Pipes v. United Parcel Service Inc et al

Filing 88

RULING re 34 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 37 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by United Parcel Service Inc and 70 MOTION to Strike 61 Memorandum in Support of Motion filed by James R Pipes. Signed by Chief Judge Robert G James on 6/16/09. (crt,DickersonSld, D)

RECEIVED USDC, WESTERN DISTRICT OF LA. TON~.MOORE, CLERK DATE çt' BY

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA MONROE DIVISION

JAMES R. PIPES VERSUS UNLTEJ) PARCEL SERVICE, 1NC. and INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS

CWIL ACTION NO. 3:07-CV-1762 JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES MAG. JUDGE ICAREN L. IIAYES

RULING Plaintiff James R. Pipes ("Pipes") brought this action against his former employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. ("UPS"), alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim and that his termination was also a breach of the collective bargaining agreement between UPS and Local 568, an affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("the International"). Pipes also asserted a claim against the International for breach of the duty of fair representation in grievance proceedings that followed his termination. On February 27, 2009, the International filed a Motion for Sunmiary Judgment [Doc. No. 34], seeking dismissal of the claim against it. On March 2, 2009, UPS also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No, 37], seeking dismissal of all claims against it. Pipes filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment [Doc, No. 81].' Pipes also filed a Motion to Strike [Doe. No. 70] portions of the affidavit of Jerry Qordanier, submitted by UPS with its Reply [Doc. No. 61] in support of its Motion for Summary

`Although the memorandum is styled, "Memorandum on Behalf of the Plaintiff, James R. Pipes, in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Filed by the United Parcel Service," Pipes addresses the arguments of both UPS and the International.

Judgment. UPS filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Strike [Doe. No. 75]. Pipes filed a reply memorandum in support of his Motion to Strike [Doe. No. 85]. For the following reasons, the International's and UPS's Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED. Pipes's Motion to Strike is DENIED IN PART and the remainder of his motion is DENTED AS MOOT. I. FACTS In October 1999, UPS hired Pipes as a temporary employee during peak season to unload trucks and to work as a driver's helper. After peak season, UPS continued to employ Pipes part time performing pre-load, local sort, and clerical work and some driving for the Ruston UPS center. In June 2004, UPS hired Pipes full time as a swing driver2 in the Ruston center, and he worked in that capacity until his termination in April 2007. Throughout his employment, Pipes was a member of Local 568 of the International. UPS and Local 568 had entered into two agreements, the National Master United Parcel Service Agreement and Southern Region Supplemental Agreement (collectively the "CBA"), which governed the relationship between UPS and the bargaining unit employees.3 The CBA set

2Swing drivers do not have their own assigned package routes, but are hired to fill in for drivers with assigned routes. 3The National Master United Parcel Service Agreement ("National Master") and the Southern Region of Teamsters and United Parcel Service, Inc. Supplemental Agreement ("Southern Region Supplement") are actually two separate documents. The National Master applies to all T.JPS union employees nationwide. The Southern Region Supplement applies only to UPS union employees in the Southern Region or Conference. The two agreements were negotiated separately and have separate provisions for grievance and arbitration procedures. The documents are signed by UPS, the "Teamsters United Parcel Service National Negotiating Committee representing Local Unions affiliated with the [International]," and the Local Union. Defendant International is not a signatory. 2

forth the rights and remedies for work-related complaints of bargaining unit employees. UPS drivers were required to have a clean driving record, have a chauffeur's license, and pass a DOT physical (every two years), a driving course, and an annual road test. UPS drivers also receive Space and Visibility training at least annually. UPS emphasizes to its drivers the necessity for them to follow the specific driving techniques taught in its training courses, known as the "Five Seeing Habits," and places stickers in its package cars to remind drivers of these defensive driving habits. Prior to April 2007, Pipes caused three accidents while driving for UPS, all resulting in property damage. On April 16, 2007, Pipes was driving a UPS package car. Prior to talcing the car out, Pipes conducted his daily pre-trip inspection, known as "pretripping" the car, including an inspection of the tires. If he had noted any problems or repairs that needed to be made, he would have made a notation on the Driver Vehicle Inspection Report ("DVIR") tablet located in the car. UPS mechanics routinely check the DVIR tablet to see what repairs need to be made and perform those repairs, or talce the car out of service. On the day of April 16, 2007, the weather conditions were dry and clear, and Pipes was traveling on a rural road in Homer, Louisiana. While going around a curve and up a hill, Pipes heard a "pop" come from the package car. Pipes contends that his front passenger wheel immediately pulled off the road to the right. Pipes quickly steered the package car back onto the road to avoid hitting the line of trees in front of him, but then lost control of the car. The back end of the car came around, causing him to turn more than 180 degrees counter-cloclcwise. As the back end began leading the package car, Pipes crossed the road at a 45-degree angle, hit the

