State of Hawaii v. Trump
Filing
336
MOTION for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief Justin B. Cox appearing for Amicus Parties HIAS, International Refugee Assistance Project (Attachments: #1 Exhibit A - Proposed Brief, #2 Exhibit Declaration of Mark Hetfield, President and CEO of HIAS, Inc, #3 Exhibit Supplemental Declaration of Mark Hetfield, President and CEO of HIAS, Inc, #4 Exhibit Declaration of Rebecca Heller, Director of the International Refugee Assistance Project, #5 Exhibit Declaration of General John R. Allen, #6 Exhibit Declaration of (SEALED), #7 Exhibit Declaration of Allen R. Vaught, #8 Proposed Order, #9 Certificate of Service)(Cox, Justin) Modified by (afc) on 7/11/2017: Per direction of the Chambers of Judge Derrick K. Watson: - VIEWING RESTRICTED -
EXHIBIT A
TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
DOCUMENT
ACLU of Hawai’i Foundation
National Immigration Law Center
Mateo Caballero 10081
P.O. Box 3410
Honolulu, Hawai’i 96801
Tel: (808) 522-5908
Fax: (808) 522-5909
mcaballero@acluhawaii.org
Justin B. Cox†
1989 College Ave. NE
Atlanta, GA 30317
Tel: (678) 404-9119
Fax: (213) 639-3911
cox@nilc.org
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
(See Next Page for Additional Counsel)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI’I
STATE OF HAWAI’I and ISMAIL
ELSHIKH,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official
capacity as President of the United
States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; JOHN F.
KELLY, in his official capacity as
Secretary of Homeland Security; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; REX
TILLERSON, in his official capacity as
Secretary of State; and the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKWKSC
BRIEF OF INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
PROJECT AND HIAS AS AMICI
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO
ENFORCE OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, TO MODIFY
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL
National Immigration Law Center
Karen C. Tumlin†
Nicholas Espíritu†
Melissa S. Keaney†
Esther Sung†
3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600
Los Angeles, CA 90010
Tel: (213) 639-3900
Fax: (213) 639-3911
tumlin@nilc.org
espiritu@nilc.org
keaney@nilc.org
sung@nilc.org
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation
Omar C. Jadwat†
Lee Gelernt†
Spencer E. Amdur†
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Tel: (212) 549-2600
Fax: (212) 549-2654
ojadwat@aclu.org
lgelernt@aclu.org
samdur@aclu.org
National Immigration Law Center
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation
Justin B. Cox†
1989 College Ave. NE
Atlanta, GA 30317
Tel: (678) 279-5441
Fax: (213) 639-3911
cox@nilc.org
Cody H. Wofsy†
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Tel: (415) 343-0770
Fax: (415) 395-0950
cwofsy@aclu.org
† Appearing pro hac vice
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1
BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................3
A. Prior Proceedings .............................................................................................3
B. The Government’s Implementation of the Stay ..............................................4
C. HIAS and IRAP ...............................................................................................5
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................6
I. The Injunction Protects Refugees With Bona Fide Relationships to U.S.Based Refugee Assistance Entities Like HIAS & IRAP .................................6
II. The Injunction Protects Additional Categories of Refugees .........................10
III. Categorical Rules are Necessary to Make the Injunction Meaningful and to
Prevent a Bureaucratic Freeze on Refugee Admissions................................13
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................15
i
INTRODUCTION
Amici are respondents in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project
(“IRAP”) and provide legal and resettlement services to refugees and other foreign
nationals here and abroad. Amici write to highlight ways in which the government
is violating this Court’s preliminary injunction, as partially stayed by the Supreme
Court, with respect to refugees and the persons and entities in the United States with
whom they have bona fide relationships.
First, the government has adopted an exceedingly narrow and unjustified
interpretation of the relationships with U.S. entities that shield foreign nationals from
Executive Order 13780.1 Perhaps most alarmingly, the government has taken the
position that refugee clients of resettlement agencies like HIAS are not protected by
the preliminary injunction—a decision that affects refugees who would otherwise be
allowed to enter the United States in the coming weeks and months. The government
has also refused to acknowledge that the injunction continues to cover clients of legal
aid organizations like IRAP. The government does not, and indeed, cannot dispute
that the relationships that HIAS and IRAP have with their clients are “formal,
documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of
Amici also agree with the Hawai’i plaintiffs that the government has adopted an
improperly narrow interpretation of which individuals have “bona fide
relationship[s] with . . . person[s]” in the United States. See Dkt. No. 328-1, Mem.
in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. to Enforce Or, In the Alternative, Modify Prelim. Inj. at 8-10.
