Inniss et al v. Aderhold et al

Filing 29

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM with Brief In Support by Deborah Aderhold. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support of Her Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, # 2 Exhibit A)(Orland, Devon)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER INNISS
et al.,

*
*
*
Plaintiffs,
*
*
v.
*
CIVIL ACTION NO.
*
1:14-CV-01180-WSD
DEBORAH ADERHOLD, et al., *
*
Defendants.
*
__________________________________________________________________
DEFENDANT DEBORAH ADERHOLD’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HER
MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
__________________________________________________________________
Defendant Deborah Aderhold, State Registrar and Director of Vital Records
for the Georgia Department of Public Health (“Defendant” or “the State”), moves
to dismiss this case pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6).
Seven individual Plaintiffs filed this putative class-action suit as a challenge
to Georgia’s constitutional and statutory provisions that define civil marriage as the
union only of man and woman. This case must be dismissed in its entirety because
(1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs fail to raise a
substantial federal question, and (2) Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim for

relief under either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare that the people of Georgia no longer have
the right to decide for themselves whether to define marriage in the way every state
in our union defined it as recently as 2003.
In arguing that this decision is now beyond the bounds of democratic
process, Plaintiffs claim that sexual orientation is a suspect class – a claim that the
Eleventh Circuit has squarely rejected – and ask this Court to recognize for the first
time a new fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Both of these arguments fail
under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent. Accordingly, rational basis scrutiny
applies, and the State easily clears that low hurdle. Plaintiffs also claim that the
State’s definition of marriage as between opposite-sex couples discriminates on the
basis of sex, but even the vast majority of courts that have found a new right to
same-sex marriage have rejected this argument because the law applies equally to
men and women. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has already rejected all of
these claims in a decision that remains binding on this Court and the Eleventh
Circuit unless and until the Supreme Court declares otherwise.
At their core, Plaintiffs’ claims are about where the law is headed, not about
where it is now. Plaintiffs may well be right that our nation is headed for a new
2

national equilibrium on same-sex marriage. Indeed, in the last several years, at
least eleven states have decided to expand their definition of marriage to include
same-sex couples through the democratic process.1 And it seems as though each
month new opinion polls are released showing increased public support for such
changes in additional states. But judicially imposing such a result now would
merely wrest a potentially unifying popular victory from the hands of supporters
and replace it instead with the stale conformity of compulsion. This Court should
reject Plaintiffs’ invitation to disregard controlling precedent, decline to anticipate
a future ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, and dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims in their
entirety.
1

Eight states (Minnesota, Illinois, Hawaii, Delaware, New York, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Vermont) and the District of Columbia passed legislation that
initiated recognition of same-sex marriages. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 129
(West 2014) (effective July 1, 2013); D.C. Code § 46-401 (2014) (effective Mar. 3,
2010); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (West 2014) (effective Dec. 2, 2013); 750 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/201 (West 2014) (effective June 1, 2014); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
517.01 (West 2014) (effective Aug. 1, 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:1-a
(2014) (effective Jan. 1, 2010); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-a (McKinney 2014)
(effective July 24, 2011); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-1-1 (West 2013) (effective
Aug. 1, 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8 (West 2014) (effective Sept. 1, 2009). The
voters of Maryland, Washington, and Maine approved same-sex marriage
electorally. Maine Dep’t of the Secretary of State, November 6, 2012 Referendum
Election Tabulations, www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2012/tab-ref-2012.html (last
visited July 14, 2014); Washington Secretary of State, November 06, 2012 General
Election Results: Referendum Measure No. 74 Concerns Marriage for Same-Sex
Couples (Nov. 27, 2012 4:55 PM), vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/ReferendumMeasure-No-74-Concerns-marriage-for-same-sex-couples.html; Maryland State
Board of Elections, Ballot Question Certifications (Nov. 30, 2012),
www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/linda_balot_question_certifications.pdf.
3

II.

BACKGROUND
A.

The Challenged Laws.

In 1996, the Georgia legislature enacted O.C.G.A. §19-3-3.1, which
prohibited marriages of persons of the same sex, and recognition of such marriages
in Georgia. Specifically, O.C.G.A. §19-3-3.1 provides:
(a) It is declared to be the public policy of this state to
recognize the union only of man and woman. Marriages
between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this
state.
(b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be
recognized as entitled to the benefits of marriage. Any
marriage entered into by persons of the same sex
pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or
foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in this
state. Any contractual rights granted by virtue of such
license shall be unenforceable in the courts of this state
and the courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction
whatsoever under any circumstances to grant a divorce or
separate maintenance with respect to such marriage or
otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties’
respective rights arising as a result of or in connection
with such marriage.
In addition, O.C.G.A. §19-3-30(b)(1) was amended to provide that “No marriage
license shall be issued to persons of the same sex.” This legislation simply made
explicit the rule that had always previously applied. Cf. Baldwin v. Smith, No. 145003, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13733, at *120-21 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014)
(Holmes, J., concurring) (enactments like this “only made explicit a tacit rule that
until recently had been universal and unquestioned for the entirety of our legal
4

history as a country: that same-sex unions cannot be sanctioned as marriages by the
State”).
In 2004, the citizens of the State of Georgia voted to amend the Constitution
of the State of Georgia to prohibit marriages of persons of the same sex and
recognition of such marriages in Georgia:
(a) This state shall recognize as marriage only the union
of man and woman. Marriages between persons of the
same sex are prohibited in this state.
(b) No union between persons of the same sex shall be
recognized by this state as entitled to the benefits of
marriage. This state shall not give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other state or
jurisdiction respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws
of such other state or jurisdiction. The courts of this state
shall have no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or separate
maintenance with respect to any such relationship or
otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties
respective rights arising as a result of or in connection
with such relationship.
Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. IV, Para. I.
The challenged laws define marriage as the union of man and woman. This
definition furthers the State of Georgia’s legitimate interests in encouraging the
raising of children in homes consisting of a married mother and father; ensuring
legal frameworks for protection of children of relationships where unintentional
reproduction is possible; ensuring adequate reproduction; fostering a child-centric
marriage culture that encourages parents to subordinate their own interests to the
5

needs of their children; and exercising prudence before departing from the
heretofore universal definition of marriage.
B.

Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs Christopher Inniss and Shelton Stroman are a same-sex male
couple residing in Snellville, Georgia. (Complaint ¶ 20). Inniss and Stroman
adopted a boy named J.S.I. in 2004. (Complaint ¶ 22). Inniss and Stroman would
like to enter into a same-sex marriage in order to affirm their relationship with each
other and J.S.I. and to prevent societal disapproval that J.S.I. or they might face.
(Complaint ¶¶ 23-25).
Plaintiffs RayShawn Chandler and Avery Chandler are a same-sex female
couple residing in Jonesboro, Georgia. (Complaint ¶ 26). Plaintiff Avery Chandler
is a U.S. Army reservist who deploys to Kuwait in July 2014. Id. Both RayShawn
Chandler and Avery Chandler serve as police officers for the Atlanta Police
Department. Id. The Chandlers married in West Hartford, Connecticut, on June
26, 2013, and later celebrated with a ceremony and reception in Atlanta.
(Complaint ¶ 28). They are planning to have children through artificial
insemination of RayShawn Chandler. (Complaint ¶ 29). RayShawn Chandler and
Avery Chandler claim that Georgia’s refusal to recognize their same-sex marriage
burdens them and their potential children because Avery Chandler cannot be
recognized as the other parent on any birth certificate. Id. RayShawn Chandler
6

and Avery Chandler also worry about any stigma their potential children might
experience due to Georgia’s refusal to recognize their same-sex marriage. Id. Due
to the dangerousness of their jobs, they also worry that, in the event that one of
them was killed in the line of duty, the surviving Plaintiff and any potential
children would not qualify for survivor benefits. (Complaint ¶ 30).
Plaintiffs Michael Bishop and Johnny Shane Thomas are a same-sex male
couple residing in Atlanta, Georgia. (Complaint ¶ 31). Bishop and Thomas
adopted two children, a five-year-old boy named T.A.B. and a three-year-old girl
named M.G.B. (Complaint ¶ 32). Bishop and Thomas want to marry to express
their devotion to each other and to obtain the dignity and legitimacy of marriage
for T.A.B. and M.G.B. (Complaint ¶ 33). Bishop and Thomas are concerned that
T.A.B. and M.G.B. might carry a sense of uncertainty, inferiority, or shame
because Georgia does not allow Bishop and Thomas to enter into a same-sex
marriage. Id. Bishop and Thomas also worry that their relationship to T.A.B. and
M.G.B. might be questioned in the event of a medical emergency and carry around
the adoption papers and medical directives when they travel. Id.
Plaintiff Jennifer Sisson, age thirty-four, entered into a same-sex marriage
with Pamela Drenner on February 14, 2013. (Complaint ¶ 34). Drenner was
diagnosed with ovarian cancer in 2008 and passed away on March 1, 2014.
(Complaint ¶¶ 35-38). Because Sisson and Drenner’s home state of Georgia did
7

not recognize their same-sex marriage, the death certificate entered by Defendant
listed Drenner as “never married.” (Complaint ¶¶ 34, 40). Plaintiff Sisson wishes
to have a death certificate that reflects her devotion and same-sex marriage to
Pamela Drenner. (Complaint ¶ 41).
The love that Plaintiffs articulate for their partners and children is clear, as
are their contributions to our society. The State values Plaintiffs as its citizens, and
readily acknowledges its responsibility to ensure that they, too, enjoy due process
and equal protection under law. The State also respects the important, intimate,
and personal choices that Plaintiffs have freely made. But the U.S. Constitution
does not convert every “important, intimate, and personal decision” into a
fundamental right immune from the democratic process. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997).
III.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs’ claims are foreclosed by binding Supreme Court and Eleventh

Circuit precedent. In Baker v. Nelson, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed
claims indistinguishable from Plaintiffs’ as failing to raise a substantial federal
question. 409 U.S. 810 (1972). That decision remains binding on lower courts
until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise, and subsequent decisions have not
changed that fact.

8

Even if this Court could disregard Baker, however, Plaintiffs lose on the
merits. Binding decisions of the Eleventh Circuit make clear that there is no
fundamental right to marry someone of the same sex and that classifications based
on sexual orientation are not subject to heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, rational
basis review applies to both claims, and the challenged laws easily pass that
review. In addition, Plaintiffs’ claims that the laws impermissibly discriminate on
the basis of sex fail because men and women are equally subject to the laws.
A.

Standard Of Review.

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must take the allegations of
the complaint as true, and must construe those allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Riven v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308,
1309 (11th Cir. 2008). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of
the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Amer. Dental Assoc. v.
Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (courts are to “eliminate any
allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions”).
B.

Binding Supreme Court Precedent Makes Clear That Federal
Question Jurisdiction Is Lacking, And Thus This Court Lacks
Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

“Absent diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff must present a ‘substantial’
federal question in order to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction.” Wyke v. Polk
9

Cnty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 566 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528, 537 (1974)). The Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson unanimously
dismissed claims indistinguishable from those raised here because they failed to
present a substantial federal question. 409 U.S. 810. That case remains binding on
this Court. Accordingly, this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear
this case, and it must be dismissed. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
514 (2006) (“[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.”)
In Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the appeal from a ruling of the
Minnesota Supreme Court that a state law ban on same-sex marriage did not
violate the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W. 2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (“The
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the due process clause,
is not offended by the state’s classification of persons authorized to marry.”). On
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that Minnesota’s refusal to
issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple violated their fundamental right to
marry under the due process clause, Baker Jurisdictional Statement at 11-15
(attached as Exhibit A), and impermissibly discriminated against them in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 15-18; accord Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052, 1098-99 (9th Cir. Cal. 2012) (Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
10

part), vacated by Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (itemizing claims
asserted in Baker jurisdictional statement). The Supreme Court dismissed the
claims “for want of a substantial federal question.” 409 U.S. 810.
A summary dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question is a decision
on the merits, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975), and “prevent[s] lower
courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented.”
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). The summary dismissal in Baker is
precedential and binding. Although the Eleventh Circuit has not considered the
holding in the context of a state’s definition of marriage, other courts have
recognized that it controls. See Mass. v. U.S. HHS, 682 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012)
(Baker precludes lower courts from accepting arguments that “presume or rest on a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage.”); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298,
1305 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (Baker is binding precedent); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F.
Supp. 2d 996, 1002-03 (D. Nev. 2012) (Baker precluded equal protection claim
challenging same-sex marriage ban ); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d
1065, 1086 (D. Haw. 2012) (Baker precluded due process and equal protection
challenges to Hawaii’s law defining marriage as between a man and woman);
Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364, 371 n.5 (Mont. 2012) (Baker is binding
precedent); see also Kitchen v. Herbert, Case. No. 13-4178, 2014 U.S. App.

