Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc. et al

Filing 104

RESPONSE by Vulcan Golf, LLC to MOTION by Defendants Internet Reit, Inc., Google Inc., Oversee.Net, Sedo LLC, Dotster, Inc. to dismiss Amended Class Action Complaint (Consolidated Motion) 98 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D (1 of 2)# 5 Exhibit D (2 of 2)# 6 Exhibit E# 7 Exhibit F# 8 Motion to Amend# 9 Motion for Leave)(Foote, Robert)

Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc. et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION VULCAN GOLF, LLC, JOHN B. SANFILIPPO AND SONS, INC., BLITZ REALTYGROUP, and VINCENT E. "BO" JACKSON, Individually And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly Situated, § § § § § § Civil Action No. 07 CV 3371 § Lead Plaintiff, § § Hon. Blanche M. Manning, District Judge v. § § Hon. Geraldine Soat Brown, Magistrate Judge GOOGLE INC., OVERSEE.NET, § SEDO LLC, DOTSTER, INC., AKA § REVENUEDIRECT.COM § INTERNET REIT, INC. d/b/a IREIT, INC.; § and JOHN DOES I-X, § § Defendants. § PLAINTIFFS' CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS I. II. III. IV. V. A. B. C. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 FACTUAL OVERVIEW.................................................................................................... 5 DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS....................................................................... 6 LEGAL STANDARDS ...................................................................................................... 6 ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................... 7 Class Plaintiffs' Have Standing .......................................................................................... 8 The Claims Pled Are Not Mutually Exclusive ................................................................. 11 Plaintiffs State Lanham Act/Trademark Claims (Counts III, IV, V, VI, IX, X, XI and XII) ........................................................................................................................................... 13 1. Class Plaintiffs Plead Valid and Cognizable Claims Against ALL Defendants for a Violation of the ACPA (Count III) ............................................................................. 13 a. The FAC Properly Alleges that Class Plaintiffs Own Marks that are Distinctive or Famous ("Distinctive and Valuable Marks")........................................................... 14 b. Class Plaintiffs Allege that the Parking Company Defendants Intend, in Bad Faith, to Profit from Class Plaintiffs' Marks...................................................................... 15 c. The FAC alleges that Defendants "register, traffic in or use" domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to Class Plaintiffs' marks...................................... 22 (i) Google................................................................................................................... 22 (ii) The Parking Company Defendants ....................................................................... 24 2. Class Plaintiffs State a Claim for Direct Trademark Infringement Under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (Count IV) ..................................................................................................... 28 a. Class Plaintiffs Properly Alleged that Defendants Used Class Plaintiffs' Marks .... 28 b. Class Plaintiffs Adequately Allege Likelihood of Confusion................................... 33 3. Class Plaintiffs Properly Allege, Against All Defendants, a Claim for Common Law Trademark Infringement for which Relief can be Granted (Count IX) ...................... 36 4. Class Plaintiffs State a Claim for False Designation of Origin Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count V)...................................................................................................... 36 5. Class Plaintiffs State a Claim for Trademark Dilution Under 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)...... 38 6. Class Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Alleged Contributory and Vicarious Infringement 42 a. Contributory Trademark Infringement ..................................................................... 42 b. Vicarious Trademark Infringement........................................................................... 47 7. Innocent Infringer/Publisher Defense Argument.......................................................... 50 a. Innocent Infringer/Publisher Defense Is Inapplicable .............................................. 51 b. Knowledge or Reason to Know the Domains Were Infringing................................ 52 c. Injunctive Relief Is Available ................................................................................... 57 D. RICO (Counts I and II) ..................................................................................................... 59 1. Civil RICO .................................................................................................................... 60 2. Class Plaintiffs Have Adequately Alleged A RICO Enterprise.................................... 61 a. The FAC Sufficiently Pleads the Structure of an Association-in-Fact Enterprise.... 63 b. The FAC Pleads an Enterprise Distinct from the Alleged Predicate Acts................ 67 c. The Members of the Enterprise Share a Common Purpose...................................... 68 d. Class Plaintiffs Have Suffered a Direct, Non-Derivative Injury, as a Result of Defendants' RICO Violations.................................................................................. 70 i

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The Predicate Acts Were Pleaded With Sufficient Particularity .................................. 73 a. 18 U.S.C. §1341 (Mail Fraud) and 1343 (Wire Fraud) ............................................ 73 b. 18 U.S.C §1952......................................................................................................... 77 c. 18 U.S.C. §1957........................................................................................................ 79 d. 18 U.S.C. §2320........................................................................................................ 79 4. Class Plaintiffs Have Alleged Defendants' Alleged Misrepresentations Were Material ..................................................................................................................................... 80 5. Class Plaintiffs Have Alleged That the Object of the Fraud Was Property Or Money In The Hands of the Class Plaintiffs................................................................................ 81 6. Class Plaintiffs' Allegations of Mail and Wire Fraud Have Provided Sufficient Particularity to Satisfy Rule 9(b) ................................................................................ 84 7. A "Pattern of Racketeering" Was Adequately Pled...................................................... 87 8. Class Plaintiffs' Adequately Plead a RICO CONSPIRACY........................................ 88 E. General State Law Claims ................................................................................................ 89 1. Class Plaintiffs Sufficiently Plead a Claim Under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Count VII)........................................................... 89 2. Class Plaintiffs are Entitled to Declaratory Relief (Count VIII)................................... 91 3. Class Plaintiffs Sufficiently State a Claim for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Count XII) .............................................................................. 92 4. Class Plaintiffs Sufficiently State a Claim for Unjust Enrichment (Count XIII) ......... 92 5. Class Plaintiffs Sufficiently State a Claim of Civil Conspiracy Upon Which Relief Can be Granted (Count XIV) ............................................................................................. 92 6. Class Plaintiffs Sufficiently State a Claim of Civil Conspiracy Upon Which Relief Can be Granted (Count XIV) ............................................................................................. 93 7. Even If Class Plaintiffs' Claims Under Federal Law are Dismissed, the Court Has Jurisdiction Over Its State Law Claims ...................................................................... 94 VI. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 94

