Robinson v. Pfister et al
Filing
59
ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 1/25/2017. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part, d/e 45 . Defendants Anderson, Godinez, Knauer and Wolf are terminated because they are implicated only in t he failure-to-protect and procedural due process claims. The Final Pretrial Conference is scheduled for 6/2/2017 at 10:00 a.m. Jury Selection and Trial set for 6/27/2017 through 6/29/2017 beginning at 9:00 AM each day in Courtroom 1 in Springfield before Judge Sue E. Myerscough. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins may be able to provide a sooner trial date if the parties consent. Consent to Magistrate forms attached. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) (Attachments: # 1 Consent to Magistrate Forms)(MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 25 January, 2017 12:47:29 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KEVIN DEVON ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
RANDY PFISTER, et al.,
Defendants.
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15-CV-1093
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se from his incarceration in Pontiac
Correctional Center on claims for failure to protect, excessive force,
inhumane conditions, and procedural due process violations. The
case is at the summary judgment stage. For the reasons explained
below, summary judgment is granted to Defendants on the failure
to protect and procedural due process claims. Summary judgment
is denied on the excessive force claim. Summary judgment is
denied with leave to renew on the inhumane conditions claim.
Facts
These facts are set forth in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
drawing reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as required at the
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summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists
when a reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant. Id.
The claims arise from events which began on September 30,
2014 in Pontiac Correctional Center. That day, Officer Cerda, who
is not a Defendant, instructed Plaintiff to move into a cell with an
inmate Daniels whom Plaintiff believed was a sexual predator.
Plaintiff had heard rumors that the inmate Daniels was homosexual
and had a history of sexual assaults on and sexual misconduct with
his cellmates. (Pl.’s Dep. 22.) Plaintiff refused to cell with inmate
Daniels, whereupon Plaintiff was handcuffed behind his back and
escorted to a cage in the sick call area. (Pl.’s Dep. 23.) Concerned
about why officers tried to move Plaintiff into the cell with inmate
Daniels, Plaintiff asked to speak to a Lieutenant and also asked
that his tight handcuffs be loosened. (Pl.’s Dep. 24.) Defendant
Tovrea refused, and the two had words. Id. Plaintiff started kicking
the cage and yelling for a Lieutenant because Plaintiff felt
threatened by Defendant Tovrea. Id.
Defendant Tovrea entered the cage—what happened after that
is disputed. Plaintiff contends that Tovrea grabbed Plaintiff by the
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throat and slammed Plaintiff onto a concrete bench, whereupon
Plaintiff’s head bounced off the concrete and hit Tovrea’s nose,
causing Tovrea’s nose to bleed. Defendant Tovrea maintains that
Plaintiff “kicked off the bench striking [Tovrea] in the nose with his
right elbow.” (Adj. Com. Final Summ. Report, d/e 46-2, p. 1.)
Plaintiff maintains that Defendants Skeen and Blackard came to
the scene and slammed Plaintiff’s head into the floor, smacked him
repeatedly on the back of his head, rammed his head into the wall,
and used other unnecessary force. (Pl.’s Dep. p. 26.)
Plaintiff was then, for a couple of hours, placed in a cell
without running water and with “feces and stuff in the toilet” and
on the floor. Plaintiff was eventually moved to a cell “that had piss
on the floor, feces in the toilet, and the cell was completely a mess.”
Plaintiff’s requests for cleaning supplies were ignored. (Pl.’s Dep.
32, 91.)
Defendant Tovrea wrote Plaintiff a disciplinary report for
assault and disobeying a direct order. In the disciplinary hearing,
Plaintiff was found guilty of both charges, receiving a punishment
that included the revocation of one year of good time. (Adj. Com.
Final Summ. Report, d/e 46-2, p. 1.) The Adjustment Committee
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found that Plaintiff had refused to comply with orders to sit down
and that, as Tovrea “was about to secure [Plaintiff] to the bench,
[Plaintiff] kicked off the bench striking this officer in the nose with
his right elbow. [Tovrea’s] nose was bleeding bad and sent to HCU
to be evaluated.” Id. Plaintiff maintains that he was not permitted
to call as witnesses the other inmates in the sick call area, who
would have disputed Defendant Tovrea’s account. Plaintiff also
maintains that striking Tovrea with Plaintiff’s elbow would have
been impossible since Plaintiff was handcuffed behind his back.
