Spreadbury v. Bitterroot Public Library et al

Filing 84

RESPONSE to Motion re 70 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Defendant Lee Enterprises Inc's Response Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's First Request Injunctive Relief filed by Lee Enterprises Incorporated. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Smith, Jeffrey)

Jeffrey B. Smith

GARLINGTON, LOHN & ROBINSON, PLLP
350 Ryman Street . P. O. Box 7909
Missoula, MT 59807-7909
Telephone [phone]
Telefax [phone]
[e-mail]
Attorneys for Defendant, Lee Enterprises, Inc.

IN THE T]NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR TTIE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION

MICHAEL E. SPREADBURY,

Cause No. CV-1 1-064-M-DWM

Plaintifl
DEFENDANT LEE ENTERPRISES,
INC.'S RESPONSE BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST REQUEST INJLNCTIVE
RELIEF

BITTERROOT PUBLIC LIBRARY,
CITY OF HAMILTON, LEE
ENTERPRISES, INC., and BOONE
KARLBERG P.C.,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Co-Defendant, Lee Enterprises, Inc. ("Lee Enterprises"),
through its counsel, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, and hereby respectfully

files its Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff

s

First Request Injunctive Relief (Dkt. 70).

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Michael Spreadbury ("Spreadbury"), has filed a request for
injunctive relief. However, Spreadbury has not established he is likely to succeed
on the merits of his claim, has not established he is likely to suffer ineparable harm

in the absence ofpreliminary relief, has not established the balance ofequities tips
in his favor, and has not established that an injunction is in the public interest

Accordingly, Spreadbury's First Request Injunctive Relief should be denied.

ARGIMENT
"A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate (1) that it

is

likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence ofpreliminary relief, (3) that the balance ofequities tips in its favor, and

(4) that an injunction is in the public interest." Earth Is. Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d

462,469 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7,

l9 (2008). "A preliminary injunction

is an 'extraordinary and drastic

remedy'; it is never awarded as of right." Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d
I 101, 1105 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

I.

Spreadbury's Request For Injunctive Relief Should Be Denied.

Spreadbury is not likely to succeed on the merits. Rather, his claims should
be dismissed as provided in Lee Enterprises' Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss

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(Dkt.7), for failing to provide the factual allegations suffrcient to entitle him to
injunctive relief. See a/so Findings & Recommendations (Dkt. 75). Further,
Spreadbury is not likely to succeed on his defamation claim, because the afiicles

published by Lee Enterprises were privileged and Lee Enterprises is not liable for
the comments made by third parties on the Ravalli Republic website. Spreadbury
has also not shown a likelihood ofsuffering irreparable harm in the absence

of

preliminary relief, and the balance of equities tips in favor of Lee Enterprises, not
Spreadbury, as an injunction prohibiting Lee Enterprises from publishing

privileged information and holding the owner of a website liable for comments
made by third parties is not in the public's interest.

A.

Spreadbury Is Not Likely to Succeed On The Merits.

Spreadbury is not likely to succeed on his baseless claims. Spreadbury's

Amended Complaint essentially requests the Court order Lee Enterprises to stop

publishing news articles and comments about Spreadbury. (Dkt.

l-l atl214.)

However, Spreadbury has not stated factual allegations sufficient to entitle him

relief against Lee Enterprises. As provided in Lee Enterprises' Brief in Support of
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 7), since it does not appear Spreadbury is entitled to the
relief demanded, an injunction is notproper. See Mont. Code Ann. $ 27-19-201
(200e).
Furthermore, an injunction is not proper because Spreadbury is essentially
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requesting the Court restrain Lee Enterprises from publishing things it already

published. "An injunction will not issue to restrain an act already committed."
Mustang Holdings, LLC v. Zaveta,2006 MT

n4,n

15,333 Mont. 47l, 143 P3d

456 (quotation and intemal citation omitted). "Injunction is not an appropriate
remedy to procure relief for past injuries, it is to afford preventive relief only

"

Mustang, fl 15 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Also, Spreadbury is not likely to prevail on his claims since the articles
published by Lee Enterprises were privileged and the comments on Ravalli

Republic's website were made by third parties. Spreadbury's Amended Complaint
basically claims Lee Enterprises defamed Spreadbury by publishing articles about
the criminal trespass charges brought against him, which were subsequently
dropped by the City, and by publishing comments posted by third parties on the

Ravalli Republic's website. (Dkt. l-1 atflfl l8l-189.) However, Spreadbury fails
to recognize the articles were true, simply reporting that criminal trespass charges
were brought against Spreadbury and that he later was convicted ofthose charges.