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases 800-Jr Cigar v. Goto.com, 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2006).................................................... 35 Abercrombie & Fitch v. Fashion Shops of Kentucky, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 952 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ................................................................................................................................................... 28 Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276 (C.D. Cal. 1997)........................................................................................................................ 36 Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 1994)................................................................. 93 Addis v. Moser, No. 83 C 6118 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 1984)............................................................. 11 Am Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2002).................................... 41 Amerimax Real Estate Partners, Inc. v. RE/MAX Intern'l Inc., 2006 WL 2794934, at *4-*5 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 26, 2006)...................................................................................................................... 21 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Caught-On-Bleu, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.N.H. 2003).................. 21 Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006) ...................................................... 72, 75 Audi AG v. D'Amato, 381 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. Mich. 2005) .................................................... 17 Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004).......................................................................... 69 Baleski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc, 514 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1981).................. 85 Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000)............................................................................................. 88 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) ................................................................. 7 Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002) ........................................................... 25, 26, 27, 33 Blisscraft v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694 (2nd Cir.1961) ................................................... 59 Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) 22, 32, 34, 35 Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992).......................................................................... 67 Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998) ............... 28 Cable News Network L.P., L.L.L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001) ...... 26 Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 220 F.R.D. 542 (N.D. Ill. 2004)............................................. 67 Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 177 (1982)........................................................................................................................................ 60 Citizens Financial Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110 (3rd Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................................................................... 82 Commercial Cleaning Services, LLC v. Colin Service Systems, Inc., 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................................................................... 72 Conopco, Inc. v. Rosa Distributors, 967 F. Supp. 1068 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ..................................... 53 Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969)....................... 9 Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1998)............................................................................. 92 Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Ill. 2001) ........................... 73 Corley v. Rosewood, 142 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1998) .................................................................... 86 Cumis Ins. Soc., Inc. v. Peters, 983 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ............................................... 93 David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int'l Trading Co., 884 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1989) ............................... 47 Days Inns Worldwide v. Lincoln Park Hotels, 500 F. Supp. 2d 770 (N.D. Ill. 2007) .................. 43 Dell, Inc. v. Solares, et al., Case No. 07-2668 (E.D. La., April 26, 2007) ............................. 12, 88 Dial One of the Mid-South, Inc. v. BellSouth, 269 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2001) ......................... 51, 53 Drake Bliss v. Cyberline Enters., WIPO Case No. D2001-0718.................................................. 17 iii

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Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929)............... 49 E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457 (N.D.Cal.1991)............... 59 E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1657 (E.D. Cal. 1989) ....................... 17 E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (S.D. Tex. 2001).................... 19 E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002) .................................... 19 Educational Tours, Inc. v. Hemisphere Travel, Inc., 2004 WL 887417 (N.D. Ill. 2004)............. 30 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000)..................... 33, 38, 40, 41 Express Media Group, LLC v. Express Corp., 2007 WL 1394163 (N.D. Cal. 2007) .................. 83 F.T.C. v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1993)........................................................................ 82 Ferleger v. First American Mortg. Co., 662 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ........................... 84, 86 First Savings Bank of Hegewisch v. Orchowski, 1994 WL 148668 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ................... 67 Flentye v. Kathrein, 485 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2007) ......................................... 12, 27, 28, 90 Fonovisa, Inc., v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996)..................................... 43, 47 Ford Motor Co. v. Ford Financial Solutions, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (N.D. Iowa 2000).............. 32 Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.Com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. Mich. 2001).. 18, 19, 20, 25, 26 Fulk v. Bagley, 88 F.R.D. 153, (M.D. N.C. 1980)........................................................................ 85 Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F.Supp 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ........................................... 12 Garden of Life, Inc. v. Letzer, 318 F. Supp. 2d 946 (C.D. Cal. 2004).................................... 18, 20 Gateway Eastern Ry. Co. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 35 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1994) ...... 84 GEICO v. Google, 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004)..................................... 33, 44, 45, 49, 50 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Networking Mktg., WIPO Case No. D2005-1064 ............................................ 17 General Media Communications, Inc. v. Crazy Troll, LLC, 2007 WL 102988 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 17 Gershwin Publishing Corporation v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971) ......................................................................................................................................... 43 Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510 (7th Cir. 1990)............................................................. 6 Gillman v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1989) ................................................ 7 Google, Inc. v. Sergey Gridasov, Nat'l Arb. Forum, Claim No. FA0505000474816 (Dorf, Arb.) last visited November 5, 2007) ................................................................................................. 18 Goren v. New Vision Intern., Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 727 (7th Cir. 1998) ................................... 59, 88 Graehling v. Village of Lombard, 58 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 1995).................................................... 15 Great Eastern Resort Corp. v. Virtual Resort Solutions, L.L.C., 189 F. Supp. 2d 469 (W.D. Va., 2002) ......................................................................................................................................... 15 Gros v. Midland Credit Management, 2007 WL 2601225 (N.D. Ill. 2007)................................... 7 Gucci America v. Hall & Associates, 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)................... 46, 47, 52 Hagstrom v. Breutman, MEB, 572 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ................................................ 86 Hamptons Locations, Inc. v. Rubens, 2005 WL 2436209 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20 2005)................... 28 Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992). 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 56, 58 Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984) ................................................................................................................................. 11, 60, 61, 85 Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Va. 2001)................. 18 Hartog & Co. AS v. SWIX.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2001) ........................................ 19 Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999)................................ 22 HER, Inc. v. RE/MAX First Choice, LLC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 964 (S.D. Ohio, 2007) ............... 14, 28 iv