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embanlcment on the other shoulder with his back end, and then rolled completely over once, counter-clockwise, and landed upright. Pipes could not recall if a speed limit was posted on the road, and he did not lcnow for certain how fast be was going. After the accident, Pipes contacted the Business Agent for Local 568, Doug Beclcham ("Beclcham")4, and Clay Burrough ("Burrough"), the UPS Division Manager for a number of centers in north Louisiana, including Ruston. They inquired if Pipes was okay and if he needed an ambulance. The police were called and interviewed Pipes, but did not issue a citation. Burrough, who has 22 years of investigative experience with UPS; Pipes's supervisor, Ronald McCown ("McCown"); Al Delaune ("Delaune"), UPS Gulf South Health and Safety Supervisor; and Gerald Castille ("Castille"), UPS Automotive Supervisor, all traveled to the accident scene to check on Pipes and conduct an investigation. Pipes told Burrough at the scene that the right, front tire of the package car blew out, causing Pipes to go off the road. As a result of the accident, the package car was severely danuged. The gear shift dislodged from the car completely, broke off, and landed on the ground, and the windshield came completely out. Pipes left the accident scene with McCown and returned to the Ruston UPS center where they contacted UPS's insurance carrier to report the accident, McCown insisted that Pipes contact him after receiving medical treatment. Pipes went home and then went to the emergency room, where Pipes's wife was worlcing as a nurse. Pipes underwent CAT scans and X-rays and was given fluids and paln medication. Pipes suffered minor injuries in the form of cuts, bruises, and scrapes as a result of the accident. He followed up with a physician two to three times after the

4Beckham's full-time job is to represent the interests of bargalning unit employees and act as the liaison between union employees and UPS management to resolve grievances. 4

accident. Pipes was off from work for approximately three weeks until he was cleared to return to full duty. Although Pipes told Burrough that a blown tire had caused the accident, based on the skid marks and the placement of the package car, Burrough, Delaune, and Castille believed that Pipes had been traveling too fast around the turn and bad caused the accident by overcorrecting. UPS towed the package car to Shreveport for a mechanical inspection. Union mechanics Joffery Cleveland and Glen Davis conducted the inspection under Castille's supervision and found no mechanical problems. Castille also sent the right front tire to Southern Tire Mart, an unrelated company, for inspection. According to Southern Tire Mart, the right, front tire held pressure at 77 psi, did not lealc down, was not run flat, and no defects were found in its casing or cap. Photographs of the tire at the scene showed that mud was lodged between the tire and the rim at the point of the seal. Based on this evidence, Castille came to the conclusion that the tire deflated when it became separated from the rim during the accident, not before the accident. UPS found no evidence that the accident was caused by the tire blowing out or deflating or any other mechanical fallure. Pipes disputes Castille's conclusions and was not present for the inspections by UPS or Southern Tire Mart, but he has no reason to believe that the reports are untruthful. When Burrough received the mechanical inspection report and report from Southern Tire Mart, he concluded that Pipes had lied about the cause of the accident. Burrough sent the accident scene photographs and the reports to UPS Gulf South District Labor Manager Rob Russell ("Russell"). But-rough and Russell made the decision to terminate Pipes for just cause,

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pursuant to Article 52 of the CBA for "recldessness resulting in a serious accident."5 On April 25, 2007, McCown, union steward Bruce Rushing, and UPS Business Manager Reginald Wells met with Pipes at the Ruston center, They informed him that he was discharged. After the meeting, Pipes had no other communications with UPS about his termination. Pipes filed a grievance challenging his termination. Article 51 of die CBA sets forth the grievance procedure and requires that a grievance proceed through three steps before reaching arbitration: a local hearing, a panel hearing before the Southern Region Area Parcel Grievance Committee ("SRAPGC"), and a panel hearing before a SRAPGC Deadlock Panel ("Deadlock Panel"). The SRAPGC is a committee composed of three UPS representatives and three union representatives. If the SRAPGC does not reach a majority decision on the grievance, the grievance advances to the Deadlock Panel, composed of one UPS representative and one union representative.6 Cases that are deadlocked at the Deadlock Panel may be referred to binding arbitration before a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service arbitrator. The CBA expressly provides that decisions at each level of the grievance procedure are "final and binding."