The fact the charges were later dropped does not change the facts which were

published. Spreadbury fails to show these publications were not true and how they
defamed

him. Moreover, Spreadbury fails to recognize the articles were

privileged.
Traditionally, the term "libel" refers to defamatory statements made in
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wdting. Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 568 (WL current through Apr. 2011).
Montana Code Annotated $ 27-l-802 (2009) (emphasis added) defines libel:

Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing,
printing, picture, effrgy, or other fixed representation that
exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy or
causes a person to be shunned or avoided or that has a tendency
to injure a person in the person's occupation.

However, certain communications are privileged. Montana Code Annotated
$ 27-1-804 (2009) establishes what types

ofpublications are privileged.

A privileged publication is one made:
(1) in the proper discharge ofan official duty;
(2) in any legislative orjudicial proceeding or in any other
official proceeding authorized by law;
(3) in a communication without malice to a person interested
therein by one who is also interested or by one who stands in such
relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground
for supposing the motive for the communication innocent or who is
requested by the person interested to give the information; and
@)by a fair and true report without malice of a judicial,
legislative, or other public official proceeding or of anything said
in the course thereof.
Section 27-l-804(4), "makes a fair and true report without malice of a

judicial proceeding a privileged publication." Coxv. Lee Enters., Inc.,222Mont.
527, 529, 7 23 P.2d 238, 239 -240 ( I 986). In Cox, the Montana Supreme Court held
pursuant to $ 27-l-804(4):
a qualified privilege is available as a defense for a newspaper
publisher in a defamation case when the alleged defamation

consists of facts taken from preliminary judicial pleadings
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which have been filed in court but which have not been

judicially acted upon.
C ox,

23 P.2d at 240. The Court noted the defi nitions of "i udicial
proceedings" include:
7

Any proceeding wherein judicial action is invoked and taken;
[a]ny proceeding to obtain such remedy as the law allows; [a]ny
step taken in a court ofjustice in the prosecution or defense of
an action.

Cox ,723 P.2d at 240 (intemal quotations and citation omitted). The Court also
noted a modern trend ofjurisdictions applying a qualified privilege to reports

of

judicial pleadings which have not yet been the subject ofjudicial action.
Certainly, the administration ofjustice is of utmost imporlance
to the citizenry. While we are aware that pleadings are onesided aad may contain, by design, highly defamatory
statements, we believe the information found in such pleadings
is of sufficient value as to warrant the encourasement of its
publication.

Cox,723 P.2d at240 (citing Newell v. Field Enters., Inc.,4I5 N.E.2d 434, 444

(Ill.

App. 1980) (intemal quotations omitted).
Stacey Mueller is the publisher of the Missoulian, a newspaper owned by Lee

Enterprises. (Foundational Aff. Jeffery B. Smith, Ex. A at !J I (June 21, 2011)

(Dkt. 57-l).) As part of her employment, she currently oversees both the
Missoulian newspaper and the Ravalli Republic newspaper. (Dkt. 57-1, Ex. A at
tl

2.) Ms. Mueller

has personally reviewed the articles published by the Ravalli

Republic which are the subject of Spreadbury's Amended Complaint. These
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articles do not contain opinions from the reporters. Instead, the articles are based

purely on the charges brought against Spreadbury, reporting facts according to

official Ravalli County documents. (Dkt, 57-1, Ex. A at fl

3.)

Pursuant to

$ 27-l-804(4), these articles are privileged and Spreadbury's allegations against

Lee Enterprises fail as a matter of law.

Similarly, Spreadbury is not likely to prevail on his claim of defamation
regarding the comments posted on the Ravalli Republic's website because they
were made by third parties - not Lee Enterprises.
"Section 230 of the CDA [Communications Decency Act] immunizes
providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content
created by third pafties." Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.Com, LLC,521 F.3d 1157,1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Specifically, $ 230(c) provides: "[n]o provider or user ofan interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider." 47 U.S.C. $ 230(c) (1998).