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Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996)......................... 33, 34, 35 Hollinger Intern., Inc. v. Hollinger, Inc. 2005 WL 327058 (N.D.Ill. 2005) ................................ 12 Hudson v. City of Chicago, 242 F.R.D. 496 (N.D. Ill. 2007) ......................................................... 8 Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2004).................................................... 75 In Re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410 (3rd Cir. 1997) ................. 92 In re EDC, Inc., 930 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1991)............................................................................ 74 In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 2005 WL 1287611 (N.D. Cal. 2005)............................. 4 In Re Nice Systems, Ltd. Securities Litigation, 135 F. Supp. 2d. 551 (D.N.J. 2001).................... 92 In Re Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc., Securities Litigation, 311 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002) . 92, 93 Information Exchange Systems, Inc. v. First Bank Nat. Ass'n, 1992 WL 494607 (D. Minn. 1992) ................................................................................................................................................... 12 Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996)................................. 29, 32, 39, 41 International Profit Assocs. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672 (N.D. Ill. 2006)....................... 30, 34 Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755 (D. Colo. 2007)................................................... 12 Interscope Records v. Leadbetter, 2007 WL 1217705 (W.D. Wash. 2007)................................. 52 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982)........................... 42, 47 Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250 (7th Cir. 1995) .. 72, 74, 84 Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434 (7th Cir. 1990)............................................................. 62, 66, 67 Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321 (7th Cir. 1994)............................................. 75, 85, 87 Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998) ............................................. 29, 38, 84 JouJou Designs, Inc. v. JoJo Ligne Internationale, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1347 (N.D.Cal. 1992) .... 36 Kauffmann v. Yoskowitz, 1990 WL 300795 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ...................................................... 62 KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I. Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004)....................... 17 Land's End, Inc. v. Remy, 447 F. Supp. 2d 941 (W.D. Wis. 2006) ........................................ 16, 83 Landmark Savings & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ......................................................................................................................................... 12 Lane's Gifts and Collectibles v. Yahoo et al., Case No. CV-2005-52-1, Miller County, Arkansas ................................................................................................................................................... 55 Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) ................................................................................................................................................... 10 Lee v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 838 N.E.2d 15 (Ill.App.Ct. 2005).................................................... 91 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) ...................... 45 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997) 27, 31, 33, 40, 46, 56 Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1989)......................................................... 16, 56 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991)....................................................... 53 Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 301 F.3d 293 (2d. Cir. 2002).................................................... 83 McKinney v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 113 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 1997) ............................ 57, 58 McMath v. City of Gary, Ind., 976 F.2d 1026 (7th Cir. 1992)........................................................ 7 Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Services, Inc., 18 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1994) ........... 74 Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1992)................................ 75, 85, 86 Mirage Resorts v. Stirpe, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Nev. 2000)............................................ 30, 34 Morgan v. Kobrin Securities, Inc., 649 F.Supp 1023 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ......................................... 84 v

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Morrison & Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000) .................................. 20 Moxie Co. v. Noxie Kola Co. of New York, 29 F. Supp. 167 (D.C.N.Y. 1939) ............................ 51 National Geographic Soc'y v. Conde Nast Publications Inc., 687 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y.1988)59 NBA Properties v. Untertainment Records, LLC 1999 WL 1103006 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ............... 52 New England Data Services v. Becher, Inc., 829 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1987).................................. 62 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)............................................................ 52, 53, 54 Nike, Inc. v. Circle Group Internet, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Ill. 2004)........................... 13 Niresek v. Federal Trade Commission, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960) ......................................... 90 Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004) ................. 38, 40, 83 Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Mass. 2000), aff'd 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................. 19 OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)....................... 29, 37 Office Depot v. Zuccarini, 2007 WL 2688460 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ................................................. 83 Old Dearborn Dist. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936) ................................ 82 Omega S.A. v. Omega Eng'g Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Conn. 2002).............................. 20, 21 P&P Marketing Inc. v. Ditton, 746 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ................................. 85, 86, 87 Paccar Inc. v. Telescan Tech., LLC, 319 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003).................................. 15, 17, 83 PACCAR, Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 772 (E.D. Mich. 2000) .................... 19 Pace American, Inc. v. Elixir Industries, 2007 WL 495302 (N.D. Ill. 2007)............................... 91 Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) ............................................ 35, 37, 41 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal 1996) aff'd 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................................................. 41 Papa John's Int'l, Inc. v. Rezco, 446 F. Supp. 2d 801 (N.D. Ill. 2006)........................................ 38 Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Darien, 357 N.E.2d 211 (Ill.App. 1976)........................... 92 Partipilo v. Hallman, 510 N.E.2d 8 (Ill.App.Ct. 1987) ................................................................ 92 Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., 1997 WL 811770 (N.D. Cal. 1997)......... 32 Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2002) ............................................................... 8 People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000) ........................................................................................................................... 29, 32, 37, 83, 84 Perkins v. Johnston, 431 F. Supp. 2d 898 (N.D. Ind. 2006)........................................................... 7 Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2003) ............................................................... 7 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) ................................................................ 90 Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005).......................................................................... 62 Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Bridge et al., 477 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2007) ... 71, 72, 73, 74, 84 Planet Hollywood (Region IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ......................................................................................................................................... 30 Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998)............................................... 29, 84 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) ... 22, 83 Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002)........................ 83 Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002)........................... 22, 35 Prudhomme v. Procter & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1992).................................. 15 R2 Medical Systems, Inc. v. Katecho, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ill. 1996)........................... 47 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) ........................................................................ 11, 60 SCA Services of Indiana, Inc. v. Thomas, 634 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ind. 1986)........................... 84 vi