1
1
evading [Executive Order 13780],” or that IRAP and HIAS “can legitimately claim
concrete hardship” if their clients are excluded. Trump v. IRAP, Nos. 16-1436 and
16-1540, 528 U.S. __, slip op. at 12-13 (June 26, 2017) (per curiam). Instead, the
government seeks to add criteria, which appear nowhere in the Supreme Court’s
order, to restrict this Court’s protection of individuals with bona fide relationships
to U.S. entities. Such restrictions, if left in place, will impose additional delay and
hardship on refugees and the U.S. entities that proudly call them clients.
Second, the government has refused to recognize that particular categories of
refugees necessarily have the requisite relationship to a U.S. entity or close family
member, and instead insists on making case-by-case determinations where none are
needed. The practical effect of this decision—which affects refugees who accessed
the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (“USRAP”) through specific programs
designed to expedite their resettlement to the United States—is to lengthen what is
already a years-long process. This will result in refugees being further delayed in
their escape from dangerous situations, and could turn into effective denial for many.
The government has grossly misconstrued the Supreme Court’s partial stay
and is inflicting substantial harm on persons and entities in the United States. Amici
respectfully urge this Court to grant Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce or to modify its
preliminary injunction to ensure that the government is not permitted to apply the
Executive Order to individuals in the following categories:
2
1. Refugees with formal “assurances” from resettlement agencies like HIAS.
2. Clients of IRAP and similar U.S. legal services organizations.
3. Individuals who have accessed USRAP through a program or mechanism
that by definition requires the requisite relationship, including but not
limited to the Iraqi Direct Access Program for U.S.-Affiliated Iraqis; the
Central American Minors program; and the Lautenberg program.
BACKGROUND
A.
Prior Proceedings
Section 6(a) of Executive Order 137802 (hereinafter, “the EO”) directed a 120day suspension of refugee travel into the United States and of “decisions on
applications for refugee status.” Section 6(b) lowered the number of refugee
admissions for fiscal year 2017 from 110,000 to 50,000, and suspended entry of
refugees above that number.3
The day before the EO’s effective date, this Court enjoined all of Sections 2
and 6, which injunction the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed as to Sections 2(c),
6(a) and 6(b). Hawai‘i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017). On June 26, 2017,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case; consolidated it with its companion
case from the Fourth Circuit, in which Amici are plaintiffs; and partially stayed the
2
See Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,
Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017); see also Presidential
Mem., Effective Date in Exec. Order 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,965 (June 14, 2017).
3
Refugees from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen are also subject to
Section 2(c)’s 90-day ban on the entry of nationals from those countries.
3
injunctions in both cases. See IRAP, slip op. at 9. While the Court held that the
injunctions appropriately “covered not just respondents, but parties similarly
situated to them,” id. at 10, it stayed the injunctions to the extent they applied to
“foreign nationals abroad who have no connection to the United States at all.” Id. at
11. The government therefore may not apply Sections 2(c), 6(a), or 6(b) against
“foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a
person or entity in the United States.” Id. at 12-13. For entities, the relationship
must be “formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the
purpose of evading [the EO].” Id. at 12.
B.
The Government’s Implementation of the Stay
Despite numerous attempts by the IRAP plaintiffs to contact the government
regarding its plans for implementing the Supreme Court’s partial stay, the
government has said little about how it is enforcing the EO as to refugees, and its
publicly available guidance has been subject to frequent unexplained revisions. The
government’s current position vis-à-vis refugees appears to be as follows.
First, HIAS’ refugee clients, and the clients of other U.S.-based resettlement
agencies, are not protected by this Court’s preliminary injunction. See U.S. Dep’t
of State, Information Regarding the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (June 30,
2017), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2017/272316.htm; see also
Dkt. 301 at 13-20.
