State of Hawaii v. Trump

Filing 383

Declaration re #368 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order . (Attachments: #1 Exhibit M, Decl. of Former Nat'l Sec. Officials, #2 Certificate of Service)(Katyal, Neal)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
STATE OF HAWAII, ISMAIL ELSHIKH, JOHN DOES 1 & 2,
and MUSLIM ASSOCIATION OF HAWAII, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the
United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; ELAINE DUKE, in her official capacity as Acting
Secretary of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE; REX TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary
of State; and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv00050-DKW-KSC

Defendants.
JOINT DECLARATION OF
FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICIALS
We, the below named individuals, declare as follows:
1.
We are former national security, foreign policy, and intelligence officials in the
United States Government:
a.

Madeleine K. Albright served as Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001. A refugee
and naturalized American citizen, she served as U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations from 1993 to 1997. She has also been a member of the
Central Intelligence Agency External Advisory Board since 2009 and of the
Defense Policy Board since 2011, in which capacities she has received
assessments of threats facing the United States.

b.

Rand Beers served as Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President of
the United States from 2014 to 2015.

c.

John B. Bellinger III served as the Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of
State from 2005 to 2009. He previously served as Senior Associate Counsel to
the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council from 2001 to
2005.

d.

Daniel Benjamin served as Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism at the
U.S. Department of State from 2009 to 2012.

EXHIBIT M

e.

Antony Blinken served as Deputy Secretary of State from 2015 to January 20,
2017. He previously served as Deputy National Security Advisor to the
President of the United States from 2013 to 2015.

f.

John O. Brennan served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from
2013 to 2017. He previously served as Deputy National Security Advisor for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Assistant to the President from
2009 to 2013.

g.

R. Nicholas Burns served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from
2005 to 2008. He previously served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO and as U.S.
Ambassador to Greece.

h.

William J. Burns served as Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014. He
previously served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 2008 to
2011, as U.S. Ambassador to Russia from 2005 to 2008, as Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2001 to 2005, and as U.S. Ambassador to
Jordan from 1998 to 2001.

i.

James Clapper served as U.S. Director of National Intelligence from 2010 to
January 20, 2017.

j.

David S. Cohen served as Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence from 2011 to 2015 and as Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency from 2015 to January 20, 2017.

k.

Eliot A. Cohen served as Counselor of the U.S. Department of State from 2007
to 2009.

l.

Bathsheba N. Crocker served as Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs from 2014 to 2017.

m.

Ryan Crocker served as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2011 to 2012, as
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
from 2004 to 2007, as U.S. Ambassador to Syria from 1998 to 2001, as U.S.
Ambassador to Kuwait from 1994 to 1997, and U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon
from 1990 to 1993.

n.

Thomas Donilon served as U.S. National Security Advisor from 2010 to 2013.

o.

Jen Easterly served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Counterterrorism from October 2013 to December 2016.

p.

Daniel Feldman served as U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan from 2014 to 2015, Deputy U.S. Special Representative for

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Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2009 to 2014, and previously Director for
Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security Council.
q.

Jonathan Finer served as Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State from 2015 until
January 20, 2017, and Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S.
Department of State from 2016 to January 20, 2017.

r.

Michèle Flournoy served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 2009 to
2013.

s.

Robert S. Ford served as U.S. Ambassador to Syria from 2011 to 2014, as Deputy
Ambassador to Iraq from 2009 to 2010, and as U.S. Ambassador to Algeria from
2006 to 2008.

t.

Josh Geltzer served as Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National
Security Council from 2015 to 2017. Previously, he served as Deputy Legal
Advisor to the National Security Council and as Counsel to the Assistant
Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice.

u.

Suzy George served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff and
Executive Secretary to the National Security Council from 2014 to 2017.

v.

Phil Gordon served as Special Assistant to the President and White House
Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf from 2013 to 2015,
and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs from 2009 to
2013.

w.

Chuck Hagel served as Secretary of Defense from 2013 to 2015, and previously
served as Co-Chair of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. From 1997
to 2009, he served as U.S. Senator for Nebraska, and as a senior member of the
Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees.

x.

Avril D. Haines served as Deputy National Security Advisor to the President of
the United States from 2015 to January 20, 2017. From 2013 to 2015, she served
as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

y.

Luke Hartig served as Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the
National Security Council from 2014 to 2016.

z.

General (ret.) Michael V. Hayden, USAF, served as Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency from 2006 to 2009. From 1995 to 2005, he served as
Director of the National Security Agency.

aa.

Heather A. Higginbottom served as Deputy Secretary of State for Management
and Resources from 2013 to 2017.

3

bb.