11

LEXIS 11935, at **123-28 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014) (Kelly, J., dissenting in part)
(arguing that Baker controls).
Lower courts are bound by summary decisions like Baker “until such time as
the Court informs them that they are not.” Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344-45 (internal
citations, quotations, and punctuation omitted). The Supreme Court explained that
“unless and until the Supreme Court should instruct otherwise, inferior federal
courts had best adhere to the view that if the Court has branded a question as
unsubstantial, it remains so except when doctrinal developments indicate
otherwise.” Id. at 344 (internal citations and quotations omitted). If there is a
Supreme Court case directly on point, a lower federal court should rely on the case
which directly controls and allow the Supreme Court “the prerogative of overruling
its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 484 (1989). The Supreme Court’s holding in Baker is directly on point.
The Supreme Court has not overruled it. Accordingly, it still binds this Court and
requires dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.
Plaintiffs will likely turn to the dicta in Hicks about “doctrinal
developments” and try to explain why Windsor v. U.S., 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013), and its predecessors constitute sufficient development to disregard
Baker’s binding effect. The “doctrinal developments” language of Hicks has
always only been dicta. Hicks was not a case about doctrinal developments. It
12

squarely held that the lower court “was in error in holding that it could disregard”
the Supreme Court’s earlier summary dismissal. 422 U.S. at 343. The “doctrinal
developments” language is one small part of a longer quotation by the Hicks Court
of language from a Second Circuit decision, and the Court did not consider
whether doctrinal developments had occurred.2 This language did not survive the
Supreme Court’s direction in Rodriguez that lower courts should leave to the
Supreme Court “the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” 490 U.S. at
484.3 And the Court reiterated this direction even more forcefully in Agostini v.
Felton, where it prohibited lower courts from “conclud[ing that] more recent
[Supreme Court] cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent.” 521
U.S. 203, 237 (1997). The Agostini Court went on to make clear that lower courts
are required to follow binding precedent of the Supreme Court even when that
precedent “cannot be squared with the Court’s later jurisprudence in the area that
has significantly changed the law.” Id. at 237-38.

2

And, indeed, it is also in Hicks that we find the Court’s direction that “lower
courts are bound by summary decisions by [the Supreme] Court ‘until such time as
the Court informs them that they are not.’” Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344-45. Whatever
the “doctrinal differences” principle means, it cannot be read to allow lower courts
to determine for themselves which directly on-point summary decisions of the
Supreme Court they need follow.
3
Lest the State be accused of encouraging this Court to do precisely what it argues
this Court cannot do, it bears mention that disregarding later-superseded dicta –
which is never more than persuasive in any event – is quite different from deciding
that an on-point merits decision need no longer be followed.
13

But even assuming that the “doctrinal developments” dicta of Hicks applies,
Windsor by its own terms does not constitute such a development, and the
Eleventh Circuit’s narrow reading of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), preclude this Court from considering
those cases sufficient “developments.” The State readily acknowledges that most
courts to consider the question since Windsor have concluded that Baker is not
binding. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935, at **21-32
(collecting cases). But none of those courts were bound by constraining Eleventh
Circuit precedent that narrowly reads Romer and Lawrence. And, frankly, the
courts that disregarded Baker were wrong. Many Court-watchers believe that the
Court is likely to change course and hold, at some point in the relatively near
future, that the U.S. Constitution affirmatively requires states to allow same-sex
marriage. The Court may well do that. But it has not yet, and in Windsor – the
closest it has come to such a ruling – the Court made very clear that it did not
address the issue. “The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State,
by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. … This opinion
and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at
2696 (emphasis added).

14

Perhaps the best way to characterize Windsor is as the converse of
Glucksberg. In Glucksberg, the key question is whether the asserted fundamental
right is “objectively … deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. In Windsor, the Court struck down a section of the
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) because “DOMA’s unusual deviation from
the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here
operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come
with the federal recognition of their marriages.” 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (emphasis
added). The Windsor Court went on to explain that this “unusual deviation” from
tradition was critical in concluding DOMA violated the Constitution:
This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of
disapproval of [the class protected by the state]. The avowed purpose
and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter
into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of
the States. The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text
demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex
marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their
sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal
statute. It was its essence.
Id. “The arguments put forward by BLAG are just as candid about the
congressional purpose to influence or interfere with state sovereign choices about
who may be married.” Id. “The Act’s demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if
any State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be treated as
second-class marriages for purposes of federal law. This raises a most serious
15

question under the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 2693-94. “DOMA’s
principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them
unequal.” Id. at 2694. Glucksberg teaches that the Due Process Clause prohibits
the government from violating individual rights that are rooted in history and
tradition. Windsor teaches that the Due Process Clause prohibits the government
from acting out of animus to strip individuals of rights they already possess, and
concluded that a government’s unusual deviation from tradition in an attempt to
revoke rights is strong evidence of impermissible motive. Cf. generally Baldwin v.
Smith, No. 14-5003, 20140 U.S. App. LEXIS 13733, at *120-21 (10th Cir. July 18,
2014) (Holmes, J., concurring) In both instances, history and tradition wins.
Here, of course, “this Nation’s history and tradition” cut the other way.
Plaintiffs seek to invalidate the definition of marriage that, until 2003, was
universal in this Nation. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(citing sources and noting also that no country allowed same-sex marriage until
2000); Baldwin, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13733, at *120-21 (Holmes, J.,
concurring) (the traditional definition of marriage, “until recently[,] had been
universal and unquestioned for the entirety of our legal history as a country”). No
holding in Windsor supports Plaintiffs’ effort. Regardless of what Court-watchers
may think the Supreme Court will do when next faced with the question, Baker
requires this Court to wait until the Supreme Court actually does it.
16

