

articles and television segments, and was addressed recently by the League in an
announcement that it would penalize illegal blows to the head. But, as noted, this
spate of head injuries is not a new problem. For decades, the League’s players
have been plagued by the devastating effects of concussions.
4.

Despite overwhelming medical evidence that on-field concussions

lead directly to brain injuries and frequent tragic repercussions for retired players,
the NFL not only failed to take effective action in an attempt to protect players
from suffering, but failed to inform players of the true risks associated with
2

concussions.

Instead, the NFL chose to misrepresent and/or conceal medical

evidence on the issue through its “hand-picked” committee of physicians who were
researching same. While athletes in other professional sports who had suffered
concussions were being effectively “shut down” for long periods of time or full
seasons, NFL protocol was to return players who had suffered concussions to the
very game in which the injury occurred.
5.

The NFL has purposefully attempted to obfuscate the issue and has

repeatedly refuted the connection between concussions and brain injury. Congress
has vehemently objected to the NFL’s handling of the issue on multiple occasions.
Expert neurologists know the true score. The reality is that in the 17 years since its
formation, the MTBI has served as nothing short of a roadblock to any genuine
attempt to appropriately inform and protect teams and NFL players regarding
concussions and resultant brain injury. The Committee’s misrepresentation and
concealment of relevant medical information over the years has caused an
increased risk of debilitating and/or life-threatening injury to players who were
purposefully not being apprised of the findings.
6.

The NFL has failed to satisfy its duty to take reasonable steps

necessary to protect players from devastating head injuries. Moreover, the NFL

3

has done everything in its power to hide the issue and mislead players concerning
the risks associated with concussions.
THE PARTIES
7.

Plaintiff Dorsey Levens is a resident and citizen of the State of

Georgia, residing in Fulton County, Atlanta, Georgia.
8.

All Defendants, and each of them, were in some fashion legally

responsible for the injuries and damages complained of herein.
9.

At all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, were the

agents, servants, and employees of each of the other, acting within the course and
scope of said agency and employment.
10.

Defendant NFL is a nonprofit, non-incorporated entity organized and

existing under the laws of the State of New York, with its principal place of
business at 280 Park Ave., 15th Fl., New York, NY 10017. The NFL is not, and
has not been, the employer of Plaintiff Dorsey Levens, who was employed by
independent club(s) during his career in professional football. The NFL regularly
conducts business in Georgia.
11.

Defendant NFL Properties, LLC, as the successor-in-interest to

National Football League Properties, Inc. (“NFL Properties”) is a limited liability
company organized under the laws of the State of Delaware with its headquarters
4

in the State of New York. NFL Properties is engaged in, among other activities,
approving, licensing and promoting equipment by all the NFL teams.

NFL

Properties regularly conducts business in Georgia.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
12.

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a), as there is diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.
13.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants as it does

business in Georgia, has a franchise which plays in Georgia, and derives
substantial revenue from its contacts with Georgia.
14.

Venue properly lies in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2)

and 1391(b)(2) as a substantial part of the events and/or omissions giving rise to
the claims emanated from activities within this jurisdiction and the Defendants
conduct substantial business in this jurisdiction.
ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS
THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
15.

The NFL acts as a trade association for 32 franchise owners, and

consists of two structured conferences, the AFC and the NFC comprised of 32
teams.

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16.

The NFL is a separate entity from each of its teams.

American

Needle, Inc. v. NFL, et al., 130 S. Ct. 2201 (U.S. 2010).
17.

Each team functions as a separate business but operates under shared

revenue generated through broadcasting, merchandising and licensing.
18.

The NFL governs and promotes the game of football, sets and

enforces rules and league policies, and regulates team ownership. It generates
revenue mostly through marketing sponsorships, licensing merchandise and by
selling national broadcasting rights to the games. The teams share a percentage of
the League’s overall revenue.
19.

Owing in part to its immense financial power and monopoly status in

American football, the NFL has assumed enormous influence over the research and
education of football injuries to physicians, trainers, coaches, and amateur football
players at all levels of the game.
20.

