State of Hawaii v. Trump

Filing 303

REPLY re #293 Emergency MOTION to Clarify Scope of Preliminary Injunction re #291 Preliminary Injunction, filed by State of Hawaii. (Attachments: #1 Exhibit Proposed Order, #2 Certificate of Service)(Katyal, Neal)

DOUGLAS S. CHIN (Bar No. 6465)
Attorney General of the State of Hawai‘i
DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, STATE OF HAWAI‘I
425 Queen Street
Honolulu, HI 96813
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Attorneys for Plaintiff, State of Hawai‘i

NEAL K. KATYAL*
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
*Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, State of
Hawai‘i and Ismail Elshikh

(See Next Page For Additional Counsel)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
STATE OF HAWAI‘I and ISMAIL ELSHIKH,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as
President of the United States; U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY; JOHN F. KELLY, in his official
capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE;
REX
TILLERSON, in his official capacity as
Secretary of State; and the UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-00050DKW-KSC
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY
MOTION
TO
CLARIFY
SCOPE OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL
CLYDE J. WADSWORTH (Bar No. 8495)
Solicitor General of the State of Hawai‘i
DEIRDRE MARIE-IHA (Bar No. 7923)
DONNA H. KALAMA (Bar No. 6051)
KIMBERLY T. GUIDRY (Bar No. 7813)
ROBERT T. NAKATSUJI (Bar No. 6743)
Deputy Attorneys General
DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, STATE OF HAWAI‘I
425 Queen Street
Honolulu, HI 96813
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Attorneys for Plaintiff, State of Hawai‘i

COLLEEN ROH SINZDAK*
MITCHELL P. REICH*
ELIZABETH HAGERTY*
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20004
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email:
[e-mail]
THOMAS P. SCHMIDT*
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
875 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
SARA SOLOW*
ALEXANDER B. BOWERMAN*
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
1835 Market St., 29th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
*Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, State of
Hawai‘i and Ismail Elshikh

INTRODUCTION
The Government fundamentally misconstrues the Supreme Court’s partial
stay. The Court did not concoct an abstract “bona fide relationship” standard that
the Government can tailor to its liking by borrowing limits from the immigration
laws, Opp. at 8, imposing restrictions found in its own Executive Order, Opp. at
13, or announcing ad hoc exceptions at will, Opp. at 15. Rather, the Court
“balance[d] the equities” and determined that they favor a stay only when
“[d]enying entry to * * * a foreign national does not burden any American party by
reason of that party’s relationship with the foreign national.” Trump v. Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”), Nos. 16-1436 & 16-1540, slip op. at 11
(U.S. June 26, 2017) (per curiam). For that reason, the Government may not apply
the bans to exclude any foreign national that has a “credible claim of a bona fide
relationship” with an individual or entity in the United States, such that the
exclusion will inflict “concrete hardship” on the American party. Id. at 12-13.
That straightforward principle resolves this motion. For five days and
counting, the Government has been directing U.S. consulates and refugee
processing organizations to deny entry to foreign nationals whose grandparents,
aunts, nephews, and other close relatives are waiting for them in this country. At
the same time, the Government has barred the doors to numerous refugees with a
connection to the United States, even where a resettlement agency has a

1

relationship with a particular refugee that involves the investment of copious
resources for pre-arrival planning. These actions plainly “burden * * * American
part[ies] by reason of [their] relationship with [a] foreign national,” and so are
unlawful.
The Government could have avoided this result. It could have engaged with
Plaintiffs in a dialogue that would have brought to light these harms, as well as the
multiple additional errors the Government has already corrected. But the
Government refused. Indeed, even on the day of the rollout, the Government spent
precious hours conducting a conference call not with Plaintiffs, but with reporters.
See Katyal Decl. Ex. D. It then issued flawed guidance regarding fiancé
admissions that a brief discussion with Plaintiffs would have easily avoided.
In short, the Government elected to implement the stay in a manner that
jeopardizes the rights of countless Americans and keeps the Government on the
deeply flawed trajectory it has pursued since the release of the first Executive
Order. The Court should correct the Government’s path, holding the Government
to the clear terms of the Supreme Court’s order.1
1