Society’s significant interest in marriage is manifested by a state’s “rightful
and legitimate concern” for the marital status of its citizens, Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942), and that concern includes the state’s power to
decide what marriage is, who may enter into it, and, consistent with federalism, an
acceptance of the fact that marital policies will differ from state to state, Windsor,
133 S. Ct. at 2691. States have historically varied in who is granted access to civil
marriage. For example, states vary in the legal minimum age of consent for
marriage,4 whether blood relatives can marry, whether a marriage can include more

4

See Ala. Code § 30-1-4; § 30-1-5; Alaska Stat. Ann. § 25.05.171; Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 25-102; Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-102 ; Cal. Fam. Code § 300 - § 303; Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 14-2-106; § 14-2-108; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-30; Del. Code
Ann. tit. 13, § 123; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.05, 800.04; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 19-3-2;
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1, 572-2; Idaho Code Ann. § 32-202 ; 750 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 5/203, 5/208; Ind. Code Ann. § 31-11-1-4 - § 31-11-1-6; Kan. Stat. Ann. §
23-106; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.020; La. Child. Code Ann. art. 1545; Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 652; Md. Code. Ann., Family Law § 2-301; Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch.. 207, § 7, 24, 25; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.51; §551.103; Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 517.02; Miss. Code Ann. § 93-1-5; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 451.090; Mont.
Code. Ann. § 40-1-213;§ 40-1-202; Neb. Rev .St. § 42-102; 42-105; Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 122.025; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 457:4, § 457:5; N.J. Stat. Ann. 37:1-6;
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-1-5, § 40-1-6; N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 7, 15a; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 51-2, 51-2.1; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-03-02; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
3101.01, § 3101.05; Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 3; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 106.010 - §
106.060; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1304; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-2-11; S.C. Code
Ann. § 20-1-100, 20-1-250, 20-1-300; S.D. Codified Laws § 25-1-9; Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-3-104 - §36-3-107; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.101-2.103; Utah Code
Ann. § 30-1-2, § 30-1-9; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5142 ; Va. Code Ann. § 20-48, §
20-49; Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010; W. Va. Code § 48-2-301; Wis. Stat. Ann. §
765.02; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-102; D.C. Code § 46-403, § 46-411.
17

than two partners,5 and even differ regarding the circumstances in which a person
can divorce or otherwise be legally released from marriage. States have varied
with regard to whether a blood test is required prior to the issuance of a marriage
license, or if a waiting period is imposed between the time the license is issued and
the time the marriage may take place. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691. The states
are laboratories of democracy and can differ in their views without interference by
the federal government. See id. (“[T]he Federal Government, throughout our
history, has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic
relations. . . . In order to respect this principle, the federal courts, as a general rule,

5

While all 50 states and the District of Columbia currently outlaw polygamy, they
outlawed the practice at different times, and currently vary in the manner in which
it is defined and penalized. See Ala. Code §13A-13-1; Alaska Stat. §11.51.140;
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-3606; Ark. Code Ann. §5-26-201; Cal. Penal Code §281§283; Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-6-201; Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a-190; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11
§1001; Fla. Stat. §826.01; Ga. Code Ann. §16-6-20; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §709900; Idaho Code Ann. §18-1101-1103; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-45 ; Ind.
Code Ann. §35-46-1-2; Iowa Code §726.1; Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-5609; Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §530.010; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:76; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §551;
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law §10-502; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, §15; Mich.
Comp. Laws Serv. §551.5; Minn. Stat. §609.355; Miss. Code Ann. §97-29-13;
Mo. Rev. Stat. §568.010 ; Mont. Code Ann. §45-5-611; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28701; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §201.160; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 639:1; N.J. Stat. Ann.
§2C:24-1; N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-10-1; N.Y. Penal Law §255.15 (Consol.) ; N.C.
Gen. Stat. §14-183; N.D. Cent. Code, §12.1-20-13; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2919.01;
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §881-883; Or. Rev. Stat. §163.515; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §4301;
R.I. Gen. Laws §11-6-1; S.C. Code Ann. §16-15-10; S.D. Codified Laws §22-22A1; Tenn. Code Ann. §39-15-301; Tex. Penal Code Ann. §25.01; Utah Code Ann.
§76-7-101; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §206; Va. Code Ann. §18.2-362; Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §9A.64.010; W. Va. Code Ann. §61-8-1; Wis. Stat. §944.05; Wyo. Stat.
Ann. §6-4-401; D.C. Code §22-501.
18

do not adjudicate issues of marital status even where there might otherwise be a
basis for federal jurisdiction.”).
After Windsor, a state retains the right to regulate marriage. Nowhere in
Windsor did the Supreme Court indicate that it interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to compel every state to extend marriage to same-sex couples. In fact,
it did not address the question at all. Decisions on issues peripheral (at most) to a
question summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court do not constitute “doctrinal
developments” sufficient to disregard that dismissal. See Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d
843, 850 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Baker still controls. It is for the Supreme
Court, and not this Court, to reverse its own precedent. And even if Hicks’ dicta
applies, there have been no doctrinal developments addressing whether a state’s
decision to define marriage in the traditional fashion as between opposite-sex
couples violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker compels this Court to
conclude that Plaintiffs raise no substantial federal question, and, thus, this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the case.
C.

Plaintiffs Fail To State A Plausible Claim For Relief Under Either
The Due Process Clause Or The Equal Protection Clause.

Even assuming that this Court did have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’
claims, those claims must still be dismissed because the challenged laws do not
violate Plaintiffs’ rights to due process or equal protection.
19

1.

Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Relief Under the Due
Process Clause.

Plaintiffs claim that the Georgia laws barring same-sex marriage violate the
due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Plaintiffs’ claim fails because it incorrectly assumes that the
fundamental right to marriage includes the right to marry someone of the same sex.
As there is no fundamental right implicated by Georgia’s marriage laws, they are
scrutinized under rational basis review, and easily pass.
a.