The website www.nflhealthandsafety.com states that USA Football,

the sport’s national governing body, “is the Official Youth Football Development
Partner of the NFL and the NFL Players Association. The independent non-profit
organization leads the development of youth, high school and international amateur
football. In addition, USA Football operates programs and builds resources to
address key health and safety issues in partnership with leading medical
6

organizations. The organization was endowed by the NFL and NFLPA through the
NFL Youth Football Fund in 2002. USA Football stands among the leaders in
youth sports concussion education, particularly for football.”
THE NFL AND THE CBA
21.

Until March of 2011, all NFL players were members of a union called

the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”). The NFLPA is a
union that negotiates the general minimum contract for all players in the League
with the National Football League Management Council (“NFLMC”).

This

contract is called the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and it is the
central document that governs the negotiation of individual player contracts for all
of the League’s players. However, the NFL retired players have not been the
subject of or a party to Collective Bargaining.
22.

Plaintiff Dorsey Levens is a retiree and not a signatory to the CBA,

nor is he a subject of or a party to the bargaining between the NFL and the
NFLPA. Plaintiff’s claims are not preempted by federal labor law since the CBA
does not apply to his claims.
THE NATURE OF HEAD INJURIES
SUFFERED BY NFL PLAYERS
23.

The American Association of Neurological Surgeons defines a

concussion as “a clinical syndrome characterized by an immediate and transient
7

alteration in brain function, including an alteration of mental status and level of
consciousness, resulting from mechanical force or trauma.” The injury generally
occurs when the head either accelerates rapidly and then is stopped, or is spun
rapidly. The results frequently include confusion, blurred vision, memory loss,
nausea and, sometimes, unconsciousness.
24.

A hit to the head may result in smashing, jiggling and torquing of the

brain while causing strains and tears, snapping blood vessels, killing brain cells
(neurons) and shearing the delicate connections (axons) that link this incredibly
complex “cerebral telephone system.”
25.

Medical evidence has shown that symptoms of a concussion can

reappear hours or days after the injury, indicating that the injured party had not
healed from the injury.
26.

According to neurologists, once a person suffers a concussion, he is as

much as four times more likely to sustain a second concussion. Additionally, after
several concussions, a lesser impact may cause the injury, and the injured player
requires more time to recover.
27.

Clinical and neuropathological studies by some of the nation’s

foremost experts demonstrate that multiple concussions sustained during an NFL

8

player’s career may cause severe cognitive problems such as depression and earlyonset dementia.
28.

Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”) is a progressive

degenerative disease of the brain found in athletes (and others) with a history of
repetitive concussions. Conclusive studies have shown this condition to be
prevalent in retired professional football players who have a history of head injury.
29.

Head trauma, which includes multiple concussions, triggers

progressive degeneration of the brain tissue. These changes in the brain can begin
months, years, or even decades after the last concussion or end of active athletic
involvement. The brain degeneration is associated with memory loss, confusion,
impaired judgment, paranoia, impulse control problems, aggression, depression,
and eventually, progressive dementia.
30.

In

2002,

Dr.

Bennet

Omalu,

a

forensic

pathologist

and

neuropathologist, found CTE in the brain of NFL Hall of Famer Mike Webster.
31.

By 2007, Dr. Omalu found a fourth case linking the death of a former

NFL player to CTE brain damage from his football career.

CTE manifests

similarly as “punch drunk” boxers.
32.

Around the same time period, the University of North Carolina’s

Center for the Study of Retired Athletes published survey-based papers in 2005
9

through 2007 that found a clear correlation between NFL football and depression,
dementia, and other cognitive impairment.
33.

In 1994, the NFL undertook the responsibility of studying concussion

research through funding the MTBI Committee.”
34.

The NFL MTBI Committee published its findings in 2004 showing

“no evidence of worsening injury or chronic cumulative effects” from multiple
concussions. In a related study, the Committee found “many NFL players can be
safely allowed to return to play” on the day of a concussion if they are without
symptoms and cleared by a physician.
35.

Commissioner Roger Goodell in June of 2007 admitted publicly that

the NFL has been studying the effects of traumatic brain injury for “close to 14
years…”.
36.