The Court should not accede to the Government’s request to stay its clarifying
order while the Government seeks appellate review: Americans are already being
harmed by the exclusion of individuals with whom they have a bona fide
relationship. The Supreme Court already held that this harm outweighs the
national security interest the Government claims. There is no justification for a
stay. Plaintiffs agree, however, that any disputes that remain after this Court’s
order should be dealt with through expedited appellate review.
2

ARGUMENT
A.

The Court Should Clarify That Its Injunction Protects
Grandparents, Grandchildren, Brothers-in-Law, Sisters-in-Law,
Aunts, Uncles, Nieces, Nephews, And Cousins.

The Government has acknowledged its error in excluding fiancés from its
definition of “close familial relationship.” Opp. at 2, 7. Yet it still adheres to the
preposterous contention that grandchildren, siblings-in-law, and other fundamental
relations are not “close famil[y],” and that excluding them somehow imposes “no[]
burden” on persons in the United States. Slip Op. at 11-12. That argument is as
wrong as it sounds, and nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion supports it.
The Government starts off by attempting to rewrite the Court’s opinion. It
speculates that when the Supreme Court used the phrase “close familial
relationship,” it “ha[d] * * * in mind” the types of family relationships delineated
in certain provisions of the INA. Opp. at 2. But as the Government ultimately
must acknowledge, one of the two relationships the Supreme Court said was
“clearly” close family—Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law—is not found in any
provision of the immigration laws the Government cites. Id. at 11. Rather than
accepting this fact as fatal to its argument, the Government soldiers on, speculating
that when the Court said “mother-in-law,” it really meant “mother,” because it was
sub silentio relying on the fact that Dr. Elshikh’s wife is a U.S. citizen. Id. That is
utter nonsense. The Court never so much as hinted that it was concerned with the

3

burden on Dr. Elshikh’s wife; it said that the injunction was justified because of
“the concrete burdens that would fall on * * * Dr. Elshikh”; that the Order may not
be enforced against “parties similarly situated to * * * Dr. Elshikh”; and that “Dr.
Elshikh’s mother-in-law[] clearly has [a qualifying] relationship.” Slip Op. at 1012 (emphases added). Furthermore, if it were even remotely plausible to posit that
the Court had any of Dr. Elshikh’s other family in mind, it would be his children,
because the record documents the harm inflicted by their separation from their
grandmother. Elshikh Decl. ¶ 3, ECF. No. 66-1.
The Government’s position also finds scant footing in the logic of the
Court’s opinion. The Court made clear that the balance of the equities supports
this Court’s injunction whenever excluding an alien would inflict “concrete
hardship” on a U.S. person. Slip Op. at 11. On multiple occasions the Supreme
Court has recognized that an individual suffers a concrete and constitutionally
cognizable injury if the Government interferes with his relationship with his
“uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents,” all of whom it has called
“close relatives.” Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); see
also, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (noting constitutional
“right to maintain certain familial relationships, including * * * association
between grandchildren and grandparents”). The Government offers no reason why

4

it is sensible to interpret the Court’s language by looking to particular provisions of
the INA rather than the Court’s own prior statements.2
In any event, the Government’s attempt to rely on the immigration laws is
self-defeating. In the Family Sponsor Immigration Act of 2002, Congress
amended the immigration laws to provide that an alien’s “close family” could
sponsor her for admission, and included in that term an alien’s “sister-in-law,
brother-in-law, grandparent, or grandchild.”3 The immigration laws similarly state
that a juvenile alien may be released from immigration detention to the custody of
her “aunt, uncle, [or] grandparent”—a list the Supreme Court has said consists of
“close blood relatives, whose protective relationship with children our society has
also traditionally respected.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 297, 310 (1993)
(emphasis added) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1992), recodified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.3(b)(1)(iii)). Other immigration provisions enable an individual to seek
admission on behalf of “[g]randchild(ren)” and “[n]iece[s] or nephew[s]”4; to apply
for asylum if a “grandparent, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew” resides in
2

