Cargo et al v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co

Filing 456

MEMORANDUM RULING re 197 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment on the claims of Tammye Stinson filed by Kansas City Southern Railway Co. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 9/16/2009. (crt,Reasor, M)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA S H R E V E P O R T DIVISION

C L A R E N C E CARGO, et al., V ER SU S K A N S A S CITY SOUTHERN

C IV I L ACTION NO. 05-2010 J U D G E S. MAURICE HICKS, JR. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

M E M O R AN D U M RULING B e fo re the Court is Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on P la in tiff Tammye Stinson's Title VII claim of failure to promote. [Record Document 1 9 7 ]. The motion is grounded in a claim that Stinson failed to timely file her charge o f discrimination with regard to her failure to promote claim, and alternatively, failed to timely file suit after the issuance of the right to sue letter. See id. Plaintiff o p p o s e s this motion. [Record Document 269]. For the reasons that follow,

D e fe n d a n t's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD S u m m a ry judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil P r o c e d u re "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions o n file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to a n y material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of la w ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). "R u le 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for d is c o ve ry and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which th a t party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F .3 d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine iss u e of material fact, "the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate s p e c ific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Littlefield v. Forney In d e p . Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001). W h e r e critical evidence is so w e a k or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of th e nonmovant, then summary judgment should be granted. See Alton v. Tex. A&M U n iv., 168 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1999). II. LAW AND ANALYSIS Employment discrimination plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies b e fo re they may seek judicial relief. McCain v. Lufkin Ind., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5 th Cir. 2008). In order to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, a plaintiff

m u s t first file a timely charge with the EEOC. "The charge enables the EEOC to in ve s tig a te and, if appropriate, negotiate a resolution with an employer." Id. Only a fte r administrative efforts terminate and the EEOC issues a statutory notice of right to sue may the employee sue the employer in federal court. Id. Because Louisiana is a deferral state, a plaintiff's charge of discrimination m u s t be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000er5 (e )(1 ). Defendant argues Stinson failed to exhaust her administrative remedies w ith regard to her Title VII claim of failure to promote in August 1999 because she 2 of 5

d id not timely assert her claim with the EEOC.

Stinson signed a Charge of

D is c rim in a tio n on May 16, 2001, alleging that "[o]n or about August 1, 1999, [she] w a s denied a Hold-Down job as a temporary clerk in position #132." [Doc. 197, Ex. A ]. She stated that she believed she had been discriminated against on the basis o f her race because a white employee with less seniority was offered the position. Id. Because the lapse in time from the alleged discriminatory act--failure to

p r o m o te on August 1, 1999--and the filing of her charge exceeded 300 days, D e fe n d a n t contends Plaintiff Stinson's Title VII claim of failure to promote in August 1 9 9 9 should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In support of her Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, P la in tiff Stinson attached another Charge of Discrimination ("Second Charge") which s h e signed on March 31, 2003 and for which a right-to-sue letter was issued on O c to b e r 14, 2004. [Doc. 248, Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, Ex. B3]. In the Second Charge, Stinson a lle g e s a "continuing action" and states, in pertinent part: 2 . Throughout my employment, I have made known my in te re s t in promotion to a better or higher paying position a t K.C.S. However, I have repeatedly been denied p ro m o tio n s to better paying and supervisory or m a n a g e r ia l level positions. Specifically and most re c e n tly, I applied for a Manager Customer Service C e n te r position and was denied that promotion. Upon in fo rm a tio n and belief, that position was awarded to a y o u n g white male who had worked for the company for o n ly one (1) year. Upon information and belief, AfricanA m e ric a n s are systematically excluded from supervisory a n d managerial level positions by the respondent. F u rth e r , upon information and belief, K.C.S. discriminates 3 of 5

a s a class in hiring, promotions, pay, and other terms and c o n d itio n s of employment. [S e c o n d Charge, Doc. 248, Ex. B3]. Because the Second Charge alleges a "continuing violation" and states that s h e has been denied promotions throughout her employment history, Stinson argues tha t she has exhausted her administrative remedies as to her August 1999 failure to promote claim. However, in Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 1 1 3 -1 4 , 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2072-73 (2002), the United States Supreme Court held that "[d ]is c re te acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire" "are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." A plaintiff can only file a charge to cover discrete acts within th e 180- or 300-day time period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred. See id . Consequently, only those acts that occurred 300 days prior to March 31, 2003, th e day that Stinson filed her Second Charge, are actionable. Because her claim of failu re to promote on or about August 1, 1999 occurred more than 300 days before s h e filed the Second Charge, the Court concludes that Plaintiff Stinson failed to e xh a u s t her administrative remedies as to her August 1999 failure to promote claim. III. CONCLUSION A c c o rd in g ly, IT IS ORDERED THAT the foregoing motion [Record D o c u m e n t 1 9 7 ] be and is hereby GRANTED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff Stinson's request for sanctions be a n d is hereby DENIED. Nothing in the argument submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel in s u p p o rt of the claim for sanctions leads this Court to believe that Defendant u n re a s o n a b ly multiplied the motion practice and proceedings in this case. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT each party shall bear its own costs with re s p e c t to the briefing of the instant motions. T h u s done and signed, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 16th day of September, 2009.

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