Applicable Law.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that all
citizens have certain “fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty [that]
are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States.” Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (quoting Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)). The Due Process Clause contains a substantive
component, which courts have recognized as providing “heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citation omitted).
While the right to traditional marriage has been found to be of fundamental
importance, this fundamental right does not encompass the right to marry a person

20

of the same sex.6 An effort to frame the fundamental right to marry in that manner
is an effort to redefine marriage as it has been known throughout history.
The Due Process Clause protects only a narrow class of what have been
identified as fundamental rights and liberty interests. Indeed, fundamental rights
are “not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal
autonomy[,]”Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725, and “[t]hat many of the rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal

6

While the right to marry is a fundamental liberty, every decision recognizing that
right involved two persons of the opposite sex and contains no indication that
“marriage” as used in these decisions meant anything other than what it has been
traditionally understood to mean since the founding of our nation. Moreover,
based on the specific facts of these cases, it does not appear that they support a
universal individual right to marry anyone a person chooses. See, e.g., Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (invalidating a law barring individuals from
marrying if they were behind in court-ordered child support obligations or if the
children to whom they were obligated were likely to become public charges, and
noting that if there is a fundamental right to abortion and to bring an illegitimate
child into life, “[s]urely, a decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional
family setting must receive equivalent protection and, if appellee’s right to
procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter [civil marriage]
the only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations
legally to take place.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discrimination.”); Skinner v. Okla. ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental” to humanity’s “very
existence and survival”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (invalidating
a prison rule barring inmates from marrying). Rather, as the Supreme Court noted
in Windsor, “marriage between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of
by most people as essential to the very definition of that term and to its role and
function throughout the history of civilization.” 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
21

decisions are so protected.” Id. at 727. Rights are designated as fundamental
where the Supreme Court (1) provides a careful description of the asserted right,
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993);
and (2) when the right has been identified as one of “those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive
due process, as has the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court has explained:
[W]e have always been reluctant to expand the concept
of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decision making in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended. By extending constitutional
protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a
great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public
debate and legislative action. We must therefore exercise
the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new
ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy
preferences of the members of this Court.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Similarly,
the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized the need to exercise restraint in identifying
new fundamental rights. The Eleventh Circuit explained that once a right is
elevated to a fundamental right, it is “effectively removed from the hands of the
people and placed into the guardianship of unelected judges.” Williams v. Att’y
22

Gen. of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations
omitted).
In upholding Alabama’s prohibition of the commercial distribution of sex
toys and rejecting a challenge based on the fundamental right to sexual privacy
under the due process clause, the Eleventh Circuit highlighted the importance of
exercising restraint in identifying new fundamental rights and allowing the
democratic process, instead of the judiciary, to regulate such issues:
One of the virtues of the democratic process is that,
unlike the judicial process, it need not take matters to
their logical conclusion. If the people of Alabama in
time decide that a prohibition on sex toys is misguided,
or ineffective, or just plain silly, they can repeal the law
and be finished with the matter. On the other hand, if we
today craft a new fundamental right by which to
invalidate the law, we would be bound to give that right
full force and effect in all future cases….
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1250. The Eleventh Circuit went on to quote Justice Felix
Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525
(1951), where he observed that “[h]istory teaches that the independence of the
judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day
and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political,
economic and social pressures.” Id. Surely these cautions are of particular
salience here.

23

In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has held that it is “particularly hesitant to
infer a new fundamental liberty interest from a [Supreme Court] opinion whose
language and reasoning are inconsistent with standard fundamental-rights
analysis.” Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004). In applying this principle, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed
the Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence v. Texas, and concluded that Lawrence
did not create a new fundamental right. In support of this conclusion, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the analysis in Lawrence did not include the “two primary
features” of fundamental-rights analysis:
First, the Lawrence opinion contains virtually no inquiry
into the question of whether the petitioners’ asserted right
is one of those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed. Second, the opinion notably never
provides the careful description of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest that is to accompany
fundamental-rights analysis. Rather, the constitutional
liberty interests on which the Court relied were invoked,
not with careful description, but with sweeping
generality. Most significant, however, is the fact that the
Lawrence Court never applied strict scrutiny, the proper
standard when fundamental rights are implicated, but
instead invalidated the Texas statute on rational-basis
grounds, holding that it furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual.

24

Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that, although Lawrence clearly established the
unconstitutionality of a criminal prohibition on consensual adult “sodomy,” “it is a
strained and ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to announce a
new fundamental right.” Id. at 817; accord Williams, 378 F.3d at 1236 (discussing
the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of Lawrence in Lofton).
As the Eleventh Circuit made clear in Lofton, and again in Williams, it will
not infer a new fundamental right from an opinion that does not employ the
Glucksberg analysis for identifying such rights. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 816;
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1237 (“[W]e are not prepared to infer a new fundamental
right from an opinion that never employed the usual Glucksberg analysis for
identifying such rights. Nor are we prepared to assume that Glucksberg – a
precedent that Lawrence never once mentions – is overruled by implication.”).
This principle is binding on this Court and precludes the interpretation of Windsor
as recognizing a fundamental right.
b.

Glucksberg Analysis.

Applying the Supreme Court’s two-step analytical framework for evaluating
new fundamental-rights claims, it is clear that Windsor did not announce a new
fundamental right. The language and reasoning of Windsor are inconsistent with
the Glucksberg analysis for identifying a fundamental right.
25

First, as explained above, Windsor is best understood as the converse of
Glucksberg. As in Romer, the Windsor Court invalidated an “unusual deviation”
from tradition. Here, it is tradition itself that Plaintiffs seek to invalidate.
Second, Windsor contains no careful description of the asserted right to
same-sex marriage. Windsor did not announce a fundamental right to marry a
person of the same sex. Rather, the Court noted that the power to define marriage
belonged primarily to the states – not Congress – and the Constitution prohibited
Congress from treating as unmarried couples whom a state had declared married.
In support of this conclusion, the Supreme Court specifically noted that its decision
was limited to the lawful same-sex marriages that the State of New York had
already recognized as a result of a local “community’s considered perspective on
the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its involved understanding of
the meaning of equality.” 133 S. Ct. at 2696; see also id. (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“The Court does not have before it, and the logic of its opinion does
not decide, the distinct question whether the States, in their exercise of their
‘historic and essential authority to define the marital relation,’ may continue to
utilize the traditional definition of marriage.”). The Eleventh Circuit applied this
same principle when it emphasized the possibility that the state could create a
protectable interest but that absent such a creation by the state, no due process
protection attached. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 814-15.
26