The Government relies on the maxim “equity follows the law.” Opp. at 10. But
that principle means only that courts cannot use their equitable powers to
“violat[e]” express statutory commands. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal.,
Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 620 (2012). It does not instruct courts to borrow statutory
provisions and repurpose them in wholly inapposite contexts.
3
Pub. L. No. 107-150, § 2(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(f)(5)); see H.R. Rep.
107-207, at 2 (2001) (provision permits “close family member[s]” to be sponsors).
4
81 Fed. Reg. 92,266, 92,280 (Dec. 19, 2016) (describing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(T)(ii)(III)).
5

the United States5; to apply for naturalization on behalf of a grandchild6; or to
qualify as a special immigrant if he is the “grandparent” of a U.S. person.7
The Government ignores all of these provisions, going so far as to claim that
“the INA does not grant any immigration benefits” for grandparents, nieces, and so
on. Opp. at 10. Not only is that demonstrably false, but the Government cherrypicked a list of immigration provisions that grant some of the most restricted
benefits in the immigration laws: Most notably, Sections 1152(b) and 1153(a)
perform the “unavoidably zero-sum” task of “allocating a limited number of
[immigrant] visas.” Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2213 (2014)
(plurality opinion).8 The Court’s injunction, however, simply authorizes aliens to
be considered for a visa or refugee status on the same terms as anyone else. Slip
Op. at 11-12. It would be nonsensical to borrow the most limiting possible
definition of family to determine who qualifies for that baseline right. Id. at 11.
Finally, grasping at any reed it can find, the Government points to the
Order’s own waiver provisions. Opp. at 12-13. But those provisions are triply
5

69 Fed. Reg. 69,480, 69,488 (Nov. 29, 2004) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.30(e)(6)(iii)(B)).
6
8 U.S.C. § 1433(a).
7
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 421(b)(3).
8
Similarly, Section 1182(a)(3)(D)(iv) establishes a limited exception to the
admissibility bar for members of totalitarian parties, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(iv),
and other provisions cited by the Government concern who may qualify for the
“exceptional” relief of cancellation of removal. Moreno-Morante v. Gonzales, 490
F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007); see INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986) (same).
6

irrelevant. First, the Court said that “[t]he facts of these cases,” not the terms of
the very Order it left enjoined, “illustrate the sort of relationship that qualifies.”
Slip Op. at 12. Second, more than half of the examples the Court gave—Dr.
Elshikh’s mother-in-law, the newly-admitted University students, the refugees
Hawaii seeks to resettle, and the invited lecturer—do not fall within any of the
waiver provisions. Order § 3(c). And, third, the waiver provisions themselves
offer only a very short illustrative list of close family members—“e.g., a spouse,
child, or parent,” id. § 3(c)(iv)—that is grossly under-inclusive even by the
Government’s standard, excluding even fiancés, siblings, and parents-in-law. They
therefore shed no light whatsoever on the existing extent of the injunction.
B.

This Court Should Clarify That Refugees With Formal
Assurances And Other Bona Fide Relationships With United
States Entities Remain Covered By The Injunction.
1.

The Injunction Covers Refugees With A Formal Assurance
From A U.S. Resettlement Agency.