Christopher R. Hill served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs from 2005 to 2009. He also served as U.S. Ambassador to
Macedonia, Poland, the Republic of Korea, and Iraq.

cc.

John F. Kerry served as Secretary of State from 2013 to January 20, 2017.

dd.

Prem Kumar served as Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa on
the National Security Council staff of the White House from 2013 to 2015.

ee.

Richard Lugar served as U.S. Senator for Indiana from 1977 to 2013, and as
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1985 to 1987 and
2003 to 2007, and as ranking member of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations from 2007 to 2013.

ff.

John E. McLaughlin served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency from 2000 to 2004 and as Acting Director in 2004. His duties included
briefing President-elect Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush.

gg.

Lisa O. Monaco served as Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security Advisor from 2013 to January
20, 2017.

hh.

Cameron P. Munter served as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from 2009 to 2012
and to Serbia from 2007 to 2009.

ii.

James C. O’Brien served as Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs
from 2015 to January 20, 2017. He served in the U.S. Department of State from
1989 to 2001, including as Principal Deputy Director of Policy Planning and as
Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans.

jj.

Matthew G. Olsen served as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
from 2011 to 2014.

kk.

Leon E. Panetta served as Secretary of Defense from 2011 to 2013. From 2009
to 2011, he served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

ll.

Jeffrey Prescott served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director
for Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Gulf States from 2015 to 2017.

mm.

Samantha J. Power served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations from 2013 to January 20, 2017. From 2009 to 2013, she served as
Senior Director for Multilateral and Human Rights on the National Security
Council.

4

nn.

Susan E. Rice served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
from 2009 to 2013 and as National Security Advisor from 2013 to January 20,
2017.

oo.

Anne C. Richard served as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees
and Migration from 2012 to January 20, 2017.

pp.

Kori Schake served as the Deputy Director for Policy Planning at the U.S.
Department of State from December 2007 to May 2008. Previously, she was
the director for Defense Strategy and Requirements on the National Security
Council in President George W. Bush’s first term.

qq.

Eric P. Schwartz served as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees
and Migration from 2009 to 2011. From 1993 to 2001, he was responsible for
refugee and humanitarian issues on the National Security Council, ultimately
serving as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and
Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs.

rr.

Wendy R. Sherman served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from
2011 to 2015.

ss.

Vikram Singh served as Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan from 2010 to 2011 and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Southeast Asia from 2012 to 2014.

tt.

Jeffrey H. Smith served as General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency
from 1995 to 1996. Previously, he served as General Counsel of the Senate
Armed Services Committee.

uu.

James B. Steinberg served as Deputy National Security Adviser from 1996 to
2000 and as Deputy Secretary of State from 2009 to 2011.

vv.

William Wechsler served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operations
and Combating Terrorism at the U.S. Department of Defense from 2012 to
2015.

ww.

Samuel M. Witten served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Population, Refugees, and Migration from 2007 to 2010. From 2001 to 2007,
he served as Deputy Legal Adviser at the State Department.

We have collectively devoted decades to combatting the various terrorist threats that the
United States faces in a dynamic and dangerous world. We have held the highest security
clearances, and many of us were current on active intelligence regarding all credible terrorist
threat streams directed against the United States as recently as one week before the issuance of
the Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order on “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into
the United States” (“Travel Ban 1.0”). A number of us joined a declaration that was filed in

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support of a legal challenge to that Executive Order.1 Each of us also joined an amicus brief that
was filed in the Supreme Court in support of the challenge of the plaintiffs in this case to the
subsequent March 6, 2017 Executive Order (“Travel Ban 2.0”).2
2.
The Administration has now replaced the Travel Ban 2.0 with a new
Proclamation titled “Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for
Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats.”
The Proclamation is dated September 24, 2017, and is scheduled to take effect fully on October
18, 2017 (“Travel Ban 3.0” or “Ban”).
3.
The Ban preserves the basic approach of the original two Orders, without
providing any persuasive evidence that these measures are necessary to enhance our national
security or foreign policy interests. The Ban includes a few new exceptions to the prior Order,
adds a couple of countries to the list (Chad, North Korea, and Venezuela) and removes a
country (Sudan). But it still relies on unprecedented and sweeping nationality-based bans,
directed at a list of almost exclusively Muslim-majority countries that is substantially similar
to the prior lists. (The North Korea and Venezuela additions will affect exceedingly few
people, and Chad is a majority-Muslim country.) The Ban blocks well over 150 million people
from entering the United States.3
4.
We agree that the United States faces real threats from terrorist networks and
must take all prudent and effective steps to combat them, including the appropriate vetting of
travelers to the United States. Yet, we are unaware of any national security threat that would
justify Travel Ban 3.0. To the contrary, its enforcement would cause serious harm to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States.
I.