Third, it is without question that the right to same-sex marriage is not deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, objectively or otherwise. In fact,
Windsor observed that the right to same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in this
nation’s history and tradition. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (“It seems fair to
conclude that, until recent years, many citizens had not even considered the
possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status
and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage.”); accord id. at 270607, (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the majority opinion “does not argue that same-sex
marriage is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’”); accord
Baldwin, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13733, at *122 (Holmes, J., concurring) (“Far
from being unprecedented, then, same-sex marriage bans were literally the only
precedent in all fifty states until little more than a decade ago.”) (quotations and
citation omitted).
Finally, although Windsor did not identify or articulate the applicable
standard of review, it did not use heightened scrutiny, which would have been the
proper standard if a fundamental right were implicated. Instead, the Supreme
Court appeared to engage in rational basis review. Windsor used the language of
rational basis review in declaring Section 3 of DOMA invalid as it was motivated
by “no legitimate purpose,” 133 S. Ct. at 2696, and relied on cases utilizing
rational basis review to invalidate Section 3 of DOMA. 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (citing
27

Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) (applying rational
basis review to a challenge under the equal protection clause), and Romer, 517
U.S. at 633 (same); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the
majority “opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions are
taken from rational-basis cases . . . the Court certainly does not apply anything that
resembles that deferential framework”) (emphasis in original).
Any attempt to extrapolate from Windsor a right to same-sex marriage
would be a dramatic step that the Supreme Court has not indicated a willingness to
take and would be contrary to Eleventh Circuit precedent regarding fundamental
rights interpretation. Like the arguments rejected in Williams, to find a
fundamental right based on Windsor would be to impose a fundamental-rights
interpretation on a decision that rested on rational-basis grounds, that never
engaged in Glucksberg analysis, and that never invoked strict scrutiny. While the
Supreme Court may expand its catalog of fundamental rights one day, for a lower
court “preemptively to take that step would exceed [its] mandate as a lower court.”
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1238.
Windsor did not find a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, and neither
should this Court. The first step in this analysis is to provide a careful and specific
description of the asserted right. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. Plaintiffs rely
heavily on the fundamental right to marry. And, of course, the right to marry is
28

fundamental. But Plaintiffs describe the right they seek at far too abstract a level.
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent requires a granular and
particularized approach to determining whether an asserted individual right is, in
fact, fundamental. For example, in Williams, the Eleventh Circuit, relying on the
Supreme Court’s formulation of the liberty interests at issue in Glucksberg and
Flores, held that the liberty interest at stake had to be defined in reference to the
scope of the challenged Alabama statute banning the commercial distribution of
sexual devices. 378 F.3d. at 1241. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the district
court’s framing of the issue in terms of whether there was a more general
fundamental right to sexual privacy and, instead, held that the correct framing was
the much more specific question of whether the Constitution protects a right to use
sexual devices. Id. at 1242. Similarly, in Doe v. Moore, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected an attempt to frame broadly the asserted right at issue in a challenge to
Florida’s sex offender publication act. In Moore, the plaintiffs argued that the
challenged act infringed on their liberty and privacy interests, particularly their
“rights to family association, to be free of threats to their persons and members of
their immediate families, to be free of interference with their religious practices, to
find and/or keep any housing, and to a fundamental right to find and/or keep any
employment.” 410 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005). The Eleventh Circuit
rejected this framing and held that the right at issue was properly framed much
29

more specifically in the context of the challenged statute as the right of a person,
convicted of sexual offenses, to refuse subsequent registration of his or her
personal information with Florida law enforcement and to prevent publication of
this information on Florida’s Sexual Offender/Predator website. Id. at 1344.
Based on the clear instructions of the Eleventh Circuit, the scope of the
asserted liberty interest at stake must be defined in reference to the scope of
Georgia’s marriage laws. Thus, the broad right to marry, or fundamental right to
marriage is not at issue. The interest at issue must be defined in reference to the
scope of the challenged marriage laws and is, therefore, whether there is a right to
same-sex marriage. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, “the requirement of a careful
description is designed to prevent the reviewing court from venturing into vaster
constitutional vistas than are called for by the facts of the case at hand.” Williams,
378 F.3d at 1240 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit
went on to note that “[o]ne of the cardinal rules of constitutional jurisprudence is
that the scope of the asserted right – and thus the parameters of the inquiry – must
be dictated by the precise facts of the immediate case.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Accordingly, the analysis here must be framed in terms of whether the Constitution
protects a right to same-sex marriage.
The second prong of the fundamental rights analysis requires an inquiry into
whether the right to same sex marriage is “objectively, deeply rooted in this
30

Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.” Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 721. As discussed above, it is without question that the right to same sex
marriage is not objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.
Accordingly, there is no fundamental right at issue in Plaintiffs’ challenge to
Georgia’s marriage law that would trigger heightened scrutiny.
Thus, Georgia’s marriage laws must be evaluated under the most deferential
level of scrutiny, rational basis review. See Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v.
Tucker, 704 F.3d 935, 945 (11th Cir. 2013) (“When a challenged law does not
infringe upon a fundamental right, we review substantive due process challenges
under the rational basis standard.”)
c.

Rational Basis Review.

“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,
[the court] will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational
relation to some legitimate end.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. Under rational basis
scrutiny, governments “are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of
their legislative judgments.” Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 464 (1981). “Rather, those challenging the legislative judgment must
convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is
apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental
31

decisionmaker.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This standard is “highly
deferential” and courts hold legislative acts unconstitutional under a rational basis
standard in only the most exceptional of circumstances. Williams v. Pryor, 240
F.3d 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2001). “Courts proceeding pursuant to the rational basis
standard ‘must be a paradigm of judicial restraint.’” Huff v. DeKalb County, No.
1:05-cv-1721, 2007 WL 295536, at *8 (N.D. Ga. April 20, 2007) (Duffey, J.)
(quoting Resindiz-Alcaraz v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 383 F.3d 1262, 1271-72 (11th Cir.
2004)).
Georgia’s marriage laws are rationally related to numerous state interests.
First, the law is rationally related to the State’s interest in encouraging the raising
of children in homes consisting of a married mother and father, an interest the
Eleventh Circuit has found to be a legitimate state interest. See Lofton, 358 F.3d
at 819-20. In support of this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit observed that “[i]t is
hard to conceive an interest more legitimate and more paramount for the state than
promoting an optimal social structure for educating, socializing, and preparing its
future citizens to become productive participants in civil society….” Lofton, 358
F.3d at 819-20. The Tenth Circuit adopted this rationale in Kitchen v. Herbert by
treating as compelling the state’s interest in linking marriage to the ability to
procreate. 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935, at *68. While finding Utah’s law
insufficiently tailored to survive heightened scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning
32

