Hofer et al v. Old Navy Inc. et al

Filing 70

Hofer et al v. Old Navy Inc. et al

Doc. 70 Att. 9

Case 4:05-cv-40170-FDS

Document 70-10

Filed 02/16/2007

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EXHIBIT 9
Dockets.Justia.com

Case 4:05-cv-40170-FDS

Document 70-10

Filed 02/16/2007

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2 0 0 7 NY Slip Op 498, *; 2007 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 786, **

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[*1] Helen M a r a ia , respondent, v Church of Our Lady of M o u n t Carmel, defendant t h i r d - p a r t y plaintiff respondent-appellant; Harrison Holidays, Inc., third-party d e f e n d a n t appellant. 2 0 0 6 - 0 0 0 3 0 , (Index No. 13789/03) SUPREM E COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTM ENT 2007 NY Slip Op 498; 2007 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 786 J a n u a r y 23, 2007, Decided N O T I C E : [**1] THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS D O C U M E N T IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING T H E RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED V E R S I O N . THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND S U B J E C T TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN T H E OFFICIAL REPORTS. C O U N S E L : Brill & Associates, P.C., New York, N.Y. ( H a yd n J. Brill and Linda Strauss of counsel), for thirdp a r t y defendant-appellant. Armienti, DeBellis & W h ite n , LLP, New York, N.Y. ( V a n e ss a M . Corchia of counsel), for defendant thirdp a r t y plaintiff respondent-appellant. J U D G E S : HOW A R D MILLER, J.P., REINALDO E. R I V E R A , GABRIEL M . KRAUSM A N , GLORIA G O L D S T E IN , JJ. M IL LE R , J.P ., R IV E R A , K R A U S M A N and GOLDSTEIN, JJ., concur. O P IN IO N : DECISION & ORDER I n an action to recover damages for personal in j u r ie s , the third-party defendant Harrison Holidays, I n c ., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an o r d e r of the Supreme Court, Richmond County ( G i a c o b b e , J.), dated N o v e m b e r 18, 2005, as denied its m o t i o n for summary judgment dismissing the third-party c o m p la i n t , and the defendant third-party plaintiff crossa p p e a ls , as limited by its brief, from so much of the same o r d e r as denied its cross motion for summary judgment d i s m i s s i n g the complaint. O R D E R E D that the order is reversed insofar [**2] a s appealed and cross-appealed from, on the law, with o n e bill of costs payable by the plaintiff to the appellant a n d the respondent-appellant, and the motion for s u m m a r y judgment dismissing the third-party complaint a n d the cross motion for summary judgment dismissing th e complaint are granted. " A tour operator has no duty to warn group members o f a possible hazardous condition on property it neither o w n s nor occupies" (Cohen v H e r i t a g e Motor Tours, 205 A . D .2 d 105, 107, 618 N.Y.S.2d 387; see Loeb v United S ta te s D e p t . of Interior, Tauck Tours and Grand Teton L o d g e , 793 F. Supp. [*2] 431, 438). However, where th e tour operator assumes a duty to the plaintiff, such as w h e r e one of its employees directs the tour participant to " p r o c e e d in a particular manner" (Cohen v Heritage M o t o r Tours, supra), the operator may be held liable if i t s conduct placed the plaintiff in a more vulnerable p o s itio n (id.). Here, the third-party defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by d e m o n s tr a tin g that it did not own or operate the premises w h e re the incident occurred or assume a duty of care by d ir e c tin g the plaintiff's path within [**3] the premises ( s e e Mongello v Davos Ski Resort, 224 A.D.2d 502, 638 N . Y .S .2 d 166; cf. Cohen v Heritage Motor Tours, supra). T h e defendant third-party plaintiff also established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by d e m o n s t r a t i n g that the platform from which the plaintiff fe l l was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous ( s e e Pirie v Krasinski, 18 A.D.3d 848, 796 N.Y.S.2d 671; F i tz g e ra ld v Sears, Roebuck and Co., 17 A.D.3d 522, 793 N . Y .S .2 d 164; Capozzi v Huhne, 14 A.D.3d 474, 788 N . Y .S .2 d 152; Jang Hee Lee v Sung Whun Oh, 3 A.D.3d 4 7 3 , 771 N.Y.S.2d 134). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The plaintiff's contention t h a t the platform was in violation of various requirements o f Administrative Code of the City of New York § 27-375 is without merit since the subject platform is not an " i n t e r i o r stair" within the meaning of Administrative C o d e of the City of New York § 27-372 (see Chaehee J u n g v Kum Gang, 22 A.D.3d 441, 806 N.Y.S.2d 62; W a lk e r v 127 W. 22nd St. Assoc., 281 A.D.2d 539, 722 N . Y .S .2 d 250). Nor did the plaintiff demonstrate that the s u b j e c t platform was in violation [**4] of Administrative

Case 4:05-cv-40170-FDS

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Filed 02/16/2007

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2 0 0 7 NY Slip Op 498, *; 2007 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 786, ** C o d e of the City of New York § § 27-127 and 27-128. A c c o r d i n g ly , the Supreme Court should have g r a n te d the third-party defendant's motion for summary j u d g m e n t dismissing the third-party complaint and the d e f e n d a n t third-party plaintiff's cross motion for s u m m a r y judgment dismissing the complaint. M ILLER, J.P ., RIV E RA, G O L D S T E I N , JJ., concur. KRAUSMAN and