Fincher v. Kansas Cty Rwy Co

Filing 101

MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER granting 94 Motion for Reconsideration re 88 Order; granting 96 Motion to Change Venue: ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to reconsider is GRANTED. The court finds that transfer of this case from the Lake Charles Division to the Alexandria Division for trial purposes only is proper. ORDERED that defendant's motion for transfer of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) is GRANTED and the case shall be tried before the undersigned on Monday, February 23, 2009 at the U.S. Federal Courthouse in Alexandria, LA (515 Murray St.) beginning at 9:00 a.m. Signed by Judge James T Trimble, Jr on 02/04/09. (crt,Harrison, U)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \\`ESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISiANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

AARON R. FINCH ER
versus

CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-1259 JUDGE TRIMBLE MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN R+4IL~VAY O. C

MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER
After discussion with the parties during a telephone conference
on

January 16,2009, this

court issued an ordert transferring the jury trial of the this case from Lake Charles, Louisiana to Alexandria, Louisiana. No motion for transfer was filed by either party and, thus. the court ordered the intra-district transfer sua sponte. On J ariuarv 27. 2009 plaintiff Aaron Finchcr ("Fincher") filed an objection to the court order along with a motion for reconsideration of the same! Plaintiff's motion argues that the transfer was improper because the court ordered the transfer on its own motion without providing the parties a hearing on the issue. Plaintiff cites Williams v. Toyota Motor Corp.3 as authority that a district court abuses its discretion when it fails to grant an intra-district transfer of venue

R. 88. R. 94. ~2008 \VL 5273528 (E. D. Tex. 12:19.08). rev'd 08-4 1323 t5(F1 Cir. 12l9/08).
~

noni+ In re Toyota Motor Corp., No.

to the division in which the injury occui-rcd. Plaintiffalleges that the injury occurred in the Lake Charles Division of the Western District of Louisiana and, under Williams, our transfer of the
ease outside of that division is error+ At the court's direction, defendant Kansas City Southern Railway Company ("KCS") filed response to plant Ifs notion and objections.4 Additionally. IKE'S filed its own motion

for transier of venue under ~ 1--104(a).5 The court has reviewed the law and argument submitted by the parties and finds that its transfer of venue tinder 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) was procedurally improper only with respect to its failure to provide the parties with prior notice and opportunity for hearing.6 Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for rehearing will be granted and the ruling reconsidered herein. As stated above, the parties have already been provided the opportunity to submit briefs on the issue of transfer and we will consider them below. As noted by the parties, the Fiflh Circuit adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilber( in 1-ILinible Oil & Ref Co. v. Bell Marine Serv.. Inc.? making it applicable not only to forum conveniens cases, but also to venue transfers under § 1404(a).

Under the Gilbert analysis, a district court considering an intra-district transfer must balance

4R. 97. 5R. 96. ~1 Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & 5
Procedure

§ 3844 (1976).

330 U.S. 501 (1947). `321 F.2d53(51]1Cir, 1963).

competing public and private interest factors. The moving party must show "good cause" in support oftransferY The movant satisfies this burden by demonstrating that the proposed transferee venue is "clearly more convenient."0
If the movant fails to demonstrate that its proposed venue is clearly more convenient, the plaintiffs choice of venue should be ~

Private Interest Factors
Under Gilbert, we must consider the following private interest factors: "(I) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trtal ofa ease easy, expeditious and inexpensive.' `] These factors are not addressed in plaintiff's motion fbi' reconsideration. Defendant, bearing the burden of proof on these factors as the movant, addresses each factor in its motion for transfer. First, defendant points out that as to all anticipated sources of proof (the parties, the witnesses and the documents), the Alexandria federal courthouse is closer in proximity. Defendant's motion uses www.mapguest.com to calculate the distances between each witness's residence and both the Lake Charles and Alexandria courthouses.'3 With the exception of

~In e Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5" Cir. 2008). r

°ld.