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Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983) .................................................................. 11, 60 Scotch Whisky Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.1973) ................................ 59 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) .............................................................. 59, 60 Segreti v. Lome, 747 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ...................................................................... 66 Shapo v. O'Shaughnessy, 246 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ill. 2002)............................................. 75, 79 Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, (3d Cir. 2001)................................................................. 15, 19 Siegel v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., 153 Ill.2d 534, 180 Ill.Dec. 300, 607 N.E.2d 194 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992) ................................................................................................................................................... 90 Size v. Network Solutions, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Va. 2003)......................................... 44 Slaney v. The Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed., 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001)..................................... 67 Smith Fiberglass Products, Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1993) ............................ 21 Sony Corporation of America, et al. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., et al., 464 U.S. at 417, 104 S.Ct. 774 (1984)........................................................................................................................ 43 Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (N.D. Ill. 2005) .......................................... 7 Sporty's Farm LLC v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2nd Cir. 2000)........................ 16, 19 St. Martin v. Mobil Exploration & Producing, Inc., 224 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 2000)...................... 51 Station Casinos, Inc. v. Domain Magic, LLC, 2006 WL 3838221 (D. Nev. 2006)...................... 83 Stella D'oro Biscuit Co. v. Patron Group, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0012............................ 18 Strachon v. United Consumers Club et al., 229 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2000).................................... 70 Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633 (7th Cir.1999)........................... 39 Systems Management, Inc. v. Loiselle, 303 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 2002)........................................... 74 Sze v. I.N.S., 153 F.3d 1005 (1998)............................................................................................... 59 Teletech Customer Care Management, Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 77 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ................................................................................................................................................... 22 The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., et al. v. Dotster, Inc., et al., No. 3:06-CV-05292-RBL (W.D. Wash., filed May 30, 2006) ...................................................................................................... 55 Too, Inc. v. TJX Cos., 229 F. Supp. 2d 825 (S.D. Ohio 2002)...................................................... 28 Trade Media Holdings Ltd. v. Huang & Assocs., 123 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D.N.J. 2000)................. 34 Trans Union v. Credit Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043-44 (N.D. Ill. 2001) . 33, 34, 35 Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002)....................................................................... 39 Ty, Inc. v. Agnes M., 2001 WL 1414201 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ............................................................ 32 U.S. ex rel Landsberg v. Argentis Medical, P.C., 2006 WL 1788381 (W.D. Pa. 2006) .............. 10 U.S. ex rel. Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 2007 WL 837203 (S.D. Ind. 2007) .......... 86 U.S. v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979)............................................................................... 61 United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, (1980)............................................... 59 United States v. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d at 1363 (7th Cir. 1993) .................................................... 75 United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 1996)................................................................... 75 United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979) ................................................................... 63 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) .......................................................... 11, 60, 61, 63 United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand America New York, 128 F.3d 86, 89-90 (2nd Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................................................. 29 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981)......................... 43 Verizon North Inc., et al. v. Internet Reit, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-00996 (S.D. Tex., filed March 23, 2007) ......................................................................................................................................... 55 Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Polygenix Group Co., WIPO Case No. D2000-0163 .................... 18 vii

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Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., 20 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1994) ......................... 59 Victoria's Cyber Secret Ltd. Partnership v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ............................................................................................................................ 19, 41 Victoria's Secret Stores v. Artco Equipment Co., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 704 (S.D. Ohio 2002) .. 17, 83 Watts v. Network Solutions, Inc., 1999 WL 994012 (7th Cir. 1999) ............................................ 42 Weiss v. Winners Circle, 1995 WL 755328 (N.D. Ill. December 14, 1995) .................................. 9 WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 80 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996) ................................................ 84 World Wrestling Federation, Inc. v. Posters, Inc, 2000 WL 1409831 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ............... 52 Zekman v. Direct Am. Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill.2d 359, 231 Ill.Dec. 80, 695 N.E.2d 853 (Ill.App.Ct. 1998)...................................................................................................................... 90 Zipee Corp. v. United States Postal Service, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D. Or. 2000) ...................... 19 Statutes 15 U.S.C. §1114.................................................................................................... 28, 34, 36, 51, 57 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) ........................................................................................................... 36, 37, 51 15 U.S.C. §1125(c) ................................................................................................................. 38, 40 15 U.S.C. §1125(d) ................................................................................... 13, 15, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26 15 U.S.C. §1127................................................................................................................ 32, 38, 40 15 U.S.C. §1129(2) ....................................................................................................................... 83 15 U.S.C.§1125(c) ........................................................................................................................ 38 18 U.S.C. §1341...................................................................................................................... 73, 74 18 U.S.C. §1343...................................................................................................................... 73, 74 18 U.S.C. §1952...................................................................................................................... 73, 77 18 U.S.C. §1956................................................................................................................ 77, 78, 79 18 U.S.C. §1957................................................................................................................ 73, 77, 79 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) ....................................................................................................................... 62 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) ................................................................................................................. 59, 60 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) ................................................................................................................. 60, 88 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) ....................................................................................................................... 61 18 U.S.C. §2320................................................................................................................ 73, 78, 79 28 U.S.C. §1441............................................................................................................................ 94 28 U.S.C. §1711............................................................................................................................ 94 28 U.S.C. §2201(a) ....................................................................................................................... 91 815 ILCS 505/2............................................................................................................................. 89 815 ILCS 510/2............................................................................................................................. 89 Publications 1 Niel Boorstyn, Boorstyn On Copyright § 10.06[2] (1994)........................................................ 43 145 Cong. Rec. at S10629-01 ....................................................................................................... 83 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§25:71, 25:72 (4th Ed. 2000)................................................................................................................................... 32 Pub.L. 91-452, §904(a), 84 Stat. 947............................................................................................ 61 Rules Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).................................................................................................................. 1, 6 Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) ................................................................................................ 1, 6, 75, 84, 85, 93 viii