The Supreme Court’s guidance with respect to refugee admissions is
straightforward: The injunction continues to apply where a U.S. entity “has a bona
fide relationship with a particular” refugee such that the entity “can legitimately
claim concrete hardship if that person is excluded.” Slip Op. at 13. As the
Supreme Court recently explained “when we have used the adjective ‘concrete’ we

7

have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”
Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
The Government’s own submissions easily establish both that there is a bona
fide relationship between a refugee and the resettlement agency that provides the
refugee’s formal assurance, and that—as a result of this relationship—the agency
will suffer real harm if the refugee is excluded. Attachment B to the Government’s
Declaration explains that, when a resettlement agency submits an “assurance,” it
makes a “written commitment * * * to provide, or ensure the provision of” basic
services to the “refugee[] named on the assurance form.” Bartlett Decl., Att. 2,
ECF No. 301-1, at Page ID # 5694. The same document demonstrates that the
resettlement agency must invest extensively in its relationship with the named
refugee well before she arrives.
Notably, the document specifies that the agency must provide “[p]re-arrival
services” for the refugee, including “[a]ssum[ing] responsibility for sponsorship,
* * * plan[ning] for the provision” of “health services,” id. at Page ID # 5702, and
making arrangements for children who must be placed in foster care, id. at Page ID
# 5715. The resettlement agency must also take all steps necessary to ensure that,
as soon as the refugee gets off the plane, she is “transported to furnished living
quarters,” receives “ready-to-eat food and seasonal clothing,” and has her “basic
needs” met for at least thirty days. Id. at Page ID ## 5704-5708. And that is only

8

the beginning of the countless tasks, large and small, that the entity must prepare to
undertake as soon as it submits the formal assurance. See HIAS & IRAP Amicus
Br. at 6-7; Hetfield Decl. (detailing the investment by resettlement agencies).
When a refugee’s travel is blocked, however, all of this planning and
preparation is wasted. The resettlement agency is unable to meet the refugee,
resettle her in the United States, or offer the myriad other services which it has
invested substantial resources to provide. That is a “concrete hardship” far more
severe than the one an entity might experience if an arranged “lecturer” is
forbidden admission. Slip Op. at 12; cf. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 253, 262-63 (1977) (organization experiences concrete
“economic injury” as a result of expenditures on planning and review).
The Government sweeps aside this tremendous burden on the ground that a
resettlement agency’s efforts are simply “resettlement services for which the
Government has contracted with [the entity] to provide.” Opp. at 20. That is both
misleading and irrelevant. As the Government requires resettlement agencies to
inform newly arrived refugees, “[t]he local resettlement agency is not a
government agency.” Bartlett Decl., Att. 2, at Page ID # 5709 (emphasis added).
It is a non-governmental organization that—in most circumstances—has been
undertaking these refugee services for decades, even before the Government
became involved. Moreover, these agencies receive only “partial funding” from

9

the Government “for resettlement services.” Bartlett Decl.¶ 20 (emphasis added).
They are required to provide the Government with a detailed break-down of the
private resources they have devoted and are prepared to devote to refugee work,
see, e.g., Katyal Supp. Decl. Ex. F (Decl. of L. Bartlett, Texas Health and Human
Services Comm’n v. United States, No. 3:15-cv-3851 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2016)) at
pp. 80, 83, 86. And even if the agencies did not invest their own resources on
behalf of each refugee, even the loss of proposed federal funding constitutes a
“concrete injury.” Clinton v. City of New York, 534 U.S. 417, 430-431 (1998).
In any event, the Supreme Court in no way suggested that only purely
private relationships qualify as “bona fide.” The injunction applies to any foreign
national whose relationship with a U.S. entity is “formal, documented, and formed
in the ordinary course rather than for the purpose of evading EO-2.” Slip Op. at
12. There is no exception for “relationships facilitated by the Government.”
Indeed, the Government’s own guidance specifies that those who qualify for visas
because of their relationship with the U.S. Government itself are covered by the
injunction. See Opp. Ex. A, at 2 (explaining that any visa category but B, C-1, C3, D, or I “inherent[ly]” requires “a bona fide relationship”); goo.gl/whF5jZ
(explaining that SI and SQ visas are granted to employees of the U.S. Armed
Forces or a U.S. Mission). It is baffling why relationships with the Government
would qualify but relationships facilitated by the Government would not.