Travel Ban 3.0 Serves No Genuine National Security Purpose

5.
As a national security measure, this Ban is unnecessary. National security-based
immigration restrictions have consistently been tailored to respond to: (1) specific, credible
threats based on individualized information, (2) the best available intelligence, and (3) thorough
interagency legal and policy review. Travel Ban 3.0 rests not on such tailored grounds, but
rather, on (1) general bans (2) that are not responsive to an actual national security threat
informed by intelligence, and (3) that emerged from a January Order that was not vetted through
the kind of careful interagency legal and policy review that we would expect from a serious
national security process.
6.
The Ban is of unprecedented scope. Apart from Travel Bans 1.0 and 2.0, we know
of no case where a President has invoked his statutory authority to suspend admission for such a
broad class of people. Even after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Government did not invoke the
1

Joint Decl. of Madeline Albright et al., No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2017), available at
https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/politics/declaration-of-national-security-officials/2324/.
2
Br. of Amici Curiae Former National Security Officials in Support of Respondents, Nos. 16-1436 and 16-1540
(U.S. Sup. Ct. Sept. 18, 2017), available at
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Clinics/rolc_amicus_9.19.17_.pdf
3
This figure reflects the population of the listed countries in the Proclamation, excluding North Korea and
Venezuela.

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provisions of law cited by the Administration to broadly bar entrants based on nationality,
national origin, or religious affiliation. Suspensions were limited to particular individuals or
subclasses of nationals who posed a specific, articulable threat based on their known actions and
affiliations. In adopting Travel Ban 3.0, the Administration alleges no derogatory factual
information about any particular recipient of a visa or green card or any credible threat from
nationals of the countries banned.
7.
Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has developed a rigorous system of
security vetting, leveraging the full capabilities of the law enforcement and intelligence
communities. This vetting is applied to travelers not once, but multiple times. As government
officials, we sought continually to improve that vetting, as was done in response to particular
threats identified by U.S. intelligence in 2011 and 2015. Indeed, successive administrations have
continually worked to improve this vetting through robust information-sharing and data
integration, without resorting to multiple, sweeping bans on travel. We have seen no evidence
from the Government for why the country suddenly needs to shift from this tested system of
individualized vetting, developed and implemented by national security professionals across the
government, to a national origin-based ban.
8.
The current individualized vetting system places the burden of proof on the
traveler to prove her identity and eligibility for travel. If the traveler is unable to make this
showing, the U.S. Government can deny her a visa based on an individualized review. This has
been the policy of the U.S. Government across multiple administrations.
9.
Travel Ban 3.0’s generalized, country-based approach is substantially the same as
its predecessors, although its bans on travel are now indefinite rather than temporary, and the
stated rationale has shifted. Removing most of the emphasis on terrorism, the new Ban is
purportedly necessary “to elicit improved identity-management and information-sharing
protocols and practices from foreign governments.” We have seen no evidence, however, that
such a sweeping, country-based ban on travel is necessary for this objective.
10.
In fact, the only concrete evidence to emerge from this administration on this
point to date has shown just the opposite, that country-based bans are ineffective. A leaked DHS
Office of Intelligence and Analysis memorandum analyzing the ban in the January Order found
that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity.”
The memorandum went on to note that a majority of the U.S.-based individuals who were
inspired by a foreign terrorist organization to participate in terrorism-related activity were
citizens of the United States; the minority of foreign-born individuals were scattered from among
twenty-six different countries; and most of the top origin countries of those individuals are not
the countries listed in the Order.4
11.
Imposing a ban on all or most of the travelers for a series of countries due to the
information sharing practices of their government is a massively overbroad and imprecise
response, especially when the data does not show any particularized threat from those
countries. Defendants have provided no evidence or specific information that nationals of the
4

Citizenship Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States,
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730/DHS-intelligence-document-on-President-Donald.pdf.

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banned countries pose a credible threat to the safety of Americans if they are allowed to enter the
United States after individualized screenings, or of the alleged harm that would occur in the
absence of the ban. The Ban targets a list of countries whose nationals have committed no
deadly terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in the last forty years.5 In fact, a recent analysis by the Cato
Institute shows that each new version of the travel ban is “even further divorced from threats of
terrorism to the United States than the prior order.”6
In particular:
a.