suggests Utah could have survived rational basis scrutiny. In the light of Lofton
and other Eleventh Circuit precedent, the Court is bound to view Georgia’s
provisions through the rational basis lens.
The challenged laws also rationally further Georgia’s legitimate interest in
ensuring legal frameworks for protection of children of relationships where
unintentional reproduction is possible; ensuring adequate reproduction; fostering a
child-centric marriage culture that encourages parents to subordinate their own
interests to the needs of their children; and exercising prudence before departing
from a definition of marriage that, until quite recently, “was an accepted truth for
almost everyone who ever lived, in any society in which marriage existed.”
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006). None of these state interests
are related to the “emotional and romantic reasons” Plaintiffs identify for seeking
to be married. Compare Complaint ¶ 13. And these interests are clearly
legitimate.
2.

The Challenged Laws Do Not Violate Equal Protection.

Eleventh Circuit precedent compels this Court to conclude that the
challenged laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. That binding
precedent establishes that:
1) Sexual orientation is not a suspect classification;

33

2) The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the traditional definition
of the nuclear family;
3) That the state can lawfully conclude that homosexuals and heterosexuals
are not similarly situated for reasons related to procreation and children;7
4) That the rationale offered by the state need only be arguable to immunize
the legislative choice from constitutional challenge.
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 821-23.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the
government to treat similarly situated people alike. Campbell v. Rainbow City,
Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006). The Equal Protection Clause does not
forbid classifications; it simply keeps governmental decision makers from treating
differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1, 10 (1992). As a general rule, “legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result
in some inequality.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961).
“Unless the challenged classification burdens a fundamental right or targets a
suspect class, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1277; see also

7

Plaintiffs’ allegation that they are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples in all
respects relevant to marriage, see Complaint ¶ 11, is a legal conclusion that this
Court should disregard.
34

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (indicating that “preserving
the traditional institution of marriage” is a legitimate state interest far beyond mere
moral disapproval).
Plaintiffs contend that because a man may not marry another man, and a
woman may not marry another woman under Georgia’s marriage laws, the
classification is necessarily one based on sex. (Complaint ¶¶ 110-14.) In other
words, if either person in a specific couple was of the other sex, the couple could
marry. But the challenged laws do not impermissibly discriminate on the basis of
sex.
Georgia’s marriage laws do not treat persons of different sex differently;
rather, the law treats persons of different sex the same and prohibits men and
women from doing the same thing – that is, marrying an individual of the same
sex. There is no indication that either sex, as a class, is disadvantaged by
Georgia’s marriage laws. The law simply states that opposite-sex couples can
marry, while same-sex couples cannot. The law is directed towards neither males
nor females exclusively, but both male and female couples seeking to enter into a
same-sex marriage in Georgia, or to have an out-of-state same-sex marriage
recognized by the State. Thus, the challenged laws do not discriminate based on
sex or involve disparate treatment based upon sex that might invite intermediate
scrutiny.
35

This conclusion is consistent with the decisions of other federal district
courts in similar cases both before and after Windsor.8 There is no indication that
either sex, as a class, is disadvantaged by Georgia’s marriage laws.9 The law
applies equally to men and women, treating a same-sex couple comprised of two
males the same as a same-sex couple consisting of two females.10

8

See Baskin v. Bogan, 1:14-CV-00355-RLY, 2014 WL 2884868, at *11 (S.D. Ind.
June 25, 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 14-CV-64-BBC, 2014 WL 2558444, at *23 (W.D.
Wis. June 6, 2014) (“[T]he general view seems to be that a sex discrimination
theory is not viable, even if the government is making a sex-based classification
with respect to an individual, because the intent of the laws banning same-sex
marriage is not to suppress females or males as a class.”); Geiger v. Kitzhaber,
6:13-CV-01834-MC, 2014 WL 2054264, at *7 (D. Or. May 19, 2014) (“The
discriminatory laws in Loving, however, are not applicable to Oregon’s marriage
laws. . . . There is no such invidious gender-based discrimination here.”); Jackson
v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1098 (D. Haw. 2012) (“The Court thus
agrees with the vast majority of courts considering the issue that an opposite-sex
definition of marriage does not constitute gender discrimination.”).
9
See Latta v. Otter, 1:13-CV-00482-CWD, 2014 WL 1909999, at *15 (D. Idaho
May 13, 2014) (“This distinction does not prefer one gender over the other—two
men have no more right to marry under Idaho law than two women.”); Sevcik v.
Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005 (D. Nev. 2012) (“The distinction might be
gender based if only women could marry a person of the same sex, or if only
women could marry a transgendered person, or if the restriction included some
other asymmetry. . . . But there is no distinction here between men and women.”).
10
See Baskin v. Bogan, 2014 WL 2884868, at *11 (“Moreover, there is no
evidence that the purpose of the marriage laws is to ratify a stereotype about the
relative abilities of men and women or to impose traditional gender roles on
individuals.”); Whitewood v. Wolf, 1:13-CV-1861, 2014 WL 2058105, at *10, n.9;
(M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014) (citing Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F.
Supp. 2d 1252, 1286 (N.D. Okla. 2014)); Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1286
(“Common sense dictates that the intentional discrimination occurring in this case
has nothing to do with gender-based prejudice or stereotypes, and the law cannot
be subject to heightened scrutiny on that basis.”).
36

Of the ten federal district courts to consider whether traditional state
marriage laws are discriminatory on the basis of sex, separate from claims of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,11 nine have held that traditional
state marriage laws do not discriminate on the basis of sex.12 The challenged laws
do not discriminate based on sex or involve disparate treatment based upon sex.
Thus, because Georgia marriage law does not discriminate on the basis of sex,
heightened scrutiny is not appropriate for evaluating the challenged laws.

