LINDSEY v. INDIANA DEPT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 43

Entry Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Order to Show Cause - Plaintiff Joshua Lindsey, a State prisoner, filed this civil action alleging that the defendants used excessive force against him in retaliation for a small claims lawsuit L indsey previously filed. Lindsey now claims that he is exposed to a substantial threat for additional injuries due to the denial of recreational time and the conditions of his confinement if he remains at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (&q uot;WVCF"). The motion for preliminary injunction [dkt. 22] is denied. Lindsey submitted two altered versions of a document entitled XRay Consultation. The complete versions are attached Exhibits 1 and 2. These documents suggest that Lindse y has intentionally filed misleading and altered medical documents to fraudulently support his claims against the defendants. Consistent with Rule 11(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Lindsey shall have through September 12, 2013, in which to show cause why the submission of the two versions of the document entitled X-Ray Consultation has not violated Rule 11(b) and why sanctions up to and including dismissal should not be imposed. (See Entry.) Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 8/20/2013. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(RSF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

JOSHUA PETER LINDSEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD BROWN W.V.C.F.
Superintendent,
B. SCOTT W.V.C.F. Correctional Custody
Officer,
JACK SCHMIDT Sergeant, W.V.C.F.
Correctional Custody Officer,
Defendants.

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Case No. 2:13-cv-00068-JMS-WGH

Entry Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Order to Show Cause
Plaintiff Joshua Lindsey, a State prisoner, filed this civil action alleging that the
defendants used excessive force against him in retaliation for a small claims lawsuit Lindsey
previously filed. Lindsey now claims that he is exposed to a substantial threat for additional
injuries due to the denial of recreational time and the conditions of his confinement if he remains
at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (“WVCF”).

I. Injunctive Relief
Lindsey’s motion for preliminary injunction seeks an order requiring the defendants to
transfer him out of WVCF to another facility and to pay money damages. For the reasons
explained below, the motion for preliminary injunction [dkt. 22] is denied.
To prevail on his motion, Lindsey must establish: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) he will suffer irreparable harm which,

absent in
njunctive re
elief, outwe
eighs the irr
reparable h
harm the respondent w suffer if the
will
injunction is granted and (4) the public interest will not be har
d;
t
i
rmed by the injunction See
e
n.
Goodman v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. and Prof'l Reg
n
gulation, 430 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir 2005); see also
0
r.
e
Promatek Indus., Ltd v. Equitr Corp., 300 F.3d 80 8, 811 (7th Cir. 2002); Abbott Lab v.
k
d.
rac
;
bs.
Mead Jo
ohnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992) The balan
C
d
h
).
ncing for thi test involv a
is
ves
sliding sc
cale analysis: the greate plaintiff's chances of success on the merits, the less stro a
er
f
ong
showing plaintiff mu make that the balance of harm is in his favor. Storck v. F
ust
t
e
.
Farley Candy Co.,
y
3
h
14 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1994).
The first ques
T
stion, therefo is wheth Lindsey h a reason
ore,
her
has
nable likeliho of succe on
ood
ess
the merit On this point, the ans
ts.
p
swer is that he has an ex
xceedingly s
slim likeliho of succe on
ood
ess
the merit
ts.
Lindsey alleg that cust
L
ges
tody officers intentional injured h
s
lly
him, but he has not prov
vided
any credi evidence to corrobo
ible
orate his alleg
gations. In fa as the de
fact,
efendants co
orrectly poin out,
nt
Lindsey attached alte
ered X-Ray documents in support o his claims of spinal in
of
s
njury. [Dkt. 4-1,
23 at p. 14.] The alterations are as obvio as they are clumsy.
a
a
ous
.

The X-R Consult
Ray
tation

nal
or
ary
n
ads
ws:
attached to his origin Motion fo Prelimina Injunction [dkt. 4] rea as follow

An even more altered version of the same purported fin
f
ndings is atta
ached to Plaintiff’s Ame
ended
a
ing
ndum for Preliminary In
njunction [dk 23, at 14]
kt.
]:
Motion and Supporti Memoran