The Ban newly adds Chad to the list of countries subject to a ban. No citizen of
Chad has carried out a terrorist attack or been convicted of planning an attack on
U.S. soil in the last forty years. Chad, a Muslim-majority country, has long been
one of the United States’ most effective counterterrorism partners in the region.
Chad has been used as a staging ground by the U.S. Air Force in its surveillance
of Boko Haram, hosted about 2,000 U.S. troops for an annual military exercise in
March 2017, and is the base of the Multinational Joint Task Force, the
coordinated effort to fight Boko Haram in the region. The presence of Boko
Haram in Chad is dwarfed by their activity in other countries in the region that
were not included in the ban. Chad’s inclusion on the Travel Ban 3.0 list
reportedly occurred over objections by officials in the State Department, the
Pentagon, the U.S. Embassy in Chad, and U.S. Africa Command, a decision that
left administration officials “befuddled and frustrated.”7

b.

The Ban newly adds North Korea (DPRK) to the list of countries subject to a ban.
No citizen of North Korea has carried out a terrorist attack or been convicted of
planning an attack on U.S. soil in the last forty years. Because of severe exit
restrictions imposed by the North Korean government, very few North Koreans
actually travel to the United States at all. North Korean defectors typically first
receive South Korean passports in any event.8 In addition, such defectors would
likely have a well-founded fear of political persecution if returned to North Korea,
and thus deserve careful consideration for refugee status.

c.

The Ban newly adds Venezuela to the list of countries subject to a ban. No citizen
of Venezuela has carried out a terrorist attack or been convicted of planning an
attack on U.S. soil in the last forty years. The Ban only applies to officials from
government agencies involved in screening and vetting procedures. Such targeted
sanctions are more appropriately done by the Treasury Department under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and other legal authorities rather
than through overbroad country bans.

5

Alex Nowrasteh, President Trump’s New Travel Executive Order Has Little National Security Justification, Cato
Institute: Cato at Liberty, September 25, 2017.
6
David Bier, New Travel Ban Would Not Have Prevented the Entry of Any Terrorists Since 9/11, Cato Institute:
Cato at Liberty, September 25, 2017.
7
Helene Cooper et al., Chad’s Inclusion in Travel Ban Could Jeopardize American Interests, Officials Say, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 26, 2017.
8
Darla Cameron, Why Trump’s Latest Travel Ban Included These Eight Countries, Wash. Post (Sept. 26, 2017);
Emily Rauhala, Almost No North Koreans Travel to the U.S., So Why Ban Them?, Wash. Post (Sept. 25, 2017).

8

12.
Notably, the Ban does not include non-Muslim majority countries such as
Belgium where there have been widely-documented problems with information sharing, and
whose nationals have carried out terrorist attacks on Europe. And although for some of the
countries, the Ban applies only to certain non-immigrant visas, together those visas are far and
away the most frequently used non-immigrant visas from these nations.
II.

Travel Ban 3.0 Will Harm the National Security and Foreign Policy Interests of the
United States

13.
In our professional judgment, Travel Ban 3.0 would undermine the national
security of the United States, rather than making us safer. If given effect, Travel Ban 3.0 would
do long-term damage to our national security and foreign policy interests, and disrupt
counterterrorism and national security partnerships. It would aid the propaganda effort of the
Islamic State (“IS”) and serve its recruitment message by feeding into the narrative that the
United States is at war with Islam. It would hinder relationships with the very communities law
enforcement professionals need to engage to address the threat. And apart from all of these
concerns, the Ban offends our nation’s laws and values.
In particular:
a.

The Ban would disrupt critical counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national
security partnerships that are critical to our obtaining the necessary information
sharing and collaboration in intelligence, law enforcement, military, and
diplomatic channels to address the threat posed by terrorist groups such as IS.
The Ban would further strain our relationships with partner countries in Europe
and the Middle East, on whom we rely for vital counterterrorism cooperation,
undermining years of effort to bring them closer. By alienating these partners, we
would frustrate access to the intelligence and resources necessary to fight the
root causes of terror or disrupt attacks launched from abroad, before an attack
occurs within our borders.9

b.

The Ban would endanger intelligence sources in the field. For current
information, our intelligence officers may rely on human sources in some of the
countries listed. The Ban breaches faith with those very sources, who have risked
much or all to keep Americans safe—and whom our officers had promised always
to protect with the full might of our government and our people.

c.

The Ban would feed the recruitment narrative of IS and other extremists that
portray the United States as at war with Islam. As government officials, we took
every step we could to counter violent extremism. Because of the Ban’s disparate

9

Chad just withdrew hundreds of troops from a regional effort to fight against Boko Haram, two weeks after their
communications minister said the new Proclamation “seriously undermines Chad’s image and the good relations
between the two countries, notably in the fight against terrorism.” Conor Gaffey, After Trump Travel Ban, Chad
Pulls Troops From Boko Haram Fight in Niger, Newsweek, October 13, 2017.