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Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 8(a)(2) ....................................................................................................... 62, 85

ix

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I.

INTRODUCTION In response to Class Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Defendants filed

consolidated, and several individual, motions to dismiss ("MTD"). In 95 pages of largely redundant briefing, Defendants failed to identify any legal basis for dismissal, littered their arguments with extrinsic facts (outside the four corners of the FAC), and repeatedly urged this Court to engage in "merits analysis" and make final determinations of hotly contested issues of fact. Defendants' MTDs did not, and cannot, establish that the well-pleaded FAC failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)) or that the detailed pleading was somehow factually deficient. (Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)). Distilled to its essence, this case is about Defendants' knowing and intentional massive internet-based scheme (Deceptive Domain Scheme) to make and transact in money derived from the unauthorized/unlawful use of Class Plaintiffs' property (domains, Distinctive and Valuable Marks, internet traffic, goodwill, customers and prospective business). (FAC¶¶1, 270). As a central part of the Deceptive Domain Scheme, Defendants identify, create, register, use, and monetize Deceptive Domains in order to "cyber-steal" and use Class Plaintiffs' and the putative class members' valuable property/interests. (FAC¶¶3, 65). The Deceptive Domain Scheme is carried out in a common manner through automated, sophisticated, electronic (done primarily on the internet) programs that aggregate and monetize millions of Deceptive Domains. (FAC¶¶1, 165-210). Importantly, Defendants' MTDs attempt to focus this Court's attention on only one component of the Deceptive Domain Scheme (individual trademark infringements), essentially admitting that they generate, collect, and transact in money derived from a few "bad apple" 1

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Deceptive Domains. 1 (Google MTD at 4). However, Defendants' seeming "fall on the sword" acknowledgment, is not a remorseful admission, but rather it is the furious back peddling of the proverbial "child caught with his hand in the cookie jar." It is a clever and strategic attempt to dodge the grenade, and take a bullet ­ creating a smoke screen to divert attention away from their much more significant and substantial liability arising from the entire "Deceptive Domain Scheme." Defendants understand that if they can avoid a Court order enjoining the Deceptive Domain Scheme, and just tackle each individual trademark based claim as it arises, the practical effect is that they can continue the larger Deceptive Domain Scheme indefinitely -- making money from using even the smallest business operations in America (i.e., Class Plaintiff Blitz Realty, a small realty company in Geneva, Illinois). Defendants hinted at their critically focused strategy to avoid liability for the larger Deceptive Domain Scheme at the very first status conference before this Court, at which Google, rather than denying the substantive allegations, attempted to shift the focus to the minuteness and unworthiness of Class Plaintiff Vulcan's individual claim, 2 asserting: "Unless this case is certified as a class, the initial Plaintiff's claims are worth about $17.00. I mean, that is the total amount of money at issue." (Hearing Transcript at 7). Defendants, however, are not masters of Class Plaintiffs' well-pleaded FAC. The FAC properly and specifically alleges a massive Internet scheme involving Defendants' common,
1

Google refers to Deceptive Domains as "bad apples". Dotster did not even file dismissal motions challenging trademark claims. IREIT only challenges standing for Deceptive Domains that were not identified as directly connected to them in the FAC. None of the Defendants deny or disclaim generating and transacting in money from Deceptive Domains.

Class Plaintiffs do not agree with Google's methodology for calculating damages (apparently confining damages to profit made by Google). Rather, Class Plaintiffs note that there are a range of available damages, including but not limited to: statutory damages, compensatory relief, treble/punitive damages, and unjust enrichment and disgorgement. 2

2

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contrived, automated and sophisticated programs that aggregate and monetize millions of Deceptive Domains, and then further aggregate the many pennies per click into billions of dollars of unlawful spoils shared among the Defendants. (FAC¶¶1, 165-210). The FAC clearly alleges that Deceptive Domains have not slipped through an otherwise legitimate system. (FAC¶¶231-233). Rather, Defendants have knowingly and intentionally created and exploited "bad apple" domains, introduce and use "bad apples" domains in the system for the express reason of generating exponential financial gain. (FAC¶¶4-10, 165-210). The FAC alleges that Defendants have done more than turn a "blind eye" to the monetization of Deceptive Domains; rather, working together, they created an entire system to make enormous amounts of money by exploiting the Deceptive Domains, while creating the appearance of innocence (through masking, redirecting, false registrations, and illusory and bad faith online complaint processes, and a multi-layer scheme with layers of participants). (FAC¶¶4-10). This case is important to hundreds of thousands of putative class members throughout the United States that lack the technological savvy, sophistication, and money to identify and stop Defendants' cyber scheme -- but who, without redress, will continue to be injured and lose valuable property/interests. As the masking and concealment allegations make clear, unless a putative class member is extremely technologically savvy, they will not be able to accurately identify and seek redress for the full scope of Defendants' illegal acts. As Google made clear at the first status conference, many of the putative class members claims are so small that individual access to the Courts is nearly impossible. Supra. Yet, as Defendants' very conduct in this action illustrates, 3 without this Court's intervention -- Defendants will continue to flaunt the