It was not until June of 2010 that the NFL publicly acknowledged that

concussions can lead to dementia, memory loss, CTE and related symptoms by
publishing warnings to every player and team.
37.

To date, neuroanatomists have performed autopsies on 13 former NFL

players who died after exhibiting signs of degenerative brain disease. Twelve of
these players were found to have suffered from CTE.
38.

Until very recently, CTE could only be diagnosed by autopsy.
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NFL’S DUTY TO PLAYERS AND THE PUBLIC
39.

The NFL overtly undertook a duty to study concussions on behalf of

NFL players.
40.

The NFL owed a duty to players including Plaintiff Dorsey Levens in

the following respects:
(a)

It owed a duty of reasonable care to protect Plaintiff on the playing
field;

(b)

It owed a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiff to educate him and other
players in the NFL about CTE and/or concussion injury;

(c)

It owed a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiff to educate trainers,
physicians, and coaches about CTE and/or concussion injury;

(d)

It owed a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiff to have in place strict
return-to-play guidelines to prevent CTE and/or concussion injury;

(e)

It owed a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiff to promote a
“whistleblower” system where teammates would bring to the attention
of a trainer, physician, or coach that another player had sustained
concussion injury;

(f)

It owed a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiff to design rules and
penalties for players who use their head or upper body to hit or tackle;

(g)

It owed a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiff to design rules to
eliminate the risk of concussion during games and/or practices;

(h)

It owed a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiff to promote research into
and cure for CTE and the effects of concussion injury over a period of
time; and
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(i)

It owed a duty of reasonable care to State governments, local sports
organizations, all American Rules Football leagues and players, and
the public at large to protect against the long-term effects of CTE
and/or concussion injury.

41.

The NFL knew as early as the 1920’s of the potential harmful effects

on a player’s brain of concussions; however, until June of 2010, they concealed
these facts from coaches, trainers, players, and the public.
42.

Plaintiff Dorsey Levens did not know, nor did he have reason to

know, the long-term effects of concussions and relied on the Defendants to provide
reasonable warnings, rules, regulations and studies.
DEFENDANTS’ KNOWLEDGE OF THE RISK OF CONCUSSIONS
43.

For decades, Defendants have known that multiple blows to the head

can lead to long-term brain injury, including memory loss, dementia, depression,
and CTE and its related symptoms.
44.

This action arises from Defendants’ failure to warn and protect NFL

players, such as Plaintiff Dorsey Levens, against long-term brain injury risks
associated with football-related concussions.
45.

While Defendants undertook to investigate, research, and promulgate

multiple safety rules, Defendants were negligent in failing to act reasonably and
exercise their duty to enact reasonable league-wide guidelines and mandatory rules
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regulating post-concussion medical treatment and return-to-play standards for
players who suffer a concussion and/or multiple concussions.
46.

Defendants affirmatively assumed a duty to use reasonable care in the

study of post-concussion syndrome, and to use reasonable care in the publication
of data from the MTBI Committee’s work.
47.

Rather than exercising reasonable care in these duties, Defendants

immediately engaged in a long-running course of negligent conduct.
48.

By failing to exercise their duty to enact reasonable and prudent rules

to better protect players against the risks associated with repeated brain trauma,
Defendants’ failures to exercise their independent duty has led to the deaths of
some, and brain injuries of many other former players, including Plaintiff Dorsey
Levens.
49.

Defendants’ ongoing undertaking to protect the health and safety of

the players is evidenced by the NFL’s enactment of at least the following nonexhaustive list of rules pertaining to players’ health and safety:
(a)

In 1956, the NFL enacted a rule that prohibited the grabbing of any
player’s facemask, other than the ball carrier;

(b)

In 1962, the NFL enacted a rule that prohibited players from grabbing
any player’s facemask;

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(c)

In 1976, the NFL enacted a rule that prohibited players from grabbing
the facemask of an opponent. The penalty for an incidental grasp of
the facemask was 5 yards.

