GMA Properties et al v. Stewart

Filing 8

ORDER denying 4 Motion for Attorney Fees; granting 4 Motion to Remand to the Fifth Justice of the Peace Court, Parish of Jefferson, State of La. Signed by Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon. (Attachments: # 1 Remand letter) (cbn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GMA PROPERTIES

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-3360

FRANK D. STEWART

SECTION: "S" (2)
ORDER AND REASONS

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that GMA Properties' Motion to Remand (Doc. #4) is
GRANTED, and this matter is REMANDED to the Fifth Justice of the Peace Court, Parish of
Jefferson, State of Louisiana. The motion is DENIED as to an award of attorneys' fees and costs.1
BACKGROUND
This matter is before the court on a motion to remand this matter to the Fifth Justice of the
Peace Court, Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana filed by plaintiff, GMA Properties.
Defendant, Frank D. Stewart,2 is a tenant in an apartment owned by GMA. Stewart's rent
is subsidized by a voucher issued pursuant to Section 8 of the Fair Housing Act. On May 20, 2015,
GMA issued to Stewart a notice to vacate the apartment by May 31, 2015. Then, on June 19, 2015,
GMA issued to Stewart another notice to vacate the apartment, this time on or before August 1,
2015. Stewart did not vacate the apartment after receiving either notice. GMA filed this action in
the Fifth Justice of the Peace Court, Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana seeking to evict Stewart.

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the court may award the plaintiff "payment of just costs and any actual
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of removal." The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that "absent unusual circumstances, attorney's fees should not be awarded when the removing party
has an objectively reasonable basis for removal." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 126 S.Ct. 704, 708 (2005).
Because defendant is proceeding pro se, removal was objectively reasonable. Therefore, the motion for
attorneys' fees and costs is DENIED.
2

Because defendant is proceeding pro se, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Grant v.
Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). However, “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a
party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592,
593 (5th Cir. 1981).

On August 3, 2015, that court set a hearing for August 11, 2015, ordering Stewart to show cause
why judgment should not be ordered against him and why he should not be condemned to vacate
the premises. The attached notice stated the reason for eviction was nonpayment of rent and
violation of the lease.
On August 10, 2015, Stewart removed the action to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana alleging federal question subject-matter jurisdiction. In the notice of
removal, Stewart claims that GMA's state-law based eviction action against him is pre-empted
because GMA did not comply with the tenancy addendum requirements of Section 8 of the Fair
Housing Act.
ANALYSIS
I.

Remand Standard
Motions to remand to state court are governed by 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), which provides that

“[i]f at any time before the final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”

The removing defendant bears the burden of

demonstrating that federal jurisdiction exists and therefore that removal was proper. Jernigan v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir.). In assessing whether removal is appropriate, the
court is guided by the principle, grounded in notions of comity and the recognition that federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, that removal statutes should be strictly construed. See
Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.2002). Doubts regarding
whether federal jurisdiction is proper should be resolved against federal jurisdiction. Acuna v.
Brown & Root, 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000).
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II.

Pre-emption
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal district court has "original jurisdiction of all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Pursuant to the well-pleaded
complaint rule, an action "'arises under' federal law 'only when the plaintiff's statement of his own
cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law].'" Vanden v. Discover Bank, 129 S.Ct.
1262, 1272 (2009) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 29 S.Ct. 42 (1908)). The
well-pleaded complaint rule "makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal
jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429
(1987). "[A]" case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including
the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even
if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue." Id. at 2430.
However, the "complete pre-emption" doctrine, provides an "independent corollary" to the
well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. Under the complete pre-emption doctrine, "the pre-emptive force
of a statute is so 'extraordinary' that it 'converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one
stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'" Id. (quoting Metro. Live
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1547 (1987)). Thus, if "'a federal statute wholly displaces the
state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption,' the state claim can be removed." Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2495 (2004) (quoting Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 123
S.Ct. 2058, 2063 (2003)). To show that an area of state law is completely pre-empted by a federal
statute, the removing party must show: (1) the statute contains a civil enforcement provision that
creates a cause of action that both replaces and protects the analogous area of state law; (2) there is
a specific jurisdictional grant to the federal courts for enforcement of the right; and (3) there is a

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clear Congressional intent" that the federal action be exclusive. Bellfort Enters. Inc. v. PetroTex
Fuels Inc., 339 Fed. Appx. 416, 418-19 (5th Cir. 2009).
GMA's eviction action is based on Louisiana law, and does not implicate a federal question
on its face. See Stump v. Potts, 322 Fed. Appx. 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that eviction actions
arise under state law). Stewart claims that state-law eviction procedures are pre-empted by federal
law because 24 C.F.R. § 982.308(f)(2) requires that all leases subject to a Section 8 voucher must
include a tenancy addendum that sets forth the tenancy requirements for the program and the
composition of the household, and also gives the tenant the right to enforce the tenancy addendum
against the owner. However, Stewart has not shown that there is a specific jurisdictional grants to
federal courts to enforce the tenant's rights or that there is any intention for an exclusive federal
action. Indeed, 24 C.F.R. § 882.511(e) states that "[a]ll evictions must be carried out through
judicial process under State and local law." Thus, there is no clear intent for federal law to pre-empt
state law with respect to the landlord-tenant relationship when Section 8 is implicated. GMA's
motion to remand is GRANTED, and this matter is REMANDED to the Fifth Justice of the Peace
Court, Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that GMA Properties' Motion to Remand (Doc. #4) is
GRANTED, and this matter is REMANDED to the Fifth Justice of the Peace Court, Parish of
Jefferson, State of Louisiana.

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7th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of October, 2015.

____________________________________
MARY ANN VIAL LEMMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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