Since the filing of the initial Complaint, written notice from Class Plaintiffs' Counsel, and the filing of the FAC, Defendants continue to take valuable property from Class Plaintiffs through 3

3

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rights and interests of Plaintiffs and the Class in order to enjoy illegal financial gain. The importance of total "scheme" adjudication versus just "individual" infringement determinations was recognized by the court in In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 2005 WL 1287611 (N.D. Cal. 2005). In certifying a class of "music publisher-principals of the Fox Agency that own or control at least one copyrighted musical work that has without their permission been made available through the Napster service," the Napster court rejected Defendants' argument that each class member's infringement required an individual case-bycase adjudication and in so doing explained: "Viewing these determinations as purely

`individual issues' ignores the fact that the claims of every member of the class are uniformly premised upon the uploading or downloading of a copyrighted work by Napster users. This shared factual predicate in turn gives rise to a host of common legal issues." Id. at *7. The Napster court acknowledged that individual copyright issues were outweighed by common legal issues, judicial efficiency, and the unfair burden that maintaining individual actions would place on the members of the class. Id. Like the Napster Copyright Class, a liability determination in the instant case will involve adjudication of a common widespread "scheme" that cannot be subsumed by or extricated from any concomitant intellectual property claims. The illegality of the Deceptive Domain Scheme should be determined once, in this forum, for all affected individuals. Defendants' absolute failure to identify factual insufficiencies, their reliance on extrinsic arguments (outside the four corners of the FAC), their mischaracterization of Class Plaintiffs' claims and injuries, their legally unsupported arguments to limit the scope of this case to just one

the monetization of at least the Deceptive Domains shown in List of Infringing Domains Registered After Filing of Complaint, attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 4

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component of the Deceptive Domain Scheme (trademark infringements), and their failure to establish any legal insufficiencies in the FAC, require denial of the MTDs in their entirety. II. FACTUAL OVERVIEW Class Plaintiffs' well-pled 94 page First Amended Complaint ("FAC") is replete with carefully researched and specifically pleaded factual and technical allegations supporting and establishing the 14 legal causes of action that they brought against Defendants. Defendants (FAC¶¶67-79) have unlawfully conspired, contrived and effectuated an unlawful scheme, the "Deceptive Domain Scheme," (FAC¶3) to obtain financial benefits from the unlawful and unauthorized use of Class Plaintiffs' and the putative class members' property, rights and interests. (FAC¶¶10-11). The FAC alleges that Defendants contrived, designed, implemented and otherwise engaged and continue to engage in the Deceptive Domain Scheme intentionally and knowingly (FAC¶¶9, 166) in order to obtain control and use over Class Plaintiffs' and the putative class members' property (distinctive and valuable marks, domains, deceptive domains, internet traffic, goodwill, prospective business and customers (FAC¶¶165, 241, 270, 421)) and to financially profit and transact in the money gained from the illegal misappropriation, taking, use and monetization of Class Plaintiffs' and the putative class members' property. (FAC¶¶1, 10, 218, 238, 261, 263, 270). Defendants' actions constituting the fraudulent scheme are carried out 24 hours a day, 7 days a week on a second-by-second, ongoing and regular basis. (FAC¶¶4,249). The FAC alleges that Defendants carry out the Deceptive Domain Scheme using sophisticated, highly organized, automated, systemic programs through use of the Mails and Wire. (FAC¶¶245, 246, 248, 249, 323, 324). 5

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Class Plaintiffs (FAC¶¶20-64) and the putative class members (FAC¶289) are the direct victims of Defendants' Deceptive Domain Scheme because it is their property/interests that Defendants unlawfully took/used in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. (FAC¶¶11-12). Additionally, Class Plaintiffs attach Factual Overview Chart, attached hereto as Exhibit "B". III. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS Not all Defendants filed motions to dismiss all counts. See "Summary of MTD Chart", attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Importantly, Dotster has chosen not to file Motions to Dismiss with respect to any of the Lanham Act and Trademark Claims and IREIT did not move to dismiss the Lanham Act or trademark claims brought against it by Class Plaintiff JBSS. The decision by these two Defendants not to seek dismissal of those claims speaks volumes about the strength and viability of those claims given that the underlying, supporting allegations in the FAC are the same as to all of the Parking Company Defendants and the legal allegations are the same as to all of the Defendants. IV. LEGAL STANDARDS Defendants moved for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows the Court to dismiss any complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the lawsuit. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). Rule 9(b) requires that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). 6

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In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court's inquiry is "limited to the factual allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint." Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1236 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Courts must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2003). A court can deny an amendment (or dismiss a pleading) only if it is clear that no set of facts consistent with its allegations would entitle the plaintiff to relief. McMath v. City of Gary, Ind., 976 F.2d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 1992); Gillman v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1989). In challenging the sufficiency of the FAC, Defendants misstate the holding in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), urging this Court to adopt a pleading standard that is tantamount to "proving the merits" at the pre-discovery/pleading stage. Perkins v.