The penalty for twisting, turning, or

pulling the facemask was 15 yards. A player could be ejected from
the game if the foul is judged to be vicious and/or flagrant;
(d)

In 1977, the NFL enacted a rule that prohibited players from slapping
the head of another player during play. This rule was referred to as
the “Deacon Jones Rule,” named after the Rams’ defensive end who
frequently used this technique;

(e)

In 1977, the NFL enacted a rule that prohibited Offensive Lineman
from thrusting their hands into a defender’s neck, face, or head;

(f)

In 1979, the NFL enacted a rule that prohibited players from using
their helmets to butt, spear, or ram an opponent. Pursuant to this rule,
any player who used the crown or top of his helmet unnecessarily will
be called for unnecessary roughness;

(g)

In 1980, the NFL enacted rule changes that provided greater
restrictions on contact in the area of the head, neck, and face;

(h)

In 1980, the NFL enacted rule changes that prohibited players from
directly striking, swinging, or clubbing the head, neck, or face
(“personal foul”). Beginning in 1980, a penalty could be called for
such contact whether or not the initial contact was made below the
neck area;

(i)

In 1982, the NFL enacted a rule change by which the penalty for
incidental grabbing of a facemask by a defensive team was changed
from 5 yards to an automatic first down plus a 5 yard penalty;
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(j)

In 1983, the NFL enacted a rule that prohibited players from using a
helmet as a weapon to strike or hit an opponent;

(k)

In 1988, the NFL enacted a rule that prohibited defensive players from
hitting quarterbacks below the waist while they are still in the pocket.
(The rule was unofficially called the “Andre Waters Rule” based upon
a hit that Waters placed on Los Angeles Rams quarterback Jim
Everett in 1988); and

(l)

Following the 2004-2005 season, the NFL’s Competition Committee
reviewed video of the entire season and concluded that the horsecollar tackle resulted in six serious injuries. On May 23, 2005, the
NFL owners voted 27-5 to ban such tackles. The ban states that a
horse-collar tackle is an open-field tackle in which a defender uses the
shoulder pads to immediately bring a ball carrier down.

50.

However, the Defendants failed to enact reasonable rules and

regulations for the prevention of traumatic brain injuries.
NFL FRAUDULENTLY CONCEALED
THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF CONCUSSIONS
51.

Instead of taking measures to actually protect its players from

suffering long-term brain injuries, the NFL created the MTBI Committee in 1994
to study the effects of concussions on NFL players.
52.

The MTBI Committee was chaired by Dr. Elliot Pellman, a

rheumatologist who is not certified as a brain injury and/or concussion specialist.

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53.

After 14 years of studies, and after numerous medical journal articles

written by the NFL’s MTBI Committee, Defendants concluded that “[b]ecause a
significant percentage of players returned to play in the same game [after suffering
a mild traumatic brain injury] and the overwhelming majority of players with
concussions were kept out of football-related activities for less than 1 week, it can
be concluded that mild TBI’s in professional football are not serious injuries.” See
“Concussion in professional football: Summary of the research conducted by the
National Football League’s Committee on Mild Traumatic Brain Injury.”
Neurosurg Focus 21 (4):E12; 2006, RI. Pellman and D.C. Viano.
54.

According to Defendants’ own “studies,” the speedy return to play

after suffering a concussion demonstrates that such players were at no greater risk
of suffering long-term brain injury.
55.

The NFL-funded study is completely devoid of logic and science.

More importantly, it is contrary to their Health and Safety Rules as well as 75
years of published medical literature on concussions.
56.

A series of clinical and neuropathological studies performed by

independent scientists and physicians demonstrated that multiple NFL inducedconcussions cause cognitive problems such as depression, early on-set dementia
and CTE and its related symptoms.
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57.

In response to these studies, Defendants, to further a scheme of fraud

and deceit, had members of the NFL’s MTBI Committee deny knowledge of a link
between concussion and cognitive decline.
58.

When the NFL’s MTBI Committee anticipated studies that would

show causal links between concussion and cognitive degeneration, the Committee
promptly published articles producing contrary findings, as part of Defendants’
scheme to deceive Congress, the players and the public at large.
59.