4
Second, IRAP’s refugee and other clients, and clients of other similar U.S.based legal aid entities, must prove on a case-by-case basis that they have a bona
fide relationship with their own lawyers. Dkt. 301 at 20-21. The government has
refused to explain what information must be provided or why an attorney-client
relationship with a U.S. entity, particularly those formed before the partial stay was
issued, does not entitle the clients to the protections of the preliminary injunction.
Third, while the government acknowledges that refugees who accessed the
USRAP via certain programs remain protected by this Court’s preliminary
injunction as a categorical matter, without the need for any further case-by-case
showing, it fails to apply that same criteria and logic to exempt the Direct Access
Program for U.S.-Affiliated Iraqis; the Lautenberg program; and the Central
American Minors (“CAM”) program, which are discussed in more detail below.
C.
HIAS and IRAP
Amici are U.S.-based non-profit organizations providing a variety of services
to refugees and other foreign nationals seeking to resettle in the United States. Both
are plaintiffs-respondents in IRAP. HIAS is the world’s oldest refugee resettlement
agency, and has been resettling refugees since 1881. Hetfield Decl. ¶ 2, attached as
Ex. A. It is one of nine agencies in the United States providing resettlement services
to refugees admitted through USRAP, including refugees resettled through the CAM
and Lauternberg programs. Id. ¶¶ 16, 30; Supp. Hetfield Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, attached as
5
Exhibit B. IRAP provides direct legal services to refugees and others seeking to
escape violence and persecution, including refugees in USRAP through the Direct
Access Program for U.S.-Affiliated Iraqis. Heller Decl. ¶¶ 2, 17-21, attached as Ex.
C. IRAP staff and pro bono volunteers represent and work directly with individuals
abroad throughout their application, travel, and resettlement processes. Id. ¶¶ 4, 3136.
ARGUMENT
The government seeks to exclude thousands of refugees who are clearly
protected by this Court’s preliminary injunction. Its position on refugees, like its
cramped and indefensible interpretation of “close relatives,” cannot be squared with
the Supreme Court’s opinion in this case. Because the government has failed to heed
the Supreme Court’s instructions, Amici respectfully ask this Court to enforce the
proper scope of its preliminary injunction, as partially stayed, to prohibit the
government from applying the enjoined provisions to refugees that have the requisite
relationships with U.S. individuals and entities.
I.
THE INJUNCTION PROTECTS REFUGEES WITH BONA FIDE
RELATIONSHIPS TO U.S.-BASED REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
ENTITIES LIKE HIAS & IRAP
The government has said that it intends to exclude HIAS’s clients, and it
apparently intends to exclude at least some of IRAP’s. But the exclusion of clients
of entities like IRAP and HIAS ignores the Supreme Court’s clear instructions. The
6
Court expressly “le[ft] the injunctions entered by the lower courts in place with
respect to respondents and those similarly situated.” IRAP, slip op. at 9 (emphasis
added). Both IRAP and HIAS are respondents before the Supreme Court, and both
“can legitimately claim concrete hardship if [their clients] are excluded.” Id. at 13.
The enjoined provisions should not apply to their clients or clients of similarly
situated entities, because those relationships are “formal, documented, and formed
in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading [the EO].” Id. at 12.
Moreover, both HIAS and IRAP form relationships with their clients that are
at least as close as that between “a lecturer” and “an American audience,” which the
Supreme Court stated was sufficient. Id. Their client relationships illustrate the type
of contact that is sufficient to trigger the injunction’s protection. See id. (“The facts
of these cases illustrate the sort of relationship that qualifies.”).
HIAS forms relationships with many of its clients long before they reach the
United States. Hetfield Decl. ¶¶ 7-9. Its staff “develop strong bonds” with refugee
clients as they provide a host of legal and mental health services. Id. ¶ 10. Once a
refugee is assigned to HIAS for resettlement, HIAS—after evaluating the refugee’s
case and circumstances, and its own capacity and resources—provides a formal
“assurance” to the federal government that it can and will provide for the refugee’s
entire resettlement process. Id. ¶ 16. After providing assurances, HIAS and its
affiliates identify and rent housing; provide transportation from the airport; arrange
7
for basic necessities like rent, food, utilities, and medical care; facilitate enrollment
in school and public benefits programs; and provide ongoing case management
services. Id. ¶¶ 17-21. The government cannot plausibly claim that this extensive,
intimate, and formally documented contact does not constitute a “bona fide
relationship” or that this relationship was formed to “evad[e]” the EO, IRAP, slip op.
at 12, because these assurances were given, and the relationships were formed,
before the Supreme Court issued the partial stay. Supp. Hetfield Decl. ¶ 4. The
Court should therefore prohibit the government from barring refugees who have
documented relationships with HIAS and the other eight resettlement agencies
operating in the United States.4
IRAP’s client relationships are similarly extensive, formal, and documented.