10

The fact that a local resettlement agency may not have personally interacted
with a refugee is equally irrelevant. The same is true of the relationship between a
U.S. entity and an invited lecturer. See Slip Op. at 12. Entities often arrange
lecturers through the speaker’s organization or agent, but the Supreme Court made
clear that a relationship exists all the same. Likewise, there is no requirement that
a refugee have any direct contact with—or even have met—his “close familial
relations” in the United States. The Supreme Court obviously did not view
personal interaction as a necessary characteristic of a qualifying relationship.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that Hawaii’s harm from the refugee ban
flows from the fact that the ban prevents the State from “assisting with refugee
resettlement.” Hawaii v. Trump, slip op. at 24 (9th Cir. June 12, 2017). The
Government urged the Supreme Court to reject that holding and to stay any
application of the injunction to refugees on the ground that the State had “no
cognizable sovereign interest in * * * the entry of refugees.” Katyal Supp. Decl.
Ex. G at 11, 30; id. Ex. H at 11, 31. The Supreme Court did not grant that request,
instead holding that the “facts of these cases” illustrate the kind of relationships
that remain covered by the injunction. Thus, at a minimum, the injunction covers
refugees with a relationship to an American entity similar to the one between
Hawaii and the refugees it intends to resettle—a relationship that is if anything
more removed than a resettlement agency’s. See Bartlett Decl. ¶  23, ECF No.

11

301-1 (explaining that “state and local governments” work with resettlement
agencies to “meet the needs of forthcoming refugees”); Katyal Supp. Decl. Ex. F.
at pp. 10-16 (summarizing state interactions with resettlement agencies).
Finally, the Government asserts that recognizing that a formal assurance
embodies a bona fide relationship would “eviscerate the Supreme Court’s stay
ruling” because every refugee must ultimately have a formal assurance. Opp. at
17. That is incorrect. The Government estimates that only 24,000 of the
approximately 200,000 individuals seeking refugee status currently have a formal
assurance. Opp. at 18; see generally www.state.gov/j/prm/ra. That makes sense
because the submission of a formal assurance is one of the last steps in the refugee
process, occurring only after the refugee has passed through multiple stages of
comprehensive vetting. Bartlett Decl. ¶¶  5, 7-16, ECF No. 301-1. Section 6(a),
however, suspends “decisions on applications for refugee status” for 120 days for
those unaffected by the injunction. Thus, recognizing the relationship between
refugees and agencies that have provided their formal assurances affects only a
fraction of the refugees in the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.
In any event, a stay is not a statute for which a court is obligated to ensure
that each word has a substantial real-world effect. Cf. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353, 372 (2001) (“this is an opinion, bear in mind, not a statute”). The Court made
it crystal clear that Sections 6(a) and 6(b) “may not be enforced against an

12

individual seeking admission as a refugee who can credibly claim a bona fide
relationship,” regardless of how many of them there may be. Slip Op. at 13.
2.

The Court Should Clarify That The Government’s Positions On
Refugee Travel And Attorney-Client Relationships Are Unlawful.

The Government’s opposition brief and guidance that it has released since
Plaintiffs’ motion raise several additional troubling issues.9
First, the Government asserts that it “has yet to determine” whether aliens
who have already booked travel may enter the United States after July 6. Opp. at
18-19. That cannot be. Refugees who have booked travel to the United States by
necessity not only have a relationship with a U.S. resettlement agency, but also
have a place to live and services lined up for them when they enter the country.
They therefore a fortiori have the requisite bona fide relationship under the Court’s
order. See supra Section B.1.
Second, in guidance sent on July 3, the Government stated that it was
temporarily halting the process through which refugees obtain the advanced
booking notifications necessary for travel, even with respect to refugees “with * * *
the required bona fide relationship to a person or entity” in the United States.
Katyal Supp. Decl. Ex. I ¶ 11. But the Supreme Court could not have been clearer
that the Order’s refugee provisions “may not be enforced against an individual
9