11

See Baskin, 2014 WL 2884868, at *10-11 (holding no discrimination on the
basis of gender); Wolf v. Walker, 2014 WL 2558444, at *23 (deciding the case on
other grounds but noting that “the general view seems to be that a sex
discrimination theory is not viable”); Whitewood, 2014 WL 2058105, at *10, n.9
(deciding the case on other grounds but finding the sex discrimination argument
“less compelling” because the Pennsylvania marriage law “has nothing to do with
gender-based prejudice or stereotypes” (citation omitted)); Geiger, 2014 WL
2054264, at *7 (holding no discrimination on the basis of gender); Latta, 2014 WL
1909999, at *15 (holding no discrimination on the basis of gender); Bishop, 962 F.
Supp. 2d at1286 (holding no discrimination on the basis of gender); Sevcik, 911 F.
Supp. 2d at 1005 (holding no discrimination on the basis of gender); Abercrombie,
884 F. Supp. 2d at 1098-99 (holding no discrimination on the basis of gender);
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010) aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) vacated and remanded sub
nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 186 L. Ed. 2d 768 (U.S. 2013)
(determining that plaintiffs’ sexual orientation claim was “equivalent to a claim of
discrimination based on sex”).
12
The only court the state has identified as holding otherwise was Kitchen v.
Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1206 (D. Utah 2013) (“[T]he court finds that the
fact of equal application to both men and women does not immunize Utah’s
Amendment 3 from the heightened burden of justification that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires of state laws drawn according to sex.”). The judge in that
case applied rational basis review rather than heightened or intermediate scrutiny.
Id. at 1206-07. In any event, the Tenth Circuit did not adopt this reasoning on
appeal. See generally Kitchen, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935.
37

At most, the challenged laws may have the effect of distinguishing based on
sexual orientation.13 In its most recent case involving sexual orientation, the
Supreme Court did not discuss whether sexual orientation is a suspect
classification. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675. Similarly, the Supreme Court did not
declare what equal protection standard it applied and has yet to decide what level
of scrutiny is appropriate for classifications based upon sexual orientation. See id.
at 2683-84.
The Eleventh Circuit has squarely held that sexual orientation is not a
suspect classification and rejected the use of heightened scrutiny. See Lofton, 358
F.3d at 818.14 Accordingly, any law that differentiates based on sexual orientation
need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. It is Plaintiffs’ burden
to establish that the challenged laws fail rational basis review. Heller v. Doe, 509
U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993).
13

The challenged laws, of course, do not contain any such distinction on their face;
they apply equally to everyone. The State acknowledges, however, that the laws
effect gays and lesbians more profoundly than they do heterosexuals. The State
does not concede that this necessarily constitutes a classification on the basis of
sexual orientation, but simply explains why even if it is, that classification is
constitutionally permissible.
14
The Ninth Circuit recently interpreted Windsor to mean that sexual orientation
is a suspect classification. In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., the
Ninth Circuit held that classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to
heightened scrutiny and that in jury selection, equal protection prohibits
peremptory strikes based on a perception that a juror was gay. 740 F.3d 471, 48084 (9th Cir. 2014). Under Lofton, however, courts in the Eleventh Circuit are
bound to apply rational basis review to classifications made based on sexual
orientation.
38

“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985). “This standard is easily met.” Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub.
Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009); Deen v. Egleston, 597
F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010) (under rational basis review, states have “wide
latitude” when crafting “social or economic” legislation). The Supreme Court has
instructed that review must be deferential:
[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas
of social and economic policy, a statutory classification
that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes
fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.
FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993); see also Panama City
Med. Diagnostic, Ltd. v. Williams, 13 F.3d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir. 1994) (deference
must be given to legislature “because lawmakers are presumed to have acted
constitutionally despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
On a “rational-basis review,” a challenged classification bears a “strong
presumption of validity” and a party challenging the classification must “negative
every conceivable basis which might support it.” Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at
39

314-15. “Defining the class of persons subject to a regulatory requirement – much
like classifying governmental beneficiaries – inevitably requires that some persons
who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on
different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn
differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial,
consideration.” Id. at 315-16 ( internal quotations omitted). As discussed earlier,
Georgia’s laws are premised upon the unique ability of opposite-sex couples to
procreate. This distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples is
relevant to marriage and, thus, sufficient to survive rational basis review. Lofton,
358 F.3d at 819-20.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be
GRANTED.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 2014.
SAMUEL S. OLENS
Attorney General
s/ NELS PETERSON
Solicitor General
KATHLEEN M. PACIOUS
Deputy Attorney General

551540
101074
558555

s/ DEVON ORLAND
554301
Senior Asst. Attorney General

40

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D), I hereby certify that the foregoing has been
prepared in compliance with Local Rule 5.1(B) in 14-point New Times Roman
type face.
This 21st day of July, 2014.

s/Devon Orland

41

554301

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing DEFENDANT
DEBORAH ADERHOLD’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF
system, including the following:
David P. Draigh, White & Case, LLP -FL
[e-mail]
Elizabeth Lynn Littrell, Lambda Legal
[e-mail]

Douglas E. Winter, Bryan Cave, LLP-DC
[e-mail]
Gregory R. Nevins, Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.-GA
[e-mail]
Jennifer Burch Dempsey, Bryan Cave, LLP-ATL Jennifer Devine Odom, Bryan Cave, LLP-ATL
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Luke A. Lantta, Bryan Cave, LLP-ATL
Susan L. Sommer, Lambda Legal Defense and
[e-mail]
Education Fund, Inc.-NY
[e-mail]
Tara L. Borelli, Lambda Legal Defense and
William Vance Custer , IV, Bryan Cave, LLPEducation Fund, Inc.-GA
ATL
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Frank E. Jenkins , III, Jenkins & Bowen, P.C.
Michael Van Stephens , II, Gwinnett County
[e-mail]
Law Department
[e-mail]
Robert Lige Walker, Jenkins & Bowen, P.C.
Diana L. Freeman, Fulton County Attorney's
[e-mail]
Office
[e-mail]
Kaye Woodard Burwell, Office of the Fulton
R. David Ware, Office of Fulton County
County Attorney
Attorney
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
This 21st day of July, 2014.
s/Devon Orland
Sr. Assistant Attorney General
Bar No. 554301