5Article 52 reads in relevant part as follows: Article 52 Discharge or Suspension (A) The Employer shall not discharge nor suspend any employee without just cause, but in respect to discharge or suspension shall give at least one (I) warning notice of a complaint against such employee to the employee, in writing, and a copy of the same to die Local Union, except that no warning notice need be given to an employee before discharge if the cause of such discharge is dishonesty,.. recldessness resulting in a serious accident while on duty, an avoidable runaway accident...
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(Pipes Exh. 8, p. 188-89). 6Tbe union representatives on the SRAPGC and Deadlock Panel are representatives from other International local unions (i.e., local unions of which the grievant is not a member). 6

Pursuant to the CBA, a local hearing was held at the Shreveport center in an attempt to resolve Pipes's grievance. Beclthani represented Pipes at the hearing. Those in attendance inspected the package car, and UPS personnel informed Pipes of the results of tie mechanical inspection of die vehicle. The grievance was not resolved at tie local bearing and, thus, moved to the next step, a hearing by the SRAPGC. On May 15, 2007, the grievance was formally heard in Tampa before the SRAPGC. Beclcham again represented Pipes at the panel hearing. Russell represented UPS. The SRAPGC heard arguments from both sides, and Pipes made a statement. However, the SRAPGC deadlocked, and the grievance automatically proceeded to the next stage of review before the Deadlock Panel. On August 16, 2007, the grievance was heard by a Deadlock Panel of two neutral decision malcers, Jeny Gordanier ("Gordanier") for UPS and Clay Jeffries ("Jeffries") for the International. Gordanier is a Region Labor Manager for UPS, and Jeffries is a Business Agent for Local 385 out of Oriando, Florida. Although Pipes did not attend the Deadlock Panel hearing, Beclcham delivered an opening statement and read Pipes's written statement. Beclcham argued that Pipes's discharge violated Article 18 of the CBA because the accident did not meet the definition of "serious accident" in Article 18. Russell represented UPS and argued that Pipes's recklessness caused the serious accident, which justified his termination under Article 52.14. The Deadlock Panel voted to sustaln Pipes's termination on the basis that die accident was serious and that it was caused by Pipes's recklessness. On October 25, 2007, Pipes filed this lawsuit against UPS and the International.

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II. LAW AND ANALYSIS A. Motions for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate oniy when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court ofdie basis for its motion by identifying portions of the record which highlight die absence of genuine issues of material fact. Topalian v. Ehnnann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132
( th 5

Cir. 1992).

If the moving party can meet the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Norman v. Apache Coip., 19 F .3 d 1017, 1023 (5~ ir. 1994). The nomnoving party must show more than "some C metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. lucius. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Coip., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). B. hybrid Section 301 and Duty of Fair Representation Claims

Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LIv[PA") provides an employee with a federal cause of action against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C.

§

185; see also Stizith v. EveningNewsAss'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).

Employees also have an implied cause of action against die union which represents them if the union breaches its duty of falr representation.7 See Vaca v. Srpes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); see also Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 563 (1990) ("The

7Within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.

§

185, it is undisputed that UPS is an "employer" and

that both Local 568 and the International are "labor organization[s]." 29 U.S.C. 8

§

185

duty of fair representation is inferred from unions' exclusive audiority under the National Labor Relations Act.
. .,

29 U.S.C.

§ 159(a) (1982 ed.), to represent all

employees in a bargaining

unit."). The Supreme Court has stated that these two claims are "inextricably interdependent." DelCostello v. hit `1 Bhd. ofTeamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983). The interdependency arises from die nature of die collective bargaining agreement. If die arbitration and grievance procedure is the exclusive and final remedy for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, die employee may not sue his employer under § 301 until he has exhausted the procedure. Further be is bound by tie procedure's result unless lie proves the union breached its duty of fair representation. Daigle i'. GulfState Utility Co., 794 F.2d 974, 977 (Sdi Cir. 1986). Thus, "[t]o prevail against eidier the company or the Union,.
. .

[the employee] must not only show that [his] discharge was

contrary to the contract but must also cany the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the Union." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65; see also Brown v. Witco Corp., 340 F.3d 209, 213 n.5 (5th Cir. 2003). The trial court engages in a two-step analysis to evaluate these so-called hybrid Section 301/fair representation claims. Because die union's breach of its duty of fair representation is an "indispensable predicate" to recoveiy against die employer, tie court should first detennine whether there is sufficient evidence to support tie claim against the union. Landry v. The Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., hic., 880 F.2d 846, 851(5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). If so, tie court then reviews die Section 301 claim to determine whether the employee has proved that the employer discharged him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. See id. Accordingly, this Court will first address Pipes's claim against the International. 1. Pipes's Section 301 Claim Against the International