"The CDA is intended to facilitate the use and development of the Intemet by
providing certain services an immunity from civil liability arising from content
provided by others." F.T.C. v. Accusearch lnc.,570 F.3d 1187, 1195 (lOth Cir.

2009). "Absent $ 230,

a person who published or distributed speech over the

Intemet could be held liable for defamation even if he or she was not the author
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of
l

the defamatory text, and, indeed, at least with regard to publishers, even if unaware

of the statement;' Batzelv. Smith,333 F.3d 1018, 1026-1027 (9th Cir. 2003).
Lee Enterprises should be considered an "interactive computer service" as to
the claims that Lee Enterprises published defamatory connrrents about Spreadbury

on the Ravalli Republic website. "Recognizing that the Internet provided

a

valuable and increasingly utilized source of information for citizens, Congress
carved out a sphere of immunity from state lawsuits for providers of interactive

computer services to preserve the "vibrant and competitive free market" of ideas
on the lntemet." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com,

Inc.,59l F.3d

250,254 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing 47 U.S.C. $ 230(bX2)). "Through this provision,
Congress granted most Internet services immunity from liability for publishing
false or defamatory material so long as the information was provided by another

party." Carafano v. Metrosplash.com. \nc.,339 F.3d I I 19,ll22 (9th Cir. 2003).
The term "interactive computer service" means any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer seryer,
including specifically a service or system that provides access
to the Intemet and such systems operated or services offered by
libraries or educational institutions.
47 u.S.C. $ 230(0(2).
The definition of o'interactive computer seryice" includes a wide range
cyberspace services. Carafano,339 F.3d at

ll23 ("reviewing

of

courts have treated

$ 230(c) immunity as quite robust, adopting a relatively expansive definition

of

"interactive computer service"); see e.g. Gentry v. eBay, Inc.,99 Cal. App. 4th
816,831 n.7 (Cal. App.4.Dist.2002) (on-line auction website is an "interactive
computer service"); Schneider y. Amazon.com, Inc.,

App. Div.

1

1

(Wash.

2001) (on-line bookstore Amazon.com is an "interactive computer

service"); see also Ben Ezra, Weinstein,
(

3l P.3d37,40-41

Oth Cir. 2000) (parties conceded that

&

Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980

AOL was an interactive computer service

when it published an on-line stock quotation sewice); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (AOL assumed to be interactive computer service

when it operated bulletin board service for subscribers).

"The prototypical service qualifoing for this statutory immunity is an online
messaging board (or bulletin board) on which Intemet subscribers post comments
and respond to comments posed by others." F.T.C., 570 F.3d at

1

196. In fact,

Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") in response to

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,1995 WL 323710 at *5 (N.Y. Sup.

May 24, 1995), which held a provider of an online message board could be liable
for defamatory statements posted by third parties. [Note: Srratlor was superseded
by statute as stated in Zeran.f See Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at I 163.

Like an online messaging board or bulletin board, the Ravalli Republic
allowed readers to comment on articles published on its website. (Aff. Stacey
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Mueller Support Lee Enterprises' Response Br. Opposition pl.'s Req. Injunctive
Relief fl 3 (Aug. 9,2011), attached as Ex.

A.

The comments Spreadbury claims

were published by the Ravalli Republic werc made by third parties. (Ex. A at flfl 4-

5.) The website acted as an interactive computer service

as defined in the CDA.

Accordingly, Lee Enterprises cannot be liable for comments made by third parties
on their website, and Spreadbury has not shown a likelihood ofsuccess for an

injunction.
In Collins v. Purdue University, the U.S. District Court, N.D. Indiana,
Hammond Division, was recently faced with the question of whether a newspaper
that publishes articles on-line is liable for subsequent comments made about the

articles by third parties. Collins v. Purdue U.,703 F. Supp. 2d 862 (N.D. Ind.