Discussion
An Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim requires
evidence that a defendant was deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of serious harm. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904,
909, 913 (7th Cir.2005); Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 525
(7th Cir.2004). A substantial risk of serious harm is one in which
the risk is "'so great'" that it is "'almost certain to materialize if
nothing is done.'" Brown, 398 F.3d at 911 (quoted cites omitted).
Plaintiff argues that Defendants Blackard and Skeens should
have known that Plaintiff was too vulnerable to be placed in a cell
with inmate Daniels. However, Plaintiff presents no evidence to
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substantiate his fears about inmate Daniels. No reasonable
inference arises from this record that inmate Daniels actually posed
any risk to Plaintiff or that anyone was aware of a risk. That
Plaintiff refused to cell with inmate Daniels based on rumors would
not have put anyone on notice that inmate Daniels actually
presented a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. See Gevas
v. McLaughlin 798 F.3d 475, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2015)(“Complaints
that convey only a generalized, vague, or stale concern about one’s
safety typically will not support an inference that a prison official
had actual knowledge that the prisoner was in danger.”). Further,
Plaintiff suffered no harm. See Jones v. Butler, 2016 WL 4994649
(7th Cir. 2016)(not published in Federal Reporter)(“Absent cognizable
harm” inmate’s claim of failure to protect from threats of violence
fails)(citing Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1996)(“It is
the reasonably preventable assault itself, rather than any fear of
assault, that gives rise to a compensable claim under the Eighth
Amendment.”) Summary judgment must be granted to Defendants
on this claim.
Summary judgment must also be granted to Defendants on
Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim regarding his disciplinary
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hearing. Plaintiff’s claim that he was not allowed to present
exonerating evidence necessarily implies that his one year of good
time should be restored. Claims which “necessarily imply the
invalidity of the deprivation of . . . [an inmate's] good-time credits”
are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until the prison
disciplinary decision has otherwise been invalidated, for example by
expungement, a state court order, or a writ of habeas corpus.
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). This rule stems
from the Supreme Court case of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
487 (1994), which held that an inmate cannot challenge his
sentence or conviction through an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Unlike Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim may proceed despite the good time revocation,
though Plaintiff cannot challenge the disciplinary committee’s
factual findings. Plaintiff will have to accept the disciplinary
committee’s version for purposes of the trial. See Gilbert v. Cook,
512 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2008).
Remaining for discussion is Plaintiff’s claim that the cells he
was placed in after the hearing were unsanitary. The Eighth
Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to inhumane prison
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conditions. Inhumane conditions are “objectively serious
deprivations,” deprivations of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities” according to “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). Deliberate indifference is
“‘actual knowledge of impending harm easily preventable.’” Delaney
v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2001)(quoting Jackson v.
Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992)(other quoted cite
omitted).
Plaintiff agreed in his deposition that his inhumane conditions
claim is against Defendant Pfister only, who was then the Warden.
Plaintiff stated in his deposition that the Warden was responsible
for these conditions because the Warden was in charge and also
because the Warden did not answer Plaintiff’s grievances. (Pl.’s
Dep. 93-94.) The Warden is not liable for the constitutional
violations of his subordinates solely because the Warden is in
charge. Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2012)( "'An
individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused
or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.'")(quoted
cite omitted); Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th
Cir. 2001)(no respondeat superior liability under § 1983).
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However, the record is not developed enough to determine
whether Defendant Pfister knew about the conditions. Defendant
Pfister maintains that he had no knowledge because his designee
reviewed Plaintiff’s grievances, not Pfister. Yet copies of the
grievances about the conditions do not appear to be in the record,
and Defendant Pfister offers no affidavit. Summary judgment will
be denied on this claim, with leave to renew.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
(1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted
in part and denied in part (45). Summary judgment is granted
to Defendants on Plaintiff’s failure to protect and procedural
due process claims. The failure to protect claim is dismissed,
with prejudice. The procedural due process claim is dismissed
without prejudice to refiling if Plaintiff’s good time is restored.
(2) Defendants Wolf, Knauer, Godinez, and Anderson are
terminated because they are implicated only in the failure-toprotect and procedural due process claims.
(3) Summary judgment is denied on Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim against Defendants Tovrea, Skeens, and Blackard.
(4) Summary judgment is denied with leave to renew by
February 10, 2017, on Plaintiff’s conditions-of-confinement
claim against Defendant Pfister.
(5) The jury selection and trial are scheduled for June 2729, 2017, beginning each day at 9:00 a.m. Magistrate Judge
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Schanzle-Haskins may be able to provide a sooner trial date if
the parties consent.
(6) The final pretrial conference is scheduled for June 2,
2017, at 10:00 a.m.
ENTERED: January 25, 2017
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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