Johnston, 431 F. Supp. 2d 898, 900 (N.D. Ind. 2006). Twombly requires no such thing. Rather, Twombly requires only that the factual allegations in the complaint "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." See Gros v. Midland Credit Management, 2007 WL 2601225 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). This recent ruling leaves intact the well-established rule that courts must accept all well-pled allegations in the complaint as true. Id. Twombly in no way transformed routine motions to dismiss into hearings on the merits. V. ARGUMENT Defendants' motions must be denied in their entirety because: (1) they fail to

demonstrate that the FAC was insufficiently pled, and (2) they have failed to assert any legal basis for dismissal. Defendants' motions are largely predicated on "alleged" insufficiencies in pleading that can be dispelled by even a cursory reading of the FAC. The MTDs also improperly 7

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rely upon factual information that is outside of the four corners of the Complaint (and irrelevant to MTD determinations), in an effort to "muddy the waters" and transform 12(b)(6) and 9(b) motions into final determinations on the merits. Defendants' failure to identify any significant factual deficiencies, coupled with their failure to set forth any legal basis for dismissal, requires denial of their MTDs in their entirety. A. Class Plaintiffs' Have Standing Defendants IREIT and Sedo seek dismissal of certain claims against them brought by specific named Class Plaintiffs 4 : IREIT moves against Vulcan, Blitz, and Vincent E. "Bo" Jackson, and Sedo moves against Blitz and JBSS, both arguing that the specific Deceptive Domains, as identified in the chart at ¶65 of the FAC, were not directly connected to them. These arguments are both premature and legally wrong. Relying on the so-called "Juridical Link Analysis," the Seventh Circuit will allow named plaintiffs to bring a class action against multiple Defendants, including those against whom the named plaintiff did not have a direct claim if all of the Defendants "took part in a similar scheme that was sustained either by a contract or conspiracy." Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 679-680 (7th Cir. 2002). The Courts within this Circuit have consistently applied the Juridical Link Analysis to class actions finding that the named Plaintiffs are not required to have direct dealings with each named Defendant in order to state claims against them on behalf of proposed classes. Hudson v. City of Chicago, 242 F.R.D. 496 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding a Juridical Link between the City of Chicago, the police department, and numerous individual police officers allegedly involved in a "concerted scheme" and "a common course of conduct," but denying IREIT and Sedo do not claim that none of the named Plaintiffs has standing to bring a claim against them. 8
4

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class certification on other grounds); Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (applying the Juridical Link Doctrine in certifying a class where the plaintiffs argued that the defendants actions in discriminating against plaintiffs in housing contracts "resulted from a concert and pattern of discriminatory activity including other similar contracts"); Weiss v. Winners Circle, 1995 WL 755328 (N.D. Ill. December 14, 1995) (where defendant assigned plaintiff's contract to various lenders, Juridical Link Doctrine applied because of the interconnectedness of lender's relationship, even though there was no actual claim between some of the plaintiffs and some of the lenders). Even without the Juridical Link Analysis, the FAC sufficiently sets forth specific facts against each Defendant sufficient to establish that each Class Plaintiff has standing to bring the claims alleged. Although not identifying a specific Deceptive Domain for each Class Plaintiff vs. each Defendant, the FAC adequately alleges that every Defendant engaged in the very conduct against each Class Plaintiff giving rise to the well-pleaded claims. The FAC chart provides examples and is preceded by the very explicit language: "Defendants taste, register, license, own, traffic in, monetize and/or otherwise utilize and control Deceptive Domains that are identical and/or substantially similar to Lead Plaintiffs, including but not limited to the following:" (FAC¶65, emphasis added). Class Plaintiffs Vulcan, Blitz, and Jackson, in addition to Class Plaintiff JBSS, have alleged that every one of the named Parking Company Defendants, as well as the numerous unnamed co-defendants, has committed deceptive acts aimed at every one of the named Class Plaintiffs, as well as the multitude of unnamed putative class members. (See, e.g., FAC¶¶16567). It is not necessary for Class Plaintiffs to specifically identify each and every Deceptive Domain at this stage in the litigation. In fact, the pleading requirements do not require that Class 9

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Plaintiffs identify any specific Deceptive Domains. Instead, Class Plaintiffs must simply make allegations that Deceptive Domains were used. Nothing more is required under even the most stringent pleading standards. Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence and

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167 (1993) ("State with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim..."). Proof is not required at this stage in the litigation. U.S. ex rel Landsberg v. Argentis Medical, P.C., 2006 WL 1788381 at *4 (W.D. Pa. 2006). Class Plaintiffs bring their allegations in good faith and based on the following: 1. 2. All of the misconduct arises from the identical, common, core of bad actions/Deceptive Domain Scheme (FAC¶¶1, 3); Defendants' conduct is so interrelated, cohesive, and cooperative in nature, each Defendant will have taken action during the class period that either directly or vicariously resulted in said violations against each named Class Plaintiff (FAC¶238); Parking Company Defendants "trade" or "switch" Deceptive Domains on a frequent basis, thus many Deceptive Domains have been parked and monetized by more than one parking company (FAC¶143); 5 In fact, the Parking Company Defendants swap the Deceptive Domains as part of the concealment and deception inherent in the scheme (FAC¶3); The false and concealed submission of WHOIS data makes it impossible, prior to discovery, to identify with certainty which Parking Company Defendants have direct privity with which Class Plaintiffs (FAC¶165, 263(f)); and

3.

4. 5.