2010). On January 13,2007, Collins,

a Purdue

University student, reported being

assaulted on the Purdue campus. On January 16,2Q07, three days after Collins'
alleged assault another Purdue University student, Wade Steffey, was reported

missing. A search ensued, ending in Steffey's body being found in

a

utility closet

on campus. Police questioned Collins regarding Steffey's death and later charged

Collins with numerous criminal charges based on the results of a polygraph test.
The University's newspaper ran an article regarding the charges brought against

Collins. The article was later published on the newspaper's website which allowed
readers to post comments about the article. Numerous comments were made
r

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l0

resulting in hostile treatment of Collins. Collins,703 F. Supp. 2d at867-869.

Collins brought suit, alleging the University defamed him by publishing the
comments made on the website. The Court dismissed these claims, finding the
newspaper's website was an interactive computer service as defined under the

CDA and immune from liability.
Similar to the Court's analysis in Collins, since Ravalli Republic's website is
considered an interactive computer service as defined under the CDA, Lee
Enterprises cannot be liable for publishing the comments made by third parties
and, consequently, Spreadbury has failed to show a likelihood ofsuccess on his

claim of defamation.
Arguably, the Ravalli Republic could also be considered an information
content provider because it publishes articles on its website. Nevertheless, Ravalli

Republic would still be immune from liability regarding the comments because
they were made by third parties and the Ravalli Republlc did not create or develop
the comments.

"Under the statutory scheme, an 'interactive computer service' qualifies for
immunity so long as it does not also function as an 'information content provider'
for the portion of the statement or publication at issue." Cardano,339 F.3d at

rt23.
Critically, however, $ 230 limits immunity to information
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ll

provided by another information content provider. An
information content provider is defined by the statute to mean
any person or entity that is responsible, in whole in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the
Intemet or any other interactive computer service. The
reference to another information content provider . . .
distinguishes the circumstance in which the interactive
computer service itself meets the definition of information
content provider with respect to the information in question,

Batzel,333 F.3d at
original).

l03l (intemal quotations and citations

omitted) (emphasis in

To clarify,

"[a] website operator can be both a service provider and a
content provider: If it passively displays content that is created
entirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider with
respect to that content. But as to content that is creates itself, or
is "responsible, in whole or in part" for creating or developing,
the website is also a content provider."

Fair Hous. Council,52l F.3d at 1162.
Even though the newspaper provided the article which sparked the allegedly

defamatory cornments, the Ravalli Republic is still immune from liability because

it did not create or develop the posted comments, nor did it encourage the readers
to comment on the articles in a defamatory manner. Collins,703 F. Supp. 2d at

878-879. See Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119 (even ifa party is considered an
information content provider $ 230(c) precludes treatment of

a

publisher if the

information was provided by another information content provider).

" [A] service provider is "responsible" for the development of offensive
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1)

content only

if it in some way specifically

encourages development of what is

offensive about the content." F.T.C.,570 F.3d at 1199; see also Carafano,339
F.3d at 1124 ("Under $ 230(c), therefore, so long as a third party willingly
provides the essential published content, the interactive selice provider receives

full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process.").
Spreadbury has not shown a likelihood of success regarding his claim that
Lee Enterprises defamed him by publishing comments onthe Ravalli Republic

website. Lee Enterprises is immune from liability regarding these comments
because they were made by third parties. (Ex.

A

at fl'lJ

4-5.) Further, Lee

Enterprises did not encourage, create, or otherwise develop the comments made by

third parties. (Ex. A at fl 6.) The Ravalli Republic has not altered or otherwise
edited the comments made by third parties on the Ravalli Republic website. (Ex.
at

lT

7.) The comments were made by third parties

A

and, therefore, Lee Enterprises

is immune from liability under the CDA.

Finally, Count 23 of Spreadbury's Amended Complaint is a request for civil
arrest of Lee Enterprises' employee and reporter, Perry Backus, per Montana Code

Annotated $ 27-16-102(2). However, Spreadbury is not likely to prevail on this

portion ofhis claim for injunctive relief, since S 27-16-102(2) gives Spreadbury no
authority to civilly arrest anyone. Clearly, Spreadbury is not likely to prevail on
his claims and his request for injunctive relief should be denied.
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13

B.

Spreadbury Is Not Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm.