Dr. Bennet Omalu examined the brain tissue of deceased NFL players

including Mike Webster, Terry Long, Andrew Waters and Justin Strzelczyk. Dr.
Omalu in an article in Neurosurgery concluded that CTE triggered by multiple
NFL concussions, was a partial cause of their death.
60.

In response to Dr. Omalu’s article, Defendants’ MTBI Committee,

(Drs. Ira Casson, Eliot Pellman and David Viano) wrote a letter to the editor of
Neurosurgery asking that Dr. Omalu’s article be retracted.
61.

A clinical study performed by Dr. Kevin Guskiewicz found that

retired players who sustained three or more concussions in the NFL had a fivefold prevalence of mild cognitive impairment. The NFL’s MTBI Committee, (Dr.
Mark Lowell), promptly attacked the article by refusing to accept a survey of 2,400
former NFL players.
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62.

Because of Congressional scrutiny and media pressure, the NFL

scheduled a league-wide Concussion Summit for June 2007. Defendants, in
furtherance of their scheme of deceit issued a pamphlet to players in August 2007,
which stated: “there is no magic number for how many concussions is too many.”
63.

When Boston University’s Dr. Ann McKee found CTE present in the

brains of two more deceased NFL players, a member of the Committee
characterized each study as an “isolated incident” from which no conclusion could
be drawn.
64.

The NFL MTBI Committee has been on direct notice of multiple NFL

head injuries contributing to cognitive decline in later life, yet it has never
amended the 2007 NFL’s MTBI Committee statement: “Current research with
professional athletes has not shown that having more than one or two concussions
leads to permanent problems… It is important to understand that there is no magic
number for how many concussions is too many.”
65.

Defendants have yet to amend these inaccurate and misrepresentative

statements to any NFL retiree, including Plaintiff Dorsey Levens.

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DEFENDANTS ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR DUTY TO
PROTECT AGAINST THE LONG-TERM RISK OF CONCUSSIONS
66.

On August 14, 2007, Defendants acknowledged their duty to players

by enacting rules to protect them against the risk associated with repeated brain
trauma.
67.

The NFL’s 2007 concussion guidelines, many of which stemmed from

an NFL conference in June of 2007 involving team trainers and doctors, were sent
to all current players and other team personnel.
68.

The NFL’s 2007 guidelines on concussion management include a

whistle-blower provision for individuals to report concussions with the League so
that a player with a head injury is not forced to practice or play against medical
advice.
69.

The NFL’s 2007 concussion guidelines also include an informational

pamphlet provided to all current NFL players to aid in identifying symptoms of a
concussion. This information was later withdrawn by one of the outside counsel of
the NFL in a separate letter to its disability plan, as well as the NFL’s August 14,
2007 press release denying that “more than one or two concussion leads to
permanent problems.”
70.

In a statement issued by the NFL on August 14, 2007, Roger Goodell,

the Commissioner of the NFL, introduced the NFL’s 2007 concussion guidelines
19

by saying, “We want to make sure all NFL players, coaches and staff members are
fully informed and take advantage for the most up-to-date information and
resources as we continue to study the long-term impact of concussions.”
71.

The NFL’s Commissioner also stated, “ [b]ecause of the unique and

complex nature of the brain, our goal is to continue to have concussions managed
conservatively by outstanding medical personnel in a way that clearly emphasized
player safety over competitive concerns.”
72.

The NFL’s 2007 concussion guidelines indicate when a player with a

concussion can return to a game or practice.
73.

The NFL’s 2007 concussion guidelines specifically mandate that a

player should have normal neurological test results and no concussion symptoms
before returning to play.
74.

Defendants acknowledged that said guidelines were inadequate and

insufficient. As a result, the NFL enacted more strict regulations to handle
concussions starting in the 2009 season. Specifically, the NFL announced new
rules requiring players who exhibit any significant concussion signs to be removed
from a game or practice and be barred from returning the same day.
75.

Nevertheless, it was not until June of 2010 that the NFL warned any

player of the long-term risks associated with multiple concussions, including
20

dementia, memory loss, CTE and its related symptoms. The Defendants also failed
to so warn active players until approximately the same time frame.
76.