`a
`21d., citing In re Volkswauen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5~ ir. 2004) C `3R. 97 at p. 6. 3

William Kramherg of Houston, Texas, each witness is more closely located to Alexandria than to Lake Charles. This is also true of the parties, themselves. Defendant also points out that the

documentary evidence in this case may just as easily be produced in Alexandria as in Lake
Charles. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff has demonstrated that this first factor weighs overwhelmingly in favor of transfer to the Alexandria Division, as access to anticipated sources of proof is clearly mole convenient in the proposed transferee venue. As to the remaining private interest factors, defendant asserts that the witnesses, with the exception of retained experts, live within the Western District of Louisiana and are subj ect to the subpoena power of this court by operation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2)(A). Defendants point out that, because all \vitnesses and parties live closer to Alexandria than Lake Charles, the cost for their attendance at trial in Alexandria is less than it would he in Lake Charles. Finally, defendant argues that a jury is called and available in Alexandria and that this is not necessarily true of Lake Charles. Although it is true that ajurv has been called in Alexandria, the court cautions that. "crc it to find that transfer is improper LII this case. the trial of this matter would proceed in Lake Charles as scheduled. As to defendant's other arguments on these remaining factors, ~ e agree. Witness cost would be decreased and the majority ofwitnesses are subject to the subpoena power of this court. Accordingly. we find that defendant has proven that, as to these three remaining factors, transfer to Alexandria is clearly more convenient. Public Interest Factors The public interest factors to be considered under Gilbert are:
h~(1) the

administrative difficulties flowing from court

4

congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests derided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the Ia's

that will govern the case: and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of law or the application of foreign law."4 Again, defendant bears the burden of proof as to these factors as the movant in favor of
transfer. As to the first factor concerning court congestion, defendant again argues that changing the venue in this case back to Lake Charles would result in a necessary continuance of the case. The cottrt. again, disagrees and finds that the case could be tried on the same dates in Lake Charles.

Defendant next argues that since the inj w'v took place in Leesvi lle, Louisiana, Alex andria is a more convenient venue because Leesville is actually closer to Alexandria than it is to Lake (`harles Although Leesville is included in the Lake Charles Division. defendant is correct that it is closer in pi'ox imity to Alexandria than to Lake Charles. Accordingly, we find that this factor supports transfer to Alexandria, as the injury is more "local" to that venue than Lake Charles.
Defendant asserts that the third and fourth factors concerning the proposed forum's

familiarity with the applicable law and the avoidance ofconflicts oflaw are also neutral because the case would be tried, whether in Lake Charles or Alexandria, by the undersigned. This assertion is correct and we also find these factors neutral under the Gilbert analysis. Surveying our findings as to both the public and private factors in this case, the court finds that defendant has successful1~'borne its burden of demonstrating that the Alexandria Division is clearly' more convenient than the lake Charles Division. Thus, although l.ake Charles is the plaintiff's choice of venue, it is not determinative in this case.

"In Re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 5

(5tlt

Cir. 2008).

Plaintiffs objection and motion for reconsideration cites Williams v. Toyota Motor Corp. as authority compelling this court to try this case in Lake Charles simply because the injury occurred in Lcesvillc, which is included in the Lake Charles Division, We reject this argument. lii that case. as here. nianv of the factors considered "crc deemed neutral by the court and the only factor `acighing one way on another "as the public factor of having localiLed interests decided locally. Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that transfer was more appropriate than not. We
reach the same result here, having found that defendant has successfttllydemonstrated that, many

factors being neutral, the only factors weighing for or against all weigh in favor of transfer. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to reconsider is GRANTED. After consideration of the law and argument advanced by the parties, the court finds that transfer ofthis case from the Lake Charles Division to the Alexandria Division for trial purposes only is proper. Accordingly,
it

is further ORDERED that defendant's motion fortransfer of~nue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) e

is GRANTED and the case shall be tried before the undersigned on Monday, February 23, 2009

at the United States Federal Courthouse in Alexandria, Louisiana (515 Murray Street), begitming at 9:00 a.m. THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers at Alexandria, Louisiana this February, 2009.

.4 4/"

day of

JAMES T. TRINIBLE, JR. UNITEb STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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