Spreadbury's request for injunctive reliefshould be denied, since he has
failed to show a likelihood of prevailing on his claims. Furthermore, Spreadbury
has not shown he

will not likely suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary

injunction. "Our frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking
preliminary reliefto demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of
an injunction . .

.;

see also

llA

C. Wright, A. Miller,

& M.

Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure $ 2948.1,p. 139 (2d ed.l995) . . . (applicant must
demonstrate that in the absence of a preliminary injunction, 'the applicant is likely

to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered'); , . .
'lssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is
inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary
remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled

to such relief. Mazurekv. Armstrong,520 U.S. 968,972, 117 S. Ct. 1865, 138

L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) (per curiam). VYinter,555 U.S. at 22. "[A] preliminary
injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote
future

injury." Winter,555 U.S. at22 (intemal quotation
Spreadbury has failed to show he

and citation omitted).

will likely suffer irreparable harm if

a

preliminary injunction is not granted. Spreadbury seeks an injunctive relief". . . to
stop defamation of character from Defendant Lee Enterprises Inc . . ." (Dkt. 70 at

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14

2.) However, Spreadbury

will occur if

does not provide any claim of irreparable harm which

the preliminary injunction is not granted. Instead, Spreadbury simply

states the standard in his Amended Complaint, without any supporting factual

allegations to show he

will suffer irreparable harm ifthe injunction

is not granted.

Furthermore, as stated above, it appears Spreadbury is requesting the Court
restrain Lee Enterprises from publishing something it already published.

"An

injunction will not issue to restrain an act already committed." Mustang Holdings,

fl

15 (intemal quotation and citation

omitted). "Injunction is not an appropriate

remedy to procure relief for past injuries, it is to afford preventive relief only."

Mustang, !l 15 (intemal quotation and citation omitted). Spreadbury has presented
no factual support that Lee Enterprises

will likely publish

subsequent articles

and/or comments, and, making an assumption on alleged past acts is insufficient to
show Spreadbury is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the future.

"[A]

preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some
remote future

injury." Winter,555 U.S. at22 (inlemal quotation

and citation

omitted). Since Spreadbury has not shown he will suffer irreparable harm if

a

preliminary injunction is not granted, his request should be denied.

C.

The Balance of Eguities Does Not Tip in Spreadbury's Favor.
and an Injunction Is Not in the Public's Interest.

Spreadbury's request for injunctive relief should be denied because he has
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l5

not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim and has not shown he

will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction

is not granted. Further, the

balance of equities tips in favor of Lee Enterprises, not Spreadbury, and the
requested injunctive relief is not in the public's best interest.

"In issuing an injunction, the court must balance the equities between the
parties and give due regard to the public interest." High Siena Hikers Ass'n v.

Moore,56l F. Supp. 2d 1107,1 I 12 (N.D. Cal. 2008). "ln

each case, courts 'must

balance the competing claims of injury and consider the effect on each party of the

granting or withholding of the requested relief,"' paying particular attention to the

public consequences. U. S. v. Ariz.,703 F. Supp. 2d980,1007 (D. Ariz.2010),

affd, 641F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 201 1) (intemal citation omitted). "In exercising their
sound discretion, courts ofequity should pay particular regard for the public
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction." Winter, 555

U.S. at 24 (quoting lVeinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)

(intemal quotation omitted)); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego,,706 F. Supp. 2d
1065, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2010) affd, F.3d

201l). "[T]he

_,

less certain the district court is

201 1

WL 2400779 (9th Cir. June 9,

ofthe likelihood ofsuccess on the

merits, the more plaintiffs must convince the district court that the public interest
and balance of hardships tip in their favor." Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v.

Winter,645 F. Supp. 2d841,847 (C.D. Cal.2007) (internal quotation and citation
t029E82

lo

omitted).
The balance of equities in this matter tip in favor of Lee Enterprises and it

would not serve the public interest to grant Spreadbury's requested injunctive

relief. In Cell Assocs., Inc.

v. Natl. Instit. of Health, Dept of Health, Educ.