9

impact on Muslim travelers and immigrants, it would fuel IS’s narrative and
sends the wrong message to the Muslim community here at home and all over the
world: that the U.S. Government is hostile to them and their religion. The
Ban also might endanger Christian communities, by handing IS a recruiting tool
and propaganda victory that spreads their message that the United States is
engaged in a religious war.
d.

The Ban would disrupt ongoing law enforcement efforts. By alienating MuslimAmerican communities in the United States, it would harm our efforts to enlist
their aid in identifying radicalized individuals who might launch attacks of the
kind recently seen in San Bernadino and Orlando.

e.

The Ban would have a devastating humanitarian impact. The current bans have
already disrupted the movement of countless people, including women and
children, who are fleeing danger and have been victimized by actual terrorists.
Travelers face deep uncertainty about whether they may travel to or from the
United States: for medical treatment, funerals or other pressing family reasons.

f.

The Ban would cause serious economic damage to American citizens and
residents. The Ban would affect many foreign travelers who annually inject
hundreds of billions into the U.S. economy, supporting well over a million U.S.
jobs. Affected companies have noted the adverse impact of the bans to date on
many strategic economic sectors, including defense, technology, medicine, culture
and others.

14.
For all of the foregoing reasons, in our professional opinion, Travel Ban 3.0
does not further—but instead harms—sound U.S. national security and foreign policy. Issuing
a new preliminary injunction against Travel Ban 3.0 would not jeopardize national security. It
would simply preserve the status quo ante, still requiring individuals to be subjected to all the
rigorous legal vetting processes that are currently in place. Allowing the Ban to take effect
would wreak havoc on innocent lives and deeply held American values.
15.
Ours is a nation of immigrants, committed to the faith that we are all equal
under the law and abhor discrimination, whether based on race, religion, sex, or national origin.
As government officials, we sought diligently to protect our country, even while maintaining
an immigration system as free as possible from discrimination, that applies no religious tests,
and that measures individuals by their merits, not stereotypes of their countries or groups.
Blanket bans of certain countries or classes of people are beneath the dignity of the nation and
Constitution that we each took oaths to protect. Rebranding a proposal first advertised as a
“Muslim Ban” as “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry” or “Enhancing Vetting
Capabilities and Processes” does not disguise the Ban’s discriminatory intent, or make it
necessary, effective, or faithful to America’s Constitution, laws, or values.
Respectfully submitted,
s/MADELINE K. ALBRIGHT

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s/RAND BEERS
s/JOHN D. BELLINGER III
s/DANIEL BENJAMIN
s/ANTONY BLINKEN
s/JOHN O. BRENNAN
s/R. NICHOLAS BURNS
s/WILLIAM J. BURNS
s/JAMES CLAPPER
s/DAVID S. COHEN
s/ELIOT A. COHEN
s/BATHSHEBA N. CROCKER
s/RYAN CROCKER
s/THOMAS DONILON
s/JEN EASTERLY
s/DANIEL FELDMAN
s/JONATHAN FINER
s/MICHÈLE FLOURNOY
s/ROBERT S. FORD
s/JOSH GELTZER
s/SUZY GEORGE
s/PHIL GORDON
s/CHUCK HAGEL
s/AVRIL D. HAINES
s/LUKE HARTIG
s/MICHAEL V. HAYDEN
s/HEATHER A. HIGGINBOTTOM
s/CHRISTOPHER R. HILL
s/JOHN F. KERRY
s/PREM KUMAR
s/RICHARD LUGAR
s/JOHN E. MCLAUGHLIN
s/LISA O. MONACO
s/CAMERON P. MUNTER
s/JAMES C. O’BRIEN
s/MATTHEW G. OLSEN
s/LEON E. PANETTA
s/JEFFREY PRESCOTT
s/SAMANTHA J. POWER
s/SUSAN E. RICE
s/ANNE C. RICHARD
s/KORI SCHAKE
s/ERIC P. SCHWARTZ
s/WENDY R. SHERMAN
s/VIKRAM SINGH
s/JEFFREY H. SMITH
s/JAMES B. STEINBERG

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s/WILLIAM WECHSLER
s/SAMUEL M. WITTEN
Executed this 15th day of October, 2017
*All original signatures are on file with Harold Hongju Koh, Rule of Law Clinic, Yale Law School,
New Haven, CT. 06520-8215 203-432-4932
We declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
foregoing is true and correct.

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