Pipes asserts a claim against the International for breach of the duty of fair representation.
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A union has a statutory duty to represent fairly all bargaining unit employees in the enforcement of die collective bargaining agreement. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177. However, an employee has no "absolute right" to have his grievance talcen to arbitration or to a specific level of the grievance process. Landiy, 880 F.2d at 852. The mere fact that a union falls to pursue arbitration is insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate a breach of its duty of fair representation. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 192, Rather, a union has "an obligation to prosecute a grievance `with reasonable diligence unless it is decided in good faith diat the grievance lacked merit or for some other reason should not be pursued." Landry, 880 F.2d at 852 (quoting Hanunons v~ dams, 783 F.2d 597, 602 (5th Cir. 1986)). Neitiier "simple negligence [nor] a A mistalce in judgment" is a breach ofthe union's statutory duty; tie "critical question" is whether the union's actions were "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith." Id; see also Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190. In diis case, the CBA identified Local 568 and the National Negotiating Committee as die exclusive bargaining representatives under the CBA, not die International. The United States Supreme Court has recognized diat conu-non law principles of agency govern whether an international union is liable for the actions of a local affiliate. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers ofAm., 444 U.S. 212, 2 16-17 (1979) (applying die common law principles to determine whedier an international union was liable for an unaudiorized strike by one of its locals). Thus, an international union is not "vicariously liable for the acts of the local union or its business agent" merely on the basis of their relationship. See Hammons
i'.

Adams, 783 F.2d 597,

604, 604 n.29 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing, in dicta, Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80, 97 (6th Cir. 1980)); see also Shinnian, 625 F.3d at 97 ("The International Union is a separate body from

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the local. The acts of the local and its agents cannot automatically be imputed to the International."); Masley v. Roadway Exp. Thc., Civil Action No. H-07-1406, 2009 WL 1064182, at *8 n,5 (S.D. Tex., Apr. 17, 2009) (where plalntiff conceded that die Local, not the International Union, was his exclusive bargaining agent, his claim against die International Union was dismissed). In this case, Pipes's sole complaint against the International is diat the union member of the Deadlock Panel, Clay Jeffries, voted to uphold his termination. First, the Court finds diat it is doubtful that the International owed Pipes a duty of fair representation in the grievance process. The International was not a signatory to the CBA. See Teamsters Local Union No. 30 v. Helms Express, Thc., 591 F.2d 211, 217 (3d Cir. 1979); Sine i'. Local No. 992, Tnt `1 Bhd of Teamsters, 730 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1984). In addition, the International had not assumed die role of bargaining unit representative, was not die administrator of die CBA, and had not undertalcen Pipes's representation in the grievance process However, the Court recognizes at least one appellate court has also found that "die duty of fair representation [is] a flexible duty, varying as the union function varies," and thus, "the union owes its members a duty of fair representation while serving in each of its many roles," including a duty offair representation while serving as a member of ajoint grievance committee.8 See Thomas v. UPS, 890 F.2d 909, 922 (7th Cir. 1989). Nevertheless, even in Thomas, die Sevendi Circuit recognized that the "nature ofthe union's role in sifting on a [ioint grievance

8The Court is also aware that die International's Rule 30(b)(6) representative, Kenneth Wood, testified that die International owed a duty of fair representation to Pipes. Wood's opinion on a legal conclusion does not create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Nevertheless, for die reasons discussed, infra, Pipes cannot meet his burden even if he was owed a duty of fair representation by die International. 11

committee] is essentially diat of an arbitrator and die union fulfills its duty of fair representation by rendering a fair and impartial decision on the merits." Id. In diat regard, a union member of a joint grievance committee cannot" rely upon political, religious, racial, ethnic, personal, or otherwise impermissible factors when ruling upon a grievance petition." Id.; see also Olsen i'. United Parcel Sen'ice, 892 F.2d 1290, 1297 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[W]e have held that fair representation in die JUC context is met by die fair and impartial consideration of grievances without regard to `political, religious, racial, etinic, personal, or otherwise impermissible factors.
.")