IRAP spends multiple weeks, sometimes months, interviewing prospective clients.
Heller Decl. ¶ 32-33. After executing a formal written representation agreement, id.
¶ 33, IRAP and its affiliated attorneys help their clients navigate USRAP, often over
The government argues that recognizing resettlement agencies’ relationships with
their formally assured clients “would largely eviscerate the Supreme Court’s stay
ruling with respect to the Executive Order’s refugee provisions.” Dkt. 301 at 17.
Yet, as the government itself acknowledges, fewer than 24,000 refugees have been
formally assured, id. at 18, out of the more than 200,000 individuals in USRAP.
Amici further agree with the Hawai’i plaintiffs’ arguments against the government’s
unsupported attempt to carve relationships initiated by the federal government out
of the Supreme Court’s order. Dkt. 328-1 at 12-13. Notably, HIAS has been
resettling refugees in the United States since long before the federal government
established any system to do so. Hetfield Decl. ¶ 2.
4
8
the course of multiple years. Id. ¶ 33. IRAP and its network of attorneys investigate
clients’ claims, draft legal submissions, prepare clients for interviews, and often
provide non-legal forms of practical assistance, such as assisting with medical and
mental health needs, housing, and safe passage out of immediate danger. Id. ¶¶ 3336. IRAP’s clients therefore have a clear relationship with a U.S. entity (IRAP itself
and affiliated attorneys) and individuals (their attorneys). The Court should hold
that the government cannot apply the EO to any clients of IRAP or any other U.S.based provider of legal services to refugees and other foreign nationals.
The Supreme Court made clear why these relationships remain protected.
Entities with bona fide relationships to refugees can “legitimately claim concrete
hardship if th[ose] person[s] [are] excluded.” IRAP, slip op. at 13. As HIAS and
IRAP have explained, their resources would be diverted, their prior efforts would be
wasted, and their staffs and budgets would be stretched thin were their clients banned
from entering the United States.5 See Hetfield Decl. ¶ 22; Supp. Hetfield Decl. 7-9;
Heller Decl. ¶¶ 37-38. The same is true for other entities that assist refugees in the
resettlement process, who also continue to be protected.
The Supreme Court further emphasized that its examples of bona fide
relationships were meant only to illustrate, not exhaust, the kinds of relationships
5
The direct injuries the EO inflicts on IRAP and HIAS are one of their bases for
standing to challenge the EO.
9
that the injunction continues to cover. IRAP, slip op. at 12 (“The facts of these cases
illustrate the sort of relationship that qualifies.”) (emphasis added). Notably, these
relationships in no way resemble the one example the Supreme Court gave of a
relationship that would not be bona fide: a non-profit that “contact[s] foreign
nationals” and adds them to client lists “simply to avoid” the Executive Order. Id.
The Court should therefore enforce the injunction against application of the EO to
clients of organizations like IRAP and to refugees who have been assured by HIAS
and other refugee resettlement organizations.
II.
THE INJUNCTION PROTECTS ADDITIONAL CATEGORIES OF
REFUGEES
In its guidance regarding visa applications, the government properly
recognized that many categories of visas are categorically exempt under the
Supreme Court’s decision.6 After Amici pointed out in briefing that same is true of
many USRAP programs, the government issued similar guidance for some
refugees.7 That guidance, however, fails to include three categories of refugees who
See Dep’t of State, Executive Order on Visas, June 29, 2017, available at
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/news/important-announcement.html.
6
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Frequently Asked Questions on Protecting the Nation
from Terrorist Entry into the United States (June 29, 2017) at Q36,
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/29/frequently-asked-questions-protectingnation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states (“[C]ertain categories of refugee cases
require relationships with close family members in the United States, specifically
‘Priority 3’ cases, Form I-730 (following-to-join) cases and Iraqi and Syrian Priority
2 cases where access is based on an approved Form I-130 (family based petition).”).