As of today, Defendants have never warned any retired player, like

Plaintiff Dorsey Levens, of the long-term health effects of concussions.
DEFENDANTS’ CONDUCT
WAS DELIBERATE, WILFULL AND WANTON
77.

The aforementioned acts and omissions of Defendants demonstrate

that Defendants acted deliberately, willfully, and wantonly with indifference to the
rights and duties owed and consequences to Plaintiff Dorsey Levens.
78.

Defendants knew that a substantial risk of physical and mental harm

to the NFL players existed in connection with repeated concussive blows to the
head, to wit: the danger of irreversible brain-damage and/or dementia. Defendants
willfully and deliberately disregarded the safety of others in continually
undertaking to establish and promulgate safety rules for the NFL that failed to
address or disclose substantial risk of head injury.
PLAINTIFF DORSEY LEVENS’ INJURIES
79.

Plaintiff Dorsey Levens was born on May 21, 1970 in Syracuse, New

York.

21

80.

Plaintiff Dorsey Levens played eleven (11) NFL seasons, including

from 1994-2001 for the Green Bay Packers; during the 2001 and 2003 seasons for
the Philadelphia Eagles; and during the 2002 season for the New York Giants.
81.

Throughout his career as a professional football player, Plaintiff

Dorsey Levens suffered multiple concussions.
82.

Plaintiff Dorsey Levens was not warned by Defendants of the risk of

long-term injury due to football-related concussions or that the League-managed
equipment did not protect him from such injury. This was a substantial factor in
causing his current injuries.
83.

Plaintiff Dorsey Levens suffers from multiple past traumatic brain

injuries with symptoms including but not limited to, memory loss, headaches, and
sleeplessness.
COUNT I
NEGLIGENCE
84.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all facts set forth in the preceding

paragraphs and further alleges on information and belief as follows.
85.

Defendants, as purveyors of safety rules for the League, owed

Plaintiff Dorsey Levens a duty to use reasonable care in researching, studying
and/or examining the dangers and risks of head injuries and/or concussions to NFL

22

players; to inform and warn him of such risks and to effectuate reasonable league
policies; and/or take other reasonable action to minimize the risks of head injuries.
86.

At all times relevant hereto, Defendants negligently performed such

duties by failing to adequately study, warn and/or implement reasonable rules and
regulations to minimize traumatic brain injuries to its players, including Plaintiff
Dorsey Levens.
87.

Defendants knew or should have known that its policies, rules and

regulations in place were inadequate to minimize traumatic brain injuries and that
Plaintiff Dorsey Levens’ injuries were foreseeable.
88.

Defendants affirmatively and voluntarily established the MTBI

Committee to examine the dangers and consequences of head injuries to NFL
players, to report on its findings, to provide information and guidance from its
research and studies concerning concussions to teams and players, and to make
recommendations to lessen the risks of concussions. Defendants are responsible for
the staffing and conduct of the MTBI Committee.
89.

Defendants failed to use reasonable care in the manner in which it

created the MTBI Committee and in the appointment of physicians to head the
Committee who were not qualified for the job.

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90.

Defendants, failed to use reasonable care in researching, studying

and/or examining the risks of head injuries and/or concussions in professional
football.

Defendants downplayed and in many cases denied both the severity of

head injuries and the clear link between concussions and brain damage, thereby
breaching its duty to its players, including Plaintiff Dorsey Levens.
91.

Defendants, failed to inform, warn and/or advise its players and/or

misinformed them of the risks and complications inherent in sustaining
concussions, thereby breaching its duty to its players, including Plaintiff Dorsey
Levens.
92.