Not only does each version of th report fail to establish that the def
y
v
he
h
fendants used excessive force
or injured Lindsey, both conclud that they are “normal plain film v
d
b
de
a
views of the spine.” [Dk 4kt.
1, dkt. 23 at 14.] Th Court will address mo fully its r
3
he
l
ore
response to t mischara
the
acterization o the
of
report at the conclusi of the en
ion
ntry.
In addition, Lindsey’s ap
n
L
pparent attem to expan the scope of his com
mpt
nd
e
mplaint to include
the denial of recrea
ation and other alleged unconst
o
dly
titutional co
onditions of confineme is
f
ent
ineffectiv The comp
ve.
plaint canno be amende through a motion for p
ot
ed
preliminary injunction.
Second, if Lin
ndsey does prevail in thi action his measure of damages is monetary an he
p
is
s
f
nd
therefore has an adeq
e
quate remed at law. In fact, Lindse is seeking monetary c
dy
ey
g
compensatio for
on
alleged excessive fo
e
orce by cust
tody officers resulting in spinal co damage and specifi
ord
fically
requests $550,000.00 for this in
0
njury. In add
dition, Linds has faile to show that a transf to
sey
ed
fer
another facility is nec
f
cessary or ap
ppropriate fo his safety. Lindsey ha not provid any proo that
or
.
as
ded
of
he is in any actual da
a
anger to warr transfer from the W
rant
WVCF to another facility.
.
The remainin factors do not weigh heavily, if a all, in favo of Lindsey obtaining relief
T
ng
o
h
at
or
y
at this po
oint. There is no evidenc the Lindse will suffe irreparable harm if he is not transf
s
ce
ey
er
e
ferred
from WV and the public has an interest in the proper professional management of correct
VCF
a
n
l
tional
facilities. Deference is given to prison ad
o
dministrators in running their facil
s
g
lities in ord to
der
accompli the goal of prison systems. Se Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2
ish
ls
ee
2003)
(Courts “must accord substantial deference to the profess
“
d
l
o
sional judgm of priso administra
ment
on
ators,
who bear a significan responsibi
r
nt
ility for defining legitim goals of a correction system an for
mate
f
ns
nd

determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them”). In other words, the relief sought
by Lindsey in his motion for preliminary injunction would improperly violate the admonition
that federal district courts are not to allow themselves to become “enmeshed in the minutiae of
prison operations.” Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (1996)(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 562 (1979)).
For all of these reasons, Lindsey’s motion for a preliminary injunction [dkt. 22] is
denied.
II. Show Cause
As explained above, Lindsey submitted two altered versions of a document entitled XRay Consultation. The complete versions are attached Exhibits 1 and 2. These documents
suggest that Lindsey has intentionally filed misleading and altered medical documents to
fraudulently support his claims against the defendants. Consistent with Rule 11(c)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Lindsey shall have through September 12, 2013, in which to
show cause why the submission of the two versions of the document entitled X-Ray
Consultation has not violated Rule 11(b) and why sanctions up to and including dismissal should
not be imposed. See Jackson v. Murphy, 468 Fed. Appx. 616, 620, 2012 WL 759363, *3 (7th Cir.
2012) (holding that the sanction of dismissal was “entirely warranted” where plaintiff both
perjured himself and forged a document critical to the prosecution of his case); Thompson v.
Taylor, 473 Fed. Appx. 507, 509, 2012 WL 1035718, 2 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding district court did
not err in determining that plaintiff’s misrepresentation was fraudulent and grounds for
dismissal); Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2011) (same); see also Garcia v.
Berkshire Life Ins. Co. Of America, 569 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding severe
sanction of dismissal was warranted where plaintiff submitted falsified evidence).

For Lindsey’s reference, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Rule 11. Signing Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to the Court;
Sanctions
(a)

Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least
one attorney of record in the attorney's name—or by a party personally if the party is
unrepresented. The paper must state the signer's address, e-mail address, and telephone
number. Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a pleading need not be
verified or accompanied by an affidavit. The court must strike an unsigned paper unless
the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney's or party's attention.

(b)

Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or
other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

(c)

it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or
for establishing new law;
the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

Sanctions.
(1)
In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate
sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the
violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible
for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.
(2)
Motion for Sanctions. A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any
other motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).
The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the
court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or
appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets.
If warranted, the court may award to the prevailing party the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, incurred for the motion.
(3)
On the Court's Initiative. On its own, the court may order an attorney, law firm,
or party to show cause why conduct specifically described in the order has not violated
Rule 11(b).

(4)
Nature of a Sanction. A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into
court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing
payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses
directly resulting from the violation.
(5)
Limitations on Monetary Sanctions. The court must not impose a monetary
sanction:
(A)
(B)

against a represented party for violating Rule 11(b)(2); or
on its own, unless it issued the show-cause order under Rule 11(c)(3)
before voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against
the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.

(6)
Requirements for an Order. An order imposing a sanction must describe the
sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction.
(d)

Inapplicability to Discovery. This rule does not apply to disclosures and discovery
requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

08/20/2013
_______________________________
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
JOSHUA PETER LINDSEY
DOC 112177
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
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All Electronically Registered Counsel