7
10
necessarily have a bona fide relationship with a U.S. entity, individual, or both. The
Court should therefore enforce the injunction against application of the EO on a caseby-case basis to these categorically exempt refugee programs.
First, the Direct Access Program for U.S.-Affiliated Iraqis permits certain
Iraqi nationals to apply to USRAP for eventual resettlement to the United States.
Applicants must demonstrate that they are at risk of persecution because of their
contributions to the United States’ mission in Iraq after March 20, 2003 as
employees of the U.S. government, a U.S.-based media organization, or a U.S.
government-funded entity “closely associated with the U.S. mission in Iraq.”8 By
definition, these Iraqis worked for Americans and American entities who were in
Iraq either to carry out or to report on the United States’ military, diplomatic, and
humanitarian mission there. Doing so put these Iraqis in the same dangerous
conditions faced by American service members, who depended on their Iraqi allies
in myriad ways.9 Iraqis who apply to USRAP through this program must prove not
only their affiliation with U.S. entities and individuals, but also that they are at risk
See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, & Migration,
Fact Sheet: U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Direct Access Program for
U.S.-Affiliated
Iraqis
(Mar.
11,
2016),
https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2016/254650.htm.
8
9
See Decl. of General John R. Allen, attached as Ex. D; Decl. of Abdulsalam
Mohammed Jameel Albasari, attached as Ex. E; Decl. of Allen Vaught, attached as
Ex. F.
11
of persecution because of those relationships. See supra note 11. As the name itself
denotes, all applicants in the program are, as a categorical matter, “U.S.-Affiliated,”
and so the government’s case-by-case approach to the program is unjustified.
Similarly unjustified is the government’s refusal to categorically exempt from
the EO individuals in USRAP by virtue of the Lautenberg Amendment, which
permits certain nationals of the former Soviet Union with “close family in the United
States” to apply for refugee status.10 The government has not explained (or even
acknowledged) its decision to require refugees in this category to provide case-bycase proof of the requisite tie to the United States. Amici note, however, that
grandparents and grandchildren are considered “close family” for purposes of the
Lautenberg Amendment. See Supp. Hetfield Decl. ¶ 6. Thus, the government’s
refusal to categorically exempt the Lautenberg program may reflect its indefensible
position that grandparents are not close relatives—even as the government’s own
rules in the program undermine its arguments for excluding grandparents.
Finally, the Central American Minors (“CAM”) program should also be
categorically exempt from the EO. This program allows children with a parent in
See Dep’t of State, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017, Sept. 15,
2016,
available
at
https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/docsforcongress/261956.htm.
10
12
the United States to petition for refugee status.11 DNA testing is required to verify
the family relationship. And the application must be initiated in the United States
through one of the nine U.S.-based refugee resettlement agencies (of which HIAS is
one), which shepherds the applicants through the entire process. The CAM program
is therefore doubly exempt, by virtue of the categorical ties to an individual (a parent)
and an entity (a resettlement agency) in the United States.12
III.
CATEGORICAL RULES ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE THE
INJUNCTION MEANINGFUL AND TO PREVENT A
BUREAUCRATIC FREEZE ON REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
The government, enjoined from implementing the total ban on refugee
admissions intended by the EO, threatens to achieve much of the same through the
slow death of procedural delays.
Case-by-case determinations of whether a
See generally Dep’t of State, Central American Minors (CAM) Program, available
at https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/cam/index.htm.
11
12
In keeping with the overall family reunification purpose of the program, a CAM
application may also seek admission of the child’s primary caregiver, provided that
the caregiver is also related to the child or parent. See Central American Minors
(CAM) Program, supra note 13. The government recently directed that CAM cases
involving a caregiver should be examined case-by-case, while cases without a
caregiver are categorically exempt. Supp. Hetfield Decl. at Ex. A. Because the child
must be related to both the U.S.-based parent and the caregiver, though, the refusal
to exempt the entire CAM program again reflects the government’s unjustifiably
cramped definition of “close family member.” See Dkt. 301 at 19 n.6 (asserting that
caregivers “do[] not necessarily have a sufficiently close relationship to a U.S.-based
parent to qualify as a ‘close family member’”). Its decision to fall back yet again on
its unjustified exclusion of grandparents and other close family relationships offers
no reason to reject a categorical exemption of the CAM program.