Defendants, were further negligent in the following respects:

·

In failing to use reasonable care in overseeing, controlling and/or
regulating policies and procedures of the League so as to minimize the
risk of head injuries and/or concussions;

·

In failing to use reasonable care in the research and/or investigation of
the concussion issue;

·

In failing to appoint a qualified physician or panel of physicians to
head Defendants’ MTBI committee;

·

In placing a physician in charge of the committee whose primary
motive was to appease the NFL rather than to report accurately;

·

In disregarding independent scientific studies which showed the risks
of head injuries and/or concussions to NFL players’ health;

24

·

In failing to acknowledge, either publicly or to their players, the clear
link between concussions and brain injuries being suffered by their
players;

·

In failing to acknowledge, either publically or to their players, the
linkage between playing football and long-term brain injuries;

·

In failing to make and/or timely make necessary league policy
changes as it pertains to intentional hits to the head, hits to the head of
a defenseless player, helmet to helmet hits, and concussions in
general;

·

In publishing misleading and erroneous findings regarding hits to the
head and NFL head injuries;

·

In failing to issue a timely warning, through a concussion pamphlet or
other means, to the players concerning the causal link between
concussions and later life cognitive decline;
In issuing misinformation and purposefully attempting to mislead
their players through the concussion pamphlet which they issued in
August 2007;

·

·

In collecting and reporting upon data that was “infected” and/or not
reliable;

·

In causing, by and through their negligent conduct and omissions, an
increased risk of harm to their players;

·

In breaching their duty to ensure that the equipment it licensed and
approved was of the highest possible quality and sufficient to protect
the NFL players, including Plaintiff Dorsey Levens, from the risk of
concussive brain injuries;

·

In failing to provide competent information to its teams, players,
coaches, trainers and medical personnel with respect to the
significance of head injuries and/or concussions, their symptoms and
necessary and/or proper treatment of same; and
25

·

In creating a “culture” within the NFL in which concussions and their
devastating effects would run rampant.

93.

As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants negligent acts and

omissions as aforesaid, Plaintiff Dorsey Levens suffered serious injury, including
but not limited to brain damage, with a resultant loss therefrom.
94.

That by reason of the foregoing negligence on the part of Defendants,

Plaintiff Dorsey Levens believes that his aforesaid injuries are permanent and that
he will continue to suffer from the effects of his aforesaid injuries, including but
not limited to continuous pain and suffering and severe emotional distress.
95.

That by reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff Dorsey Levens has and will

be required in the future to obtain medical aid and attention, with a resultant cost
therefrom.
96.

That by reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff may suffer a loss of

employment opportunity in the future with a resultant loss therefrom.
COUNT II
FRAUD
97.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all facts set forth in the preceding

paragraphs and further alleges on information and belief as follows.
98.

The NFL materially misrepresented the risk faced by Plaintiff related

to head injuries. Defendants MTBI Committee, through misleading public
26

statements, published articles and the concussion pamphlet issued to the players,
downplayed known long-term risks of concussions to NFL players.
99.

Material misrepresentations were made by members of Defendants’

Committee on multiple occasions, including but not limited to testimony given at
congressional hearings and the “informational” pamphlet which they issued to the
players.
100. The material misrepresentations include the NFL’s remarks that
Plaintiff Dorsey Levens and other players were not at an increased risk of head
injury if they returned too soon to an NFL game or training session after suffering
a head injury.
101. Defendants’ material misrepresentations also included the NFL’s
criticism of legitimate scientific studies which illustrated the dangers and risks of
head injuries.
102. Defendants knew the misleading nature of these statements when they
were made.
103. Defendants knew, or should have known, that Plaintiff and other
players would rely on these misrepresentations.