(citing Thomas, 890 F.2d at 922)). The Court need not determine today whether the International owed Pipes a duty of fair

representation because its appointees served on the SRAPGC and/or the Deadlock Panel.9 Even if Pipes was owed a duty by die International, there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Pipes has admitted that his grievance was filed, was taken through the proper steps, and that he was satisfied with die representation of Local 568's Business Agent, Beclcham, at the local and panel hearings. There was no majority decision reached at die SRAPUC, and die case advanced to the Deadlock Panel. Although be was not present at die Deadlock Panel, he had no reason to believe that Beckham had not represented him well there, too. The role of the International appointee to die Deadlock Panel, Jeffries, was not to advocate for Pipes, but to render, along widi his UPS counterpart, a neutral decision. Pipes has produced no evidence that Jeffries or any oilier representative of die International acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or

9Likewise, the Court need not reach Pipes's argument that die International owed a duty of fair representation to him because the "Teamsters United Parcel Service National Negotiating Committee" participated in tie negotiation of the CBA, was a signatory to the CBA, and was identified as an exclusive bargaining agent, along with Local 568. [Doc. No. 81, p.11]. 12

discriminatorily. Jeffries has provided affidavit testimony that he voted to sustain the grievance and uphold Pipes's termination "solely on [his] independent voluntary judgment of the merits of die grievance based on the hearing evidence and the applicable contract language." [Doc. No. 34, Jeffries Aff., ¶8]. While Pipes is understandably dissatisfied with tie result of die grievance process and that be was not pennitted to proceed to arbitration, his personal dissadsfacdon is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Thus, the International's Motion for Summary Judgment on Pipes's Section 301 claim is GRANTED, and the claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 2. Pipes's Section 301 Claim against UPS

Pipes cannot establish his remaining Section 301 claim against UPS for breach of die CBA without also having established that the International breached its duty of fair representation. Having found no genuine issue of material fact to support Pipes's claim against the International, the Court must also dismiss die Section 301 claim against UPS. UPS's Motions for Summary Judgment on Pipes's Section 301 claim is also GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. C. Workers' Compensation Retaliation

Pipes also asserted a workers' compensation retaliation claim against UPS under Louisiana Revised Statute Section 23:1361(B). Section 23:1361(B) provides: "No person shall discharge an employee from employment because of said employee having asserted claims for benefits under the provisions of diis chapter or under the laws of any state or the United States." In advancing a claim for retaliatory discharge under die Workers' Compensation Statute, the employee bears the burden of proving

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by a preponderance of die evidence diat be was terminated for asserting a workers' compensation claim. Lewis v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 537 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989). In a case where "the employer offers another justification in connection widi firing a workers' compensation claimant, die trial court must ascertain die employer's true reason or motive based on die facts presented. An employer cannot circumvent the statute by stretching die facts out of context or inventing an excuse for firing a compensation claimant." Id at 783. "Timing of die dismissal alone is insufficient to carry die employee's burden of proof" Woolsey i'. Delta Disposals, L.L.C., 40,339 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/26/05); 914 So.2d 618, 621 (citing King i& Career Training Specialists, Inc., 35,050 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/01); 795 So.2d 1223, 1228). Radier, timing may be some evidence of retaliatory motive when presented with additional evidence. See King, 795 So.2d at 1228. Even so, "[e~mphoyee ault may be a f sufficient independent basis for termination coincident with the employee's filing of a compensation claim. Woolsey, 914 So.2d at 622 (citing Myers v. Omni Hotel, Inc., 94~2004 La. ( App. 4 Cir, 4/13/95); 654 So.2d 771). In this case, Pipes's only evidence to support his claim of woricers' compensation retaliation is timing. 1-le has no other direct or circumstantial evidence to support his claim. UPS, on die other hand, has presented evidence diat be was terminated for having a serious accident while driving a UPS package car. While Pipes may disagree whether the reason for his termination is adequate under die CBA's language, he has presented no evidence that die reason was pretext for workers' compensation retaliation. Accordingly, UPS's Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is also GRANTED.
P.

Motion to Strike

Pipes also moved die Court to strike portions of the declaration of Jeny Gordanier. [Doc. 14

No. 70]. To the extent that Pipes objected diat Gordanier's statements in paragraph 3 of his declaration constituted "legal conclusions," die Court disagrees and finds that Gordanier could properly testify as to the factual nature of his role on die Deadlock Panel. Pipes's Motion to Strilce is DENIED IN PART. The remainder of Pipes's motion addresses Gordanier's interpretation of the CBA. Given the Court's conclusions in this matter, it has not considered these statements, and, dius, die remaining portion of Pipes's Motion to Strike is DENIED AS MOOT.

In.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant International's Motion for Summary Judgment

[Doe. No. 34] and Defendant UPS's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doe. No. 37] are GRANTED. Accordingly, Pipes's claims against all Defendants are DISIVIISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Pipes's Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 70] is DENIED iN PART as to Gordanier's statements regarding his role on the Deadlock Panel. The remainder of the motion is DENIED AS MOOT. MO~OE,LOthS~A, this

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day of

2009.

ROBERT(~G. .Ø4ES J UNITED STATES bISTRICT JUDGE

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