For example, after the filing of the original complaint in this action, the following conduct occurred: wwwvulcangolf.com and volcangolf.com were deleted by the original registrants and "unparked/unmonetized" by Defendant Oversee and Defendant Google. As stated in the FAC: ii. Almost immediately thereafter, wwwVulcanGolf.com and VolcanGolf.com were re-registered, relicensed, and redirected to Google AdSense for Domains displaying Google AdWords Ads for commercial gain by Defendant Google and Oversee, despite formal notice. (FAC¶222(a)).

5

The key change, however, was that the Deceptive Domain was "swapped" and a new parking company (DomainSponsor.com) was parking it and monetizing it in concert with Defendant Google. 10

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6.

Stealth redirect, masking, and framed forwarding make it impossible to identify, prior to discovery, which Parking Company Defendants have direct privity with which Class Plaintiffs (FAC¶156).

Nowhere in the Class Plaintiffs' FAC do the Class Plaintiffs ever limit the claims of any named Class Plaintiffs to individual Defendants, because such allegations would be inaccurate as all of the Defendants have harmed all of the Class Plaintiffs. B. The Claims Pled Are Not Mutually Exclusive Class Plaintiffs bring several distinct claims that directly arise out of Defendants' illegal Deceptive Domain Scheme. Class Plaintiffs did not "transform" a federal trademark case into a racketeering scheme, in violation of RICO; rather, Class Plaintiffs seek redress for multiple claims because Defendants themselves chose to violate multiple laws and engage in a variety of illegal conduct. Both the Seventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court have consistently rejected defense arguments urging narrow construction of the civil RICO provision and arguments that civil RICO does not apply to "garden variety" business fraud cases. Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1357-1358 (7th Cir. 1983);; Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 25 (1983). Further, it is well understood that "injury to free competition in the marketplace" caused by racketeering was a major concern of Congress in enacting RICO. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 391, citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590-591 (1981). Contrary to Defendants'

suggestion, a business competitor harmed by infiltration or by other effects of racketeering may well be able to state a claim under RICO by alleging a "competitive" injury. See Addis v. Moser, No. 83 C 6118, slip op. at 14 & n.9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 1984); Landmark Savings & Loan v. Loeb 11

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Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-209 (E.D. Mich. 1981). Notably, while the civil RICO provision contains an express "RICO bar" that excludes claims if the conduct "would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities," 18 U.S.C. §1964(c), that bar does not apply to the instant facts. Courts faced with facts giving rise to such securities claims cannot allow them to proceed as RICO claims. Hollinger Intern., Inc. v. Hollinger, Inc. 2005 WL 327058 (N.D.Ill. 2005). The "RICO Bar", however, does not extend to facts that also give rise to trademark and state law claims. If Congress had intended trademark/cybersquatting/typosquatting claims to fall outside the reach of RICO, surely it would have explicitly carved such claims out as it did with the securities claims that are precluded by the RICO bar. Courts acknowledge the ability of plaintiffs to simultaneously pursue RICO and intellectual property claims. See, e.g., Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F.Supp 1282

(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (sustaining RICO claims at the motion to dismiss stage based on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud where Defendants' scheme primarily involved the copying and sale of counterfeit Salvador Dali prints). See also Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755 (D. Colo. 2007); Information Exchange Systems, Inc. v. First Bank Nat. Ass'n, 1992 WL 494607 (D. Minn. 1992); Dell, Inc. v. Solares, et al., Case No. 07-2668 (E.D. La., April 26, 2007). A court in this very district recently denied motions to dismiss Lanham Act, ACPA, and state law claims, in a case involving the use of trademarks in a domain name. Flentye v. Kathrein, 485 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2007). The fact that Defendants infringed upon certain marks and other intellectual property owned by Class Plaintiffs does not immunize Defendants from responsibility for also violating RICO and state law. Defendants would like this Court to carve down the scope of their liability for the multiple bad actions in which they engage. 12

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However, limiting the civil claims against Defendants in the instant action would be as unjust as limiting charges against a criminal defendant to "breaking and entering" when he also set the house on fire. C. Plaintiffs State Lanham Act/Trademark Claims (Counts III, IV, V, VI, IX, X, XI and XII) Class Plaintiffs allege a total of seven Lanham Act and trademark causes of action: cybersquatting (Count III), direct trademark infringement (Count IV), contributory and vicarious trademark infringement (Counts X and XI), false designation of origin (Count V), dilution (Count VI), and common law trademark violation (Count IX). Defendants' strained attempts to dismiss these claims fall well short. 1. Class Plaintiffs Plead Valid and Cognizable Claims Against ALL Defendants for a Violation of the ACPA (Count III)

Pursuant to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"), a plaintiff may bring a civil action against a defendant if it establishes that: (1) the plaintiff owns a mark that is distinctive or famous; (2) the defendant in bad faith intends to profit from the plaintiff's mark; and (3) the defendant "registers, traffics in, or uses" a domain name that, at the time of its registration, is identical or confusingly similar to the plaintiff's mark. See 15 U.S.C.

§1125(d)(1)(A). See also, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Circle Group Internet, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 688, 690-91 (N.D. Ill. 2004). As explained below, Class Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a valid claim against each of the Defendants in Count III of the FAC for a violation of the ACPA and related trademark claims.

13

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a.

The FAC Properly Alleges that Class Plaintiffs Own Marks that are Distinctive or Famous ("Distinctive and Valuable Marks")

Class Plaintiffs satisfy the first required element, as they allege that they own unique, distinctive, famous, and/or publicized marks that the Parking Company Defendants are infringing: · Plaintiff Vulcan Golf owns the registered trademark VULCAN and trade name Vulcan Golf (since November 1993) and the domain name www.VulcanGolf.com (registered in 1997) which, since their origins, ha