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104. Plaintiff Dorsey Levens relied on these misrepresentations when
playing in the NFL. Had Plaintiff Dorsey Levens known the risks to his health, he
would not have agreed to jeopardize his health.
105. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ fraudulent conduct,
Plaintiff Dorsey Levens has suffered physical injury, including, but not limited to,
memory and cognitive problems, and economic losses.
COUNT III
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
106. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all facts set forth in the preceding
paragraphs and further alleges on information and belief as follows.
107. Defendants’ MTBI Committee concealed the risks of head injuries to
Plaintiff Dorsey Levens, and the risk to him if he returned to the playing field
before making a proper recovery from his head injuries.
108. Defendants’ MTBI Committee, through misleading public statements,
published articles and the concussion pamphlet issued to players, concealed and
downplayed known long-term risks of concussions to NFL players.
109. The concussion pamphlet created player reliance. The NFL stated that
“[w]e want to make sure all N.F.L. players … are fully informed and take
advantage of the most up to date information and resources as we continue to study
the long-term impact on concussions.”
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110. Further concealment of material information occurred in January
2010. Dr. Casson provided oral and written testimony at the January 2010
congressional hearings. He continued to deny the validity of other studies.
111. Defendants failed to acknowledge, either publicly or to its players, the
clear link between concussions and brain injuries being suffered by NFL players.
112. Defendants failed to acknowledge, either publicly or to its players, the
linkage between playing football and long-term brain injuries.
113. Defendants willfully concealed this information from Plaintiff Dorsey
Levens in order to prevent negative publicity and increased scrutiny of their
medical practices.
114. Defendants knew that Plaintiff Dorsey Levens and other NFL players
would rely on the inaccurate information provided by the NFL.
115. Plaintiff Dorsey Levens relied on this inaccurate information during
his NFL career.
116. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ fraudulent conduct,
Plaintiff Dorsey Levens has suffered physical injury, including, but not limited to,
memory and cognitive problems, and economic losses.

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COUNT IV
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
117. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all facts set forth in the preceding
paragraphs and further alleges on information and belief as follows.
118.

The NFL misrepresented the dangers that NFL players faced in

returning to play too quickly after sustaining a head injury. Defendants’ MTBI
Committee, through public statements which it knew or should have known were
misleading, published articles and issued the concussion pamphlet to its players,
and downplayed the long-term risks of concussions to NFL players.
119. Material misrepresentations were made by members of the NFL’s
committee on multiple occasions, including but not limited to testimony at
congressional hearings and the “informational” pamphlet issued to players.
120. The misrepresentations included the NFL’s remarks that Plaintiff
Dorsey Levens and other NFL players were not at an increased risk of head injury
if they returned too soon to an NFL game or training session after suffering a head
injury.
121. Defendants’ material misrepresentations also included the NFL’s
criticism of legitimate scientific studies that illustrated the dangers and risks of
head injuries.

30

122. Defendants made these misrepresentations and actively concealed
adverse information at a time when they knew, or should have known, because of
their superior position of knowledge, that Plaintiff Dorsey Levens faced health
problems if he were to return to a game too soon.
123. Defendants knew or should have known the misleading nature of
these statements when they were made.
124. Defendants

made

misrepresentations

and

actively

concealed

information with the intention that Plaintiff Dorsey Levens and other NFL players
would rely on the misrepresentations or omissions in selecting their course of
action.
125. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ fraudulent
conduct, Plaintiff Dorsey Levens has suffered physical injury, including, but not
limited to, memory and cognitive problems, and economic losses.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment as follows:
a.

For past and future medical and incidental expenses, according to
proof;

b.

Awarding to Plaintiff Dorsey Levens past and future loss of earnings
and/or earning capacity, according to proof;
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c.

Awarding to Plaintiff Dorsey Levens past and future general damages,
including pain and suffering according to proof;

d.

Punitive damages as allowable by law;

e.

Awarding to Plaintiff the costs of this action, including reasonable
attorneys’ fees; and

f.

Granting any and all such other and further relief as the Court deems
necessary, just, and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby requests a trial by jury of all issues triable by jury.
DATED:

December 21, 2011
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Michael L. McGlamry
Michael L. McGlamry
Georgia Bar No. 492515
N. Kirkland Pope
Georgia Bar No. 584255
Jay F. Hirsch
Georgia Bar No. 357185
M. Gino Brogdon
Georgia Bar No. 084252
George W. Walker
Georgia Bar No. 548316
POPE, McGLAMRY, KILPATRICK,
MORRISON & NORWOOD, LLP
3455 Peachtree Road, N.E., Suite 925
P.O. Box 191625 (31119-1625)
Atlanta, GA 30326-3256
32

[phone]
Fax [phone]
[e-mail]
Bruce A. Hagen
Georgia Bar No. 316678
Bruce A. Hagen, P.C.
119 N. McDonough Street
Decatur, GA 30030
[phone]
Fax [phone]
[e-mail]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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