Plaintiffs have attached a revised Proposed Order to this brief in light of the
Government’s new representations and the alterations to its guidance since
Plaintiffs filed.
13

seeking admission as a refugee who can credibly claim a bona fide relationship
with a person or entity in the United States.” Slip Op. at 13 (emphasis added).
Any programmatic delay in permitting them to enter is plainly unlawful.
Third, while the Government appears to accept that some client relationships
with a legal services organization qualify under the terms of the Court’s order, it
nonetheless refuses to say whether all relationships qualify. See Opp. at 20-21.
The fact that an alien has a “formal, documented” relationship with a legal services
organization that is “formed in the ordinary course,” however, is ipso facto
sufficient under the Court’s order. Slip Op. at 12; see HIAS & IRAP Amicus Br.
at 5-6. There is no reason for the Government’s equivocation.
The Government wrongly attempts to dodge each of these issues by
asserting that the disputes are unripe. Opp. at 18-19. But parties may seek
clarification of an injunction whenever there is a “question about [its] terms.”
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 321 F.3d 878, 883
(9th Cir. 2003). It is especially appropriate for courts to provide clarification
where one party “proposes to engage” in action that may be unlawful. Matter of
Hendrix, 986 F.2d 195, 200 (7th Cir. 1993). Here, the Government has said it is
actively considering violating the injunction as early as Friday of this week.
Waiting any longer to clarify the unlawfulness of that conduct would result in
contempt by the Government and impair the public interest.

14

That is all the more true because the Government has offered (at 22-25) a
decidedly confused account of how it intends to ensure that qualified applicants are
not affected by the bans. Refugee and visa processes are already notoriously slow
and backlogged; applicants wait for months or years for individual interviews. The
Government cannot be permitted to drag this process out even further by refusing
admission when it is “unclear” whether a particular applicant is exempt from the
ban, see Opp. at 24, while discouraging the courts from giving the guidance that
will produce clarity. Nor can the Government be permitted to employ a
cumbersome individualized process for applicants that should be categorically
exempt from the bans. 10 The time wasted in that process may, for example,
unfairly preclude refugees from entering the country before October 1, when
President Trump is authorized to set a new refugee cap.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant Plaintiffs’ motion to clarify the scope of the
injunction.
10

While the Government has properly recognized that certain categories of foreign
nationals seeking entry are categorically exempt from the bans, see Opp. at 18-19,
it still refuses to acknowledge that three categories of refugee applicants are
similarly categorically exempt: “U.S.-affiliated Iraqis” at risk of persecution
because of their contributions to the United States’ combat mission in Iraq; and
participants in the Lautenberg Program and the Central American Minors Program,
each of which requires participants to have close family ties with the United
States, a relationship with a “designated resettlement agency,” or both. See HIAS
& IRAP Amicus Br. at 10; https://www.uscis.gov/CAM.
15

DATED: Washington, D.C., July 5, 2017.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Neal K. Katyal
DOUGLAS S. CHIN (Bar No. 6465)
Attorney General of the State of Hawai‘i
CLYDE J. WADSWORTH (Bar No. 8495)
Solicitor General of the State of Hawai‘i
DEIRDRE MARIE-IHA (Bar No. 7923)
DONNA H. KALAMA (Bar No. 6051)
KIMBERLY T. GUIDRY (Bar No. 7813)
ROBERT T. NAKATSUJI (Bar No. 6743)
Deputy Attorneys General
DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, STATE OF HAWAI‘I
Attorneys for Plaintiff, State of Hawai‘i

16

NEAL K. KATYAL*
COLLEEN ROH SINZDAK*
MITCHELL P. REICH*
ELIZABETH HAGERTY*
THOMAS P. SCHMIDT*
SARA SOLOW*
ALEXANDER B. BOWERMAN*
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
*Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, State of
Hawai‘i and Ismail Elshikh