13
particular refugee has “a credible claim of a bona fide relationship” with a U.S. entity
or person, IRAP, slip op. at 12, should be strictly limited to situations in which such
analysis is actually necessary to determine whether a relationship exists.
Refugee processing and resettlement is a long and tortuous process, requiring
coordination across multiple governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations. Within the U.S. government, a variety of agencies
conduct different security checks for every refugee. See Supp. Hetfield Decl. ¶¶ 1215.13 Some of these clearances are only valid for a set period, usually months, and
must be repeated if they expire. Supp. Hetfield Decl. ¶¶ 11-17. But because each
security check can take months or even years to complete, the expiration of one can
have a cascade effect, as other clearances expire while the first is being redone. Id.
¶¶ 10, 18-19. Accordingly, even relatively short-term delays in processing or
disruptions of USRAP reverberate for far longer.14
13
See generally USCIS, Refugee Processing & Security
https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening#RefugeeProcessing.
14
Screening,
A powerful example of this reality is readily available. The day President Trump
was inaugurated, the United States was on pace to hit the existing admissions cap of
110,000 refugees for this fiscal year. See Phillip Connor & Jens Manuel Krogstad,
U.S. On Track to Reach Obama Administration’s Goal of Resettling 110,000
Refugees
This
Year,
Pew
Research
Center
(Jan.
20,
2017),
http://pewrsr.ch/2jwYQvg. A few months later—before the Supreme Court issued
its partial stay—that expected total had fallen to slightly more than 70,000. See
Gardiner Harris, U.S. Quietly Lifts Limit on Number of Refugees Allowed In, N.Y.
Times (May 26, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2tzUcmL. In between, USRAP was suspended
for eight days (before that provision of the first EO was enjoined nationwide) and
14
Further, the looming end to the government’s fiscal year on September 30
means that any delay could effectively bar refugees from the United States forever.
The annual level of refugee admissions is reset annually by the President, before the
beginning of the next fiscal year, and after appropriate consultation with Congress.
See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1157. Depending on where President Trump sets that level,
refugees who are not resettled this fiscal year—even those protected by the
injunction—may be left in limbo indefinitely.
Amici accordingly urge the Court to articulate categorical rules to ensure that
refugees who the Supreme Court held are still protected by this Court’s injunction
are not delayed or wrongly excluded from the United States while the ban is partially
implemented. Specifically, the Court should enforce the injunction as to all refugees
who have assurances; are clients of IRAP or similar organizations; or are in the
categories noted above.
CONCLUSION
Amici respectfully request that the Court grant Plaintiffs’ Motion.
DATED: Atlanta, Georgia, July 10, 2017.
/s/ Justin B. Cox
Justin B. Cox
the lowered admissions cap was in effect for fewer than seven weeks (before that
part of the first EO was superseded by the same provision in the second EO, which
this Court enjoined before it went into effect). Those eight days and seven weeks
prevented tens of thousands of refugees from entering the United States.
15
National Immigration Law Center
Justin B. Cox†
1989 College Ave. NE
Atlanta, GA 30317
Tel: (678) 279-5441
Fax: (213) 639-3911
cox@nilc.org
National Immigration Law Center
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation
Karen C. Tumlin†
Nicholas Espíritu†
Melissa S. Keaney†
Esther Sung†
3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1600
Los Angeles, CA 90010
Tel: (213) 639-3900
Fax: (213) 639-3911
tumlin@nilc.org
espiritu@nilc.org
keaney@nilc.org
sung@nilc.org
Omar C. Jadwat†
Lee Gelernt†
Spencer E. Amdur†
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Tel: (212) 549-2600
Fax: (212) 549-2654
ojadwat@aclu.org
lgelernt@aclu.org
samdur@aclu.org
ACLU of Hawaiʻi Foundation
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation
Mateo Caballero
10081
P.O. Box 3410
Honolulu, Hawaiʻi 96801
Tel: (808) 522-5908
Fax: (808) 522-5909
mcaballero@acluhawaii.org
cox@nilc.org
Cody H. Wofsy†
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Tel: (415) 343-0770
Fax: (415) 395-0950
cwofsy@aclu.org
† Appearing pro hac vice
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
16
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