&

Welfare,579F.2d 1115(9thCir. 1978),theNinthCircuitdeniedplaintiffsrequest
for a preliminary injrurction in part, because on the balancing of the equities-the
public and medical community were better served by free distribution of

information. Similarly, here, the balancing of the equities tips in favor of Lee
Enterprises and it betters serves the public to allow Lee Enterprises to publish

privileged information. As provided above, Spreadbury claims Lee Enterprises
defamed him by publishing articles about the criminal trespass charges brought
against him, which were subsequently dropped by the City, and by publishing
comments made by third parties on Ravalli Republic's website. (Dkt. 1-1 at
flU 181-189.) However, Spreadbury fails to recognize the articles were privileged.

Section 27-l-804(4), "makes a fair and true report without malice of

a

judicial

proceeding a privileged publication." Cox,723 P.2d a|239-240. The articles
published about Spreadbury were privileged because they contain no opinions

from the reporters. Instead, the articles are based purely on the charges brought
against Spreadbury, reporting facts according to official Ravalli County

documents. (Dkt. 57-1, Ex. at fl 3.) Likewise, the comments published on the
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17

Ravalli Republrc's website were made by third parties, not Lee Enterprises. As
such, Lee Enterprises is immune from

liability.

See Barnes v. Yahoo!,

Inc., 570

F.3d 1096, 1099-1102 (9th Cir. 2009); Fair Hous. Council,52l F.3d at 1173-1174;
Miles v. Raycom Media, [nc.,2010 WL 3419438, slip op. at**2-3 (S.D. Miss.
Aug. 26, 2010) (citing Collins,2010 WL 1250916 at*14). It obviously serves the
public to immunize Lee Enterprise from liability for comments made on their
website by third parties, since this was Congress' purpose behind $ 230 of the

CDA.
In balancing the equities, the scale should tip heavily in favor

oflee

Enterprises, not Spreadbury, since granting the injunction would prevent Lee
Enterprises from publishing privileged information and would be in direct

contradiction to the purpose of $ 230 of the CDA. Obviously, the public would not
be served by such an order as they would be precluded from the information,

which newspapers are privileged to publish. Accordingly, Spreadbury's request

for iniunctive relief should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Spreadbury is not entitled to injunctive

relief. Spreadbury

has not

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his defamation claim.
Spreadbury has actually failed to state a sufficient claim upon which reliefcan be

ro2e882

l8

granted. Even ifhe had, Spreadbury is not likely to succeed on his defamation
claim because the articles published by Lee Enterprises were privileged and the
comments were made by third parties. Spreadbury has also not shown a likelihood

ofsuffering irreparable harm in the absence ofpreliminary relief, and the balance
of equities tips in favor of Lee Enterprises, not Spreadbury. As such, Spreadbury's
request for injunctive relief should be denied.

DATED this 9th day of August, 201L

lsl

Jeffrey B. Smith
Attornevs for Defendant. Lee Entemrises. Inc.

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l9

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to L.R. 7. 1(dX2XE), I

cetify

that this Defendant Lee Enterprises,

Inc.'s Response Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff

s

First Request for Injunctive

Relief is printed with proportionately spaced Times New Roman text typeface of

l4 points;

is double-spaced; and the word count, calculated by Microsoft Office

Word 2007, is 4,141 words long, excluding Caption, Certificate of Service and
Ceni fi cate of Compliance.

DATED this 9th day of August, 201

1.

lsl

Jeffrey B. Smith
Attornevs for Defendant. Lee Enterorises. Inc.

l029EE2

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certi$, that on August 9,2011, a copy ofthe foregoing document
was served on the following persons by the following means:

1.3
2

CM/ECF
Hand Delivery

Mail
Ovemight Delivery Service
Fax
E-Mail

l.

Clerk, U.S. District Court

2

Michael E. Spreadbury
P.O. Box 416
Hamilton, MT 59840
Pro Se Plaintiff

3.

William L. Crowley
Natasha Prinzing Jones
Thomas J. Leonard
bcrowley@boonekarlberg. com
npj ones@boonekarlberg. com
[e-mail]
Attorneys for Defendants Bitterroot Public Library, City of Hamilton, and
Boone Karlbere. P.C.

lsl

Jeffrey B. Smith
Attomeys for Defendant, Lee Enterprises, Inc.

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2l